STUDIES IN SEMITIC
LANGUAGES AND LINGUISTICS

GREEK ELEMENTS
IN ARABIC
LINGUISTIC THINKING

BY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

'... that most irksome and difficult part of literature, with
so much labour of the memory, and with so little assis-
tance of the understanding.'[1]

There are two ways of studying the historiography of linguistics:
either you stress the continuity of the history of linguistics and bring
out the essential similarities between geographically and chronologi-
cally diverse approaches to the study of speech, or you treat every
approach as an individual and unique phenomenon without bothering
with parallels. The former method was used by Chomsky in his
'Cartesian linguistics', and it brought him a lot of criticism from both
historians and linguists.[2] The latter, more or less philological, form
of the historiography of linguistics seemed to have gone out of use,
but there appears to be a revival in recent times: congresses, collec-
tions of studies, a special journal.[3] Within this new wave of interest
in the history of linguistics Arabic linguistics does not seem to have
received its full share, neither from general linguists, nor from Ara-
bists;[4] it is rather frustrating to read that 'curiously enough, the
Arabs seem to have contributed nothing to the study of language
comparable to the additions and improvements they made in mathe-

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[1] Robert Lowth, Introduction to English grammar, London, 1762; ed. Alston, 1967,
no. 18, preface.

[2] Chomsky, 1966. From the many reviews and discussions pro or contra we cite:
Aarsleff, 1970, especially pp. 571-2; id., 1974; Koerner, 1976; Miel, 1969; reviews in:
Linguistics, 49, 1969, 74-91 (Brekle; the same review in: Linguistische Berichte, 1, 1969,
52-66); Archív Orientálni, 36, 1968, 484-5 (Zgusta); International Journal of American
Linguistics, 34, 1968, 290-303 (Zimmer); Philosophical Review, 77, 1968, 229-35 (Har-
man); Language, 45, 1969, 343-64 (Lakoff).

[3] Congresses about the history of linguistics were held in 1964 at Burg Wartenstein
bei Gloggnitz in Austria, and in 1968 in Chicago; the thirteenth volume of the series
'Current trends in linguistics', edited by H. Aarsleff, R. Austerlitz, D. Hymes, L. Romeo,
E. Stankiewicz will be dedicated to the historiography of linguistics; a collection of
studies about the history of linguistics with special attention to the relevance of Kuhn's
theories for the historiography of linguistics was edited by Hymes, 1974; in his introduc-
tion to this collection Hymes announces the appearance of a new journal, Historio-
graphia Linguistica, under the editorship of E. F. K. Koerner (cf. ib. pp. 20-1), which is
now in its third year; an important collection of original articles has been edited by
Parret, 1976.

[4] The only comprehensive history of Arabic grammar is still G. Flügel's Die
grammatischen Schulen der Araber, the first and only part of which was published in
Leipzig, 1862.

matics, astronomy, physics, medicine, and natural history'.[5] The history of classical grammar is treated somewhat better, although not much.[6]

The special problem of the relationship between Greek and Arabic linguistic thinking is almost completely disregarded: reference is made almost solely to the supposed similarities between Aristotelian logic and Arabic grammar. The theory that Aristotle provided the Arabic grammarians with some basic notions concerning speech and the study of speech has been advanced before, especially in the past century, and it met then as now with the seemingly unrefutable objection that the origin of Arabic linguistics lies before the introduction of Greek writing into the Arabic world. Our thesis is that Greek logic (not just Peripatetic, but Stoic logic as well) did play a considerable role in the history of Arabic linguistic thinking, but only at a later time, during the 9th/3rd and the 10th/4th centuries, when the center of Arabic linguistics had been transferred to Baghdad. The beginnings of Arabic grammar, on the other hand, are characterized by the direct, personal contact with living Greek education and grammar in the recently conquered Hellenistic countries.[7]

We hold that in this early period many elements of linguistic theory, especially in the field of paradigms and terminology, were borrowed from Greek by those Arabic scholars who started to describe their own language scientifically.[8] When we use here the word 'borrowing' (or sometimes *calque*) we use the technical apparatus of the study of 'christianisms' in Greek and Latin. The study of borrowings has reached such a level in this field that it may have a special methodological relevance for the study of borrowings from Greek into Arabic.[9]

The chapters of our dissertation are arranged according to a rough chronology. The first four chapters discuss Greek elements in the first

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[5] J.C. Greene, in Hymes, 1974, 494.

[6] A brief, but useful state of the art in Scaglione, 1970, 11-43.

[7] General studies about the history of the relevant period: Byzantine history: Ostrogorsky, 1963[3]; Vasiliev, 1935-68; id., 1970[2]; Arabic history: Spuler, 1952-3; Gabrieli, 1965; Brockelmann, 1974[2]; Hitti, 1968[9]. About the problem of the contacts between the Byzantine empire and the Arabic East: Kraemer, 1959.

[8] We use the word 'scientifically' in order to distinguish between the activities of Sîbawaihi and his immediate predecessors on the one hand, and the obscure origins of Arabic grammar at a pre-scientific stage on the other; cf. the discussion in chapter I.

[9] Cf. Mohrmann, 1961[2], especially the articles 'Quelques traits charactéristiques du latin des Chrétiens' (21-50); 'L'étude de la latinité chrétienne. État de la question, méthodes, résultats' (83-102); 'Le problème du vocabulaire chrétien. Expériences d'évangélisation paléo-chrétiennes et modernes' (113-22); about *calques*: ib. 44 sqq.; 280 sqq.

stages of Arabic grammar. Chapter I gives a brief sketch of the historical context of the process of Greek influence on Arabic grammar. The next three chapters deal with the various Greek elements we have found within this first stage: in the field of sound, articulation, and meaning (chapter II); in the theory of the parts of speech, declension, verbal tenses, and so on (chapter III); in the methodology of grammar, i.e., in the system of norms of linguistic method (chapter IV). Chapter V deals with the position of the two schools of Baṣra and Kūfa in the history of Arabic linguistics.

Chapter VI and VII are concerned with a later stage, when Greek writings had begun to play a more indirect role, through their translations into Arabic: their influence was felt not only in grammar, but also in logic and philosophy. In chapter VI we sketch the historical context; then we examine in detail the logical arguments used in grammatical literature, in so far as they can be traced back to Greek influence (chapter VII). Chapter VIII discusses the role of the Mu'tazila, an important sect in the history of Muslim theology. The Mu'tazilites are characterized by their liberal use of Greek dialectic methods in defense of their theological dogmas, the most important of which was a rigorous monotheism. They should not be regarded as a group of free-thinking liberals, on the contrary, when their point of view gained official support under the 'Abbāsid caliphs from 833/218 till 850/236, they took a very intolerant stance on contrary opinions.[10] They are interesting for our purpose mainly because of their use of logical methods, and their particular views on speech and thinking. In chapter IX we discuss the theories concerning the origin of speech, a comparatively recent topic in Arabic linguistics. In chapter X, we examine the role of Stoic linguistics, especially in the theory of meaning.

Originally, the essential part of this dissertation was a translation of the work of a tenth century grammarian of Baghdad, namely the *Īḍāḥ fī 'ilal an-naḥw* (Explanation of grammatical norms) by Abū 'l-Qāsim 'Abd ar-Raḥmān ibn Isḥāq az-Zaǧǧāǧī.[11] We have abandoned this plan, but its traces are still discernible throughout our dissertation in the form of the many quotations from the *Īḍāḥ*, which turned out to be a very useful work on Arabic linguistics, not because of

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[10] Cf. about this period: Patton, 1897; Gabrieli, 1929; about the Mu'tazila: Nader, 1956.

[11] Data about this Arabic grammarian in the introduction to the edition of the *Īḍāḥ* by M. Mubārak, Cairo, 1959.

the originality of the author, but because of his personal acquaintance with most of the important Baghdadian grammarians.[12] Often we have not been able to trace a particular point of linguistic doctrine back to its first occurence; in these cases we have contented ourselves with quotations from the *Īḍāḥ*, or we have had to rely on even later authority, more than once as late as Suyūṭī, a fifteenth century compiler, who wrote his *Muzhir* by quoting extensively from all sorts of grammatical and lexicographical writings. The necessity of combining the two disciplines of Classical and Arabic studies caused some rather long discussions: we tried to make the context comprehensible for both disciplines, but we fully understand that the digressions are often tediously self-evident to the specialist in either field.

In translating Arabic and Greek terminology we have generally used current English equivalents, not as a matter of principle, but in order to make the discussion somewhat more readable; a few exceptions to this custom are mentioned in the following note.[13] Details about the abbreviations used in references and quotations are given in the bibliography at the end of the book.[14]

In my view it is difficult, given the present condition of our sources, to determine beyond any reasonable doubt the extent of Greek influence in Arabic grammar, as far as the scientific beginnings of Arabic grammar are concerned—for later periods we have the translations of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* as a textual basis at our disposal. At most

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[12] As he himself tells us, Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 78-80.

[13] One should keep in mind that the English terms are not synonymous with the Arabic terms, e.g. 'declension' translates *i'rāb*; 'nominative' represents *raf*. In a few cases we have used the Arabic term, when no English term was available, e.g. *alif*, *maṣdar* (for obvious reasons the English 'infinitive' could not be used). In other cases a Latin term was used, e.g. 'nominatum' (for *musammā*). In accordance with Arabic grammatical theories the concept of 'declension' has sometimes been applied to the verbs, so that verbs may be said to be declinable and to have cases. For *ǧazm* we have chosen 'jussive'. 'Inflection' translates *ṣarf* or *taṣrīf*. One should always keep in mind that *ism* and *fi'l* have two meanings: 'noun' / 'name' and 'verb' / 'action', respectively. The third part of speech, *ḥarf*, is the '(meaningful) particle'; *ḥarf* as against *ḥaraka* (vowel) is sometimes translated as 'consonant', but in other cases we preferred to translate this term with 'letter'. Added words in quotations are between brackets; explanations are introduced by 'sc.'; the other abbreviations will be obvious. Greek proper names are transliterated, except 'Plato' and 'Aristotle'; Latin proper names are used in their Latin form. The system of transliteration of Arabic is almost identical to that of *Arabica* (exceptions: *ai* instead of *ay*; the assimilation of the *ḥurūf šamsiyya* is indicated, as well as the *hamzat al-waṣl*).

[14] In quoting from the *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* we have used two systems for ease of reference: either three figures, referring to volume, page, line; or two figures, referring to volume and fragment.

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we can show the probability of a connection between Arabic and Greek linguistic thinking. I am fully aware of the fact that details of my explanation of the phenomena and terminology of Arabic grammar, which form the basis of my argumentation, are perhaps consistent with alternative explanations. I have, however, tried to define the historical context within which I place my explanations, and this, I believe, justifies my bringing together these arguments and regarding them as sufficient support for my case, even though I am also aware of the high risk of a vicious circle : starting from the assumption that there was contact between Greek and Arabic grammar, I was, of course, continuously tempted to regard something as proof precisely because of my original thesis. I have taken this line of research, because up till now there has been hardly any serious attempt to put together materials from later Greek grammar and Arabic linguistic thinking. I have tried to collect these materials and to compare them, even if the comparison seemed sometimes far-fetched or tivial. Perhaps these materials will be useful, even if the original thesis should have to be modified.

Historiography of linguistics is a dangerous field of research, in which anachronistic thinking is very tempting. I have, however, refrained from any commentary on similarities and parallels between Arabic linguistic theory and contemporary linguistics, and only tried to present the facts as I saw them, without subscribing either to a relativist or an evolutionist point of view. The historiography of linguistics has not yet begun, or rather, has not yet proceeded beyond a first exploration of the facts. What we need now is a methodology, and a critical reflection on the historical growth of linguistics. We may expect that in this sense the historiography of linguistics will contribute, not so much to the solution of the problems of our discipline, as to the formulation of the relevant questions.

N.B.   The abbreviations A and G refer to the original texts included on pp. 209 ff. The former abbreviation indicates an Arabic text, the latter a Greek one.

THE FIRST CONTACT WITH GREEK GRAMMAR

'This science is called in Greek *ǧarmāṭīqī*, and in Arabic *naḥw*'.[1]

It is nowadays generally agreed that learned Arabs in a good many branches of science were influenced by their Greek predecessors, but a restriction is made for the so-called pure Arabic sciences, such as the science of tradition and linguistics. This view is partly based on the Arabic tradition: a good example of the traditional account of the history of linguistics is the one given by Ibn Ḥaldūn, who explains how the science of linguistics was born from the necessity to prevent the corruption of the Arabic language.[2] Our intention is to show that a claim for Greek influence may be made for Arabic linguistics as well, and that, as a matter of fact, this influence followed the same course in linguistics as, for instance, in the field of logic and philosophy. This means that we have to distinguish between a direct and an indirect way of transmission, the first one of which was earlier than the second. In the first place we must direct our attention to the origin of Arabic linguistics in order to demonstrate which elements in this phase were the result of direct contact between Arabic grammarians and Hellenistic culture in many of the conquered territories; in the second, we must show how later developments may be explained by the growing influence of Arabic translations of the works of Aristotle and his commentators.

All over the eastern Hellenistic world, in every place of any cultural standing, the Greek language was being used, at first as a sort of lingua franca for the cultured people—the lower strata of the community continued to speak Aramaic dialects (e.g. Syriac) or Coptic—,[3] but soon there arose independent cultural centres, the importance of

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[1] Ḥwār. Maf. 42, 13 [A1].

[2] b. Ḥald. Muq., 546-7; cf. also Fück, 1955², 6 sqq.; Weiß, 1910, 349-50.

[3] Cf. e.g. Festugière, 1959, 291 sqq.: several monks did not even understand Greek (4th century). For the situation in Egypt we refer to note 16 below. About the political situation in the Byzantine empire and the hostility towards the central government in the Eastern provinces: Stratos, 1968.

which grew as the power of Greece itself declined. Alexandria in Egypt and Antioch in Syria were among the most important ones,[4] but in a later period the number of cities with their own universities and educational systems increased, partly as a result of the competition between the various Christian sects, for instance in the Nestorian East Edessa and Nisibis,[5] and later, in the Persian empire, the famous school of Ğundi-Šāpūr near Kūfa, a refuge for scholars of other universities who had had to flee because of their heretical opinions. The Persian emperor Ḥosroes Anuširvān (d. 587 A.D.) gave shelter at his court to those philosophers who were without a job after Justinian had closed the Athenian academy (in 529 A.D.), among them even the great Simplikios![6] In these centres of culture and science, Greek philosophy was studied and Greek writings were translated into Syriac and Persian.[7] It was in this region, near Ğundi-Šāpūr, and not in the neighbourhood of the Umayyad court at Damascus, that the first signs of Greek influence appeared. The first juridical speculations,[8] and the nature of the first Mu'tazilite debates about the creation of the Qur'ān, the problem of free will, and the doctrine concerning the attributes of Allāh:[9] all these issues bear witness to the contact between the two cultures in various fields, before the 'official' translation of Greek writings. Muslims and Christians were forced to live together, and so, inevitably, Greek knowledge was communicated to the East before the indirect transmission began.[10] We will try to show that this first contact played a considerable role in the field of logic and linguistics.

[4] On Alexandria: Meyerhof, 1930; Schemmel, 1909; Parsons, 1952; Meyerhof, 1933; Bell, 1946. On Antioch: Downey, 1966[2].

[5] On the Eastern church and its influence on Islam: Bell, 1926. About Edessa: Duval, 1892; Segal, 1970; Hayes, 1930; Furlani, 1937. About Nisibis: Vööbus, 1962; Hermann, 1926.

[6] Agathias, II, 30.

[7] There is an interesting statement in the chronography of Abū 'Īsā ibn al-Munağğim (3rd/10th century; Sezgin, 1967, 1, 322) that under the reign of the Sassanid king Šāpūr (241-272 A.D.) the Persians conquered Greek and Roman provinces, such as Upper Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, Constantinople (sic!), and that they took 'the books of the philosophers'. King Šāpūr even received, according to this account, Greek scientific books from the Roman emperor (Islamic philosophy, 1972, 437-66, especially p. 454); cf. Peters, 1968, 46.

[8] On traces of Greek logic and Roman law in early Muslim legal thought: van Ess, 1970, 33 and n. 59; Schacht, 1950[b]. Cf. below, chapter IV, note 53.

[9] On the polemic of Byzantine theologians against Islam: Khoury, 1969[2]; Krumbacher, 1897[3], 49-51. The influence of the Church fathers on Islamic theological thinking is emphasized by Seale, 1964; cf. also van Ess' remarks, 1966, 18-20.

[10] de Lacy O'Leary, 1949, 142; also pp. 68, 143; Daif, 1968, 21.

The Hellenistic universities not only gave courses in Greek philosophy, but also in the Greek language, which as the most important instrument and medium of teaching, constituted a compulsory subject for every student of philosophy.[11] For a long time the language of education remained Greek, but in the East Syriac gradually took its place. At the end of the 4th century a Spanish nun Egeria, who made a pelgrimage to the Holy Land, observed that only part of the population spoke both Greek and Syriac, the rest spoke only one of the two languages.[12] Bilingualism was probably restricted to the upper classes, but sometimes even a bishop only began to study Greek at an advanced age.[13] Greek exercised an enormous influence upon Syriac —many loanwords, the system of the vowel-signs,[14] even the literary style—, but Syriac remained in use as the language of the lower classes. After the invasion of the Arabs, it became more important as the intermediary language between Greek and Arabic: translations were made first from Greek into Syriac, and then from Syriac into Arabic. This shows that the study of Greek did not disappear; on the contrary, it became more important than ever to have at one's disposal trained translators who could provide the students with translations of Greek philosophical writings.[15] In Egypt, although even among the clergy many people, even bishops, did not understand Greek,[16] this language remained in use as the language of educated

[11] Georr, 1948, 10.

[12] *Itinerarium Aetheriae* (*Egeriae*), ed. H. Pétré. Paris, 1948 (Sources Chrétiennes): '... and in that province (sc. Syria) only part of the populations knows both Greek and Syriac; others only Greek, and still others only Syriac; the bishop, therefore, always speaks Greek, never Syriac, even if he knows it. There is always a priest nearby, who translates what the bishop says in Greek into Syriac, so that everyone may hear the argument'. (*et quoniam in ea provincia pars populi et graece et siriste novit, pars etiam alia per se graece, aliqua etiam pars tantum siriste, itaque quoniam episcopus, licet siriste noverit, tamen semper graece loquitur, et numquam siriste: itaque ergo stat semper presbyter, qui, episcopo graece dicente, siriste interpretatur, ut omnes audiant, quae exponuntur*) (cap. 47, pp. 261-2).

[13] *S. Ephraemi Syri Rabbulae Episcopi Edesseni ... opera selecta*, ed. J. Overbeck, Oxford, 1866, 160. On Greek Hellenism in the Eastern provinces: Liebermann, 1960[2]; Peeters, 1950.

[14] Cf. Segal, 1953 (Jacob of Edessa's innovations: pp. 37-47). Greek loanwords in Syriac: Schall, 1960.

[15] de Lacy O'Leary, 1949, 71-2.

[16] Cf. Mitteis/Wilcken, 1912, pp. 87-8: during the Byzantine period Coptic gradually penetrated into public life; increasingly few people understood Greek, for instance, the bishop of Hermonthis, Abraham (± 600 A.D.), who had to dictate his testament in Coptic. In Arabic times the decline of the Greek language may be deduced from the language of the papyri (ib. p. 91); cf. Peeters, 1950, 12-5; 27-32.

people; at the Alexandrian university, medical courses were always given in Greek.

It is significant that Greek materials remained available. Until the reign of the caliph 'Abd al-Malik (685/66-705/87) Greek remained the language of the administration and the tax-register (*diwān*) in Damascus.[17] As late as the 10th/4th century we find the historian Ḥamza al-Iṣfāhānī (d. 961/350) using directly Greek historical materials concerning the Byzantine emperors with the help of a Greek-speaking servant at the court in Iṣfāhān.[18] But, of course, it cannot be denied that Greek rapidly lost its significance as a medium of communication, and that the number of commentaries on the works of Aristotle in Greek decreased.

All the same, there were still people who had studied Greek according to the rules of Greek grammatical tradition, which had been formulated by many authors, beginning with Dionysios Thrax ($\pm$ 170 - $\pm$ 90 B.C.). At that time, Greek grammatical tradition was actually the only source of grammatical knowledge and study. The *Téchnè* of Dionysios Thrax was translated at an early date into Syriac, according to the Nestorian tradition by Joseph of Ahwāz, who died before 580 A.D.[19] Quite fundamental was the work of Jacob of Edessa, who seems to have had a lasting influence on later generations of Syrian grammarians.[20] Some of these Syrian scholars studied Greek in Alexandria, for instance Sergios of Reš'ainā (d. 536 A.D.), who wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Categoriae*, and a treatise about the parts of speech,[21] and also the aforementioned Joseph of Ahwāz and Jacob of Edessa. We may, therefore, safely assume that there were translators with a good or reasonable knowledge of the Greek language far into Arabic times.[22] We may also assume that, unwittingly, the work of these translators and their methods were dominated by Greek linguistic methods, terminology, and categories. Thanks to these translators, a tradition was built up during a period of a few centuries, which served

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[17] Hitti, 1968[9], 217, and the anecdotic account with Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, ed. Riḍwān, Miṣr, 1959, 196-7: according to Balāḏurī the *naql ad-dīwān* took place in 700/81; the reason was that a Greek clerk had urinated in an ink-pot!

[18] Ḥamza, *Ta'rīḫ*, ed. Gottwaldt, St. Petersburg/Leipzig, 1844-48, (Baġdād, 1961) 70, 11 (*min lafẓ ar-rūmī*), cf. Wakī''s sources, ib. 68, 4-5; cf. Rosenthal, 1968[2], 74, n. 1; also pp. 91; 136-7.

[19] Merx, 1889, 9; Baumstark, 1968[2], 116-7; 222; Georr, 1948, 5, n. 1.

[20] Merx, 1889, 34-101; Baumstark, 1968[2], 248-56; Baumstark/Rücker, 1964, 191-2.

[21] On Sergios: Merx, 1889, 6; Baumstark, 1968[2], 167-9; Georr, 1948, 17 sqq.; cf. b. a. Uṣaibi'a, I, 109; 185-9; 204.

[22] Peters, 1968, 58.

as the foundation for the development of Arabic grammar. The story of the first Syriac translations of Greek writings has already been told several times, and we refer to the accounts by Baumstark and others.[23]

Returning to the origins of Arabic linguistics we may summarize them as follows. The different accounts about the first Baṣrian grammarian, Abū 'l-Aswad ad-Du'alī (d. 688/69?), emphasize that his primary intention in 'inventing the art of grammar' was to prevent the corruption of the Arabic language in the mouths of the illiterate and the neophytes, especially, of course, where the text of the Qur'ān was at stake.[24]

A careful study of the sources reveals that, whatever the differences may be in details, they always connect the names of ad-Du'alī and of the fourth caliph 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 660/40) with the *waḍ' an-naḥw*.[25] We do believe, therefore, that the tradition should be given credit, at least in the main point, namely that grammar was invented in order to save the Qur'ān from corruption. Wild's objection that there are hardly any quotations from the Qur'ān in the oldest lexicographical work, the *Kitāb al-'ain*, and that grammarians were not regarded as particularly religious scholars, is not valid, since it is based on later data.[26] Moreover, the development of lexicography should not be connected with the development of grammar. It is only natural for the early lexicographers to be interested more in rare words from classical poetry than in the comparatively normal vocabulary of the Qur'ān. The most important argument in favour of ad-Du'alī's activities is the unanimity of the sources about the fact that he was inspired by the necessity to correct the various versions of the Qur'ān and to put a stop to the corruption of speech. As a matter of fact, it is typical of almost every grammar to be used originally as a means to preserve ancient or sacred literature, for instance, the Homeric epic in Greece, the Vedas in India, the sagas in Icelandic literature, and the Confucian texts in China.[27] The reason is, of course, that as the traditional texts

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[23] Baumstark, 1968[2] (1922); 1900; Baumstark/Rücker, 1964, 168-204; Duval, 1907[3]; Georr, 1948; Klinge, 1939; Huby, 1969. Recent synthesis: Rosenthal, 1965.

[24] Semaan, 1968, 21 sqq.; Ḍaif, 1968, 13 sqq.; cf. the version of the story in Zaǧǧ: Id. 89, 3-12.

[25] Mubārak, 1974[3], 10-37, gives a detailed analysis of the different accounts; he concludes that the fundamental facts of the story are correctly transmitted by the Arabic sources.

[26] Wild, 1965, pp. 5-6.

[27] On Greece: Steinthal, 1890[2], 1, 28-9; 1891[3], 2, 71 sqq. On India: Renou, 1940,

remained the same, and the colloquial language gradually changed, the danger arose of misunderstanding the (sacred) meaning of the old texts.

The corruption of speech in ad-Du'alī's time consisted mostly in a confusion of the case-endings. This explains why we find Abū 'l-Aswad mainly concerned with two problems: in the first place punctuation and the creation of a vowel-orthography—which he borrowed from the Syriac script—;[28] and in the second place the study of the *fā'il*, the *maf'ūl*, and the *muḍāf ilaihi* (or the *raf'*, the *naṣb*, and the *ġarr*), i.e., the case-endings.[29] The 'discovery' of the cases may well have originated with ad-Du'alī; the terminology was probably interpolated by later grammarians, who applied the grammatical terms of their own time to ad-Du'alī.

As for 'Alī's role: he is said to have instructed Abū 'l-Aswad as follows: 'Language is noun and verb and particle; noun is what gives information about the nominatum; verb is that by which information is given; particle is what comes to a meaning'.[30] We do not know if there is any truth at all in this tradition; maybe we should ascribe it to Šī'ite partisanship, as Nöldeke does, with the traditions about 'Alī having been the first to collect fragments of the Qur'ān.[31] We certainly do not know whether this story may be connected with Greek influence—not even when we find 'Alī using at least one Greek word, namely the word *qālūn* (i.e., Greek *kalón*, 'good!'), in normal

1, 1, 7; Misra, 1966, 17-8. On Iceland: Gordon, 1957[2], XLIV sqq. On China: Karlgren, 1926, 47; 63 sqq.

[28] Semaan, 1968, 11 sqq. This is confirmed by the fact that the Syriac name for the vowel 'a' (Arabic *fatḥa*), *ptāḥā* already existed at the time of its supposed invention by ad-Du'alī; cf. Tarazi, 1969, 115. Later Arabs were aware of this Syriac influence, cf. Semaan, 1968, 18, n. 2. On the vocalization in early Arabic manuscripts: G. Bergsträßer/ O. Pretzl, in: Nöldeke/Schwally, 1961[2], III, *Die Geschichte des Korāntexts*, pp. 261-69, where different traditions about the invention of the vocalic signs are mentioned as well.

[29] 'He laid down the chapter of the doer and of whom it is done to' (*fa-waḍa'a bāb al-fā'il wa-'l-maf'ūl*), Sir. Aḥb. 18, 10; 'he (sc. 'Alī) pointed out to him (sc. Abū 'l-Aswad) the nominative, the accusative, and the genitive' (*aśāra lahu ilā 'r-raf' wa-'n-naṣb wa-'l-ġarr*), Abū 'ṭ-Ṭayyib al-Luġawī, *Marātib an-naḥwiyyīn*, ed. M.A. Ibrāhīm, Qāhira, 1954, 6, 13-4; the question whether or not declension still existed in spoken Arabic at this time is irrelevant to this point of view, since what matters is, whether grammarians were convinced of the necessity of preserving the correct declensional endings. About this question: Fück, 1955[2], 1-5; 8-10, and the critical remarks of Spitaler (Bibliotheca Orientalis, 10, 1953, 144 sqq.) and Wehr (ZDMG, 102, 1952, 179-86).

[30] b. Anb. Nuzha, 4, 9-11 [A2], cf. below, chapter III A.

[31] 'An alledem ist kein wahres Wort': Nöldeke/Schwally, 1961[3], II, 8-11; cf. Wild, 1965, p. 5, n. 20.

conversation.[32] If we were able to go further back into the history of Arabic linguistics, and if we had reliable information about the way grammar was taught previously to al-Ḫalīl (d. 791/175) and Sībawaihi (d. 793/177), we could perhaps extend our conclusions concerning Greek influence to the first period of Arabic linguistics, but given the present state of knowledge this is impossible.

About the period following on Abū 'l-Aswad's activities information is almost completely absent, except for a few names of authors and titles of books, but at the time of al-Ḫalīl and Sībawaihi, about a century after Abū 'l-Aswad, we find an Arabic grammar that has reached a high stage of perfection. Nothing is left of al-Ḫalīl's own writings: the *Kitāb al-'ain*, the first lexicographical work of Arabic literature, was certainly not compiled by him alone, although he seems to have invented the system of arranging the radicals and the phonetic principles underlying this arrangement. His phonetic theories are probably due to Indian influence, and maybe we must also reckon with Syrian influence.[33] Ḫalīl's grammatical writings are lost, but according to Reuschel the grammatical system which is found in Sībawaihi's *Kitāb* is to a substantial degree Ḫalīl's.[34] It does not seem very probable *a priori* that this balanced system with its advanced terminology should be the result of a natural development in the course of less than one century. It has been objected that Sībawaihi lived too early to have undergone the influence of the translations of Greek writings; this is even more the case with al-Ḫalīl. But, true though it is, this argument cannot be used in favour of the independence of Arabic grammar, since there is another factor to be reckoned with. Everything points to the fact that these first real grammarians did not have anything to do with the Aristotelian logic of speech, but with the living practice of grammar which existed all over the Near East.

We do not agree with Madkour's statement that 'ces grands fondateurs al-Khalīl et Sībawayh vivaient au milieu du mouvement traducteur de l'Islam',[35] which is contradicted even by Madkour's own account of the history of the translations: he situates their apogee at the end of the 8th/2nd and the 9th/3rd century.[36] Besides, his

[32] Ta'ālibī ap. Suy. Muzh. 1, 163 ult.; cf. Lisān, s.v. qln, 13, 347r.

[33] Wild, 1965, 37-40; manuscripts of the *Kitāb al-'ain*: ib., 9-13; edition by 'A. Darwīš, Baġdād, 1967 (1st part).

[34] Reuschel, 1959; cf. the index of quotations from al-Ḫalīl in Sībawaihi's *Kitāb*, to be supplemented by Troupeau, 1961.

[35] Madkour, 1969[2], 17.

[36] Madkour, 1969[2], 26.

comparison of the grammatical *qiyās* with the logical syllogism is certainly wrong,[37] and the argument based on the division into three parts of speech, *ism*, *fiʿl*, and *ḥarf* as compared with Aristotle's tripartition in the *De Interpretatione* is not decisive at all.[38] In our view, Arabic grammar was indeed influenced by Greek logic, but this influence took place at a much later date, when Baghdad had become the centre of Arabic culture.

When Merx in his *Historia artis grammaticae apud Syros* tried to prove the dependence of Arabic grammar on Greek logic, he used mainly terminological resemblances. His most important arguments were:[39]

1. the notion of declension and the term *iʿrāb*
2. the division of words into three parts of speech
3. the distinction of two genders
4. the distinction of three tenses
5. the notion of *ẓarf* (local or temporal adverb)
6. the notion of *ḥāl*.

We believe that these arguments do not prove the influence of Greek logic, but contact with Greek grammar. The first two arguments will be discussed in the second chapter, as well as the fourth argument. The third argument is trivial. The case of the term *ẓarf*, which is traced back to Aristotle's *angeîon* (vessel, jar), is stronger, and it does not seem possible to refute its value as an argument for the influence of logic on the beginnings of Arabic grammar. Still, the combination of time and place, which underlies Merx' identification of the two terms, is not typical of Aristotle alone, since it may also be found in Stoic theories, and is present in a Latin work about grammar.[40] It is therefore not too unlikely that somehow the word *angeîon* came to be used in Greek grammar with the technical meaning of 'temporal or local adverb' (which envelops as it were the action taking place in it, just like a vessel does), which is the meaning of the Arabic word *ẓarf*, though not the meaning of the Aristotelian *angeîon*, which means 'temporal or local circumstance'. Nevertheless, this is purely

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[37] Cf. below, chapter IV.

[38] Cf. below, chapter III A.

[39] Merx, 1889, 141-8 (ea vero, in quibus Grammatici notionibus ab Aristotele propositis usi sunt, haec sunt ...).

[40] SVF 2, 331; Varro, De L.L., 5, 10-2. Is there any connection with the Stoic term *pandéktēs* (adverb); did this term ever have the meaning of 'vessel, container'?

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hypothetical, and the fact remains that nothing much can be argued against Merx' identification. As for *ḥāl*, usually defined as 'condition, appearance of the active and the passive person',[41] this is compared by Merx to the *héxeis kaì diathéseis*, which in Aristotelian technical language mean 'permanent and temporary qualities and states'. But on the other hand, Merx himself tells us that the Arabic *ḥāl* corresponds to *diáthesis* alone, so that the distinction between permanent and temporary qualities has disappeared. Besides, *ḥāl* has been connected by others with the Stoic *pôs échon*, one of the four Stoic categories.[42] There is also the possibility that the Arabic use of the word corresponds to the use of *diáthesis* in Greek grammar, which not only means 'verbal voice', as Merx asserts,[43] but is also used for the verbal mood, i.e., for the expression of a mental condition (*psuchikè diáthesis*).[44]

Our theory advocating a direct contact between Arabic grammarians and Greek scholars, possibly with the Syrians as intermediaries, is further confirmed by the history of Stoic influence on Islamic logic, theology, and philosophy. Most scholars assume a so-called *voie diffuse* to be responsible for those similarities between the two doctrines which cannot be explained by influence through translations of Greek writings.[45] This *voie diffuse* consisted in direct contact with the cultural centres of Hellenism, and especially with the monasteries and learned clergy.[46] This contact had been established even before the beginning of Islam, by those Arab tribes that had been christianized, and it was maintained on a much larger scale after the conquest of Egypt, Syria, and the other Hellenistic territories where Muslims and Christians had to live together in the same cities. We should keep in mind that the clergy were generally in charge of passing on and teaching literature and the sciences, and that they were trained in such disciplines as grammar and rhetoric. A typical case is that of Jacob of Edessa, who asks whether it is allowed for a Christian presbyter to teach Muslim children.[47] In later times, these

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[41] b. Anb. Asr. 77, 9; Zam. Muf. 27, 18.

[42] Rescher, 1966, 80.

[43] Merx, 1889, 146.

[44] Steinthal, 1891[2], 275 sqq.

[45] Jadaane, 1968, 45 with further references; also: Amine, 1959, 97.

[46] On the monasteries in Syria in the 4th century A.D.: Festugière, 1959, 311-6.

[47] Merx, 1889, 43 quoting from: Lagarde, *Reliquiae iuris ecclesiasticae antiquissimae syricae*, 1856, p. 140, quaestio 48.

Christians came to Damascus and Baghdad, where they sometimes obtained high functions in the administration and in education.[48]

Not only the Christian clergy were active in this process : we must also reckon with the professional translators, who had to have a professional interest in grammatical matters. Ḫalīl has been mentioned as one of the teachers of the most important of all translators, Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, but this is contradicted by chronology: al-Ḫalīl died at the latest in 791/175, whereas Ḥunain lived till 873/260 or 876/263.[49] Nevertheless, Ḥunain had predecessors and other teachers, from whom he received his knowledge of Greek grammar.[50] One of the first translators was the Byzantine Roman Yaḥyā ibn Biṭrīq, who lived during the reign of the caliph al-Manṣūr (754/137-775/159).[51] This means that Arabic linguists were or could have been acquainted with methods and rules of Greek grammar well before the times of, say, al-Māzinī (d. 863/249), the teacher of al-Mubarrad (d. 898/285). These methods were totally different from the logical theories of Aristotle, which were to have a considerable influence through the commentaries of Ammonios, Porphyrios, and others. In order to prove this difference we shall have to show that there is a fundamental difference between linguistic activity in the period of al-Ḫalīl and Sībawaihi, and that of later linguists, who were concentrated mostly in Baghdad. Then we shall have to prove that this difference may be explained in terms of a different foreign background, and that those foreign elements which may be found in the work of Sībawaihi and other early grammarians should be attributed to direct contact with living grammar, whereas later authors in the Baghdadian period underwent the influence of translated Greek writings.

An interest in grammar was to men like Sībawaihi and his immediate predecessors and successors not theoretical, but only a means to a single goal, substantially the same one as Abū 'l-Aswad had had, namely to create some order in the immense material of the Arabic

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[48] On the position of the Christians in the Islamic empire: Nau, 1933.

[49] Incorrect Brockelmann, GAL S I, 366; cf. Gabrieli, 1968, 283; Bräumlich, 1926.

[50] The first group of translators was concentrated around Ibn al-Muqaffa' (GAL I, 158) in the reign of al-Manṣūr (754/137 - 775/159), and had connections with Christians from Harrān, the most important among them being Ṯābit ibn Qurra (GAL I, 241; S I, 384). The former was a pupil of Johannes Damaskenos. Cf. Peters, 1968, 59-60. Peters mentions elsewhere (1968, 134, n. 136) a typescript thesis by G. Afnan, *La connaissance du grec parmi les philosophes islamiques*, which I have not been able to find.

[51] Cf. below, chapter IV, note 26.

language. This they tried to achieve by means of a few fundamental notions, which very often were not defined at all, or defined in a descriptive way. The basis of their theory of language was the natural instinct as to the correctness of speech, which the pure Arabs were assumed to possess.[52] Many terms were used in a non-technical way, for instance the term *ism* (noun).[53] The notion 'verb' was described in the following way: 'As for the verbs, they are patterns taken from the expression of the events of nouns, and they are constructed to (signify) what is past and what is to come and what is being without interruption'.[54] This is not to be taken as a definition—as, for instance, Zaǧǧāǧī seems to do—,[55] but as a simple reminder of the fact that verbs are derived from the masdars, and that they occur in various forms which are expressive of tense; in other words, it is not a definition of the essence of the verb—such as we find with later grammarians—, but a description of something that happens in speech. Non-technical terms are found for instance in the chapters about the passive and about the various forms of transitivity.[56] Sībawaihi's *Kitāb* could be called a *dīwān* of all the curiosities and *nawādir* of the Arabic language, but as such it operates on a very high and accomplished level, rarely attained by later grammarians. It is difficult to imagine that in the fifty or sixty years following Abū 'l'Aswad's first endeavours, Arabic grammar could all on its own have assumed such large proportions without any foreign influence. The absence of Aristotelian influence should not be interpreted as an argument for the thesis that grammar was a purely Arabic science untainted by any foreign elements, nor is it surprising that there is no clear evidence of foreign influence, as long as we take the view that the first contacts with the Greek world were direct, as it were 'unofficial', contacts with the living instruction of grammar at the Hellenistic schools and universities.

In the following three chapters we will discuss some elements in Arabic grammar which we believe to have been coined on Greek

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[52] Cf. Mubārak, 1974³, 63-4 (*ḏauq al-'arab*); for the story about al-Ḫalīl's sources for the study of the *'ilal*, cf. below, chapter IV, note 76.

[53] Sib. Kit. 1, 2, 2 : 'The noun is *raǧul* (man) and *faras* (horse) and *ḥā'iṭ* (wall)'. Cf. Zaǧǧ. Id. 49, 9-10 (without *ḥā'iṭ*).

[54] Sib. Kit. 1, 2, 2-3 [A3]; cf. below, chapter III A.

[55] Zaǧǧ. Id. 53, 1-5. Zaǧǧāǧī refers to his *Šarḥ ar-risāla* where he dealt with this question more fully. Nothing is known about this work except for what he tells us himself in the *Īḍāḥ* (41, 11; 53, 5). On the *Risāla*: cf. below, note 78.

[56] Cf. Sib. Kit. 1, 13 sqq.

examples; these elements are: the terminology of articulated sound
and of phonetic change; the term *haraka* (vowel); the definitions of
noun and verb; the paradigms for noun and verb; the theory of the
parts of speech; the notion *i'rāb*; the verbal tenses; the theories
concerning the infinitive; the concept of transitivity; the system of the
uṣūl an -naḥw. We wish to make clear from the start that we do not
agree with Weiß's methodological remarks about the borrowing of
systems or doctrines. Weiß vigorously opposes the thesis of Greek
(and even Latin) influence on Arabic grammar, and states that it is
methodologically wrong to look at one isolated term, since every term
is part of a complicated system, without which it is meaningless.[57] One
must, of course, concede that his opinion arises from the laudable
wish to prevent wild conjectures, but his appeal to the psychological
improbability of the borrowing of single elements out of their context
is contradicted by modern studies, notably by Barwick's studies con-
cerning the relationship between Greek and Latin grammar. We firmly
believe that one of the characteristics of grammatical systems is that
each element tends to lead its own life outside the original framework.
This is, indeed, the cause of such misunderstandings as arose—and still
arise—in grammatical problems. We do agree, of course, with Weiß
that one should not postulate a dependence on Greek sources without
sufficient proof.

The current opinion about the dependency of Arabic grammar on
Greek examples is expressed by Fleisch in the following words: 'Des
influences grecques sont à signaler: la spéculation grammaticale arabe
a emprunté des concepts initiaux à la science grecque, non pas à la
grammaire grecque, mais à la *logique aristotélicienne*'; and: '*Ceci
réduit beaucoup l'influence grecque*; munis de ces concepts initiaux
aristotéliciens, que la simple ambiance a pu leur fournir, les gram-
mairiens arabes ont travaillé avec leur mentalité arabe; la description
des catégories grammaticales est arabe; l'agencement en un système
est arabe, si bien qu'on peut dire que, de toutes les sciences isla-

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[57] Weiß, 1910, 389-90: 'Handelt es sich gar wie bei der Grammatik und Philosophie
um ein wissenschaftliches *System*, so erscheint von vornherein der Versuch, auf Grund
bloß gelegentlicher Übereinstimmungen eine Beeinflussung nachzuweisen, als ein sehr
wenig aussichtsreiches Beginnen, insofern die zahlreichen Divergenzen die eventuelle
Beweiskraft der Kongruenzen gründlich paralysieren; denn man darf nicht übersehen,
daß ein System ein *Ganzes* darstellt, und daß es psychologisch ganz unwarscheinlich ist,
daß ein *einzelner* Begriff daraus wie ein erratischer Block gewandert sein soll, ohne
Spuren sogar seiner nächsten Nachbarschaft mitzunehmen'.

miques, la grammaire est peut-être celle qui a le moins subi d'in-
fluences extérieures et est restée la plus purement arabe'.[58]

In the following chapters we shall try to show that there is more
than one reason to reject, or at least to modify this theory, namely
that all traces of Greek influence which may be detected in Arabic
grammar should be attributed to Greek logic. It appears that the
influence of logic was at first almost non-existent, or only filtered
through to a small degree along the *voie diffuse*, i.e. via direct contact
between translators and grammarians, whereas the real influence was
exercised by Hellenistic educational institutes with their long-standing
tradition of grammar-teaching. Sometimes, Syriac grammar must have
acted as intermediary. Logic became important as Greek philosophi-
cal writings were gradually translated from Greek into Arabic, mostly
indirectly via Syriac. Its influence came to be felt in linguistics with
the rise of the so-called 'philosophical school', which has long been
regarded as a special group of philosophically minded scholars who
were also interested in grammar and language,[59] but which we believe
to have been nothing more than the development of linguistics after
the introduction of logic into the Arabic world under the influence of
the Mu'tazila.[60] The rise of this 'philosophical school' coincides with
the transference of the centre of linguistics from Baṣra and Kūfa to
Baghdad. As for the first period of Arabic linguistics, the chronology
of the translational activities compels us to reject any appreciable
influence of logic before, for example, Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq. This opinion
is confirmed by the study of those linguistic elements which may be
traced back to Greek grammar. Viewed in this light, the problem of
the sudden appearance of a complete model of grammar with al-Ḥalīl
and Sībawaihi ceases to be a problem: the Arabian conquest of the
culturally superior civilization that was Hellenism, the geographical
location of Baṣra and Kūfa near Hellenistic centres of education, the
fact that there were many bilingual people, and the presence of some
striking similarities between Greek and Arabic grammar, these are the
main points of our evidence for the thesis of a direct contact between
the first representatives of a new method of describing language and
the last representatives of the old.

In two articles, *Les origines de la grammaire arabe* and *An Arab*

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[58] Fleisch, 1961, 23.
[59] Kraus, 1942, 2, 251, n. 2.
[60] Cf. below, chapter VIII.

grammarian of the eighth century A.D.,[61] M.G. Carter attacks the
—what he calls—*thèse helléniste*. In our view his theory that Arabic
grammarians were influenced by Arabic theories and methods of law
is not as incompatible with our theory as one would think at first
sight.

Carter believes that every form of linguistic study preceding Sība-
waihi—i.e., the period of orthographical innovations, and the period
of the group of *naḥwiyyūna* (les gens concernés par la façon de
parler)[62]—had been the work of amateurs. Sībawaihi was the first
real grammarian. In his *Kitāb* he brilliantly undertook to assemble the
linguistic facts, which form part of a social system, into a juridically
organized corpus. His purpose was the description of linguistic beha-
viour, a normative grammar of the kind that was customary with
later grammarians. At the time of Sībawaihi's activities there existed
an abstract legal system set up by Islamic lawyers in order to analyse
laws and traditions: this proves that Sībawaihi did not need any
abstract Greco-Hellenistic theory for his grammatical system.

Sībawaihi had at his disposal two sets of terms.[63] In the first place
he used a series of already existing terms for the categories and
phenomena of the Arabic language. These terms may or may not
have been modelled on Greek examples. In the second place he used
a set of operational-functional terms, which are borrowed from the
legal system.

Carter adduces four important terminological arguments:

1. the use of moral criteria in grammar (*ḥasan*, 'good'; *qabīḥ*,
   'bad')[64]
2. the *qiyās* is a juridical method[65]
3. the terminology of *mauḍi'* etc. is derived from the study of law[66]
4. a great deal of linguistic terms have a juridical connotation (e.g.,
   šarṭ, 'condition'; '*iwaḍ*, 'compensation')[67]

Furthermore he points out that there were many contacts between
lawyers and grammarians. Sībawaihi himself had started his educa-

[61] Carter, 1972; 1973; cf. also id., 1973[b].
[62] Carter, 1972, 76-7.
[63] Carter, 1972, 80; 81-2.
[64] Carter, 1972, 83; 1973, 147-50.
[65] Carter, 1972, 84.
[66] Carter, 1972, 84-5; 1973, 147-8.
[67] Carter, 1972, 86.

tion as a student of law, and lawyers often needed the help of
grammarians for the explanation of linguistic subtleties in legal texts.
Carter concludes that if it can be proved that the science of law
furnished the examples for Sībawaihi's theory of speech, the Greek
hypothesis has lost its *raison d'être*. In his view the Greek hypothesis
is *a priori* improbable because of the complete silence in Arabic
sources concerning any dependency on Greek examples. What is
more, Greek grammar is of a completely different character.

Carter's observations concerning the relations between grammar and
law in the Islamic world are certainly very plausible, but they do not
rule out Greek influence. We agree with Carter that borrowing gram-
matical terms does not imply a total dependency; Arabic grammar
is a linguistic system in its own rights. Our point is that the early
Arabic grammarians borrowed several elements from Greek grammar
in order to build their own system. The argument *e silentio* is very
strong, indeed, but presumably religious reasons as well as patriotic
feelings played a role in this respect, and we can certainly appreciate
that grammarians were more sensitive about the purely Arabic origin
of their discipline than physicians or philosophers.[68]

Apparently Carter agrees with this point of view when he says
about the fundamental notions of Arabic grammar—Sībawaihi's first
set of terms—: 'certains de ces termes peuvent avoir une éventuelle
origine grecque', but he adds that 'même dans le cas peu probable
où on pourrait trouver la trace de tous ces termes dans le grec ils
représentent quand même un groupe fort restreint par rapport à
l'ensemble de la terminologie du *Kitāb*'.[69] We do not assert that
Arabic linguistic thinking was a copy of Greek grammar, but we do
believe that the instruction of Greek grammar was the model and the
starting point for Arabic grammar. It is generally difficult to trace
exactly the way transmission took place, but there is an unmistakable
similarity between the two grammars in their categorization. This first
influence was, of course, quite distinct from the second wave, after
the introduction of the Corpus Aristotelicum into the Islamic world:
the second wave is concerned much more with linguistic method and
linguistic philosophy than the technical aspects of grammar.

[68] Cf. below, chapter VI, notes 36-7.
[69] Carter, 1972, 80. We believe, indeed, that the Greek origin of many of the terms
in the first set may be demonstrated: *ism, musammā, fī'l* (?), *raf', i'rāb, i'ǧām, binā',
ḥaraka, ta'alluq, māḍī, ma'nā, kalām, qaul, 'adala, ṣarf, fā'ida, mufīd; ṣaḥīḥ, mu'tall*
(cf. Carter, 1972, 83); *ta'addī*.

As for Carter's terminological arguments:

ad 1.It is true that in describing linguistic facts Sībawaihi uses terms that are also used for moral categories; there may be a connection with the study of law, but we must also point out that in the Hellenistic and Byzantine periods there were many treatises about the *aretai kaì kakíai tès léxeôs* (virtues and vices of speech), i.e., about correct and incorrect speech. These treatises had been an integral part of the Stoic *téchnai*, and through the *téchnai* they were introduced into rhetorical education.[70]

ad 2.The origin of the linguistic method called *qiyās* may well lie in juridical practice. We shall try to demonstrate the connection between the set of four criteria of scientific analysis in the Islamic world on the one hand, and on the other hand the method of the empiricist physicians in the Greek world.[71] Whether grammar obtained its kind of *qiyās* through law, or through another discipline, or even independently, is not very relevant. All the same, there is the matter of chronology: according to Schacht aš-Šāfi'ī was the first to codify the juridical *uṣūl*, so that the question arises whether such a system could already have existed at the time of Sībawaihi. We would rather favour a dependency on medical studies in this respect.

ad 3.The terminology of *mauḍi'* etc.[72] We agree with Carter that this set of terms is a genuine Islamic invention, but we do not know whether its grammatical application is really derived from the legal system.

ad 4.Carter's assertion that such terms as *šarṭ* (condition), *'iwaḍ* (compensation), *badal* (replacement), *ḥadd* (definition), *ḥuǧǧa* (argument), *niyya* (intention)—we might add the important term *ǧazā'* (requital, recompense; in grammar: the protasis of a conditional period)—have a juridical flavour, is plausible enough in itself, but the argument needs to be developed more fully.

We cannot accept the picture of a spontaneous creation of the linguistic corpus at the hands of one man. The character of the oldest extant grammatical literature supports much more Sezgin's

[70] Barwick, 1922, 95-9; Donnet, 1967, 154-6; cf. also Apoll. Dysk. index, s.v. *kakía* (*mala dictio*); Quint. inst. orat. 1, 5, 1: *virtutes* vs. *vitia*. *Mustaqīm* may be related to Greek *orthós*.

[71] Cf. below, chapter IV.

[72] Cf. for this terminology: Weil, 1913, 24, n. 3; Carter, 1973, 147-9; below chapter VII, n. 86.

conception of the history of Arabic scientific literature, 'wonach z.B. dem monumentalen grammatischen Werk von Sībawaihi eine vorbereitende Literatur vorangegangen sein muß und die umfangreichen Bücher von Historikern derselben Zeit, wie z.B. ibn Isḥāq und Saif b. 'Umar, Kompilationen früherer Schriften darstellen und zahlreiche Qur'ānkommentare des ersten Jahrhunderts der Hiǧra in den späteren Werken verarbeitet wurden'.[73] We assume that Sībawaihi borrowed a great deal from written sources, even if this borrowing took place under the supervision of a teacher. We do not possess much information about the organization and methods of instruction and education of the early grammarians, but we suppose that Sezgin's conclusions concerning the *muḥaddiṯūna* and the *mu'arriḫūna* are also valid for the *naḥwiyyūna*. Some of the terms with which Sībawaihi introduces his quotations from earlier grammarians refer in that case to the modality of transmission, not to the value of the contents of the quotation.[74]

According to this conception the *naḥwiyyūna* who are mentioned by Sībawaihi—Ḫalīl ibn Aḥmad, Yūnus ibn Ḥabīb, Abū 'Amr ibn al-'Alā', al-Aḫfaš Abū 'l-Ḫaṭṭāb, 'Īsā ibn 'Umar a.o.[75]—should not be regarded as mere amateurs interested in linguistic curiosities. According to Reuschel a great deal of the facts and theories collected in the *Kitāb* are the result of a linguistic tradition, although it is true that Sībawaihi marks the culminating point of this tradition, and that he represents at the same time a remarkable technical innovation in grammatical description.[76] The difference between the *naḥwiyyūna* —experts in traditional linguistics[77]—and Sībawaihi is that Sībawaihi organizes the linguistic facts into a consistent whole. Reuschel refers to the fact that only in the first seven chapters of the *Kitāb*—the so-called *Risāla*[78]—does Sībawaihi not quote any of the older gram-

[73] Sezgin, 1967, 393.

[74] Cf. the table of the terms used by Sībawaihi in introducing a quotation from Ḫalīl: Reuschel, 1959, 11; he suggests that the difference in the terminology is indicative of a different 'Wertung der Aussagen Ḫalīls', ib. p. 10, n. 2, but cf. Sezgin, 1967, 58-60; 77-9; 240-1.

[75] For these scholars, cf. Brockelmann, GAL I, 96-8; S I, 158-60.

[76] Reuschel, 1959, 7-8.

[77] Perhaps Carter's explanation of the term *naḥw* in *naḥwiyyūna* as 'façon de parler' is correct, but he is not right in regarding the *naḥwiyyūna* merely as interested laymen.

[78] According to Mubārak, 1963, 112-3, the *Risāla* comprises the first seven chapters of Sībawaihi's *Kitāb* (Kit. 1, 1-13). Commentaries written exclusively on the *Risāla* are known from Zaǧǧāǧī (cf. above, note 55) and also from al-Aḫfaš aṣ-Ṣaġīr. Cf. the remark in an editorial note in one of the mss. of the *Kitāb* (mentioned by de Sacy,

marians. This may be significant inasmuch as these first chapters
discuss precisely the fundamental notions of grammar, and mark the
beginning of a really technical grammar. In our view this achievement
was partly influenced by the growing acquaintance with Greek gram-
matical practice.

On the other hand Carter is certainly right in supposing that the
juridical system exercised a considerable influence upon the Arabic
grammarians of this time, just as it is true that there has always been
an intimate relationship between the two disciplines, especially in the
discussions about the *uṣūl*, the *'illa*, the *qiyās* and other subjects that
touch on the methodology of the discipline. However, in this case
there is more a similarity in methods than a dependency of grammar
on law.[79]

In our view Arabic grammar is far from being a slavish imitation
of Greek grammar. What may be the most startlingly original trait
of Arabic grammar is that it applies the theory of a natural balance
(*mīzān*) to language; this results in a conception which views speech
as a harmonious structure, in which every constituent part has its
rightful place,[80] which it cannot lose without repercussions in the
rest of the system, or without being compensated. This conception
is not paralleled by any Greek theory. We refer to Weil's introduc-
tion to the *Inṣāf* for a discussion of the grammatical consequences of
this theory, and to Kraus' study about Ğābir ibn Ḥayyān for a
discussion of the methodological background of the theory of the
natural balance, as well as its sources.[81] We are fully aware that in
trying to prove the presence of Greek influence we have given far
too little attention to this and similar aspects of the originality of
Arabic grammar.

1829, 382, line 19) that Ismā'īl al-Warrāq copied the *Risāla* of the *Kitāb*, as well as part
of the *fā'il* (i.e., the *bāb al-fā'il*, the eighth chapter) (*nasaḥa min al-Kitāb ar-risāla wa-ba'd
al-fā'il*).

[79] Mubārak, 1974³, 79-93.

[80] For the terminology of 'syntactic place': cf. chapter VII, n. 86.

[81] Weil, 1913, 7-28; Kraus, 1942, 2, 187-303 (La théorie de la balance); (ib. 187):
'La science de la Balance (*'ilm al-mīzān*) a pour but de réduire toutes les données de la
connaissance humaine à un système de quantité et de mesure, leur conférant ainsi un
caractère de science exacte'; cf. especially the sections 3 (la balance des lettres) and 4
(la philosophie du langage); Kraus refers to theories of Galenos and Plato as the
sources of the *'ilm al-mīzān*.

CHAPTER TWO

ARTICULATED SOUND AND ITS MEANING

'Most scholars agree in thinking fit to begin the study of
dialectics with the subject of sound'.[1]

In this chapter we will discuss a few aspects of the relation sound
vs. meaning: the notion of a long vowel; the term *ḥaraka*; the theory
that a change in the sounds of a word affects its meaning; and the
terminology of articulated sounds and their meaning. The phonetic
studies of the Arabs lie outside the scope of this chapter;[2] it has been
suggested that the first classification of the Arabic sounds in al-Ḥalīl's
Kitāb al-'ain was due to Indian influence since a similar classification
is used for the Indian alphabet.[3]

The relationship between the three vowels and the so-called *ḥurūf
al-līn wa-'l-madd*, i.e., the *alif*, the *wāw*, and the *yā'* had already been
recognized by early grammarians: according to Sībawaihi a word can
go eight 'ways' (*maǧārī*), in other words it may have eight different
endings in declension. These eight endings form four pairs, because
the *alif* and the 'a', the 'w' and 'u', the 'y' and the 'i' belong together;
the fourth pair is formed by the nominal and the verbal zero
ending.[4] There were two opinions as to whether the letters are original,
or the vowels,[5] but the relationship between the two groups is acknow-
ledged by both theories. The conception of a long vowel was fairly
uncommon: vowels and *ḥurūf al-līn wa-'l-madd* are related, but they
do not belong to the same category. There is a third theory, which
regarded the *ḥurūf al-līn wa-'l-madd* as long vowels.

In his treatment of the declension of the dual and the plural, Ibn
al-Anbārī does not mention the theory of Ṯa'lab, which is mentioned
by Zağğāğī in the same context:[6] Ṯa'lab held that the *alif*, the *wāw*,
and the *yā'* may serve as substitutes of the vowels (*abdāl al-ḥarakāt*);

[1] Diokles Magnes ap. Diog. Laert. 7, 55 = SVF 2, 136 [G1].

[2] Cf. Schaade, 1911; Cantineau, 1960, 19-25; Bravmann, 1934; Semaan, 1968.

[3] Cf. Wild, 1965, 37-40.

[4] Sib. Kit. 1, 3, 2-3.

[5] Cf. Zağğ. Id. 123, 9-13; b. Anb. Asr. 127, 9-12.

[6] Zağğ. Id. 141, 10-2.

in the plural *zaidūna* the *wāw* is the substitute of three 'u''s. We do not believe that this is a mere formal or functional comparison between two elements of speech, such as we find in other chapters of Arabic grammar,[7] but we connect this isolated observation about Ṯa'lab's theory with other texts, and conclude that it forms part of a theory which differs from the general Arabic conception of vowels and letters.

Ibn al-Anbārī's second question in the *Inṣāf* deals with the declension of the so-called 'six words', *abun, aḫun*, etc.[8] Ibn al-Anbārī quotes Māzinī, who says that the series *abū, abā, abī* is derived from the series *abun, aban, abin* by lengthening of the vowels (*išbāʿ*). The Arabic term for 'lengthening' is normally used for a metrical phenomenon, namely the lengthening of a vowel in a line for metrical reasons.[9] But we could also say that Māzinī departs here from the current Arabic conception: instead of 'long vowel = vowel + letter' he says 'long vowel = vowel + vowel', or 'long vowel = lengthened short vowel'. In that case 'u' comes from 'u + u', just as Ṯa'lab said.

There is proof that such a conception actually existed in the Arabic world, and, what is more, that it was explicitly connected with Greek theories. In the section about grammar in Ḫwārizmī's *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm* there is a chapter about the ways of declension 'according to the doctrine of the Greek philosophers' (*'alā maḏhab falāsifat al-yūnāniy-yīn*);[10] it is probably a quotation from the work of Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, who wrote about Greek and Arabic grammar.[11] Ḫwārizmī says that 'the logical scholars of the Greek people call the nominative an imperfect *wāw*, and likewise the "u" and her sisters ..., and the "i" and her sisters are in their view an imperfect *yā*', and the "a" and her sisters are in their view an imperfect *alif*. But if you wish to do so, you may also call the long, soft *wāw* a lengthened "u", and the long, soft *yā*' a lengthened "i", and the long *alif* a lengthened "a"'.[12]

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[7] For instance the article and the *iḍāfa*, which have the same function, and may, therefore, take each other's place, i.e., they have the same *mauḍi'*, though not the same *manzila*.

[8] b. Anb. Inṣ. 6, 11- 12, 25.

[9] The term *išbā'* is explained by Ibn al-Anbārī; two of his examples are also found with Ibn Ǧinnī, Ḫaṣ. 3, 136, 1, in a passage about the *išbā'*-theory in connection with the declension of the dual and the plural. Possibly both authors quote from a work of al-Māzinī.

[10] Ḫwār. Maf. 46, 3-10.

[11] Cf. below, chapter VI, note 23.

[12] Ḫwār. Maf. 46, 4-8 [A 4].

This quotation shows that the conception of long vs. short vowels instead of short vowels vs. short vowels + *alif, wāw, yā*' was felt to be connected with the declension and with Greek sources. Perhaps this may be explained in the following way: Arabic translators and logicians by virtue of their knowledge of the Greek language and of Greek grammar tried to improve the theories of Arabic grammarians by showing that the difference between *zaidun* and *zaidūna*, and between *abun* and *abū* is nothing else than an alternation of long and short vowels. It is quite understandable that this 'improvement' was misunderstood in the course of time and became a separate type of declension, or was confused with a metrical phenomenon.

Ibn. Ǧinnī mentions as one of the reasons for the resemblance between letters and vowels that the vowel is a small letter (*ḥarf ṣaġīr*): 'Don't you see that some people in the past used to call the "u" the small *wāw*, and the "i" the small *yā*', and the "a" the small *alif*?'[13] The same terminology of the vowel as a 'small letter' is found in Sīrāfī's commentary on the *Kitāb*,[14] and with Ǧābir ibn Ḥayyān.[15] Bravmann mentions a phonetic theory according to which an *alif* is composed of two 'a''s, a *wāw* of two 'u''s, and a *yā*' of two 'i''s, and *alif, wāw, yā*' are the result of pronouncing a vowel with *išbā'*.[16]

Arabic philosophers use another terminology for the sounds, taken from Aristotle, who divides sounds into *phôneenta, hèmiphôna*, and *áphôna*.[17] In this division there is a special category for the continuous sounds, the *hèmíphôna*, for which the 'r' and the 's' are given as examples. This terminology is found in Arabic translation, for instance in Ibn Sīnā, who divides sounds into three groups: voiceless sounds (*ṣāmitāt*), i.e. the consonants; semivoiced sounds (*allatī lahā niṣf ṣaut*), i.e. the fricatives; voiced sounds (*muṣawwitāt*), divided into long and short voiced sounds (*mamdūda wa-maqṣūra*).[18] In the last group the *maqṣūra* are the vowels and the 'weak letters' (*ḥurūf al-'illa*),

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[13] b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 2, 315, 7-8 [A 5].

[14] Cf. Hegazi, 1971, 71-2, the passage from Sīrāfī's *Šarḥ* is quoted by Mubārak, 1974², 118-9.

[15] Kraus, 1942, 2, 244, n. 1.

[16] Bravmann, 1934, 13, quoting from 'Alī ibn Sulṭān al-Qārī's (d. 1014/1605), *Kitāb al-minaḥ al-fikriyya 'alā matn al-Ǧazariyya*, ed. Cairo, 1308 A.H., p. 50.

[17] Aristot. poet. 1456 b 24-30; cf. Steinthal, 1890², 1, 254 sqq.; Bravmann, 1934, VII-VIII, and note 2.

[18] b. Sīnā, Ši'r, 191, 11-4.

i.e., the *alif*, the *wāw*, and the *yā'*, and the *mamdūda* are also called *maddāt*, i.e., probably the long vowels.

The theory of short vowels as 'small' (*ṣaġīr*) or 'imperfect' (*nāqiṣ*) letters is connected by Ḥwārizmī with the Greek world, so that we would expect the two terms *ṣaġīr* and *nāqiṣ* to be related with Greek terms. In Hellenistic Greek the opposition between long and short vowels, and between diphthongs and vowels, had completely disappeared, at least in pronunciation; in writing, the traditional orthography was strictly maintained.[19] Actually, the correct spelling of the vowels and the diphthongs formed an essential part of education and scholarship. For this purpose lists were made of words with their correct spelling, i.e. mainly whether to write 'o' or 'ô'; 'e' or 'ai'; 'u' or 'oi', 'ei' or 'i' or 'ē' for instance in the Herodian *Epimerismoi*.[20] In the *Epimerismoi*, 'ei', 'i', and 'ē' are indicated by their names (i.e. *ei diphthongos*, *iôta*, *èta*). 'O' and 'ô' are referred to as *o mikrón* (little o) and *ô méga* (big o); 'e' and 'u' are distinguished from 'ai' and 'oi', respectively, by the addition *psilón*, i.e. 'bare, naked, separated from, simple'.[21] Perhaps these terms *mikrón*, and *psilón* are the originals of *ṣaġīr* and *nāqiṣ*. This could explain why we find a different terminology with Ibn Sīnā: he was dependent on the Aristotelian terminology, which originated at a time when the original opposition between long and short vowels still existed.[22] Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq and the other translators, however, learned the Greek language as a living language. Perhaps they took the terms for the written vowels and introduced them into Arabic grammar.

The Arabic term for vowel, *haraka* (movement), has up till now been explained by only one theory, namely that of Bravmann.[23]

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[19] Cf. Kühner/Blass, 1966', 1, 1, 41, Anm. 2; also Browning, 1969, 32-3.

[20] *Herodiani Partitiones*. Ed. J.Fr. Boissonade. London, 1819 (Amsterdam, 1963). cf. about the *epimerismoi*, Glück, 1967, 35-40. These lists ultimately derive from an Alexandrian grammarian of the second century A.D., Herodianos, the son of Apollonios Dyskolos.

[21] Note that in the scholia on D.T. *psilós* is used as the opposite of *dasús*, i.e. 'pronounced with a *spiritus asper*' (e.g. scholia D.T. 32-3); later *o mikrón*, *ô méga*, *e psilón* became names, cf. Liddel/Scott, s.v. *ū* and s.v. *psilós*.

[22] Steinthal, 1891², 2, 192 sqq.; 201.

[23] Bravmann, 1934, 12-8. We do not take into account the explanation mentioned by Rāzī (Maf. 1, 48, 3-7): the voice moves from one sound to another in pronouncing a consonant with its vowel; a vowel is, therefore, a movement (*haraka*). Rāzī himself disagrees, since it is not the vowel itself that is the movement. Cf. also *Rasā'il Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā'* (3, 136, 2): 'The movement (*haraka*) is the transferring (sc. of the sound) from one place to another in a second time' (about the expression 'second time': Bravmann, l.c.).

According to Bravmann, *haraka* is a term from musical literature: metre and rhythm consist in the alternation of consonants with and consonants without a vowel (*hurūf mutaharrika wa-sawākin*). Hence the original meaning of *haraka* was 'syllable', where syllable is interpreted as consonant + vowel. The term itself is a *calque* of the Aristotelian *kinèsis*, which is used in the *Physica* for a specific form of change, namely the realization of something potential.[24] In this context, the vowel is considered to be the necessary condition for the realization of the consonant. Fischer adds that in Greek poetical theory one of the primary characteristics of a syllable is its movability, i.e., the fact that it may be compressed or extended. According to him, this movability is also expressed by the Arabic term.[25] Both authors also point to a statement made by aš-Šāṭibī (d. 1193/590), that the vowel is the accident (*'arad*) and the consonant the substance (*dāt*), where the vowel is defined by means of logical terms.[26] The fundamental failure of this theory is that it does not take into account historical context. Sībawaihi used the term *haraka* long before Aristotle's *Physica* became known in the Arabic world in the translation of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain. We must also point out that, as far as we know, nowhere in Greek logical or musical literature is *kinèsis* used with the meaning of 'vowel'.

We propose to give another explanation with the help of Greek data. There is a striking terminological similarity between Zaǧǧāǧī's words: 'It (sc. the declension) is a vowel that enters speech after the completion of its phonetic structure' (*hiya haraka dāḫila 'alā 'l-kalām ba'da kamāl binā'ihi*),[27] and a text in the scholia on Dionysios Thrax where a grammatical case is defined as 'a movement that occurs at the end of a noun' (*onómatos katà tò télos ginoménè kinèsis*).[28] That

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[24] Aristot. phys. 201 b 4.

[25] Fischer, 1964, 146.

[26] Quoted by Bravmann, 1934, 13.

[27] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 72, 2-3.

[28] Scholia D.T. 383, 3-4; 550, 24; cf. also *praefatio*, XLI, 2, and *Grammatici Graeci*, IV, XXII, 12. Note the similarity between *binā'* (phonetic structure, originally: construction) and *súntaxis*. The Greek word has among its significations also that of 'the internal phonetic structure', e.g. in the title of a book written by the grammarian Herodianos *Perì suntáxeōs tôn stoicheiōn* (About the phonetic structure of the elementary words), and especially in a phrase used by Apollonios Dyskolos 'the structures resulting from these (sc. from the syllables) ... complete the word' (Apoll. Dysk. Synt. 2, 7-8. About *súntaxis*: Donnet, 1967ᵇ, 23-30). We may also quote another phrase from the same author: 'Every undeclinable part of speech has one and the same structure (*súntaxis*) in each gender' (Apoll. Dysk. synt. 316, 8-9; cf. synt. 488, 5-6). In later Greek, *súntaxis* is also used with the same concrete meaning as *binā'* possesses in

haraka and the grammatical term *kinèsis* are related may also be deduced from another parallel: the Greek word *kineisthai* is used in the sense of 'to be declined',[29] and the word *akinètos* sometimes has the meaning 'undeclined';[30] in Arabic we find the word *mutaharrik* (set in motion) with the meaning 'declined'.[31] That this word was already used at an early time is proved by a quotation from al-Ḫalīl: 'Al-Ḫalīl was asked about the nominative, why it is used for the agent, and he answered: the nominative is the first "movement", and the agent is the first "moved", and so they used the first movement to indicate the first moved'.[32] This text also shows that the notion of movement was really felt to be connected with the declension.

It is not so strange that the word for vowel should be derived from the theory about the declension, if we consider that the primary motive of the Arabic grammarians was to preserve the Qur'ān from corruption. This corruption was mostly the result of a wrong use of the case endings: we fully appreciate this when we read the stories about Abū 'l-Aswad ad-Du'alī![33] *Haraka* as an equivalent of the Greek grammatical term *kinèsis* was then originally the vowel *par excellence*, namely that vowel which indicates the cases : hense it came to be used as a general term for vowel. Elias of Tirhān, a Syrian grammarian (d. 1049/441) defines grammar as 'the knowledge of the movements of the nouns, the verbs, and the particles'.[34] Even if the Syriac word *zau'ā* or *mettezi'ānūṭā* (movement) is a *calque* of the Arabic term, and not a translation of the Greek *kinèsis*, Elias' definition still proves that there did exist a definition of grammar in terms of movements, i.e. the case endings.

It is quite understandable that the term *haraka* was taken by later grammarians to indicate a real movement, for instance in the explana-

Arabic, for instance in an inscription from Ephesos 'the construction of the door-way' (*hè súntaxis toú perithúrou*), Liddel/Scott, s.v. Note also the similarity in meaning between the Greek word *télos* and the Arabic word *kamāl* (completion). The word *kamāl* was already used for related words such as *teleiótès*, *entelécheia* (Daiber, 1968, 77), and a confusion between *télos* — end and *télos* — fulfilment is easy to imagine.

[29] Scholia D.T. 230, 26; Sophr. in Theod. 2, 418, 17-8.

[30] Scholia D.T. 427, 11; Apoll. Dysk. pron. 70, 17; 71, 2, et passim.

[31] 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, Muġnī, 7, 205, 13: Abū Hāšim is quoted as saying *mutaharrik bi-raf' aw-naṣb aw-ǧarr* (set in motion by the nominative or the accusative or the genitive).

[32] Al-Ḫalīl ap. Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 253, 12-4 [A 6].

[33] Cf. above, ch. I, note 24, and e.g. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. pp. 89-90.

[34] Merx, 1889, 155.

tion of the names of the cases.[35] They may have been influenced by the fact that vowels were also called 'voiced' (*muṣawwitāt*),[36] and that a sound, according to Stoic doctrine, is a body because it moves.[37] The ultimate consequence of this interpretation is found in the writings of the Hebrew grammarian Marwān ibn Ǧanāḥ, who compares the vowels to the three principal movements in the physical world, and classifies them accordingly.[38]

In the introduction of Weil's edition of Ibn al-Anbārī's *Inṣāf* there is a long excursus about the various phonetic rules which were used, especially by the Baṣrians, to explain changes in words, and deviations from the norm. These phonetic rules were axiomatic and they were accepted as an ultimate explanation of phonetic change.[39] Three procedures are mentioned by Weil: change of a letter (*qalb*), metathesis (*naql*), and elision (*ḥadf*). A fourth procedure certainly existed : the addition of a letter (*ziyāda*).[40] This system of phonetic rules is called *i'lāl*,[41] i.e., an affection of the word, a deformation, which makes the word 'ill', as it were: essentially it is an offence against the laws of speech, against the harmony that ought to reign in linguistic structure—which is evidently thought of as an organic whole. Such affections are allowed in the case of poetry, when a poet has to change the form of a word for metrical reasons.[42] But apart from poetry, such an offence can be tolerated only when there is a very good reason for a phonetic change, for instance when a change will make the word easier to pronounce. Even then, the change remains an 'illness', which makes the word unfit to be used in a grammatical analogy: the word remains a deviation from the norm. A word which

[35] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. pp. 93-4.

[36] b. Sīnā, Ši'r, p. 31.

[37] SVF 2, 140; this doctrine was known to the Arabs through the translation of the *Placita Philosophorum*, ed. Daiber, pp. 278-80; cf. below, notes 44, 69, 70.

[38] Bacher, 1970², 9; Ibn Ǧanāḥ, Opuscules, 275-6; cf. Chomsky's notes on Kimhi's *Mikhlol*, p. 32, n. 12.

[39] Weil, 1913, 10: 'Die Gesetze der Lautphysiologie, die die Araber schon früh aufgestellt haben, gelten als unbedingt giltige Erklärungen von Abweichungen'.

[40] Cf. for instance the *ḥurūf az-zā'ida*, the additional letters. Ibn Ǧinni uses this category to explain the 'n' in the word 'aṃbar, which is derived from the radicals '-b-r, Haṣ. 3, 66.

[41] Cf. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. pp. 60, 4-5; 11-2: ṣaḥḥa, ṣiḥḥa and i'talla, i'tilāl. Ibn Ǧinni uses the expression i'tilāl bi-'l-qalb (an illness as the result of a change), Haṣ. 1, 377, 17-8; i'lāl bi-'l-ḥadf, ib. 2, 155, 7.

[42] This is called *ḍarūra* (Weil, 1913, 28), e.g. b. Anb. Inṣ. 203, 9; 228, 18. In classical literature we find the term *necessitas* for the same phenomenon, e.g. Quint. inst. 1, 6, 2.

is not affected by any of these changes is called 'sound' (ṣaḥīḥ). In Syriac grammar the same terminology exists. We find there a distinction between words which are sound (ḥlīmā), and words which are ill (krīhā), just as in Arabic grammar.[43] It is our contention that Syriac and Arabic terminology were influenced by a similar doctrine in Greek grammar. In that case, of course, the Syrians played an intermediary role in the contact between Arabic and Greek grammar.

In Greek grammar we are frequently confronted with the doctrine of the 'affections of speech' (páthè tès léxeôs, tès phônès), which describes phonetic change in words in terms of four categories. These categories were borrowed from the Peripatetic terminology of physical change, which distinguished between four categories: addition (prósthesis), elision (aphaíresis), transfer (metáthesis), change (enallagé). It is no coincidence that these were borrowed by Stoic philosophers, since Stoic philosophers tended to compare linguistic facts with parallels from the physical world.[44] The same tendency existed in Baṣrian grammar: speech is the mirror of the physical world, the same laws apply therefore to both speech and nature.[45] This specific conception of speech as a replica of nature—which in the case of the Stoa was caused by their materialistic philosophy: speech is part of the physical world, sound is a body[46]—resulted in both grammars in the same terminology: páthè and 'ilal are related in meaning. In both Greek and Arabic grammar it was customary to regard a word which did not undergo any change at all as being 'sound', i.e. not affected by any alteration.[47]

The Stoic method of analyzing phonetic processes is also used in Latin grammar, which provides us with a few more details. Varro

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[43] Tarazī, 1969, 115.

[44] Barwick, 1922, 98: 'Sie (sc. the Stoics) haben eine auch für uns noch erkennbare Neigung gehabt, die Verhältnisse der Sprache mit den Dingen der körperlichen Natur in Parallele zu stellen; eine Neigung, die man ohne weiteres versteht, da nach stoischer Lehre, das Grundelement der Sprache, die phōné, ein sōma ist (Diog. Laert. VII 55)'. About the physical categories: Barwick, ib., 96-9, especially p. 96, note 5, with loci from Greek literature concerning the division into four categories; cf. also van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 2; 27.

[45] Weil, 1913, 7 + note 1: 'Die Sprache ist nach streng baṣrischer Auffassung ein treuer Spiegel der Erscheinungen, Dinge und Begriffe, die sie zum Ausdruck bringt. Daher müssen in ihr dieselben Gesetze wie im Denken, in der Natur und im Leben zu beobachten sein'.

[46] Cf. above, note 44; below, notes 69, 70.

[47] E.g. Theodosios, 14, 4; 14, 10 apathés; Apoll. Dysk. adv. 156, 11; 160, 3; 200, 22 hugiés (phonetically correct).

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says: 'For (changes) are caused by the elision or the addition of letters, and also by their transposition or their change, likewise by the lengthening or shortening of syllables, and finally by their elision or loss'.[48] The Stoic origin of the system is also proved by Varro's remark: 'Chrysippos and Antipatros ..., who both write that words are derived from other words in such a way, that some words take on letters, other words drop them, still other words change them'.[49] The conception of phonetic laws as physical events which come about in a mechanical way, is of course older: we find it already in Plato's Cratylus.[50]

There is another, later, development of this doctrine in Greek grammar, which is usually connected with the name of the grammarian Tryphon, who lived in the first century B.C.[51] He used the same categories as the Stoa did,[52] but he connected a change of sound with a corresponding change of meaning: the sounds suffer together with the meaning, as he put it: 'Limós (famine), the lacking of provisions. Limós comes from the verb leípō (to leave behind), future leipsô; it should have been written with a diphthong (sc. leimós), but the same happened to the sounds as to the meaning. The word indicates a lack, and that is the reason why it lacks a sound as well. Thus Tryphon'.[53] We may compare with this the words of the scholiast on Dionysios Thrax: 'The form epoíoun (I was doing) contains more of the past than the form poiô (I do)'.[54] Here the additional 'e' in the imperfect tense is explained from the grammatical meaning of the word. The difference

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[48] Varro De L.L. 5, 6: Litterarum enim fit demptione aut additione et propter earum traiectionem aut commutationem, item syllabarum productione aut correptione, denique adiectione aut detractione; cf. Quint. inst. 1, 5, 6 where the categories are listed as follows: adiectio, detractio, immutatio, transmutatio.

[49] Varro De L.L. 6, 1 = SVF 2, 154: Chrysippus et Antipater ..., qui omnes verba ex verbis ita declinari scribunt, ut verba litteras alia assumant, alia mittant, alia commutent...

[50] Plato, Crat. 394 B [G2]: 'In the same way, perhaps, the expert of words considers their power, and he is not disconcerted, when a letter is added or transferred or taken away, or when the power of the word finds its expression in completely different letters.'; cf. Gentinetta, 1961, 112 sqq.

[51] Steinthal, 1890², 1, 346 sqq. An edition of Tryphon's fragments has been published by A. de Velsen in 1853 (1965). According to others the theory is much older, Barwick, 1957, 57.

[52] According to this theory, words may change by addition (pleonasmós), elision (sunkopé), change (metabolé), or metathesis (tropé). Tryphon uses the term páthé for these phenomena, e.g. frg. 131, pp. 97-8.

[53] Tryphon, frg. 130, p. 97 [G3]; another example, Barwick, 1957, 56-7.

[54] Bekker, AG, II, 891, quoted by Steinthal, 1890², 1, 311, note [G4].

with ordinary sound symbolism is that this doctrine of Tryphon does not explain the meaning of a word by means of the sounds of that word, but that it seeks to give an explanation of the change of one form into another in terms of the change in meaning. There is, of course, a certain relationship with the doctrine of the significant value of sounds, as it is found in the *Cratylus*, in so far as each sound is believed to contribute to the formation of the meaning.[55] Both doctrines are found in Arabic grammatical works. In Ibn Ǧinnī's *Ḥaṣā'iṣ* we find three chapters that deal with the subject of the relations between sounds and meaning: 'Chapter on sounds that follow the meaning',[56] 'Chapter on the strength of the sound as corresponding with the strength of the meaning',[57] 'Chapter on sounds that imitate the meaning'.[58] Ibn Ǧinnī says: 'As for the correspondence between the words and those events that are symbolized by their sounds, this is a large subject ..., namely that they (sc. the Arabs) very often make the sounds of the letters correspond to the events expressed by those letters. They treat the events and the letters alike, and they try to imitate the events with the letters'.[59] Suyūṭī quotes these remarks about sounds that imitate the meaning of the word,[60] and in the same context he also deals with the theory of 'Abbād ibn Sulaimān, according to whom there is a natural relationship (*munāsaba ṭabī'iyya*) between words and meanings;[61] this brings us to the theories concerning the origin of speech and the epistemological value of words.

A good example of the way in which Ibn Ǧinnī's theory about the correspondence between sound and meaning operates is that of the words *haḍm* (to eat) and *qaḍm* (to crunch something dry): 'An example of this are the expressions *haḍm* and *qaḍm*, because *haḍm* is used for eating fresh herbage ... and *qaḍm* for eating something hard and dry ... They chose the letter 'ḥ' to indicate the softness of the fresh herbage, and the letter 'q' to indicate the hardness of the dry things, in order to imitate the sounds which are heard when we observe these actions".[62] Here we are dealing with ordinary sound symbolism, very

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[55] Cf. Sokrates' remarks concerning the value of the various sounds, Crat. 426 C-427 D; cf. Steinthal, 1890², 1, 129.

[56] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 145 (*Bāb fī taṣāqub al-alfāẓ li-taṣāqub al-ma'ānī*).

[57] Ib. 3, 264 (*Bāb fī quwwat al-lafẓ li-quwwat al-ma'nā*).

[58] Ib. 2, 152 (*Bāb fī imsās al-alfāẓ ašbāh al-ma'ānī*).

[59] Ib. 2, 157, 9-11 [A 7].

[60] Suy. Muzh. 1, 31-35.

[61] Cf. chapter IX, note 65.

[62] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 157, 13- 158, 2, quoted by Rāzī, Maf. 1, 22, 14 sqq. (Rāzī mentions his source) [A 8].

similar indeed to the remarks made by Sokrates in the *Cratylus*, but the doctrine is also used for grammatical purposes. In that case we are not comparing two words on the same level, but one primitive, original word, and a secondary form that is derived from it. A good example of this is the explanation of the reduplication of the second radical of a verb as a sign of the repetition of the action expressed by the verb.[63]

It goes without saying that such a theory is founded on the belief that words are not arbitrarily chosen, but that they actually express the essence of the things denoted, in other words, that every word is 'invented' (*wuḍi'a*) for a specific reason, and that there is a natural relationship between words and objects.[64] When a word is changed after the first imposition (*awwal al-waḍ'*), this indicates a change in meaning, and this change must be explained, otherwise the change of the sounds could not be justified. Sometimes we find the argument of the 'frequency of use' (*kaṯr al-isti'māl*) as an explanation of the change of a word, but this argument was not accepted by all grammarians.[65]

The conclusion of our discussion is that Greek grammarians with their etymological theories exercised a certain influence upon their Arabic colleagues, who developed the theory in their own way. Probably the structure of the Arabic language, with its clear-cut patterns, helped the Arabic grammarians considerably in their efforts to build up a system of rules that could explain the changes in sound occurring in actual speech. In building up this system they made use of the principles they had received from Greek grammar. Our thesis is that this influence was already being felt at the time of Sībawaihi, in view of the fact that Ibn Ǧinnī mentions al-Ḥalīl in his chapters about sounds that imitate the meaning of the word. In the phonetic chapters of Sībawaihi's *Kitāb* the term *mu'tall* is already a frequently used technical term, and it is also used by al-Ḥalīl, according to one tradition.[66]

The terminology of sound and its relation to meaning is of great interest to a better understanding of the views of Arabic gramma-

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[63] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 155, 3 sqq.

[64] According to Stoic theory, words in the first imposition were imitations of reality, cf. chapter IX.

[65] Weil, 1913, 11-2 asserts that it is not a Baṣrian principle and that the Baṣrians refused to accept it, but cf. b. Anb. Inṣ. 173, 7 and al-Ḥalīl ap. b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 35, 11.

[66] Sīb. Kit. 2, 355; 362; 368 et passim; Wild, 1965, 35; 94.

rians;[67] it also gives us the opportunity to illustrate their relations
with the Greek world. We will discuss below the opposition *ma'nā/
lafz*;[68] here we will occupy ourselves with the term *ṣaut* (sound) and
the classification of sounds—not, though, according to their various
phonetic properties, but according to their semantic value.

First we must consider the Greek data, which we assume to represent
to a large degree the Stoic theory. According to the Stoics sound is a
body,[69] which comes into being as the result of a percussion of the air:
'Sound is air which is struck, or (it is) what is perceived especially by
the ear, as Diogenes the Babylonian says in his treatise about sound'.[70]
The most important subdivision of sounds was the division into sounds
produced by an act of will (i.e. human speech), and sounds which are
produced instinctively (i.e. sounds produced by animals). Only the first
group of sounds may receive the attribute 'meaningful' (*sēmantikós*).
It goes without saying that human speech is always articulated and
that it can be written (which in Stoic terminology amounts to the same
thing).[71] Animal sound, on the other hand, is never a carrier of
meaning, even though it may be considered articulated at times.[72]
Moreover, there are sounds which are produced in the form of
meaningless and unarticulated noises, which cannot be written down
(i.e., the sounds proper, produced by inanimate objects): 'The sound
of an animal is air which is hit instinctively, (the sound) of a man is
articulated and intentionally pushed out, as Diogenes says'.[73] 'Speech,
according to the Stoics, as Diogenes says, is a sound which can be
written down, like *hēméra* (day); language is meaningful sound, which
is intentionally produced. like *hēméra esti* (it is day) ... Sound differs
from speech, because sound may also be a noise, but speech can only
be something articulated. Speech differs from language, because lan-
guage is always meaningful, whereas speech, unlike language, may also
be meaningless, like *blíturi*'.[74]

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[67] Cf. also Loucel, 1963, 263-4; 201-2.

[68] Cf. chapter X.

[69] SVF 2, 140-2; 3, 213, 2; cf. scholia D.T. 181, 4 sqq.; SVF 3, 212, 29 sqq.

[70] SVF 3, 212, 23-5 [G 5]; cf. SVF 2, 138; 139; 142; Sen. Quaest. nat. 2, 6.

[71] Barwick, 1957, 11; Steinthal, 1890², 1, 291; Diomedes, 2, 413 ed. Keil.

[72] Even about the articulateness of animal sounds there existed some disagreement,
cf. SVF 2, 135; 2, 734, and Pohlenz, 1939, 194, note 1. The speech of animals
formed one of the basic issues in the discussion about the 'inner' and the 'outer'
speech (cf. chapter X, note 18). Most of the later Stoics conceded that, for instance,
parrots do have a voice which can produce articulated noises, but according to Stoic
doctrine animals can never communicate a meaning.

[73] SVF 3, 212, 25-7 [G 6].

[74] Ib. 213, 5-21 [G 7].

In the scholia on Dionysios Thrax we find a schematic elaboration
of this system: 'articulated' is used in the sense of 'meaningful',[75] and
a new category is added, consisting of those sounds which can be
written down: 'Let it be known that some sounds are articulated and
have a spelling, like our own; some of them are not articulated, nor
can they be spelled, like the crackling of a fire or the sound of a
falling stone or a piece of wood; some of them are not articulated,
but they can be spelled, like imitations (of the sounds) of irrational
animals, e.g. *brekekéx* (sc. the sound of a frog), or *koi*, the sound of a
pig: the sound itself is not articulated, in so far as we do not know
what it means, but it does have a spelling, in so far as it can be
written down; still other (sounds) are articulated, but they do not
have a spelling, such as the sound of whistling: the sound itself is
articulated, in so far as we know what it means—for instance "and
whistling he gave a sign to the brilliant Diomedes (Hom. K 502)"—,
but it has no spelling in so far as we cannot write it down'.[76] Because
of the synonymity of 'articulated' and 'meaningful' there is no place
in this classification for the articulated speech of some animals, e.g.
parrots, which is meaningless in spite of its articulateness. Imita-
tions of the sounds of animals appear as meaningless sounds with a
spelling, which is quite reasonable, when we consider the fact that
'with a spelling' (*engrámmatos*) only indicates that such and such a
sound can be reproduced in writing with normal letters. The category
of 'whistling'—i.e. a sound which is articulated, but does not have a
spelling—may be explained as a misunderstanding on the part of the
scholiast: what he meant to say was that the sound of whistling
cannot be reproduced in writing, but that the word which is used to
indicate this sound is meaningful; he then confused the two state-
ments, thereby completing his classification.

A similar division of the sounds is adopted by Ammonios, but he
uses 'articulated' again with the sense of 'writable', in accordance with
the Stoic use.[77] He says: 'It follows that some sounds are meaningful,

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[75] Scholia D.T. 181, 23-7.

[76] Ib. 18-27 [G 8].

[77] Amm. comment. in Aristot. de interpret. 31, 3-5 ed. Busse; also Joh. Dam. D.,
5, 1-27; cf. Zirin, 1974, who translates *agrámmatos* with 'not resolvable into discrete
units of speech-sound', identifying the *grámmata* with phonemes. We agree, but have
retained the translation 'not having a spelling' in order not to confuse the terminology.
As a matter of fact, we may safely state that prior to the beginning of phonology only
phonemes were used and (implicitly) known; the real discovery of phonology has been
that the chain of phonetic events was endless and variable. In order to reestablish a

while they can be written down, like human speech; some sounds are meaningful, though they cannot be written down, like the barking of a dog; other sounds are meaningless, but they can be written down, like the word *blituri*; still other sounds are meaningless and they cannot be written down, like a whistle which is produced for no reason at all and not for purposes of communication, or like the imitation of the sound of some animal'.[78] We observe in the first place that Ammonios attributes to dogs a meaningful, though not 'writable' sound, unlike the Stoics, who grant to animals at the utmost an articulated, never a meaningful speech. This is, however, in accordance with the Peripatetic doctrine that animals, too, use their voices to express a meaning.[79] But when we try to imitate these animal sounds, they remain sounds which cannot be written down, and which, moreover, lose their original meaning. In the second place, we find that Ammonios' primary division is made into meaningful and meaningless sounds. This brings words like *blituri* into another category than human speech.

The Stoic opinion that sound is a body, is found in the Arabic translation of the *Placita Philosophorum*.[80] This materialistic doctrine was taken over by Naẓẓām (d. 231/846),[81] a Mu'tazilite whose affinity with Stoic philosophy in various respects has been demonstrated by Horowitz.[82] The Stoic definition of sound as the result of a percussion of the air is found in a number of authors in the Arabic world, who have in common that they used Greek logical and physical theories: Ibn Sīnā, the Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafā', and 'Abd al-Ğabbār.[83] 'Abd al-Ğabbār also gives us his ideas about the classification of sounds: 'The principle of this chapter is that sound in general is produced in different ways: it may be produced as sound proper,[84] not articulated;

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sound basis for the study of these events it was necessary to formulate exactly and explicitly the operational function of the phoneme. It is, of course, absurd to suppose that, prior to modern enlightenment, all grammarians confused letter and sound, cf. Caron, 1947. A very good analysis of the mediaeval concept *littera* in Benediktsson, 1972, 41-86.

[78] Amm. comment. in Aristot. de interpret. 31, 12-6 [G9].

[79] Pohlenz, 1939, 191 sqq.

[80] Plac. Phil. 277, 17.

[81] Ap. Rāzi, Maf. 1, 29, 7.

[82] Horowitz, 1903; 1909, 8-33.

[83] b. Sīn. ap. Rāzi, Maf. 1, 29, 3-4; Rasā'il, 3, 123, 10-1; also p. 132; 'Abd al-Ğabbār, Muġnī, 7, 12, 7-8.

[84] *Correcting tentatively mufīd into muqayyad*, cf. below. *Ṣaut muqayyad* should be translated by 'specific sound'; *muqayyad* is synonymous with *mu'ayyan*, cf. b. Anb. Ins. 103, 7.

it may be an articulated sound in general; and it may be articulated, and then either be connected or interrupted;[85] it may be produced to form one or more letters, but sometimes it is produced as something which cannot be described thus, for instance the creaking of a door: even though it consists in something with the same nature as some of the letters, it is only recognized as such when the sound is produced in a place with a definite acoustic structure, such as the structure of the mouth.[86] There is also a remark about the speech of birds: 'Therefore (sc. because it is meaningless), the speech of birds is not called language, even though it consists sometimes in two or more letters in a definite order'.[87]

To begin with his last remark about the speech of birds: 'Abd al-Ğabbar apparently agrees with the Stoics that animals can imitate human speech, and that, therefore, their speech can be written down and is also articulated.[88] This speech, however, can never be meaningful (*mufīd*), since animals do not possess reason.

The rest of the sounds are divided into sounds proper, which cannot be articulated, and articulated sounds, which may or may not have a spelling. Our emendation of the text seems to be unavoidable, because if language alone is meaningful, and if language consists in letters in a definite order,[89] and if these letters have to be articulated sounds, then a sound which is not articulated, but does have a meaning, is hardly conceivable. The examples of the two subdivisions of the articulated sounds—those which have a spelling, and those which cannot have one—are the same as in the scholia on Dionysios Thrax: on the one hand we have human speech, which can be written down, and on the other hand we have a sound which as a sound cannot be written down, but as the word which denotes that sound, is articulated, i.e. meaningful. In both cases the misunderstanding arises from the confusion between the sound and the word that denotes it. The expression 'a definite acoustic structure' is matched by the Stoic descriptions of the nature of sound and speech.[90]

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[85] For an explanation of these terms: Rasā'il, 3, 137, sqq.

[86] 'Abd al-Ğabbār, Muġnī, 7, 6, 16- 7, 2 [A9].

[87] Ib. 6, 14-5 [A10]. The 'speech of birds' (*manṭiq aṭ-ṭair*): Qur'ān, 27/16.

[88] If sounds can be written down, they are also articulated, cf. Muġnī, 7, 11-2: '... (speech) cannot be letters in a definite order, without at the same time being articulated sounds' [A11].

[89] Muġnī, 7, 6, 11-2.

[90] Cf. SVF 2, 44, 15-6; 2, 227, 35-7; 2, 258, 32 sqq.

The classification of sounds that we have discussed here uses the same categories of articulateness and spelling as the Stoic division. There is another division—found in the *Rasā'il Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā'* and in Rāzī's *Mafātiḥ*[91]—, namely into animal and non-animal sounds. In this division there is also a place for interjections, which are classified as those human sounds which cannot be expressed by letters, or as those human sounds which do not convey a meaning. One of the technical meanings of the word *ṣaut* (sound) is indeed 'interjection'.

Another important resemblance between Greek and Arabic theories is provided by the distinction between 'speech' (*léxis*) and 'language' (*lógos*) on the level of human speech, which is so characteristic for Stoic linguistics, and which turns out to have been known in the Arabic world. Ibn Ǧinnī writes: 'As for language (*kalām*), this is every self-sufficient expression, which communicates its own meaning. This is what the grammarians call "sentences" (*ǧumal*), such as *zaid aḫūka* (Zaid is your brother), *qāma muḥammad* (Muḥammad stood up) ... As for speech, (*qaul*), essentially it is every expression which is uttered by the tongue, be it complete or incomplete. Complete speech is communicative—I mean the sentences—..., while incomplete speech is not, such as *zaid, muḥammad, in* (if) ... Every language is speech, but not every speech is language'.[92]

The distinction between complete speech (*qaul tāmm*) and incomplete speech (*qaul nāqiṣ*) is identical with the Stoic *lektà autotelè* and *lektà ellipè*:[93] the similarity in terminology is striking.[94] The Stoic example of a meaningless word—i.e. a word which is speech, though not language—, *blituri* occurs in an Arabic source, namely in the notes of al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār (d. 942/331) on the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Categoriae*: here it has the form *balanṭūr*.[95]

The word that we have translated with 'communicative' is *mufīd*; this attribute may be applied only to complete sentences which consist minimally of a verb with its subject. A verb and its subject form a

91 Rasā'il, 3, 123-4; Rāzī, Maf. 1, 21, 19 sqq.

92 b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 1, 17, 9-16 [A 12].

93 SVF 2, 58, 29-30; 2, 61, 25-6.

94 *Ellipès = nāqiṣ; autotelès = mustaqill fī nafsihī*. As the exact equivalent for *autotelès* we regard the term *mufīd*, which means in our interpretation 'completing, realizing', cf. below. *Mustaqill fī nafsihī* is a translation of the Greek term, not a *calque*.

95 Ed. Georr, 361 antepen. (the vocalization is hypothetical); cf. chapter VI, note 38, and Walzer, 1963², 72.

sentence that is independent and yields meaning (*fā'ida*).[96] The term *fā'ida* indicates an independent meaning that is self-sufficient; it is connected with other words from the same radicals 'f-y-d'. The fourth form of the verb, *afāda*, means 'to do someone a service, to give property to someone', or 'to derive profit from' (in this sense it is synonymous with the tenth form *istafāda*); the masdar *ifāda* means 'advantage, usefulness'. *Afāda* is also a technical term with the sense of 'to transmit something, to express'; it may be said about the transmission of science, an opinion, knowledge, a meaning,[97] or about the expression of grammatical categories, for instance of the tenses, or of determination.[98] Goichon translates *afāda* with 'il donna', and consequently, *ifāda* with 'don, acquisition': (Ibn Sīnā) 'l'acquisition de l'existence par la nécessité d'être (*ifādat al-wuǧūd li-wuǧūb al-wuǧūd*).[99] We believe that in all examples quoted, *afāda* also expresses the actualizing of something potential, the realization or the completion of something.

In the technical vocabulary of 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, *afāda* is used for persons: speech is only possible when it is produced by someone who 'talks sense' (*yufīdu*).[100] A similar use is found in grammatical writings, when the verb is used absolutely: this or that word 'imparts a meaning', 'completes the meaning of the utterance' (*yufīdu*), for instance when it is said that 'the particle only means something in conjunction with two words' (*al-ḥarf lā yufīdu illā bi-kalimataini*).[101] In this sense *ifāda* may come very close to *ma'nā*, for instance when ibn Hišām says that speech consists in two parts: the phonetic expression (*lafẓ*), and the semantic function (*ifāda*).[102]

96 Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 119, 18-9 (*wa-'l-fi'l wa-'l-fā'il ǧumla yastaqnā bihā wa-taqa'u bihā 'l-fā'ida*).

97 *Yufīdu 'l-'ilm* (b. Anb. Lum. 33, 2; 34, 2); *yufīdu 'ẓ-ẓann* (ib. 34, 1); *yufīdu ma'rifa* (Fur. Šarḥ, 53, 19); *yufīdu 'l-ma'nā* (b. Anb. Inṣ. 72, 7-8; Aš'arī, Ibāna, 44, 10; Suy. Muzh. 1, 16, 13; *ifādat al-lafẓ li'l-ma'nā*). Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain translates the Greek verb *phótizein* with *yufīdu 'd-ḍau'* (ap. Gätje, 1971, 147, 12-6). Cf. van Ess, 1966, 447, s.v. ('einbringen').

98 *Ifādat al-azmina* (b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 1, 375, 9); *at-ta'rīf* (b. Anb. Asr. 93, 6). Cf. Suy. Muzh. 1, 25, 15-6 'the fact that *qāma 'n-nās* expresses the predication of the standing up to all of them' (*ifādat qāma 'n-nās al-iḫbār li-qiyām ǧami'ihim*).

99 Goichon, 1938, 288, s.v. *ifāda*. We would prefer to translate 'realization' (cf. in the same lemma 'faire acquérir l'être, donner l'être à une chose qui n'a pas en soi cet être').

100 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, Muǧnī, 7, 6, 14; 7, 9, 16-7; 7, 10, 9 sqq.; 7, 48, 9-10; 7, 63, 18-9; 7, 101, 20-1; 7, 102, 3; 7, 182, 9-12; 7, 183, 16.

101 b. Anb. Lum. 51, 7-8; cf. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 55, 1-4.

102 b. Hiš. Awḍ. 1, 11, 2-3.

A sentence which contains everything it needs, a complete sentence, is called *mufīd*: only *kalām* can be called *mufīd*, unlike the *qaul*, which may be *ġair mufīd*.[103] In this sense, *mufīd* is equivalent to the Greek term *autotelès*, which is used to indicate the quality that separates *léxis* from *lógos*. The literal meaning of *autotelès* is something like 'self-accomplished, complete in itself, realized by itself'.[104] The product of a *mufīd* sentence coming from a *mufīd* person, or, in other terms, the result of the process of *ifāda* is the *fā'ida*. *Fā'ida* is the meaning of the sentence, which can only be conveyed by a complete sentence, not by a string of loose words. Completeness should be understood in this context as syntactic completeness: the verb and the agent are the minimum constituents of an independent sentence that makes a complete sense.[105] In Greek grammar this complete meaning is called *autotéleia*.[106]

The tenth form of the verb, *istafāda*, means 'to receive, to acquire', for instance 'with the "*m*" and the *wāw* of the form *maf'ūl* you obtain a specific meaning (*tastafīdu bi-mīm maf'ūl wa-wāwihi ma'nan maḥṣūṣan*).[107] The meaning resulting from this is *mustafād* (realized, acquired, complete). Goichon translates 'c'est ce qui est donné par le *mufīd* et acquis par le *mustafīd*'.[108] It indicates what is received from outside, and what completes and realizes a potential quality: (Ibn Sīnā) 'things imagined by the mind, under the influence of something from outside' (*umūr tuṣuwwirat fī 'd-dihn mustafāda min ḫāriǧ*).[109] We may also refer to a technical term in Islamic psychology *'aql mustafād*, i.e. *ho thùrathen noûs*: the *'aql hayūlānī* in so far as it is realized by the *'aql fa''āl*, that is, by a factor not coming from itself, but from outside.[110]

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[103] Cf. above, note 93.

[104] Dion. Thr. 22, 4-5; SVF 2, 166; 2, 181; 2, 187; a synonym of *autotelès* is *téleios*, cf. also Donnet, 1967, 150-3.

[105] Cf. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 119, 17- 120, 4, and below, chapter VII, note 101. Lane. s.v., translates *fā'ida* with 'utility as expressive of a meaning, or as contributing to the expression there of; meaning, import; complete meaning'.

[106] Donnet, 1967, 150-3.

[107] b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 2, 481, 13-4; cf. Suy. Muzh. 1, 25, 19; b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 1, 300, 1: *yustafādu ma'nan* (a meaning is obtained).

[108] Goichon, 1938, 289, s.v. *mustafād*.

[109] Goichon, 1938, 290.

[110] Ḥwār. Maf. 135, 2; cf. Ḥunain b. Ishāq's translation ap. Badawī, 1971, 35, 4; cf. ib. pp. 36-7 with Alexandros of Aphrodisias' treatise *Perì noû*, Scripta Minora, 1, 106-113, ed. Bruns, Berlin, 1887; for the psychological theories: Gätje, 1965, 277. Finnegan, 1957, discusses the connection between *mustafād* and the Greek term *epiktétos*, pp. 147-8.

We believe that 'f-y-d' is equivalent to the meanings espressed by the Greek verb *teleîn*; the Arabic root is singularly suited for the translation of the Greek verb, since both verbs indicate a relation of giving, paying, as well as a completion, a realization. Probably the first term to be used in this context in the Arabic world was *mufīd* as the translation of *autotelès* (or *téleios*). The philosophical terms *mustafād*, *afāda* etc. must be a later development. It is interesting that *télos* in the sense of 'use, aim, goal' of a science is translated with *fā'ida*.[111]

Another trace of the Stoic theory about the *lógos* is found in observations about the development of speech and reason—in Stoic terminology translated both by the word *lógos*. Jamblichos tells us that according to the Stoics the *lógos* is not immediately realized at the time of birth, but that it takes fourteen years to build it up.[112] The number of fourteen years is mentioned by Diogenes the Babylonian in his definition of language 'which is completed after fourteen years'.[113] A number of seven years is given in the *Placita Philosophorum* in the chapter about the question 'How do perception, insight, and the internal *lógos* come into being?'.[114] The answer is that the internal *lógos* is formed in the course of seven years, which is evidently the first phase of a process that results in the possession of both inner and outer *lógos* (i.e. both reason and speech). This passage in the *Placita Philosophorum*, or rather its translation by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā[115] may have been the source for Ġazzālī[116] and Rāzī,[117] who mention the same division of human life into periods of seven years.[118]

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[111] Cf. below, chapter VII, note 18.

[112] SVF 2, 835; cf. also Zenon, SVF 1, 149.

[113] Diog. Laert. 7, 55 = SVF 3, 212, 27-8. A number of fourteen years, necessary for the maturing of the mind, is mentioned by Poseidonios, a later Stoic (± 150 A.D.), according to a quotation by Galenos (de aff. dign. 8, 3 (p. 29.9 de Boer = p. 41, 10 K.), cf. Walzer, 1963², 162.

[114] SVF 2, 83; for the term *endiáthesis*, cf. Pohlenz, 1939, 193, and chapter X, note 18.

[115] Plac. Phil. 71, 17: Daiber's translation 'Woche' is to be corrected into 'Hebdomade' according to the data given here.

[116] Ġazz. Iḥyā, 4, 9, 1. 11; Munqiḏ, 41, 15, ed. transl. F. Jabre, Beyrouth, 1959.

[117] Rāzī, Maf. in sūra 12/22, p. 111, 5 sqq.

[118] Also van den Bergh, 1954, 198-9.

CHAPTER THREE

THE THEORY OF GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES

'Children should know in the first place how to decline nouns and verbs, for otherwise it is impossible for them to reach an understanding of the rest.'[1]

A. THE PARTS OF SPEECH AND SĪBAWAIHI'S DIVISION

At first sight the division into three parts of speech (*aqsām al-kalām*) in Arabic grammar seems to be a blueprint of the Aristotelian division into noun (*ónoma*), verb (*rhèma*), and particle (*súndesmos*). This was already suggested by Merx, but he pointed out the resemblance to Aristotle and Greek logic exclusively, without taking into account Greek grammar.[2] While it is true that there is an undeniable superficial parallelism between the Aristotelian and the Arabic tripartition —a parallelism noticed by Arabic authors as well[3]—it cannot be denied that there is a great difference between the Aristotelian logical division and the Arabic grammatical division, especially when we consider the fact that the Aristotelian terms did not denote parts of speech, but rather constituent parts of sentences.[4]

Merx accepted the identification of the three Arabic parts of speech, *ism*, *fi'l*, and *harf*, with the Aristotelian *ónoma*, *rhèma*, and *súndesmos* without any reserve, but this was rejected by Weiß.[5] According to him *harf* is a non-technical notion (i.e., it is used for every word that is neither noun nor verb), whereas *súndesmos* is something specific, namely a word which binds together other words and phrases.[6] There

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[1] Quint. instit. orat. 1, 4, 22 (*nomina declinare et verba in primis pueri sciant: neque enim aliter pervenire ad intellectum sequentium possunt*).

[2] Merx, 1889, 141-3.

[3] Cf. Ḥwār. Maf. 145, 9 sqq.; *kalima* and *ribāṭ* are called by the grammarians *fi'l* and *harf al-ma'nā*, *adā* respectively; Far. Iḥṣ. 34, 4-7: the Arabic parts of speech, *ism*, *fi'l*, *harf* are called by the Greek (sic!) grammarians *ism*, *kalima*, *adāt*.

[4] Weiß, 1910, 379 sqq.; on the nature of the Aristotelian division: Koller, 1958, 28-9; Larkin, 1971, 27-33.

[5] Weiß, 1910, 379 sqq.

[6] On the *súndesmos* in Aristotle's writings: Gallavotti, 1954. The definition, poet. 1456 b 38-1457 a 6, is completely corrupted, but the examples show that the *súndesmos* has a specific function, namely that of linking words and phrases, as is suggested by

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did exist in the Arabic world a logical triad which correlated with the Aristotelian 'parts of speech', namely *ism*, *kalima*, *ribāṭ*, for instance in the writings of Fārābī and Ḥwārizmī, but these terms date from a later time. Weiß is right in saying that the Arabic grammatical division was anterior to the introduction of logic into the Arabic world, so that the latter cannot have been imitated by the former: 'Die Auffassung, als gingen bei den Arabern die Anfänge der Logik denen der Grammatik voraus ist ein Hysteronproteron, das die Folge der historischen Tatsachen auf den Kopf stellt'.[7] We must add, though, that although the logical division became known to the Arabs at a later time, it could have influenced Arabic grammar through Greek grammatical theory, which often betrays the traces of logical influence. For most Greek grammarians the study of language was identical with the study of the nouns and the verbs, while the rest of the words were considered not essential for the sentence, and therefore, not for grammar.[8] In this respect, they undoubtedly followed the tradition initiated by Aristotle.

Sībawaihi begins his 'Kitāb' with the words 'Words are noun, verb, or particle with a meaning that is neither noun nor verb'.[9] The term *ism* does not receive any definition, but three examples are given: *raǧul* (man), *faras* (horse), *ḥā'iṭ* (wall).[10] It is a well-known fact that the analysis of paradigms is very important for the history of Greek and Latin linguistics, not only because in giving examples grammarians tended to use their own names or those of their teachers, but also because the recurrent use of the same examples often helps to

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its name. Cf. Pohlenz, 1939, 161-3; Steinthal, 1891², 2, 263 sqq.; Gudemann, RE, VII, 2, 1780-1811, s.v. Grammatik; Morpurgo-Tagliabue, 1967, 43-58.

[7] Weiß, 1910, 381.

[8] On the opinion of the Latin grammarians in this respect: Glück, 1967, 29-30.

[9] Sib. Kit. 1, 2, 1 [A 13]. Usually the word *kalim* (words) is explained as a collective indicating the material from which the *kalām* (speech) is made (*ism al-ǧins*, *ism ad-dāt*; cf. Sīr. in marg, Sib. Kit. 1, 2; b. Mal. Alf. vss. 8-9; b. Hiš. Awḍ. 1, 11, 9-12). A single word is called *kalima*, which is defined as 'a sound which indicates a single, conventional meaning' (Zam. Muf. 4, 14 *al-lafẓat ad-dālla 'alā ma'nan mufradin bi-'l-waḍ'*). The regular plural of *kalima* is, of course, *kalimāt*. The difference between *kalim* and *kalām* is that the latter always possesses a complete meaning (*fā'ida*), whereas the former does not necessarily possess such a meaning, cf. b. Hiš. Awḍ. 1, 12, 1-6.

[10] The word *ḥā'iṭ* is left out in Zaǧǧāǧī's quotation of the 'definition', Iḍ., 49, 9-10. As far as I know, 'wall' is not used in Greek grammatical literature, except for the famous example of *soloikismós*: *peripatōn egō ho toíchos épese* (while I was walking the wall fell down); according to Donnet, 1967, 250-1, this was the standard example of the grammarians; cf. his reference to Johannes Glykas, *Johannis Glycae opus de vera syntaxeos ratione*. Ed. A. Jahn. Bern, 1848, 35, 15 sqq.

establish links between different groups of grammarians.[11] The field of Arabic grammar lies almost barren in this respect. It is, therefore, rather significant that Sībawaihi uses the two words *raǧul* and *faras* as examples of nouns. Barwick already observed that when these two examples occur in Greek or Latin grammar (*ánthrôpos/híppos*, and *homo/equus*, respectively) they spring from Stoic tradition.[12] We do not believe that the occurrence of the same two words 'man' and 'horse' in Arabic grammatical literature is a coincidence, and we think that by his use of precisely these two substantives—the origin of the third one, *ḥā'iṭ*, remains unclear—Sībawaihi followed a very old tradition, a tradition even older than the examples cited by Barwick, since the very same words are already used by Plato and Aristotle.[13] Of course, Sībawaihi's source could not have been the Aristotelian tradition, since he lived before the introduction of Greek logic into the Arabic world, but he was dependent on the tradition of the schools, as reflected in Dionysios Thrax' *Téchnè*, which in its turn was dependent on the Stoics. Incidentally, Dionysios' third example, *líthos* (stone), was also among the popular examples of Arabic grammarians, but in this case Aristotle may have been the source. It is true that later grammarians who continued to use Sībawaihi's first two examples may have borrowed them from the by then already existing translations of the works of Aristotle, but it is certainly more obvious to attribute them to the enormous influence of the *Kitāb*.

Among later grammarians who used *raǧul* (or *insān*) and *faras* are Zaǧǧāǧī,[14] Mubarrad,[15] Ibn Kaisān,[16] Abū 'Ubaid,[17] Ibn Ǧinnī,[18]

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[11] For the use of one's own name or the name of one's teacher, cf. Barwick, 1922, 93 and note 2; 173. As a typical example we may mention Apollonios' use of the name *triphōn*; the name *diogénès* in the *Téchnè* of Diogenes of Babylon; the names *diōn* and *dioklēs* in Diogenes Laertios, 7, 56 sqq. Cf. however Schmidt, 1839, 66, n. 91, last paragraph. For the tradition of the paradigms: Barwick, 1922, 93; 1957, passim; Donnet, 1967, 294-6.

[12] Barwick, 1957, 8, n. 1: 'Die beiden Substantiven (sc. *homo, equus* in Augustinus' *De Dialectica*) stammen aus stoischer Tradition; Diogenes v. Bab. (SVF III, 213, 29) nennt ebenfalls "Mensch" und "Pferd", *ánthrôpos* und *híppos* als Beispiele'; cf. Dion. Thr. 24, 5.

[13] Plato, Alc. I, 111 D; Aristot. categ. 1 b 28 et passim; cf. also Antisthenes in discussion with Plato ap. Simpl. in Aristot. categ. 208, 28 ed. Kalbfleisch (*híppos*).

[14] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 100, 6; Ǧum. 17, 8.

[15] Mub. ap. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 51, 2 (quoted from the beginning of the *Muqtaḍab*), cf. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 100, 6.

[16] b. Kais. ap. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 50, 13, cf. below, chapter III B, note 23.

[17] Abū 'Ubaid ap. Suy. Muzh. 1, 191, 4.

[18] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 206, 9.

Ibn al-Anbārī,[19] to name but a few. Even outside grammar we find the same two nouns being used as examples, for instance by a theologian such as al-Aš'arī,[20] and by two philosophers, al-Fārābī[21] and Ibn Sīnā.[22] In the case of al-Aš'arī the use of *insān* and *faras* may be ascribed either to his knowledge of Sībawaihi's *Kitāb*, or to his use of the commentaries on the Aristotelian writings, which, under Stoic influence perhaps, use *ánthrôpos* and *híppos*.[23] The same holds true for Ibn Sīnā. With al-Fārābī there is also the possibility of influence by Greek grammar.[24]

Sībawaihi's words 'As for the verbs they are patterns taken from the expression of the events of the nouns, and they are constructed to (signify) what is past, and what is to come, and what is being without interruption'[25] have often been taken as a definition of the verb.[26] But when we understand the term *ma'ḫūḏ* in the sense of 'etymologically derived from', we find that it is an assertion that the masdars are etymologically prior to the verb. Merx thought that there is a connection between this assertion and a passage from Aristotle, where the same thing seems to be stated in slightly different words.[27] There is, however, no need to look for a connection in the commentaries on Aristotle, if we take into account the data furnished by the Greek grammarians, as we will see below in the discussion concerning the priority of the masdar.[28]

Another problem is the interpretation of the words 'the events of the nouns' (*aḥdāṯ al-asmā'*). According to Zaǧǧāǧī we must understand by 'nouns' 'the owners of the nouns' (*aṣḥāb al-asmā'*), i.e., the real persons who perform the actions, and who are the nominata of the

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[19] b. Anb. Inṣ. 102, 17; Asr. 16, 17.

[20] Aš'arī, Ibāna, 21, 24-5. Aš'arī uses *insān wa-faras* instead of *raǧul wa-faras*.

[21] Far. Iḥṣ. 11 ult. - 12, 1 (*insān wa-faras*); Fārābī also uses Sībawaihi's examples for the personal names *zaid wa-'amr*.

[22] van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 130.

[23] See Aristot. categ. 1 b 28.

[24] Cf. below.

[25] Sīb. Kit. 1, 2, 2-3 [A 14].

[26] These words are also quoted by Rāzī, Maf. 1, 36, 7-8.

[27] Merx, 1889, 142; cf. Gätje, 1971, 5-6. It really does not seem very probable that Aristotle meant an etymological derivation of the verb from the noun when he says (de interpret. 16 b 8 sqq.): 'I say that it also signifies time (sc. the verb), such as "health" (*hugieia*) is a noun, but "is healthy" (*hugiainei*) is a verb, because it also signifies the present occurrence, and it is always a sign of those things which are said about something else' [G 10].

[28] Cf. below, chapter III C.

nouns.[29] This interpretation is criticized by Bāqillānī: according to him such an interpretation is only allowed when there is sufficient proof to alter the manifest meaning (*zāhir*) of the words. In the present case, it is perfectly right to interpret Sībawaihi's words as an implicit statement that nouns are identical with their nominata.[30] 'Events of the nouns' are thus identical with 'events of the persons' (*aḥdāṯ al-ašḫāṣ*).

Concerning the paradigms of the nouns, *raǧul* and *faras*, we can have no absolute certainty whether their origin must be sought in the translation of the commentaries on Aristotle, or in direct contact with Greek grammar. The most frequently used paradigm for the verbs, however, hardly leaves any room for such doubts. The Greek verb *túptein* (to hit) was never used by Aristotle, or by his commentators, whereas in grammar it was the most popular example for the category of the verbs.[31]

Throughout antiquity *túptein* remained the most popular and the most frequently used verbal paradigm. Theodosios used its conjugation as an example in his treatment of the verb—which means that it was used in the schools. We come across *túptein*—sometimes together with *gráphein* (to write) and *poiein* (to do)—in almost every work of Greek grammar.[32] It is hardly surprising then that this verb, translated into Arabic as *ḍaraba* should have been borrowed by the Arabic grammarians, if they really were dependent on the contact with living grammar in the Hellenistic countries. Since Aristotle uses other paradigms, e.g. *hugiainein* (to be healthy) and *badízein* (to walk), we cannot but attribute Sībawaihi's use of *ḍaraba* to the influence of living Greek grammar.[33] Note that *kataba* (to write) and *faʿala* (to do) are also frequently used.

[29] *Ṣāḥib al-ism* is in Zaǧǧāǧī's terminology synonymous with *musammā*, Īḍ. 56, 5; 82, 3; 83, 4.

[30] Bāq. Tamh. 228, 17- 229, 7.

[31] A few examples: Dion. Thr. 49, 1 (*túptein, poiein, gráphein*); 54, 2; 55, 1 (*gráphein, légein*); Greg. Cor. 95 (*túptein, poiein*); Barwick (1922, 93, n. 3) supposes that *gráphein* and *légein* stem from the Stoic tradition, cf. Diog. Laert. 7, 58, from the Stoic *Téchnē* of Diogenes of Babylon. Note that the verb *légein* in its Arabic translation *qāla* was less appropriate because of its weak medial radical; still, it is often used as an example of this class of verbs.

[32] Cf. Uhlig's amusing note in his introduction to the *Téchnē* of Dionysios Thrax, LIII, 16-25, where he also draws the attention to the fact that the Syriac and Armenian translations use the verb 'to hit'.

[33] Sib. Kit. (a few examples chosen at random): 1, 1, 14; 1, 2, 6; 1, 4, 4; 1, 14, 10; 1, 24, 4; 1, 55, 12; 1, 66, 5 sqq.; 1, 82, 9 sqq.; 1, 87, 7-8; 1, 93, 3 sqq.; 1, 100, 8-9; 1, 103, 10; 1, 211, 8 sqq.; 1, 278, 16; 1, 386, 7; 1, 407, 10; 1, 433, 11; cf. also Sib. ap. b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 49, 11 sqq.

Owing to the enormous influence of Sībawaihi's *Kitāb ḍaraba* remained in use with later grammatical writers; these include: Māzinī,[34] Mubarrad,[35] Zaǧǧāǧī,[36] Sīrāfī,[37] Ibn Ǧinnī,[38] Ibn al-Anbārī,[39] Zamaḫšarī.[40] The same verb is used also in logical writings, mainly in a grammatical context, for instance with Ḫwārizmī[41] and with Rāzī,[42] but there are also instances where it is used in purely logical texts, for instance by Ġazzālī[43] and by Ibn al-'Assāl (1st half of the 13th/7th century).[44] This shows that whatever may have been the influence of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* on Arabic logic and grammar. Sībawaihi's influence as the author of the *Kitāb* surpassed it in such things as the choice of a paradigm.

The interpretation of Sībawaihi's definition of the third part of speech *ḥarf ǧāʾa li-maʿnan laisa bi-'sm wa-lā fiʿl*[45] is essential for the understanding of the Arabic doctrine of the parts of speech. The first translation into a European language was given by de Sacy: '(et la lettre) employée pour exprimer un sens et qui n'est ni nom, ni verbe'.[46] According to this translation the particle is a part of speech with a special meaning, just as nouns and verbs have their special meanings. Merx tried to fit Sībawaihi's words into his conception of an Aristotelian division of the Arabic parts of speech, and was therefore forced to regard the third part of speech as a category without a meaning of its own, since according to Aristotle the *sindesmos* is a meaningless sound (*phōnē ásēmos*).[47] This resulted in the translation: 'particula sive littera, quae ad sensum aliquem accedit',[48] i.e., the particle serves to indicate a meaning in another word. Similarly we find with Jahn: '... um (den Nominibus und Verbis) Sinnstellungen zu geben (welche sie sonst nicht haben), ohne selbst Nomina und Verba

[34] Maz. ap. Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 81; 88.

[35] Mub. ap. Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 219, 15; ap. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 136, 7 sqq.

[36] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 56, ult.; 59, 8; 60, 1; 61, 3; 62, 3; 64, pen.; 65, 9; 12; 72, 13 etc.

[37] Sir. ap. Tauḥ. Muq. 175, 20 sqq.

[38] b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 1, 375, 12; 1, 379, 5; 2, 44, 5 etc.

[39] b. Anb. Inṣ. 2, 17.

[40] Zam. Muf. 126, 10.

[41] Ḫwār. Maf. 42, 15.

[42] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 33, 4; for his use of the example, cf. the quotation from Sībawaihi ap. b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 49, 11 sqq.

[43] Ġazz. Maq. 10, 13.

[44] Cf. Rescher, 1966, 117.

[45] Sib. Kit. 1, 2, 1.

[46] de Sacy, 1829, 361; cf. 385.

[47] Aristot. poet. cap. 20; 1456 b 38.

[48] Merx, 1889, 142-3.

zu sein'.[49] This interpretation is correct according to the definitions of the particle given by later grammarians, for instance by Zaǧǧāǧī 'particle is whatever signifies a meaning in another word' (*mā dalla 'alā ma'nan fī ġairihi*),[50] which assign to the particle the function of modifying the meaning of another word in the sentence.[51]

We agree with Weiß[52] that Sībawaihi's words, interpreted in this way, are in conformity with the interpretations of later grammarians, but that they do not represent Sībawaihi's own conception of the particle. In the first place, the words *laisa bi-'sm wa-lā fī'l* cannot belong as a second attribute to the word *harf*—which would be a highly unusual construction—, but they determine the word *ma'nan*.[53] In the second place, these words would be completely redundant, if we were to follow Merx and Jahn in interpreting *ġā'a li-ma'nan* as 'gives a meaning in another word', since in that case the particles would have been defined sufficiently as something different from the nouns and the verbs, which do have a meaning of their own. In the third place, it is difficult to imagine that Sībawaihi should have left out words to the effect that this *ma'nā* is found in other words. For these reasons Weiß translates '3. *Harfe*, die zum Ausdruck für etwas gemeintes stehen, das nicht Name (d.h. Ding) und nicht Aktion ist'.[54] In other words *ġā'a li-ma'nan* does not distinguish the particles from the nouns and the

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[49] Jahn, I, 1, 1. Cf. also Gätje, 1971, 6-7, who apparently believes that Jahn and de Sacy had the same idea about the semantic function of the particles. At least, that is what appears from Gätje's words about later Greek theories, which assign to the *sündesmoi* a certain meaning: 'Daß man den *sündesmoi* eine semantische Funktion zuerkennt, würde in jedem Falle auch zur Auslegung Sībawaihs durch de Sacy und Jahn passen'.

[50] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 54, 12-3.

[51] Cf. also b. Anb. Inṣ. 72, 7-8 'the particle is only used in order to communicate a meaning in a noun or a verb' (*al-harf innamā ġā'a li-ifādat al-ma'nā fī 'l-ism wa-'l-fi'l*); Mub. ap. Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 222, 11: '... it is like a particle of meaning, which is dependent on another word' (... *kānat ka-harf al-ma'nā allaḍī huwa mu'allaq bi-ġairihi*); Ġazz. Mi'yār, 43, 1 '(the particle) is what does not signify a meaning, unless it is combined with another word' (*mā lā yadullu 'alā ma'nan illā bi-'qtirānihi bi-ġairihi*); id., Maq. 10, 10-5.

[52] Weiß, 1910, 375-9.

[53] Sībawaihi uses *ism* in the sense of *musammā*, which explains how he can say about a *ma'nā* that it is neither a noun nor a verb, cf. Weiß, ib. 376-7 and e.g. Zaǧǧ. about a *ma'nā* that it is neither a noun nor a verb, cf. Weiß, ib. 376-7 and e.g. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 56, 3-6. There is, though, a note in the margin of the manuscript used by de Sacy, which says (de Sacy, 1829, 385): 'And (the words) *laisa bi-'sm wa-lā fi'l* are an attribute to *harf*, not to *ma'nan*, as some people believed. This is proved by his (sc. Sībawaihi's) words at the end of the chapter (*wa-asmā' mā ġā'a li-ma'nan*) *wa-laisa bi-'sm wa-lā fi'l*'. (cf. Sib. Kit. 1, 2, 6-7) [A 15]. The same argument is used by Diem, 1970, 322; cf. also Mosel, 1975, 217.

[54] Weiß, 1910, 376.

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verbs, but from other particles without a meaning, i.e., the *hurūf* in the sense of 'letters, syllables'. We may compare with this the expression al-Aḥfaš uses when he speaks about the word *mundu* (since): *hiya harf ma'nan laisa bi-'sm*.[55] Here the category of the *hurūf* with a meaning of their own is designated with the term 'meaningful particle' (*harf ma'nan*). We may also refer to Zaǧǧāǧī's category of the *hurūf al-ma'ānī* as against the *hurūf* as letters and as parts of words.[56] Ḥwārizmī informs us that the Aristotelian *ribāṭāt = sündesmoi* are called by the Arabic grammarians *hurūf al-ma'ānī*.[57] That particles contribute to the meaning of the sentence with their own meaning is already stated in ''Alī's definition 'a particle is what communicates a meaning'.[58] This interpretation seems to be preferable to the one given by Diem,[59] who takes *ġā'a li-ma'nan* and *laisa bi-'sm wa-lā fi'l* as two 'parallele asyndetische Relativsätze'. According to Diem *ġā'a li-ma'nan* indicates the function of the *harf*, namely having a meaning, as against the nouns and the verbs, which denote a thing and an action, respectively.[60]

The question remains how the words *ġā'a li-ma'nan* are to be translated. Merx' criticism of de Sacy's translation 'employée pour exprimir un sens'—according to Merx this should have been *bi-ma'nan*—is invalidated by the loci cited by Weiß, where the same words are used in the unambiguous sense of 'meaningful', 'giving a meaning',[61] which seems to be the correct interpretation of Sībawaihi's words.

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[55] Aḥfaš ap. Zaǧǧ. Amālī, 92, 1, 1 (cf. Weiß, 1910, 379).

[56] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 54, 12 sqq.

[57] Ḥwār. Maf. 145, 13-4; cf. also Far. Alf. 42, 7-8 'To the meaningful words belong those words which are called by the grammarians *hurūf*, and which are used to signify a meaning' [A 16].

[58] Ap. b. Anb. Nuzha, 4, 10-1 in a *varia lectio* which has *ġā'a li-ma'nan* instead of *afāda ma'nan*. Cf. also b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 53, 6-8: 'Arabic grammarians discussed this very often (sc. the nature of the *harf*), but the nearest thing to the truth is what Sībawaihi said; namely, that it is that which expresses a meaning which is neither a noun nor a verb. Like when we say *zaid munṭaliq* (Zaid is leaving), and then we say *hal zaid munṭaliq* (is Zaid leaving?): with the word *hal* we express a meaning which is neither present in *zaid*, nor in *munṭaliq*' [A 17]. Cf. Carter, 1972, 85: the particle possesses a certain meaning, but its function is not specified.

[59] Diem, 1970, 321-2.

[60] Diem, 1970, 316-7.

[61] Merx, 1889, 142, n. 2; Weiß, 1910, 378; cf. Sib. Kit. 2, 328, 11; 2, 473, 22; 2, 172, 4; cf. also above, note 51 (b. Anb.: *li-ifādat al-ma'nā*). In his commentary on Sībawaihi's words Sīrāfī says (Šarḥ, 1, 7, quoted by Mubārak in his edition of the *Īḍāḥ*, p. 54, n. 3): 'And if someone were to ask: why did he say *harf ġā'a li-ma'nan*, yet we all know that nouns and verbs are meaningful as well (*ǧi'na li-ma'ānin*)? ...' [A 18].

Several philosophical sources demonstrate the fact that a connection was felt between the grammatical *ḥarf* (together with *ism* and *fiʿl*) and the philosophical *ribāṭ* or *rābiṭ* (together with *ism* and *kalima*), for instance in the remarks made by Fārābī,[62] Ḥwārizmī,[63] and Ǧābir ibn Ḥayyān,[64] and also in Zaǧǧāǧī's conspicuous use of the word *ribāṭ* in his explanation of the term *ḥarf*.[65] *Ribāṭ* may be regarded as a *calque* of the Greek (Aristotelian) *sùndesmos*.[66]

For the original meaning of *ḥarf* we should turn to Sībawaihi. In the *Kitāb* the *ḥarf* is the third part of speech, with a meaning of its own. Sībawaihi wished to express the fact that the *ḥurūf* have their own meaning in order to distinguish them from another kind of *ḥurūf*, namely the letters. *Ḥurūf* in the sense of 'letters, sounds' are divided by Zaǧǧāǧī into two groups: in the first place, they are the *ḥurūf al-muʿǧam*, i.e., the sounds of the alphabet, which constitute the elementary material for all languages. But these *ḥurūf* may also be regarded as the elements of the words, e.g., the *ʿain* in the word *ǧaʿfar*, or the *ḍād* in the word *ḍaraba*, i.e., as the letters of these words.[67] This corresponds to the Greek distinction between the *stoicheîon* and the *charaktèr toû stoicheíou*, a distinction that is made by Diogenes of Babylon, by Sextus Empiricus, and by Ammonios in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*.[68] In the translations of Aristotle's writings *stoicheîon* is first transcribed as *usṭuquss*,—under the influence of Syriac *usṭuqsā* = Greek *stíchos*, contaminated with Syriac *usṭuqyā* = Greek *stoicheîon*—but this transcription was soon replaced by the term *ḥarf*, which is very near to *stoicheîon* in meaning: both words

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[62] Far. Šarḥ, 54, 8-9: *rābiṭ* is called by the grammarians *ḥarf*.

[63] Ḥwār. Maf. 145, 13-4: *ribāṭ* is called by the grammarians *ḥarf*.

[64] Ǧābir ap. Kraus, 1942, 2, 250: in grammar we have *ism*, *fiʿl*, *ḥarf*; philosophers (*ahl al-kalām al-ǧauharī*) use to call these parts of speech *ism*, *kalima*, *ribāṭ* (unites two nouns) / *ṣila* (unites a noun and a verb); cf. above, note 3.

[65] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 44, 11: the particle is a tie (*ribāṭ*) between noun and verb.

[66] E.g. in the translations of Aristotle's *Poetica*: Ibn Sīnā, Šiʿr, 191, 15 (= *wāṣila*); Mattā ibn Yūnus, Šiʿr, 127, 9 (distinguished from *wāṣila = árthron*, ib. 127, 12); Ibn Rušd, 235, 20 (distinguished from *fāṣila = árthron*, ib. 235, 24); cf. Fischer, 1964, 148. For *wāṣila*, cf. below.

[67] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. pp. 54-5.

[68] Diog. Bab. ap. Diog. Laert. 7, 56; Sext. Emp. adv. math. 1, 99; Ammon. comment. in Aristot. de interpret. ed. Busse, 23. 17 sqq.; cf. Barwick, 1922, 102 and note 1; Schmidt, 1839, 19, n. 32. Bravmann, 1934, 7-8, refers to a definition in the *Rasāʾil* *Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ*, where a distinction is made between three meanings of *ḥarf*: a mental, a phonetic, and a graphic meaning (Rasāʾil, 1, 311, 16); cf. Fischer, 1964, 145; scholia D.T. 317, 32; 326, 7-8.

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indicate the smallest part of something, an element, a little piece.[69] In order to distinguish them from the meaningful *ḥurūf* these elements are also called *ḥurūf al-muʿǧam*.[70]

The second category of *ḥurūf* is called *ḥurūf al-maʿānī*: they are distinguished from the *ḥurūf* in the sense of 'letters, consonants' by the fact that they are meaningful. According to Weiß the meaning of *ḥarf* as a member of the second category is not yet restricted to the technical meaning of 'particle': 'Hier ist nun zunächst festzustellen, daß bei Sībaweihi noch kein Ansatz für diesen Sprachgebrauch vorhanden ist. Nie bedeutet *ḥarf* bei ihm schlechtweg "Partikel"; wo er wirklich den dritten Redeteil als solchen bezeichnen will, bedient er sich umständlicher Umschreibungen, in denen oft das Wort *ḥarf* nicht einmal vorkommt'.[71] Very frequently Sībawaihi uses *ḥarf* in the sense of 'word', 'phrase', 'combination of words', or generally 'small component of the sentence'.[72] This is also confirmed by Zamaḫšarī's warning that the ancient grammarians often used *ḥarf* with the meaning of *kalima* (word).[73] The Greek term *stoicheîon*, which we have met above as the prototype for the Arabic *ḥarf* = 'letter', is also used in expressions where its meaning seems to be rather close to the term 'word', as for instance with Apollonios Dyskolos: the meaning that corresponds to each word is as it were a component of the sentence (*stoicheîon toû lógou*);[74] sometimes a sentence lacks an element (*stoicheîon*), e.g. a preposition.[75] But the most frequent meaning of *stoicheîon*—apart from the meaning 'letter'—is that of 'part of speech': in the scholia on Dionysios Thrax' *Téchnē* it is stated that the philosophers call *stoicheîa* what is called in grammar *mérē toû lógou*;[76] doubtlessly this use of *stoicheîon* was also known in other grammatical writings. The Arabic word *ḥarf* was an ideal *calque* of the Greek

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[69] Fischer, 1964, 142; Weiß, 1910, 369 sqq.; *usṭuquss*: e.g. Mattā ibn Yūnus, Badawi, 1953, 126, 5.

[70] Weiß, 1910, 375.

[71] Id. ib.

[72] Id. ib. 361 sqq.

[73] Zam. Kaššāf, 1, 61, 10.

[74] Apoll. Dysk. synt. 2, 11.

[75] Ib. 5, 14.

[76] Scholia D.T. 514, 35; Chrysippos, SVF 2, 45, 11; Apoll. Dysk. synt. 7, 12; 449, 2. The classic study about the meaning of *stoicheîon* is Diels, 1899. Cf. also: Balázs, 1965. According to Balázs, the *stoicheîon* was originally a rhythmical-metrical term, which denoted the smallest element of a verse, and later became a grammatical term with the meaning of 'sound', 'letter'. The Atomists' use of *stoicheîon* in the sense of 'constituent elements of the universe' was derived from the grammatical term (cf. Balázs, ib. 234).

stoicheion, since it shares with the Greek word the meaning 'compo-
nent, small part, element'; the meaning 'letter' was original; the
meaning 'particle' is the result of the development of the meaning of
harf via 'small word' to 'small word other than noun or verb' and
finally to 'third part of speech'. This development was already deter-
mined by the use of *stoicheion* in Greek grammatical and philoso-
phical literature.

Besides the three official parts of speech, *ism*, *fi'l*, *harf* Arabic
grammar recognized a number of other grammatical or syntactic
categories without considering them to be real parts of speech. This
is also the case in Greek grammar, where we find for instance the
category of the adjective (*epitheton*), which is not regarded as a
separate part of speech, although it is being used as such. In a
discussion between the grammarian Tryphon (1st century B.C.) and
an unknown Stoic[77] the criteria for the division into parts of speech
are dealt with: the morphological change of a word (*paraschèmatis-
mós*) can never be the criterion for a division into parts of speech.
For instance in the case of proper names, even when they may be
shown to possess a different declension, they are not a separate part
of speech, since their meaning is identical with that of the rest of the
nouns: 'It must be said about each part of speech that we should take
into account the essential characteristics (sc. the semantic ones), and
not the secondary ones (sc. the morphological ones), and we should
divide (the words) accordingly'.[78] The same opinion is expressed in
Arabic grammar: the proper name ('*alam*) has its own phonetic rules
and its own deviations from analogy due to its frequent use,[79] yet the

proper name cannot be set apart as a separate part of speech. In the
same way, Arabic grammar distinguished between 'general' (*kullī*)
and 'particular' (*ǧuz'ī*) nouns, but did not regard them as separate
parts of speech: the distinction, which is probably borrowed from
logic, is based on a difference in use and extension, not in essential
meaning.[80]

We have already pointed out that adjectives were not recognized as
a separate part of speech either in Arabic or in Greek grammar.[81]
The Greek grammarian Dionysios Thrax defined nouns as 'words
which signify something concrete or abstract'. If it is accepted that
this something may be a substance as well as a quality, then adjec-
tives will be nouns as well, since they indicate a quality, which may be
attributed to more than one substance.[82] This is, of course, in
accordance with the Stoic doctrine that everything, including the
qualities, is a body. Adjectives are defined—as a subspecies of the
nouns—in the following way: 'Adjectives are words that are used
homonymously for general and proper nouns, and which signify praise
or blame'.[83] In Arabic grammar we find a *de facto* distinction between
adjectives and substantives: in a discussion with Ibn Ḥālawaih, Abū
'Alī al-Fārisī is criticized for neglecting the distinction '... it was as if
the learned sheikh (sc. al-Fārisī) did not distinguish between noun
(*ism*) and adjective (*sifa*)!'[84] It is hardly a coincidence that several
Arabic authors define adjectives as words that are used as indications
of praise or blame.[85] According to Diem, Sībawaihi distinguished

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[77] Scholia D.T. 214, 17 sqq.; 24 sqq.; 517, 33 sqq. On Tryphon: RE VII A, 1, 726-
44, Schneider, Apoll. Dysk. frg. pp. 30 sqq. connects this discussion with Apollonios
Dyskolos (cf. also Schmidt, 1849, 44, n. 64). His main argument is that it is improbable
that Priscianus (instit. 1, 2) should have borrowed his opinion about the *partes orationis*
from Tryphon, and not from Apollonios Dyskolos. On the other hand, it seems more
obvious to proceed from the fact that Tryphon's name is actually mentioned by the
scholiasts. Cf. also Prisc. instit. 9, 1 with Tryphon, frg. 39, p. 33.

[78] Scholia D.T. 214, 29-31 [G11].

[79] This is already recognized by Sībawaihi, e.g. Kit. 1, 229, 9 sqq.; 2, 211, 11 sqq.
Cf. also Ibn Ǧinnī's chapter in the *Ḥaṣā'iṣ* on those characteristics of the proper
names (*a'lām*) that are not shared by the generic nouns (*aǧnās*), Ḥaṣ. 3, 32, 8 sqq.;
cf. Ta'lab, Maǧ. 1, 211, 8-9. The distinction *aǧnās / a'lām*: Zaǧǧ. Lām. 37-8; Zam.
Muf. p. 5 (important for Barhebraeus' doctrine, cf. Merx, 1889, 235 sqq.). *Laqab* is
used for proper names by al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār in his notes on the *Categoriae*, 371, 16:
'A nickname (*laqab*) is a name used for things which do already have another name'
[A19]. *Laqab* is also used in grammar, e.g. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 89, 16: noun (*ism*), and attribute
(*sifa*) and proper name (*laqab*). The difference between nouns and proper names is
mentioned in some definitions of the noun, cf. below, chapter III B.

[80] This difference is explained by Rāzī, Maf. 1, 40, 11 sqq.; Ġazz. Mi'yār, 36, 3-4;
6-7; 37, 11-6; Maq. p. 10. Cf. Arnaldez, 1956, 127.

[81] Steinthal, 1891², 2, 251-60.

[82] The category of the *onómata katēgoriká* (i.e. nouns serving as predicates) is
conjectured by Steinthal (1891², 2, 256); a class of adjectives called *katēgoriká* is
mentioned in the scholia D.T. 233, 24. In the definition of the noun given by Ibn al-
Anbārī, Ins. 2, 14, the two syntactic functions of the nouns are mentioned: '(A noun is)
that which can receive a predicate, and which can be used as a predicate', cf. below,
chapter III B, note 33.

[83] Dion. Thr. 34, 2-4 [G12].

[84] Suy. Muzh. 1, 240, 15 (*wa-ka'anna 'š-šaiḫ lā yafruqu baina 'l-ism wa-'ṣ-ṣifa*); cf.
Suy. Iqt. 72, 8: if a word is a noun, it has to be either solid (*ǧāmid*) or an attribute
(*waṣf*) (on *ǧāmid*, cf. below chapter III C, note 73, and Ta'lab, Maǧ. 350, 8). The
same distinction with Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 89, 16: noun (*ism*) or attribute (*sifa*) or nickname (*laqab*).
Cf. also b. Kais. ap. b. Anb. Ins. 19, 7 'the nouns, but not the adjectives' (*al-asmā' dūna
'ṣ-ṣifāt*).

[85] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 371, 2 sqq.; b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. p. 56; cf. 61, 10; 'Abd al-Ǧabbār,
Muġnī, 7, 52, 15; Zam. Muf. 46, 12-5; Rumm. ap. Mubārak, 1963, 315, 15; Ta'lab,
Maǧ. 2, 360, 12.

between three parts of speech, of which the *ism* indicates objects, the *fiʿl* actions, and the *harf* meanings (functions). The category *sifa* is a syntactic category which includes the adjectives but not only them: 'Das Adjektiv wurde seinem Wesen nach als syntaktisches Attribut aufgefaßt und stand damit außerhalb dieses Systems'.[86] In later grammar *ism* became a grammatical category, so that abstract nouns and adjectives could be reckoned among the *asmāʾ*. The criterium for the inclusion of a word in a category is whether it may replace words from that category.[87]

Morphological and semantic differences between the noun and the pronoun (e.g. different declension, absence of a deictic element in the nouns) led the Greek grammarians to separate the pronoun from the noun and to recognize it as a part of speech (*antônumia*) which included the personal and the demonstrative pronouns.[88] The *Aristotelikoi* continued to regard the noun and the verb as the pivots of the sentence, and the rest of the words as unessential; in their view the pronoun was only a substitute for the noun. We may quote in this context the testimony of the above-mentioned discussion in the scholia, as well as the remark of Ammonios that Alexandros of Aphrodisias added the pronouns and the adverbs to the category of the nouns.[89]
Stoic grammarians did combine the personal and the demonstrative pronouns, but within the category of the *árthra*, which comprised besides these pronouns the article, as well as the relative pronouns.[90] Their argument was that pronouns may be replaced by articles, for instance in Homeric Greek, and something which may replace a word is identical with that word, and belongs to the same category.[91] This theory is criticized in the above-mentioned discussion between Tryphon and an unknown Stoic.[92]

It was precisely this argument of syntactic interchangeability that made Sibawaihi include personal and demonstrative pronouns in the category of nouns.[93] The personal pronoun is called by him *ism*

[86] Diem, 1970, 331.

[87] This doctrine is refuted in the scholia D.T., 518, 33 sqq., and by Apollonios Dyskolos, cf. Steinthal, 1891², 2, 223. Cf. Diem, 1970, 323; Mosel, 1975, 111, and below, note 92.

[88] Steinthal, 1891², 2, 213 sqq.

[89] Scholia D.T. 515, 30 sqq.; Alexandros ap. Ammon. in Aristot. de interpret. 13, 19-21, ed. Busse.

[90] Barwick, 1957, 35; Schmidt, 1839, 39-42; Pohlenz, 1939, 164.

[91] Scholia D.T. 518, 33- 519, 5.

[92] Cf. above, note 87.

[93] On this criterium of Sibawaihi: Diem, 1970, 323; Mosel, 1975, 111.

mudmar (hidden noun), but this term may also denote the noun to which the pronoun refers.[94] *Ism mudmar* is apparently related to the Syriac term for the personal pronouns, *huššabāyā* (the understood one, the intended one); the origin of the Syriac term is not clear. A variant of the Arabic term, *damir*, became the usual name for the pronouns in Arabic grammar. The demonstrative pronoun is called by Sibawaihi *ism mubham* (dubious, ambiguous noun), because it may refer to many objects;[95] a later term for the demonstrative pronouns is *asmāʾ al-išāra*. Both categories, *ism mudmar* and *ism mubham*, are combined into one category, the *hawālif*, by Hwārizmī and Fārābī. In Hwārizmī's account of Aristotelian logical theory he tells us that *hawālif* is a logical term, and that it is the equivalent of the grammatical technical terms *asmāʾ mubhama, asmāʾ mudmara*, and *abdāl al-asmāʾ*.[96] Earlier in his work Hwārizmī deals with the theory of the grammarians, and there he asserts that in grammatical terminology *asmāʾ mudmara* denote the personal pronouns, and *asmāʾ mubhama* the demonstrative pronouns. The term *hawālif* was probably influenced by the Syriac term for the pronouns, which was originally *hlāp šmā*, before it became *huššabāyā*.[97] Both *hlāp šmā* (*hawālif*) and *abdāl al-asmāʾ* would be good translations of the Greek term *antônumiai*.

Fārābī uses the term *hawālif* in his *Kitāb al-alfāz al-mustaʿmala fī 'l-mantiq*.[98] In this work he describes the elements of speech in accordance with Greek grammatical doctrine—as he himself admits: Arabic grammarians did not distinguish between different kinds of *hurūf*, and he—Fārābī—had therefore had to borrow names for these different kinds of *hurūf* from Greek grammatical scholars, who operated with five categories: *hawālif, wāsilāt, wāsitāt, hawāši, rawābit*.[99] The first category comprised the personal and demonstrative pronouns and has been dealt with above.

The second category, the *wāsilāt*, includes the article, the relative pronouns, and the particle of the vocative *yā*. The combination of the

[94] Mosel, 1975, 109; other terms used by Sibawaihi are ʿalāmat al-mudmar, ʿalāmat al-idmār, damir.

[95] Sib. Kit. 1, 63, 16; 2, 42, 7; Diem, 1970, 317-8; Mosel, 1975, 122-5.

[96] Hwār. Maf. 146, 2; abdāl al-asmāʾ is also used by Taʿlab, Mag. pp. 439-40; the grammatical passage: Hwār. Maf. 47, 3-4.

[97] Tarazi, 1969, 115; hlāp šmā was already used in the Syriac translation of Dionysios Thrax' Téchnè.

[98] Edited by M. Mahdī, Beirut, 1968. This book has recently been the subject of two studies, cf. Gätje, 1971 and Haddad, 1969.

[99] Far. Alf. 42, 11 sqq.

article and the relative pronouns is typical for Greek grammar, for instance in Dionysios Thrax' *Téchnè*, where they together form the category of the *árthra*.[100] Even more characteristic is the combination of the article and the particle of the vocative: the particle *ô* was generally regarded as the vocative of the article, a doctrine refuted by Apollonios Dyskolos.[101] Arabic grammar often designates the relative pronouns as *asmā' mauṣūla*, and this grammatical term is related to Fārābī's *wāṣilāt*.[102] *Wāṣila* translates the Greek word *árthron*: Mattā ibn Yūnus used it to translate *árthron* in his translation of Aristotle's *Poetica*.[103] In Ibn Sīnā's commentary on the *Poetica*, however, we find *wāṣila* as a synonym for *ribāṭ*, whereas the articles are called *fāṣilāt*.[104] Gätje solves this problem by supposing a division of the *rawābiṭ* into two sub-groups, *wāṣilāt* and *fāṣilāt*, the first sub-group being formed by the conjunctions proper, and the second by the articles.[105] In that case, the term *fāṣila* may be related to the Greek definition of the article, which was believed by some grammarians to serve as a sort of distinctive mark of the gender of the substantives, for instance by Diogenes of Babylon: 'The article is a declinable element of speech, which marks the difference in gender and number of the nouns, e.g. *ho, hè, tó, hoi, hai, tá'*.[106] The Greek word *dihorizon* (which marks) has the same meaning as the Arabic *fāṣila*. It is not very surprising that Arabic grammarians regarded the article generally as a particle, since this word does not have any declension.[107]

The third group in Fārābī's division is formed by the prepositions, which are called *wāṣiṭāt*, because they always stand between two substantives, or between a verb and a substantive. We do not know any equivalent in Greek grammatical terminology—the Stoic term *mesótès* designates the adverbs. That Fārābī classifies the prepositions

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[100] Steinthal, 1891², 2, 309.

[101] Apoll. Dysk. pron. 6, 10; 14, 18 et passim; cf. Steinthal, 1891², 2, 309; Gätje, 1971, 15.

[102] E.g. b. Anb. Inṣ. 380, 25; 303, 4; Lum. p. 51; Zam. Muf. pp. 56-61; also *ṣila*: Zam. Muf. 57, 3. Sībawaihi's theory of the relative clause: Mosel, 1975, 155 sqq.

[103] Mattā ibn Yūnus, ed. Badawī, 1953, p. 127.

[104] Ibn Sīnā, Si'r, 191, 15; 191, 19; 235 pen.

[105] Gätje, 1971, 12.

[106] Diog. Bab. SVF 3, 214, 2-4 [G 13].

[107] This group also includes according to Fārābī a category of logical quantifiers, such as *kull, ba'ḍ*, cf. also Far. Šarḥ, 63, 22 sqq.; Ḥwār. Maf. 146, 3-4 (*sūr*); cf. Zimmermann, Islamic philosophy, 1972, 534-5. In Greek logic such words were called *sunkatègorèmata*, cf. Pinborg, 1967, 31. About the article as a particle: Gabučan, 1972, 35 (*harf at-ta'rīf*); Zaǧǧ. Lām. 17-29.

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as particles is quite understandable within the Greek context: in Greek grammar, the prepositions formed either a separate category or a sub-group of the conjunctions (*súndesmoi prothetikoí*). In Arabic grammar many words which we would call prepositions are included in the category of the nouns under the name *ẓurūf*.[108]

The adverbs, *ḥawāšī*, constitute the fourth category of Fārābī's particles. If this word is really derived from the radicals *ḥ-š-w*, the meaning of this term is 'filling up, stuffing'. In that case *ḥawāšī* means the same as the Greek word *stoibaí* used by the grammarian Tryphon to indicate the group of the conjunctions. Calling these words *stoibaí* implies that they are redundant, and that they only serve to fill out speech, as it were.[109] *Ḥašw* in the sense of 'redundant word' is used by al-Kindī in the case of the word *inna*, which according to him has no real function in the sentence and is, therefore, unnecessary and redundant.[110] Weil asserts that *ḥašw* is a Kūfan term, but we know from Zamaḥšarī that the term was used by Sībawaihi to indicate a special class of expressions which contain a redundant word.[111] It is unclear how this root came to be used by Fārābī as a designation for the adverbs; most adverbs were called *ẓurūf* in later grammar, and were classified as nouns after the example of Sībawaihi.[112] For the classification of the adverbs as nouns there are parallels in Greek literature: Alexandros of Aphrodisias regarded the adverbs as nouns, and so did the Stoa in the case of adverbs derived from nouns.[113]

Fārābī's last category is formed by the conjunctions, *rawābiṭ*. This term seems to be a *calque* of the Greek *súndesmos*; it persisted in

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[108] For the name of the *wāṣiṭāt*, cf. perhaps Ibn al-Anbārī's remark that a particle can only have a meaning with the help of two words (b. Anb. Lum. 51, 7-8), and Zaǧǧāǧī's observation that the particle must be constructed with two words (Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 55, 2 sqq.) and that they join a verb with the genitive case with which it is constructed (Iḍ. 93, 10 sqq.).

[109] Tryphon, frg. 41, p. 35; cf. scholia D.T. 66, 30, and maybe Varro, De L.L. 8, 10 (*fulmentum*).

[110] Al-Kindī in a conversation with al-Mubarrad, reported by Rāzī, Maf. 2, 42 ult.-43, 4.

[111] Weil, 1913, 72, n. (instead of the Baṣrian *ilǧā'*; cf. Maḥzūmī, 1958, 315); Zam. Muf. 57, 3 (in expressions such as *allaḏī abūhu munṭaliq zaid*, where the normal term is *ṣila*). *Ḥašw* was also used to indicate the middle of the word, as against the end or the beginning (*ṭaraf; awwal, mubtada'*), b. Anb. Inṣ. 11, 23; b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 329, 11 sqq.; 2, 337, 13. According to Ḥwārizmī, Maf. 44, 7, *ḥašw* in this sense was already used by al-Ḥalīl.

[112] On the *ẓarf*: cf. above, chapter I, note 40.

[113] Scholia D. T. 520, 16 and Schmidt, 1839, 45, n. 66.

Arabic grammar, as we have seen in the discussion concerning the meaning of *harf*.[114]

B. THE NOUN

Several definitions of the noun have been proposed by Arabic grammarians:

1. Mubarrad defines the noun, and at the same time describes it morphologically. His definition—which is mentioned by Zaǧǧāǧī and Ibn Fāris[1]—indicates the function of the noun as a sign of meaning: 'A noun is what denotes a meaning, such as *raǧul* (man), *faras* (horse), and *zaid*, *'amr*, and so on'.[2] Nouns serve as 'names' for the objects, just as verbs serve as 'names' for the actions. In the discussions concerning the etymology of the word *ism*[3] Mubarrad expresses the same thought with different words, when he says 'A noun is what signifies a nominatum underlying it'.[4]

2. Morphological definitions of the noun—such as the ones transmitted from Mubarrad and from Hišām ibn Mu'āwiya—emphasize the fact that nouns may be in the genitive case; this is the one nominal case that is not shared by the verbs: 'A noun is a word which is able to receive one of the particles that govern the genitive, and, inversely, what cannot receive any of them, is not a noun'.[5] How important this morphological feature is, is demonstrated by the fact that Zaǧǧāǧī dedicates one very lengthy chapter to the question why verbs do not have a genitive.[6]

3. Some definitions distinguish between 'general' and 'individual' nouns. Stoic logic correlated the difference between individual terms

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[114] Cf. above.

[1] Mub. ap. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 51, 2-3 [A 20] (quotation from the beginning of the *Muqtaḍab*); b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 50, 19-20.

[2] On these paradigmata: above, chapter III A.

[3] Cf. below, chapter IX.

[4] Mub. ap. b. Anb. Inṣ. 2, 10 (*al-ism mā dalla 'alā musamman taḥtahu*). Cf. also the definition given by 'Ukbarī, Mas. 43, 6: 'A noun is what names its nominatum and explains it and reveals its meaning' [A 21]. Cf. Diem, 1970, 316.

[5] Mub. ap. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 51, 3-4; cf. Hiš. ap. b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 50, 9 [A 22]; *umtuni'a min ḏālika*: the same terminology in the definition of the verb, cf. below, chapter III C, note 1.

[6] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. pp. 107-20.

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and generic ones—which is a difference in logical connotation—with a grammatical distinction between proper nouns (*onómata*) and common nouns (*prosēgoriai*),[7]—two parts of speech where older grammar had had only one. Thus we find in the *Perì phônês* of the Stoic grammarian Diogenes of Babylon two definitions: 'A common noun is a part of speech which signifies a common quality, such as *anthrôpos* (man), *hippos* (horse). A name (proper noun) is a part of speech which signifies an individual quality, such as *diogénès*, *sôkrátès*'.[8] Pohlenz tried to explain this distinction of two sorts of nouns in terms of the Stoic doctrine according to which only the individual phenomena possess a real existence, whereas the *lektá* (translated by him as 'general notions') are only found in speech.[9] This explanation is rather unsatisfactory: the word *diôgénès* is as much a *lektón* as is the word *anthrô-pos*;[10] only their denotata (*tunchánonta*) differ inasmuch as they are either individual qualities, or qualities shared by several individuals. As a matter of fact, the grammatical distinction is already to be found in Aristotle's writings, who interprets the division of the nouns into two categories in terms of the distinction between genus and species:[11] 'As some things are general, other things individual—I call "general" something which can be naturally predicated about several objects, and "individual" something which cannot be predicated in this way, e.g. *anthrôpos* is general, and *kallias* is individual—, it is necessary to show in which way something is present or absent in a substrate'.[12] The Aristotelian distinction is found in Arabic grammatical writings,

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[7] Christensen (1062, 49) explains the distinction as follows: 'The meaning of a proper name is an "individual quality" (*idia poiótès*). By asserting an individual quality of a region of reality, we refer to that region as being the region of exceedingly complex motion of high stability and permanence, since Socrates is what in physics might be called a high-level tensional field ... The meaning of "Socrates" is intended to imply the unique set of true propositions that can be made about Socrates'. The common nouns, on the other hand, denote 'field' with common qualities (*koinè poiótès*). On the grammatical distinction: Schmidt, 1839, 43-4; Barwick, 1957, 35.

[8] Diog. Laert. 7, 58 = SVF 3, 213, 27-31 [G 14]; cf. Steinthal, 1891², 2, 237 sqq.

[9] Pohlenz, 1939, 163.

[10] Cf. however Long, 1971, 77-8; 104-6: the meaning of a word such as *diôn* is not a *lektón*, but the object signified by that word, viz. Dion himself.

[11] *Koinós* vs. *idios*: Aristot. categ. 2 b 8-13: 'If you wish to show what the first substance is, you will make it more recognizable and more particular by mentioning the species than by mentioning the genus; for instance, you will make a certain person more recognizable by calling him "man" than by calling him "living being"—the first attribute is more characteristic for that certain person, the second more general' [G 15].

[12] Aristot. de interpret. 17 a 38 - 17 b 2 [G 16].

for instance in Ġazzāli.[13] The difference between the Aristotelian and Stoic distinctions is that Aristotle defines the logical extension of general and individual nouns, whereas the Stoics are more concerned with the nature of the objects denoted by those nouns: some philosophers like Philoponos and Romanos even modified the definition by substituting the word 'substance' (*ousia*) for 'quality' (*poiótēs*).[14]

The Stoic distinction disappeared from Greek grammatical literature, but it left some traces. Dionysios Thrax explicitly mentions the distinction between proper and common nouns, although he disagrees with it: 'The common noun is a subspecies of the noun'.[15] His definition of the noun is also interesting in this respect: 'A noun is a declinable part of speech ... which may be used generally or individually, generally like *anthrôpos*, *híppos*, individually like *sōkrátēs*'.[16] It will be noted that Dionysios uses the same paradigmata as Diogenes did. The arguments adduced by the scholiasts in defending the distinction between proper and common nouns are purely grammatical, and probably not derived from Stoic sources.[17] They need not bother us here, but are more relevant in the discussion about the Arabic division of the parts of speech as compared with the Greek division.[18] Still, the discussion proves that the Stoic distinction was not lost totally, which is also apparent in the definition of the noun, attributed by Priscianus to Apollonios Dyskolos: 'A noun is a part of speech which shows the individual or general quality of the underlying concrete or abstract things'.[19] The influence of the Stoic distinction is also manifest in Latin grammar.[20]

In his *Iḥṣā' al-'ulūm* Fārābī describes the single words as follows: 'Some single words are names of persons, such as *zaid*, *'amr*; other

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[13] *Ǧuz'ī* vs. *kullī*: Ġazz. Miʿyār, 37, 11-6; cf. 36, 3-4; 6-7; Maq. p. 10. Cf. Arnaldez, 1956, 127.

[14] Choirob. 1, 106, 5-7 (cf. Steinthal. 1891², 2, 239): 'A noun is a declinable part of speech, which assigns to each of the underlying concrete or abstract things its general or individual substance' [G 17]. Probably this Philoponos is Johannes Philoponos *an-Naḥwi*, the philosopher-grammarian, cf. below, chapter VI, note 40.

[15] Dion. Thr. 23, 2-3 (*hē gàr prosēgoría hōs eîdos tōi onómati hupobéblētai*).

[16] Ib. 24, 3-6 [G 18].

[17] Scholia D.T. 214, 17 sqq.; cf. above, chapter III A, note 78.

[18] Cf. above, chapter III A.

[19] Prisc. de XII vers. Aen. 6, 95: *Nomen est pars orationis quae singularum corporalium rerum vel incorporalium sibi subiectarum qualitatem propriam vel communem manifestat*. On this definition: Schneider's remarks, frg. Apoll. Dysk., pp. 38-9; Steinthal, 1891², 2, 240.

[20] Barwick, 1922, 106.

(single) words denote the species and the genus of the objects, such as *insān* (man), *faras* (horse), *ḥayawān* (animal), *bayāḍ* (whiteness), *sawād* (blackness)'.[21] Fārābī's pupil and teacher, Ibn as-Sarrāǧ, introduced the distinction into grammar with his definition of the noun, the one quoted by Zaǧǧāǧī: 'A noun is what signifies a meaning, and this meaning is an individual thing, or a non-individual thing'.[22] Connected with this definition is the one quoted from Ibn Kaisān: 'A noun is what indicates individuals, and what has a meaning of its own, such as *raǧul* (man) and *faras* (horse)'.[23] In this form, however, the definition can hardly be correct, since it only mentions the proper nouns (individuals), but with the examples for the common nouns. This does not make sense: we can hardly consider the words 'man', 'horse' representative for individuals (*ašḫāṣ*). Somehow, the missing parts of the definition must be supplemented, namely the examples for the individual things, and the name of the group of words represented by the two examples given.

4. Nouns may be defined syntactically in that they may serve as the subject of a sentence, unlike the verbs or the particles, for instance in a definition ascribed to al-Aḫfaš Saʿīd ibn Masʿada: 'A noun is that about which it is permitted (to say) "it helped me", "it harmed me"'.[24] There is a second version of this definition, quoted by Ibn Fāris,[25] which seems to be the original one.[26] The general meaning of the definition is very close to that of the definition reported by Ibn Fāris from Sībawaihi: 'A noun is that about which something is told'.[27]

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[21] Far. Iḥṣ. 11, 14-12, 2 [A 23]; cf. Alf. 58, 12-59, 4: an almost literal translation of the Aristotelian text quoted above, note 12; here the examples are 'man', and 'zaid', 'amr': the Aristotelian context leaves out 'horse'! On universals vs. particulars in Islamic logic: Zimmermann, Islamic philosophy, 1972, 518; 527, and note 11 with quotations from Fārābī's *Šarḥ al-'ibāra*.

[22] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 50, 5-6 [A 24]; cf. also b. Anb. Asr. 5, 19-20.

[23] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 50, 12-3 [A 25].

[24] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 49, 12; the addition 'to say' is form Zaǧǧāǧī himself [A 26].

[25] b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 50, 7-8.

[26] Instead of *ǧāza fīhi* (it is permitted) the expression *ḥasuma fīhi* is used here, which is also used in another definition of the noun by al-Aḫfaš, ap. b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 50, 5-7. The same expression in two anonymous definitions of the verb, which are transmitted by Ibn Fāris, Ṣāḥ. 52, 11-2; 13-4 (cf. Tarazi, 1969, 144), and in Zaǧǧāǧī's definition of the verb, Ǧum. 21, 13; 22, 2. 'To help' (*nafaʿa*) and 'to harm' (*ḍarra*) are possibly borrowed from a Qur'anic verse, Qur'ān, 22/12-3; this verse is discussed by al-Aḫfaš ap. Ṯaʿlab, Maǧ. 592, 2-3. Sīrāfī uses in a similar context the verb *aʿǧaba* (to wonder), in marg. Sib. Kit. 1, 123, 7.

[27] b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 49, 7-8 (*al-ism huwa 'l-muḥaddaṯ 'anhu*).

Another definition of the noun from al-Aḫfaš, also mentioned by Ibn Fāris, may be quoted as well, since it not only includes the verbal, but also the adjectival predicates: 'When you find a word with which the verb and the adjective may be properly used, such as "Zaid stands", or "Zaid is standing", and when you find moreover that it has a dual and a plural, such as *zaidāni*, *zaidūna*, and when you find that it cannot be conjugated, know then that it is a noun'.[28] These three definitions have in common that they are formulated in syntactic terms: a noun is characterized by the fact that it may be subject of a sentence. There is apparently a connection with the Mu'tazilite definition of 'thing' (*šay*): 'A thing is something about which something may be predicated'.[29] We know that al-Aḫfaš was indeed a Mu'tazilite.[50]

Al-Aḫfaš' definition met with critical remarks from other grammarians. Zaǧǧāǧī, for instance, does not accept it, since it does not include words such as *aina* (where?), *kaifa* (how?). About these words nothing can be predicated, but they are nevertheless reckoned among the nouns.[31] This criticism is also mentioned by Rāzī,[32] who defines the noun as 'something about the meaning of which something can be predicated'.[33] He remarks: 'Some people object to the words "noun is that about which you can predicate something", since, as they say, "where", "when", "how" are nouns, but you cannot predicate something about them. 'Abd al-Qāhir, the Grammarian, gave the following answer to this: When we say "noun is that about which you can predicate something", what we intend to say is: "(noun is) that about the meaning of which you can predicate something". As a matter of fact, it is possible to predicate something about the meaning of *idā* (when), since when we say *ātika idā ṭala'at aš-šams* (I will come to you when the sun rises), the meaning is *ātika waqt ṭulū' aš-šams* (I will come to you at the time of the rising of the sun). About the word *waqt* (time) you can predicate something, as is proved by the

28 b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 50, 5-7 [A 27].

29 This definition of *šay* stems from the Stoic tradition, cf. Rescher, 1966, 69-70, and below, chapter VII, note 33.

30 Cf. chapter VIII, note 10.

31 Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 49, 14- 50, 4; 'Ukb. Mas. 54-7.

32 Rāzī, Maf. 1, 33-4.

33 Ib. 1, 34, 13; the complete form of the definition ib. 1, 32, pen.: 'The word which allows predication about itself and with itself is a noun', as against the verb, which allows only predication with itself, not about itself, and the particle, which allows neither. Cf. the Baṣrian doctrine, reported by Ibn al-Anbārī, Inṣ. 2, 13 sqq.

expression *ṭāba 'l-waqt* (the time is good)'.[34] This discussion is continued in 'Ukbarī's *Masā'il ḫilāfiyya*; after reproducing 'Abd al-Qāhir's argument, 'Ukbarī tries to refute it. His conclusion is that adverbs are nouns, but that it is nevertheless impossible to predicate something about them.[35] This conclusion makes al-Aḫfaš' definition unacceptable to him.

5. According to Zaǧǧāǧī the only correct definition of the noun, if one is to work along grammatical standards, is his own definition: 'A noun in the language of the Arabs is something active (*fā'il*) or passive (*maf'ūl*), or what takes the place of something active or passive.'.[36] There are other definitions, he says, but those are correct only from a logical point of view. At first sight, he seems to define nouns in terms of 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity'; in that case his definition would be a syntactic definition, just as the definition of al-Aḫfaš mentioned above. But Zaǧǧāǧī quotes al-Aḫfaš' definition as an example of a definition in terms of 'subjectivity' (*taqrib 'alā 'l-mubtada'*),[37] and he criticizes it for precisely this reason: adverbial nouns can never be the subject of a sentence; still, they are nouns. This suggests that we should interpret Zaǧǧāǧī's definition differently, and that the terms *fā'il* and *maf'ūl* do not denote activity and passivity in a grammatical sense, but in a physical sense.[38]

34 Rāzī, Maf. 1, 33 [A 28]. Cf. Rāzī's answer, Maf. 1, 34, 2-7. The 'Abd al-Qāhir the Grammarian who figures here and in 'Ukbarī's account is 'Abd al-Qāhir ibn 'Abd ar-Raḥmān al-Ǧurǧānī an-Naḥwī, the author of *Dalā'il al-i'ǧāz* und *Asrār al-balāǧa* (d. 1078/471), cf. Brockelmann, GAL I, 341; S I, 583, Suy. Buġya, 2, 106, nr. 1557. He also wrote a *Muġni fī šarḥ al-Īḍāḥ*, but that may be Fārisī's *Īḍāḥ*.

35 'Ukb. Mas. 53; he uses the same arguments as Zaǧǧāǧī does, Iḍ. 51, 14- 52, 8, in his answer to those who criticize Mubarrad for this definition (an argument in terms of general principle and exception to the rule).

36 Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 48, 6-7 [A 29].

37 Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 49, 13, cf. above.

38 This notwithstanding the fact that the same terms are used elsewhere in a grammatical sense: Ibn al-Anbārī tells us that one of the characteristics of the noun is that it may be active or passive, e.g. in the sentence *ḍaraba zaidun 'amran* (Zaid hit 'Amr); what he means is that a noun may be subject or object of a sentence (Asr. 6, 6-7; cf. also Rāzī, Maf. 1, 34, 17). *Fā'il* and *maf'ūl* do not correspond exactly to our 'subject' and 'object': in the sentence *ḍuriba zaid* (Zaid was hit) *zaid* is the *maf'ūl* in Sībawaihī's terminology, cf. Mosel, 1974, 246-7. Zaǧǧāǧī himself uses *fā'il* and *maf'ūl* in another definition of the noun in their grammatical sense, Ǧum. 17, 6-7: 'A noun is that which may be used as a subject (*fā'il*) or as an object (*maf'ūl*) ...' [A 30]. The difference with the definition in the *Īḍāḥ* is emphasized by the words '... which may be used ...': in the *Ǧumal* Zaǧǧāǧī deals with the possibilities of the syntactic use of the noun, not with the nature of the substances denoted by it, which are always active or passive.

In order to clarify this we would like to call in evidence a few Greek texts. Dionysios Thrax: 'A noun has two dispositions, action and passion, e.g. *kritès* (a person who judges), *kritós* (a person who is judged)'.[39] Scholia on Dionysios Thrax: 'It is always the substance which is doing something or undergoing something, whereas the verb signifies the action or the passion'.[40] Apollonios Dyskolos: 'The noun precedes the verb of necessity, since to act or to be acted upon is characteristic of the body, and the giving of names concerns the bodies. From the names is derived the characteristic property of the verb, namely the action and the passion'.[41] Being active or passive, according to these definitions, is something characteristic for substances, which are represented in speech by the nouns. Verbs represent the actions of the substances.

This suggests that Zaǧǧāǧī's definition must be explained in the following way: there is a well-known *dictum* about nouns signifying substances, and verbs actions; we know that substances are the agents of the actions which are indicated by the verbs (or, indeed, the objects of such an action by another substance); we may conclude, then, that nouns are characterized by the fact that they are active or passive. This definition is connected with the discussions about the priority of nouns,[42] and we may deduce from its existence that the doctrine according to which nouns signify substances, and verbs actions—which is why nouns are prior to verbs—was known in the Arabic world, even though the specific formula is not found in these discussions. What we have here is probably a Stoic doctrine. The Stoa asserted that every substance is a body, and that activity and passivity are among the essential attributes of the bodies.[43] This Stoic dogma is found in the

[39] Dion. Thr. 46, 1-2 [G 19].

[40] Scholia D.T. 515, 16-8 [G 20]; cf. 215, 28-30.

[41] Apoll. Dysk. synt. 18, 5-8 [G 21]; cf. Steinthal's translation, 1891², 2, 233: 'Das *ónoma* aber geht dem *rhéma* voraus, weil das Bewirken und Bewirktwerden dem Körper angehört, und auf die Körper sich die Gebung der Namen erstreckt, aus denen sich die Eigentümlichkeit des Verbums, nämlich das Tun und Leiden, erst ergibt'.

[42] Cf. below, chapter VII, n. 88.

[43] Cf. SVF 2, 359: body (*sóma*) and substance (*ousia*) are identical; ib. 2, 363: something without a body (*tò asómaton*) is unable to act or to suffer; on the 'dynamic concept' of the Stoic bodies: Sambursky, 1971², 95-6. The doctrine that only bodies possess existence was introduced into the Arabic world under the influence of the Stoa, cf. Jadaane, 1968, 137-47; for the connection between Naẓẓām's theories and Stoic materialism: Horowitz, 1903 (Naẓẓām held that atoms can be divided infinitely, and that a body is nothing more than an assembly of accidents, which are corporeal, cf. Nader, 1956, 155-8); on Mu'tazilite materialism in general: Nader, 1956, 150-67.

Arabic translation of the *Placita philosophorum*: 'Everything which acts or is being acted upon is a body'.[44] But, of course, an explanation of the difference between nouns and verbs in terms of action and passion is quite common: we find it as early as Plato.[45] Our conclusion that this definition of nouns really deals with substances rather than with nouns themselves, is confirmed by the fact that apparently the objection to al-Aḫfaš' definition is not applicable: substances denoted by words such as *kaifa*, *aina* are actually regarded as something active or passive, which makes them fall under this definition.[46]

In the Greek world there was no definition of the nouns similar to the one proposed by Zaǧǧāǧī, since Greek grammarians did not combine data from the discussions about the hierarchy of the parts of speech with the definitions of these parts of speech. It is evident that we are here concerned with a definition which is completely different from the Aristotelian tradition: not only from a terminological point of view, but also with regard to the substance of the definition: Aristotle is interested in the linguistic properties of the *definiendum*, c.q. the noun (nouns do not have tenses, nouns are conventional signs, no part of a noun is meaningful in itself). This definition, however, tries to define the nature and the physical properties of the objects denoted by the *definiendum*, c.q. substances (substances always play an active or a passive role in the actions denoted by the verbs).

In his *Rhetorica* Aristotle uses the term *hellènizein* in the sense of 'speaking uncorrupted Greek without using wrong words or making grammatical mistakes'.[47] It is on this use of the word that Merx bases his identification of the word *i'ráb* (declension) with *hellènismós*, but he does not explain the difference in meaning: although the identification of the two words as to form may be correct—both words are causatives with the same lexical derivation—, the difference in technical meaning cannot be explained away. The term *hellènizein* as it is used by Aristotle—who does not use the substantive *hellènismós*—has a much wider range than the Arabic term, which only means 'declension of nouns and of those verbs that resemble nouns'. The solution

[44] Plac. Phil. 277, 18 [A 31].

[45] Plato, Soph. 262 A: 'the sign for the actions is what we use to call *rhéma* ... and the phonetic sign for those who perform those actions *ónoma*' [G 22]; cf. also the discussion about the priority of the nouns, below, chapter VII.

[46] Cf. above, note 31.

[47] Aristot. rhet. III, 1407 a 20.

may be that Merx wrongly based his argumentation on the Aristotelian use of the word exclusively, and that he disregarded later developments in Greek grammar. In order to clarify this we must turn to Sextus Empiricus, who tells us a good deal about later grammar—he lived about 150 A.D.—notwithstanding his critical attitude towards grammar as well as all other dogmatic disciplines. Sextus says: 'They (sc. the grammarians) compose general theorems, and from these they pretend to be able to judge about every single word, whether it is Greek or not'.[48] These general theorems[49]—also called *kanónes*— formed the core of the so-called *Téchnai perì hellènismoú*; they were meant at first as a description of the actual state of the language, but soon became normative rules for teaching purposes. As the *téchnai* were primarily concerned with the declension,[50] the word *hellènismós* itself came to be used in the sense of 'declension': one may compare with this the Stoic definition of the word *hellènismós*: 'Correctly inflected speech in the civilized, and not in the vulgar way of speaking'.[51] Considering the fact that the word *kanónes* has been arabicized by the Arabic grammarians (*qānūn*, plural: *qawānīn*), we believe that these treatises about flexion somehow served as a model for the first attempts of the Arabic grammarians to describe their own language. The imitation of the *kanónes* which is found in the fragments of Jacob of Edessa may have played an intermediary role in this respect.[52]

We have a description of such a treatise which determines the flexion of nouns and verbs by means of *qawānīn*, in the section about grammar in al-Fārābī's *Iḥṣā' al-'ulūm*:[53] 'Then, it (sc. the *qānūn*)

[48] Sext. Emp. adv. math. 1, 221 [G 23].

[49] For this meaning of *katholikós* and the difference between *hóros* and *katholikón*: Sext. Emp. adv. math. 9, 8 = SVF 2, 224. In Latin grammar we have Varro's *universa discrimina*, De L.L. 10, 8 sqq. and Char. 63, 16 sqq.

[50] Barwick, 1922, 182: 'Es muß also einen Typus grammatischer Lehrschrift (*téchnē perì hellènismoú*) gegeben haben, der die Darstellung der Flexion zum Gegenstand hatte mit der ausgesprochenen Absicht Regeln für den richtigen Sprachgebrauch (*hellènismós, latinitas*) an die Hand zu geben'.

[51] Diog. Laert. 7, 59 [G 24]. For the word *adiáptōtos* in this definition, cf. Liddell/Scott, s.v., especially the quotation from Apoll. Dysk. pron. 109, 23, where the word is translated as 'not using the cases at random'; cf. Steinthal, 1891², 2, 121; 126.

[52] Merx, 1889, 56-62. Jacob of Edessa followed the example of Dionysios Thrax and Theodosios. We will not enter here into the question of the relationship between these Syriac *kanónes* and al-Fārābī's description of the *kanónes*.

[53] The rest of Fārābī's section about grammar also shows a remarkable influence of Greek terminology, cf. *lawāḥiq*, p. 14 (= *parhepómena*); *wuǧūh*, 14, 14 (= *prósōpa*; cf. Daiber, 1968, 25. The Syriac term *parsūpā*, Merx, 1889, 17; 19; Tarazi, 1969, 115, is a transliteration of the Greek word); *taṣarruf* (= *klísis*), cf. below, chapter III C.

teaches us in which case which ending is attached to each noun and each verb; then, it enumerates briefly the cases of the singular nouns, case by case, for those nouns that are declinable and can receive in each case one of the endings; then, it does the same for the feminine, the dual, and the plural nouns; then, it gives the same list for the singular, the dual, and the plural verbs, until all cases which change the endings of the verbs have been exhausted; then, it informs us which nouns are only declined in some cases, and in which cases they are declined, and in which they are not; then, it informs us which nouns have only one case-ending, and which ending each of these (nouns) has'.[54] This description corresponds exactly to the Greek *kanónes onomatikoí* and *kanónes rhēmatikoí*, as we know them from Theodosios, even in the distinction of words which are declined only in one case, or only in some cases.[55] The order of the Fārābian flexional tables is the same as the one we know from Greek examples. This proves that there still existed at this time traces of the Greek flexional tables with general rules about the flexion of nouns and verbs. The general character of these rules is correctly defined by Ibn Ḥaldūn: 'They (sc. the scholars) extracted from the course of their own speech general rules ..., and by means of these rules they judged about the rest of the forms of speech, and they attached similar endings to similar words'.[56] Viewed in this light the difference between the Aristotelian *hellènismós* and the Arabic *i'rāb* is no longer a problem: *i'rāb* in fact translates the *hellènismós* of later Greek grammarians.

Our explanation does not take into account the explanation of the Arabic grammarians themselves. They translate *i'rāb* as 'explanation' (*bayān*).[57] In their view the *i'rāb* is the focal point of grammar, which gives the Arabic language its clarity—even to the point where some of them believe that the Arabic language is the only language to possess an *i'rāb*.[58] *I'rāb* in the sense of 'declension' is defined as follows: declension is a vowel at the end of the word that indicates the meanings (sc. the grammatical meanings[59]). It should be added that

[54] Far. Iḥṣ. 16, 11- 17, 9 [A 32].

[55] *Grammatici Graeci*, IV, 1; cf. Glück, 1967, 23 and n. 6; the distinction between *monóptōta* and *áptōta*: Barwick, 1922, 177 sqq.; Steinthal, 1891², 2, 224-6.

[56] b. Ḥald. Muq. 546, 18-20 [A 33].

[57] Zağğ. Iḍ. 91, 3-8; b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ. 1, 36, 2- 37, 4; b. Anb. Asr. 9, 16 sqq.; cf. Fück, 1955², 25; 60.

[58] E.g. b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 42; 161.

[59] Zağğ. Iḍ. 72, 2-3. For *ḥaraka* = *kínēsis*: cf. above, chapter II, The 'meanings'

declension is a semantic, not a phonetic matter, or, to put it in Rāzī's words, 'the declension is a rational, not a physical state'.[60] This was recognized already by the scholiast on Dionysios Thrax, who says: '(it should be known) that the five cases are a matter of meaning, not of sound'.[61]

Words with a complete declension (triptotic words) are called in Arabic grammar from the time of Sībawaihi *munṣarif*, words with an incomplete declension (diptotic words) are *ġair munṣarif*.[62] As the nunation indicates the complete declension,[63] in some cases *ṣarf* and *tanwīn* are very close to each other in meaning.[64] We believe that the term *ṣarf* is connected with the Greek word *klisis*, although the exact relation between the two terms is very difficult to trace.

Two things are more or less certain. In primitive Arabic grammar the term used for 'declension' was *i'rāb*, in our view a *calque* of the Greek *hellēnismós*. On the other hand, in philosophical circles the terms *ṣarf* and *taṣrīf* are consistently used for all morphological changes of nouns and verbs, but this term is, of course, found only after the first translations of Greek writings had been made. We find, for instance, in Mattā ibn Yūnus' translation of Aristotle's *Poetica* the term *taṣrīf* as the translation of the Aristotelian *ptôsis*, i.e., the inflection of both nouns and verbs.[65] Ibn Suwār tells us: 'Inflection (*taṣrīf*) is a sound added to the word and consisting in a vowel that is added to the first case (*istiqāma*) ... and there are five kinds of inflection (i.e., five cases), as I have mentioned in the *De Interpretatione*'.[66] The same is said by al-Fārābī who distinguishes between nouns in the first case (*mustaqīm*) and inflected nouns (*mā'il*); both nouns and verbs have inflection (*taṣrīf*).[67] It is obvious that we are

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(*ma'ānī*) alternate on the words (*ta'tawiru 'alā 'l-asmā'*); they are equivalent to Rāzī's 'states that occur to the nouns' (*aḥwāl 'āriḍa 'alā 'l-asmā'*), Maf. 1, 45, 7 sqq. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 69, 6 sqq. gives examples of these meanings.

[60] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 48, 14 (*al-i'rāb ḥāla ma'qūla lā maḥsūsa*).

[61] Scholia D.T. 230, 34-5 (*tôn sēmainoménōn ou tôn phōnôn eisìn hai pénte ptôseis*); cf. Schmidt, 1839, 59.

[62] Wright, 1964³, 1, 234-47 (the triptotic and the diptotic declension); Sib. Kit. 1, 7, 6; cf. also the detailed analysis, ib. 2, 2-13.

[63] Cf. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 97, 3 sqq.

[64] E.g. Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 92, 7 sqq.

[65] Mattā ibn Yūnus, Badawī, 1953, 128, 20-4; cf. Ibn Sīnā, Ši'r, 191, pen.; b. Rušd, Ši'r, 236, 14-8.

[66] b. Suwār, 372, 4-7 [A 34].

[67] Far. Šarḥ. 32, 15; 36, 8; 42, 21; Iḥṣ. p. 16. Cf. Islamic philosophy, 1972, pp. 521 sqq.

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dealing here with a direct translation of Greek words, where *mā'il* stands for *enklinómenos*, *mustaqīm* for *orthós*, and the term *taṣrīf* itself for the word used by the Greek commentators of the writings of Aristotle and the Alexandrian grammarians alike, namely *klisis*.[68] The *taṣrīf* is an imitation of the Greek declension, c.q. inflection, as is evident from the five cases given by Ibn Suwār.

In Alexandrian grammar *klisis* was used for the morphological changes of nouns and verbs, whereas other (analogical) changes of words were indicated by the term *paragōgḗ*.[69] In the Stoic-Pergamene type of grammar, *klisis* was used for every change of a word, be it regular or irregular.[70] Later distinctions allowed to nouns a *ptôsis* and a *klisis*, but to verbs only a *klisis*:[71] verbs are *áptôta*, just as, for instance, adverbs and prepositions.[72] Among the nouns there are also those with only one case (*monóptôta*), e.g. the name *ho abraám*; nouns are called *áklita*, when they miss some of their cases.[73]

According to the Arabic grammarians, only nouns are declinable (*mu'rab*), whereas verbs have no right to declension, although they do have an inflection (*taṣrīf*).[74] On the other hand, nouns are divided into those which are fully declined (*munṣarif*), and those with only two cases: the latter category is called *ġair munṣarif*, and it seems that we have here the equivalent of the Greek term *áklitos*, which we have mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The Arabic theory, according to which nouns lose something of their declension on

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[68] Islamic philosophy, 1972, 521 sqq.

[69] Barwick, 1957, 34.

[70] This was precisely the reason why the debates about analogy and anomaly were so fruitless: both parties disagreed as to where analogy was to be demonstrated, cf. Barwick, 1922, 179 sqq.

[71] Cf. scholia D.T. 549, 33, on the question why the terms *klisis* and *ptôsis* are used for the nouns, but only the term *klisis* for the verbs. Unfortunately the answer has not been preserved in the manuscript. It is difficult to find out what exactly a *klisis* of the nouns is. From the way Apollonios Dyskolos uses the term it appears that *klisis* denotes every morphological change of either a noun or a verb, and that *ptôsis* is the special name for a *klisis* of a noun.

[72] Steinthal, 1891², 2, 224-6.

[73] Scholia D.T. 231, 12-5: 'How does the *monóptôton* differ from the *áklitos*? (Answer:) the *monóptôton* receives only the article, e.g. *abraám*, but the *áklitos* is a word which neither receives (only the article), nor does it have a complete declension, e.g. *oũs* (ear), *démas* (stature)' [G 25]. Also Apoll. Dysk. synt. 47, 8: adjectives like *tachú* (swift), which are used as adverbs, become *áklita*, thus imitating the undeclinability of the adverbs—this is the only trace in Greek grammar of a theory of resemblance (cf. below). Cf. also Choirob. 1, 341, 24-37 (on the names of the letters).

[74] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 80, 7-9; 101, 5-6 (a quotation from Ṯa'lab).

account of a resemblance to the verbs or the particles, was, however, unknown in Greek grammar.

Ṣarf and *taṣrif* have yet another meaning in Arabic grammar. The science of *ṣarf* is defined as the science of the phonetic forms of words and their changes, apart from those changes that are caused by declension. We may cite the following definitions: 'It (sc. the *ṣarf*) is the science of the roots, by which we know the various phonetic forms of the words, apart from the declension' (Ibn Ḥāǧib);[75] 'It is the knowledge of the root of the word, and its additions, elisions, and changes' (Ibn al-Atīr).[76] Apparently *ṣarf* could indicate every change of the word in general, i.e., almost the same meaning as the Pergamene use of the word *klisis*. Perhaps this may be explained by the fact that in Arabic as well as in Greek grammar *ptôsis/iʿrāb* was reserved for the nouns, so that its opposite *klisis/ṣarf* could obtain the double meaning of 'inflection of the verb' and 'derivation in general'. Whatever the case may be, it seems rather probable that *ṣarf* is the translation of the Greek term *klisis*, since both words indicate a departure from the original meaning or form of the word—the original meaning of *klisis* is 'bending, inclination', normally in a downward direction, but also aside, whereas *ṣarf* means 'turning away, averting'. In philosophical grammar this change in meaning by means of a phonetic change applies to the declension of the nouns and the verbs; in grammatical works it refers either to the inflection, or to every change apart from those caused by declension. When the word is used in this second sense, it has a sub-category, *ʿadl*, which indicates more specifically the analogical derivation of one form from another: Ibn Ǧinnī says that *ʿadl* is a kind of derivation (*taṣarruf*), which consists

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[75] b. Ḥāǧib ap. Astarābāḏī, *Ṣarḥ ar-raḍī ʿalā 'š-Šāfiyya*, ed. M. N. al-Ḥasan, Qāhira, 1358 A.H., 1, 2, 3 [A 35].

[76] b. al-Atīr, *al-Maṯal as-sāʾir*, ed. M. N. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Qāhira, 1358 A.H., 1, 12 [A 36]. Both this definition and the one quoted in the preceding note are quoted by ʿUbaidī, 1969, 98-9, who discusses several other definitions, as well as the place of *ṣarf* within grammar. Compare Flügel's note 1862, 13-4, note 2. On the etymology of *ṣarf*: 'Ukb. Mas. 106-9. We are not concerned here with another use of *ṣarf*, namely in Kūfan grammar, where this term is used for the procedure that causes the accusative in sentences such as *lā taʾkul as-samak wa-tašraba 'l-laban* (don't eat fish, while you are drinking milk!), cf. b. Anb. Inṣ. 229-30; Farrāʾ, Maʿānī 'l-Qurʾān, 1, 33, quoted by Mubārak, 1963, 325 with further discussion; cf. also Carter, 1973, who tries to show that it is incorrect to attribute the term *ṣarf* in this sense to the Kūfans exclusively. According to him Farrāʾ and Sībawaihi (Kit. 1, 424-7) to a large extent agreed as to the nature of this principle, which is called *ḥilāf* by Sībawaihi. Later Baṣrian grammarians rejected it, and it was, therefore, attributed to the Kūfans. On the *ṣarf/ḥilāf*: Reckendorf, 1921, 462; de Sacy, 1829, 217-9; Maḥzūmī, 1958, 293 sqq; Mosel, 1975, 57-8.

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in a change of the root from its primary meaning to a secondary one.[77]

ʿAdala in its sense of 'to derive analogically from' represents the Alexandrian term *parágein*, as against the term *taṣrif* (i.e., the Greek *klisis*), which is restricted to the inflection. In the Stoic-Pergamene system, on the other hand, *klisis* (*taṣrif*) is used for every sort of derivation, including declension and inflection.[78] A few examples of the use of *ʿadala* in Arabic grammar are: (Ibn Ǧinnī) the form *fuʿāl* is derived from the form *faʿil* by means of *ʿudūl*;[79] (id.) the form *faʿāli* is derived from the form *faʿla*;[80] (Farrāʾ) *aǧmaʿūna* is derived from (*maʿdūl ʿan*) *aǧmaʿ*;[81] (Taʿlab) *ṣabūr* is derived from the verb *ṣabira*;[82] (Ibn Maḍāʾ) the nouns which are derived from the participles.[83] These examples are all in accordance with the Alexandrian use of *parágein*: they are all cases of derivation, not of declension or inflection. On the other hand, in philosophical grammar we find for instance with al-Fārābī that verbs (*kalim*) are changed (*yuʿdalu bihā*), so that they become commands or prohibitions (*amr aw nahy*).[84] Here we find *ʿadl* applied to the verbs.

The Arabic name for the first of the nominal cases is *rafʿ*, i.e., 'lifting'. In 1889 Merx pointed out the similarity between this term and the Greek name for the first case, *orthè ptôsis*, but he did so not without reservation: 'Potestne credi hoc casu esse factum, et negari in seligendo nomine *rafʿu* Arabes doctrinam Peripateticorum esse secutos, quam a commentatore aliquo Aristotelico didicerunt? Nihilo minus vero mihi nondum constat, nomen *rafʿu* nihil esse nisi interpretationem vocis *orthè* vel *eutheia*, nam si *rafʿu* graecum esset, etiam reliqua casuum nomina ex graecis processisse coniciendum esset, quod probari nequit'.[85]

In the first place we must remark that Merx attributed every similarity between Greek and Arabic grammar in the early period to Peripatetic influence; he did not look for similarities between living

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[77] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 1, 52, 9-10.

[78] Barwick, 1957, 34.

[79] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 267, 9.

[80] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 261, 6; cf. Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 223, 14: *haǧāmi* (hurry up!) is a derivate of the same order as, for instance, *ʿamaru*, which is derived from *ʿāmir*.

[81] Farr. ap. TaʿL. Maǧ. 1, 98, 11.

[82] Taʿl. Maǧ. 1, 316, 4.

[83] b. Maḍāʾ, Radd, 100, 3; cf. Arnaldez, 1956, 91.

[84] Far. Iḥṣ. 14, 8.

[85] Merx, 1889, 152.

Greek grammatical practice and Arabic grammar. In the case of the names of the nominal cases we have a good example of the difference between the two influences, since the Aristotelian tradition forced its own names upon the Arabic translators and upon those philosophers who based themselves on Greek material, namely *mustaqīm* for Greek *orthós*, and *māʾil* for Greek *enklinómenos*. These are the terms used by Fārābī.[86] It is obvious that Fārābī did not adhere strictly to the Peripatetic doctrine, which considered the nominative as the basic form, and the rest of the cases as declension (*ptōsis*), but rather followed the Stoic tradition, which considered the nominative as the first of the nominal cases.[87] This has been pointed out by Zimmermann, who may be right in attributing this departure from the Aristotelian tradition to the discussions by Greek commentators concerning this point.[88] On the other hand, it is also possible that Fārābī heard something about Greek grammatical practice, possibly via the Arabic and Syrian translators, who were active at Baghdad during his lifetime. We have seen above that he sometimes uses elements from Greek grammar, which cannot be derived from translations of Aristotelian writings.[89]

For an explanation of the grammatical names of the nominal cases we cannot resort to the translations at all, but must base ourselves on the data from Greek grammar. We do not believe that it is possible —given the present state of our knowledge—to prove any connection between *rafʿ* and *orthè ptōsis*. Merx is certainly right when he says that when there is a connection between the name of the nominative in Greek and Arabic grammar, we expect the same connection to exist in the case of the names of the other cases. His own efforts to prove that connection seem rather farfetched,[90] so that the question remains undecided. The only additional observation we would like to make is of a very hypothetical character: all Arabic names for the cases taken together could give the picture of a noun being erected (*marfūʿ*), which is then pulled aside (*maǧrūr*), and finally brought down

[86] Far. Šarḥ, 64, 15 (as synonym for *māʾil* the term *muṣarraf*); Ibn Suwār, 365, 5 (only *mustaqīm* as against *muṣarraf*). According to Zimmermann (Islamic philosophy, 1972, 540, note 14) these terms were used only in the Baghdad school of translators.

[87] Cf. Steinthal, 1890², 1, 303-4; Schmidt, 1839, 59-60; Pohlenz, 1939, 169; cf. the discussion in the scholia D.T., 230, 24-33; 546, 15 - 548, 5.

[88] Zimmermann, Islamic philosophy, 1972, 521-2 referring to the discussion by Stephanos, 10, 22 sqq.

[89] Cf. above, note 53, and chapter III A (Fārābī's division of the *ḥurūf*).

[90] Merx, 1889, 152-3.

(*manṣūb*?),[91] in other words the same metaphor as in the Greek *ptōseis*, which begin with the *orthè* and end with the *plagiai ptōseis*.[92] We must concede, though, that the evidence is rather meagre. Perhaps the explanation of the Arabic grammarians of the names of the cases in terms of the articulatory movements needed for the pronunciation of the case-endings is correct after all.[93]

Although there seems to be no connection between the Greek and the Arabic name for the genitive, there is a similarity in functions. The genitive indicates the *iḍāfa* (adjunction, annexion), and the *iḍāfa*, according to Zaǧǧāǧī, has three functions: it joins something to its owner; it joins something to the person who has a right to it; it joins something to its genus.[94] We are reminded by these three functions of the three names the second case may have in Greek grammar:[95] the second case may be called *ktètikè* (case of possession); *patrikè* (case of fatherhood); *genikè* (interpreted as 'general case', 'case of the genus', 'case of the root').[96]

Nouns and particles may be said to be dependent (*muʿallaq*) on other words:[97] the meaningful particle, for instance, is said to be always dependent.[98] A second meaning of the word is 'being in suspense, not yet terminated', when it is said about a sentence which has not yet been completed and still misses an essential part.[99] In that case the term is almost synonymous with the term *nāqiṣ* (as against *tāmm*) used by Ibn Ǧinnī.[100] Finally the word *muʿallaq* is also used for the creation of the words, which are said to have been 'hung up' on the things.[101] Ibn Maḍāʾ explains the first meaning

[91] For the lexical signification of the terms we refer to the *Lisān al-ʿArab*, ss. vv.: *rafʿ* is the opposite of *ḥafḍ* (8, 129 right); *ǧarr* is explained by the word *ǧaḏb*, i.e., 'pulling aside' (8, 4 right 9); but *naṣb* means 'standing erect' (1, 760, left 12; cf. Shehaby, 1975, 78, note 7).

[92] For the meaning of the Greek term *ptōsis*: Sittig, 1931; Hiersche, 1955; cf. also Pohlenz, 1939, 169-71.

[93] E.g. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ., pp. 93-4; Semaan, 1968, 19.

[94] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 108, 10 sqq.; cf. b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 26, 9 sqq.

[95] E.g. scholia D.T. 384, 1-7.

[96] For a discussion about the meaning of the term *genikè* we refer to: de Mauro, 1965, appendice I (pp. 206-8); also Pohlenz, 1939, 172-5.

[97] Cf. Zaǧǧ. Lam. 22, 8; b. Kais. ap. Suy. *Hamʿ al-hawāmiʿ*, 1, 140 (quoted by Daif, 1968, 251); b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 107, 1-2; 3, 170, 2; 3, 256, 1; 3, 270, 10, with other forms from the same root (*taʿallaqa*, *ʿallaqa*).

[98] Mub. ap. Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 222, 11.

[99] Māzinī ap. Suy. Buǧya, 1, 465, 7.

[100] Cf. above, chapter II (the distinction between *qaul* and *kalām*).

[101] E.g. by Ibn Ḥazm, Iḥk. 1, 261, 13 *ʿulliqa ʿalā* ... (to be created in order to signify ...).

of the term, when he tells us that the grammarians use the verb *a'mala* to indicate the word that governs a nominative or an accusative, but the verb *'allaqa* to indicate the word that is connected with a genitive. He himself cannot accept the first verb, because as a Zāhirite he does not acknowledge any human action at all, and human action is implied by the use of the verb *a'mala*, when we are talking about a grammatical subject or object.[102] Ibn Madā' uses, therefore, *'allaqa* in all cases, since this verb indicates only a statement about an established syntactic situation.[103] In Greek grammatical terminology the verb *artāsthai* is used with the same sense as the first meaning of *mu'allaq*, namely 'to be dependent on', for instance by Apollonios Dyskolos.[104] There are also expressions with the verb *kremāsthai* (to hang), which remind us of the second meaning of *mu'allaq* e.g., *krêmatai ho lógos* (speech is in suspense, is not yet complete).[105]

C. THE VERB

Three types of definitions may be distinguished in Arabic grammatical literature.

1. In the first place there is the morphological definition, which lists those morphological characteristics of the verb that mark it as different from the noun and the particle. Some of these characteristics are negative, e.g., the verb has neither dual or plural, nor a feminine gender;[1] some characteristics are positive, e.g., the verb may have a personal suffix attached to it, and it may be used in combination with temporal adverbs, such as 'yesterday', 'tomorrow', i.e., it can indicate time.[2] Those definitions that mention positive characteristics

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[102] Cf. below, chapter VIII, note 23.

[103] b. Madā', Radd, p. 107.

[104] Apoll. Dysk. synt. 24, 1-3; 72, 10; 120, 12; 421, 9; 463, 4.

[105] Cf. Liddell/Scott, s.v.

[1] Cf. ap. b. Fār. Sāh. 52, 9 [A 37] 'the verb is that which is prevented from (receiving) the dual and the plural'; b. Anb. Ins. 40, 18-9 [A 38] 'the verb cannot be made feminine, only the noun'. For the term *imtinā'* (*umtuni'a*): cf. Mubarrad's definition of the noun, above, chapter III B, note 5. Note that it is the subject of the verb that is made dual, plural, feminine, not the verb itself.

[2] Cf. ap. b. Fār. Sāh. 52, 11 'the verb is that which is correctly combined with -*tu*, e.g. *qumtu* (I stood up), *dahabtu* (I left)' [A 39]; ib. 52, 13 'the verb is that which is correctly combined with *amsi* (yesterday) and *gadan* (tomorrow)' [A 40]; cf. Zaģğ. Ğum. 21, ult. - 22, 2.

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often contain the words *hasuna an* ... (it is correct to ...); these words seem to be typical of the definitions of al-Ahfaš.[3] Sībawaihi gives the indication of time as one of the characteristics of the verb.[4]

2. In the second place, there is a group of definitions which are not concerned with the characteristics of the verb or with its function, but with the nature of what is signified by the verb. These definitions have been influenced by Aristotle's definition; they will be discussed in the chapter about the influence of logic.[5]

3. Finally, there are definitions which define the syntactic function of the verb: it is always used as a predicate, but it cannot have a predicate itself. That verbs serve as predicates in the sentence, had already been mentioned by Aristotle; still, we believe this type of definitions to have been formulated under the influence of Stoic theories. The definition of the verb as an attribute which cannot receive any attributes itself (*sifa ģair mausūf*) stems from a very old non-aristotelian tradition which regards the verb not as something that denotes an action as well as the time of that action, but as one of the two components of a complete sentence, namely the predicate.

Subject and predicate are called by Fārābī *mausūf* and *sifa*.[6] He also mentions as synonyms *musnad ilaihi/musnad bihi* and *muhbar 'anhu/ muhbar bihi, habar*. The first set of synonyms is used by Sībawaihi,[7] but the subject is normally called by him *mubtada'*. The second set is found in the definitions of noun, verb, and particle in the Basrian tradition: noun is 'what can be used as a predicate and can receive a

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[3] Cf. above, chapter III B, note 26.

[4] Cf. above, chapter III A, note 25. In Greek grammar Dionysios Thrax defines the verb according to its morphological properties as follows: 'The verb is an undeclined word which can receive tense, person, and number, and which expresses an action (*enérgeia*) or a passion (*páthos*)' (46, 4-5) [G 26]. This definition was imitated by other authors, including Apollonios Dyskolos, who adds, however, that morphological properties are not essential for the verb: the most characteristic feature of the verb is that it signifies an action (*prágma*), the rest of the properties is accidental (*sumparhepómena*). Only thus can we include the infinitive in the verbal system. Cf. Steinthal, 1891², 2, 267 sqq.

[5] Cf. below, chapter VII.

[6] Far. Alf. p. 57; the two terms are also used by Hwār. Maf. 142, 11 sqq. Gazzālī tells us that this set of terms for the subject and the predicate was used especially by the theologians, Mihakk, 23, 28; Qistās, 67/62; cf. Brunschvig, 1970, 163 (21); Gätje, 1974, 163-4. On predication as the central part of traditional grammar: Gabučan, 1971, 26 sqq.; Cohen, 1970.

[7] Sib. Kit. 1, 7, 13-21; cf. Rāzī, Maf. 1, 36, 9.

predicate itself'; verb is 'what can be used as a predicate, but cannot receive a predicate itself'; particle is 'what can neither be used as a predicate, nor receive a predicate itself'.[8] The function of the verb as the predicate of the sentence is already expressed in "Alī's" definition: 'The verb is what is used to give information'.[9] *Ḫabar* came to be used in Arabic syntax as the *terminus technicus* for the notion of 'predicate'.

Arabic syntax divides sentences into nominal sentences (*ǧumal ismiyya*), and verbal sentences (*ǧumal fiʿliyya*). The essential parts of a verbal sentence are the 'do-er' (*fāʿil*) and the 'action' (*fiʿl*).[10] The nominal sentence contains a 'subject' (*mubtadaʾ*; *muḫbar ʿanhu*), and a predicate (*ḫabar*). The term *ḫabar* is also used with the meaning 'proposition': it is then defined as 'that which can be declared truth or falsehood (*allaḏī yataṭarraqu ilaihi 't-taṣdīq wa-'t-takḏīb*).[11] This definition is identical to the Stoic definition of *axiôma*.[12] Ploutarchos tells us about the proposition: 'Is it because the classical authors used to call what was then termed *prótasis*, and now *axíôma* "the first sentence", because it is the first thing uttered by us, (which shows us) telling the truth or lying? This first sentence contains a noun and a verb; the former is called *ptôsis* by the Stoic logicians, the latter *katēgórēma*.[13] The predicative part of the proposition, the *katēgórēma*, is then defined as 'That which is said about something', or 'A composed meaning (*prâgma suntaktón*) about something singular or

[8] Ap. b. Anb. Inṣ. 2, 13-8; cf. Rāzī, Maf. 1, 32 pen. - 33, 1; the same kind of definitions for the noun, the verb, and the particle were used by the Coptic grammarians, cf. Bauer, 1972, 68. The Baṣrian grammarians used these definitions as an argument for the priority of the noun, cf. below, chapter VII, note 107. On the *isnād*: Zam. Muf. 13, 2 (predication (*isnād*) necessarily consists of two parts, the *musnad* and the *musnad ilaihi*).

[9] Ap. b. Anb. Nuzha, 4, 10 (*al-fiʿl mā unbiʾa bihi*).

[10] For these terms an Indian origin has been suggested (*kartṛ, karman*), cf. Diem, 1970, 318, note 1; on the other hand, we find in Greek grammatical literature *ho energôn* and *ho energoúmenos* with approximately the same sense as Arabic *fāʿil* and *mafʿūl*, cf. Apoll. Dysk. synt. 139, 7; 344, 12-3; 396, 3. *Enérgeia* is already translated by *fiʿl* in Qusṭā ibn Lūqā's translation of the *Placita Philosophorum*, ed. Daiber, p. 69, 9. On the terms *fāʿil/mafʿūl* used in another sense in a definition of the noun, cf. above, chapter III B, note 36.

[11] Ġazz. Maq. 19, 11; in grammar: b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 1, 186, 12-3; b. Anb. Inṣ. 54, 10-1; 61, 25; Mub. Muqt. 3, 89; cf. van Ess, 1970, 30 and note 40; also b. Fūr. Ṣāḥ. 150, 7; definition of the *ahl an-naẓar*.

[12] Sext. Emp. adv. math. 1, 70 (= SVF 2, 187); Diog. Laert. 7, 66 (= SVF 2, 186); in logic *axíôma* is translated by *qaḍiya*, cf. van Ess, 1970, 30 and note 40; Zimmermann, Islamic philosophy, 1972, 536.

[13] Plout. quaest. plat. X, p. 1009 C [G 27].

plural', or 'A deficient meaning (*lektòn ellipés*, i.e., an utterance which does not form a complete sentence) constructed with a nominative in order to form a proposition'.[14] We suppose that the Greek terms *agoreuómenon* (that which is said) and *suntaktón* (composed, constructed with) are at the basis of the Arabic terms *muḫbar* and *musnad*, respectively. This would explain the resemblance between the definitions of 'proposition', as they are given in the Greek as well as in the Arabic world, and also the existence of several sets of synonyms. One could object that the Greek word *katēgórēma* denotes a verbal predicate, whereas in Arabic *ḫabar* is precisely the nominal predicate (in the Arabic sense of the word: in *zaid kataba* (Zaid wrote) we would call the second word a verb, but in Arabic grammatical terminology it is called a nominal predicate, or rather, the predicate of a nominal sentence[15]). This problem may be solved, when we take into account the Greek conception of the verbal predicate, which considers *diôn peripatei* (Dion walks) equivalent with *diôn estí peripatôn* (Dion is walking). This construction was borrowed by the Arabic grammarians and, adapted to the structure of the Arabic language, it became a nominal sentence, where the predicate was the predicate of a nominal sentence. For verbal sentences a new set of terms was invented.[16]

The term used for the subject of the nominal sentence is not the Stoic term *ptôsis*, but a new term, *mubtadaʾ*. This 'first position' (*ibtidāʾ*) does not indicate the first place of the subject in the sentence, but it is the 'first position' of the noun itself, i.e., the nominative: 'The *mubtadaʾ* is the noun in the first position, before the existence of any expressed grammatical *regens*. We use the expression "first position" in order to distinguish between that which has the first place in the real sentence, even though it should come later, and that which has a right to the first position, even though it comes later in the real sentence by a process of extension (*ittisāʾ*)'.[17] According to

[14] Diog. Laert. 7, 64 (= SVF 2, 183) [G 28].

[15] Cf. Cohen, 1970. Zimmermann (Islamic philosophy, 1972, 542, note 37) points out that a Greek sentence *Philôn hugiaínei* (Philon is healthy) would be translated into Arabic as *fulān ṣaḥīḥ*, i.e. a sentence with a nominal predicate.

[16] But cf. above, note 10.

[17] Rumm. ap. Mubārak, 1963, 312, 13-6 [A 41]. On the difference between *mubtadaʾ* and *fāʿil*: b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 1, 196, 1-14. Mubarrad's use of the term *ibtidāʾ* is rather different; he says (Muqt. 3, 89) about the *ibtidāʾ* that it is 'what is called by the grammarians the article (*alif-lām*)'. According to Mubarrad, in an expression such as *qāma zaid* (Zaid stood up), if we want to predicate something about Zaid, we say *al-qāʾim zaid* (the stander-up is Zaid) and this process is called *ibtidāʾ* (??).

Sībawaihi's explanation the *mubtada'* is the first of the nominal states (*aḥwāl*).[18] Greek grammarians, too, held that the nominative is the principal case, and Gregorios of Corinth emphasizes that the subject should occupy the first place in the sentence, theoretically at least: 'Do not think that the noun necessarily occupies the first place in the construction of the sentence, and the verb the second place, and then the rest. On the contrary, the order of the words is left to chance ..., even though it is in the nature of the words that the noun should be put first, being the substance, and that the verb should follow, being the accident, and that the rest of the words should be placed after them ...'.[19] We will not go into the matter of the Syriac equivalents of *mubtada'* and *ḫabar*, *šurrāyā* and *ṭebbā*, which are used by Barhebraeus, since these terms may be the result of Arabic influence, especially by Zamaḫšarī's *Mufaṣṣal*.[20]

It is important to note that there also exists in Arabic literature a set of terms that correspond to the Aristotelian terms for 'subject' (*hupokeímenon*) and 'predicate' (*katēgoroúmenon*), namely *mauḍū'* and *maḥmūl*.[21] The existence of two sets of terms, one used in grammar and one in logic—this is stated explicitly by Ḫwārizmī and Ġazzālī[22]— confirms the fact that the original grammatical tradition was not influenced by Aristotelian logic, but by the contact with living Greek grammar, which bore the traces of Stoic influence.

It should be mentioned that some grammarians held that a verb sometimes does have a predicate of its own, for instance in expressions such as *ḍaraba huwa fiʿl* (hit is a verb). The arguments for this 'predication about the verb' (*iḫbār 'an al-fiʿl*) are rejected by Rāzī.[23] Another question concerns the position of the temporal and local adverbs (*ẓurūf*), which according to some opponents fall under the definition of the verb, since they cannot have a predicate. Zaǧǧāǧī

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[18] Sib. Kit. 1, 7, 17; cf. b. Anb. Inṣ. 15, 2.

[19] Greg. Cor. 6-7 [G 29]; cf. scholia D.T. 548, 27-9.

[20] Merx, 1889, 147; 246; Tarazi, 1969, 115.

[21] Aristot. categ. 1 a-b; the Arabic terms are given, for instance, by Far. Šarḥ, 17, 12; Ḫwār. Maf. 142, 11 sqq.; Ġazz. Miḥakk, 23, 28; Qisṭās, 67/62 (cf. Brunschvig, 1970, 163 (21)); Siǧistānī ap. Tauḥ. Muq. 284, 9; cf. also Fleisch, 1961, 25, n. 1; Zimmermann, Islamic philosophy, 1972, 534.

[22] Ḫwār. Maf. 142, 11 sqq.; Ġazzālī explains that *mubtada'/ḫabar* is typical for grammar, *mauṣūf/ṣifa* for theology, and *muḫbar 'anhu/maḥmūl* for logic; in law *maḥkūm/ḥukm* are used for the notions of subject and predicate, cf. the references in the preceding note. As for *ṣifa*, according to Diem, 1970, 313-5, it is used in Sībawaihi's *Kitāb* as a general term for attributes, not for the adjective alone.

[23] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 33, 6 sqq.

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denies this: the words *makān* (place) and *zamān* (time), implied by the adverbs *aina* (where?) and *matā* (when?), can receive a predicate. 'Abd al-Qāhir argues in the same way against the objection of the opponents: 'When we say "noun is something about which you can predicate something", what we intend to say is "noun is that about whose meaning you can predicate something" ...'.[24] *Aina* and *matā* fall, therefore, under the definition of the noun, since it is possible to predicate something about their meaning.

After having examined the definition of the verb, we will look into two characteristics of verbs, namely the indication of tense, and (in)transitivity; finally, we will discuss the relationship between the masdar/infinitive and the verb.

Grammatical tenses are not the same thing as physical time; still, the two are related. Time (*chrónos*) is defined by Chrysippos as 'interval (or: extension) of the movement of the cosmos' (*diástēma tēs toû kósmou kinēseôs*);[25] it is one of the four incorporeal things (*asómata*).[26] With the 'void' (*kenón*) it shares the property of being infinite in two directions, the past and the future.[27] The present moment is only an intersection of two infinite times, itself being without dimensions and without existence from a geometrical point of view.[28] But on the other hand, the present time is the only one which really exists (*hupárchein*), whereas past and future only exist as constructions of the mind (*huphestánai*).[29]

Aristotle wrote about the precarious existence of the present time, which cannot exist in any physical sense.[30] This implies that actions

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[24] 'Abd al-Qāhir ap. Rāzī, Maf. 1, 33, pen.—34, 2. Note the discrepancy between Zaǧǧāǧī's denial, Iḍ. 53, 7-12, and his own objections to the definition of the noun by al-Aḫfaš Saʿīd ibn Masʿada, Iḍ. 49, 14 sqq.

[25] SVF 2, 510. Cf. Christensen, 1962, 25-6; Rist, 1969, 273-88; Goldschmidt, 1953; Sambursky, 1971, 98-108. Cf. in Arabic literature the definition given by Abū Sulaimān as-Siǧistānī, ap. Tauḥ. Muq. 278, 16-7, and the definition mentioned by Ibn al-Anbārī, Inṣ. 63, 23-4 'time is the movement of the stars' (*az-zamān ḥarakat al-falak*), and by Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā ar-Rāzī, Opera Philosophica, 1, 243, 14-6 'time is the duration of the existence of the stars' (*az-zamān mudda wuǧūd al-falak*); cf. Nader, 1956, 188-9; Jadaane, 1967, 214-5.

[26] Together with *tópos* (place), *kenón* (void), and *lektón* (meaning), SVF 2, 331.

[27] SVF 2, 509; 520.

[28] A point also made by Hebrew grammarians, cf. Chomsky's notes on Kimḥi's *Mikhlol*, p. 361, n. 628.

[29] SVF 2, 164, 26-7.

[30] Aristot. phys. 233 b 33 sqq.; natural. auscult. 219 b-220 a; cf. Steinthal, 1890², 1, 312 sqq. For Aristotle's theories concerning time: Conen, 1964. After Aristotle became known in the Arabic world the concept of time was dealt with in a more scientific way, by means of the distinction between time in a broader and in a narrower

in the present time cannot exist, and that verbs cannot possess verbal
forms of the present tense. However, besides time in the strictest sense
of the word, there exists another time, which is defined by Fārābī
in the following words: 'If we take the time with a definite distance
in the past from the present moment, which is the end and the
beginning (sc. the present time conceived of as an intersection of two
infinite times, itself without dimensions), and we join it with the
same time in the future, and if their distance from the present
moment, which is the end and the beginning, forms one single distance
in past and future, and if they are taken together, then this time is
the present time'.[31] According to Fārābī, philosophers use the word
'now' in both senses, i.e., in the strictest sense and in the derived
sense, common people know only of the second sense,[32] whereas
grammarians base themselves on the first sense exclusively in con-
cluding that verbs in the present tense do not exist.[33] In Fārābī's
definition present time is actually the contraction of the last part of
the past and the first part of the future. This is expressed in gram-
matical terms by Priscianus, when he describes the present tense of a
verb: 'We use to call this tense *praesens*, because it holds together and
it unites, as it were, in one point the junction of the past and the
future tenses, without any intercision ..., like when I say in the middle
of a verse "I write a verse", when the first part of the verse has
already been written down, and the last part is still lacking. I use
the verb in the present tense, saying "I write a verse", but it is
imperfect, because part of the verse is still lacking'.[34] In fact, this
is the original theory of Chrysippos: the present time consists of two
parts, one of which is past, and the other future.[35]

This present time may be long or short, for it is possible to say
'the present year', 'the present day', or 'the present minute'.[36] The

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sense. As-Sīǧistānī (ap. Tauḥ. Muq. 278) and Ibn al-Anbārī (Inṣ. 103) use the terms
zamān muṭlaq and *zamān basīṭ* (or *mu'ayyan*); their source was probably Fārābī's
Šarḥ al-'Ibāra (Šarḥ. 40, 1 - 42, 26).

[31] Far. Šarḥ. 41, 2-4 [A 42].

[32] Ib. 40, 25 - 41, 2.

[33] Ib. 40, 17-8.

[34] Prisc. instit. 8, 52 (414, 24 - 415, 6): *Ergo praesens tempus hoc solemus dicere quod
contineat et coniungat quasi puncto aliquo iuncturum praeteriti temporis et futuri nulla
intercisione interveniente... ut, si in medio versu dicam 'scribo versum' priore eius parte
scripta, cui adhuc deest extrema pars, praesenti utor verbo dicendo 'scribo versum', sed
imperfectum est, quod deest adhuc versui, quod scribatur.*

[35] This theory is transmitted by Plout. de comm. not. cap. 41 sqq.; cf. SVF 2, 517.

[36] Far. Šarḥ. 41, 8-9; cf. scholia D.T. 559, 4-8: 'They say that Dionysios used

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present time is a gradual transition from the future into the past.[37]
In this time the action takes place simultaneously with the expression
of that action in speech: 'The present time comes into being during
the words of the speaker', says Zaǧǧāǧī,[38] thereby agreeing with the
scholiast on Dionysios Thrax, who puts it like this: 'It (sc. the present
time) combines the existence of something with its expression'.[39]

Sībawaihi's analysis of the Arabic verbal system revealed two verbal
forms: a perfect (*qatala*), and an imperfect (*yaqtulu*) (and an impera-
tive (*uqtul*)). He described these forms in the following way: 'As
for the verbs, they are patterns taken from the expression of the
events of the nouns, and they are constructed to (signify) what is
past, and what is to come, and what is being without interruption.
The structure of what is past is *ḏahaba*, *sami'a*, *makuṯa*, *ḥumida*;
the structure of what did not yet occur is, ... when you are telling
something *yaqtulu*, *yaḏhabu*, *yaḍribu*, *yuqtalu*, *yuḍrabu*, and so is the
structure of what is being and is not yet finished, when you are
telling something'.[40] Remarkable in this division is the fact that,
although there are only two verbal forms, and although these forms
do not indicate the time of the action, but its aspect, Sībawaihi never-
theless designed a system with three tenses. Merx attributed this to
the influence of the Persian translations of Aristotle's *De Interpreta-
tione*[41] in combination with the fact that Sībawaihi was of Persian

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"times" in the sense of "distances of time", like when we divide the time into years,
months, days, and hours. That is why he calls it "present tense" (*enhestōs*), namely, as
if it has the length of a year, or a month, or a day, or an hour, for we say "the present
year, month, day, hour"' [G 30]; cf. Choirob. 2, 12, 2 sqq. (the *platukōs chrónos* of the
grammarians); also Joh. Phil. comment. in Aristot. phys. 703, 16. On the grammatical
present tense: scholia D.T. 248, 13 sqq.; 249, 3-8; 403, 3; 404, 26-8; 559, 4 sqq.; cf. also
Ploutarchos' criticism on Archedemos, de comm. not. cap. 41 = SVF 3, 263, 14.

[37] Cf. Prisc. instit. 8, 51-3 (414, 9 - 415, 10): '... as time flows continuously like a
river, it can hardly have a (fixed) point in the present time'. (... *cum enim tempus fluvii
more instabili volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in praesenti*). cf. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 87,
5-6 'bit by bit' (*awwalan awwalan*).

[38] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 87, 3 (*al-mutakawwin fī ḥāl ḥiṭāb al-mutakallim*); Sīrāfī defines the three
grammatical tenses with similar terms (Šarḥ al-Kitāb, 1, 12, as quoted by Mubārak in
his edition of Zaǧǧāǧī's *Iḍāḥ*, p. 87, n. 1).

[39] Scholia D.T. 404, 27-8 (*hāma gàr tōi légesthai échei kai tò einai*); cf. Choirob. 2,
11, 34 - 12, 1.

[40] Sīb. Kit. 1, 2, 2-5 [A 43]. Merx' analysis of this text, 1889, 142, can hardly be
correct: Sībawaihi most certainly did not mention the imperative as an example of
what is being done and is not yet finished! Sībawaihi's 'definition' of the verb: cf.
above, chapter III A, note 25; also: Troupeau, 1962b.

[41] Aristot. de interpret. 113 b 17, as compared with the translation given by Paulus
Persa, ed. Land, IV, 15, 112, in the preserved Syriac translation of the Persian original

origin.[42] On the other hand, awareness of three physical times is not unique, and Sībawaihi may very well have adapted on his own initiative the Arabic verbal system to these three times. What is more, he does not give to each of the three times its own name, but uses, following the structure of the Arabic language, only one name for the present and the future tenses together. The perfect 'tense' is called by him *māḍī*, i.e., 'what has gone, what is past'. In this case, there may be a connection with the Greek *pareléluthós*, but not in the case of the imperfect 'tense', which is called *muḍāri'*, i.e., 'resembling' (sc. the nouns, or the active participle *fā'il*), since the verbal forms of the imperfect have almost the same endings as the nouns, or since the syntactic function of the imperfect resembles that of the active participle.[43]

The term *muḍāri'* is used by Sībawaihi not only to indicate the resemblance of the verbal modes to the nominal cases—which is evident in Arabic—, but also the fundamental equivalence in function of the imperfect verb and the active participle: *zaid la-yaf'alu* (Zaid really does) and *zaid la-fā'il* (Zaid is really doing) have the same construction, and amount to the same thing. Another analogy between the imperfect verb and the active participle is that verbs may receive the particle *saufa*, just as participles may be determined by the article: in both cases, according to the Arabic grammarians, the function of the added article is to make the word to which it is added definite.[44] This 'famous resemblance' (*muḍāra'a mašhūra*)[45] was held for a long time by all grammarians, although the Baṣrians and the Kūfans interpreted it differently: according to Ibn al-Anbārī,[46] the Kūfans held that the imperfect verbs had a certain right to declension, because they, like the nouns, are used to convey different meanings (*ma'ānī muḫtalifa*);[47] the Baṣrians, on the other hand, granted the right of

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(probably this Paulus Persa is identical with Paulus of Nisibis, who died in 571 A.D., cf. Baumstark, 1968², 121; Georr, 1948, 15-6), quoted by Merx, 1889, 142.

[42] Merx, 1889, 142.

[43] For *muḍāri'* : Maḫzūmī, 1958, 238 : Diem, 1970, p. 319, note. Apparently, Zaǧǧāǧī avoided the term *muḍāri'* : whenever it crops up in the argument of an adversary (e.g., Īḍ. 107, 9 sqq.; Īḍ. 87, 13 sqq.: *fī kutubihim*!) he starts to explain its meaning.

[44] Sīb. Kit. 1, 3, 12 sqq.; cf. Hegazi, 1971, 55-9.

[45] Zaǧǧ Īḍ. 87, 14.

[46] b. Anb. Inṣ. 224, 21 - 225, 25 (*mas'ala* 73).

[47] Probably not in the sense that homonymous verbs exist, as Zaǧǧāǧī tries to make out, Īḍ. 87, 13 sqq., but that verbs indicate different meanings—possess different syntactic functions—, just as nouns are subject to changes which serve to express the different functions of the nouns (*ma'ānī*), e.g. Īḍ. 69, 6 sqq. But cf. Zam. Muf. 109, 8.

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declension to the imperfect verbs in accordance with their place within the grammatical system, where they resemble the nouns in three respects (*wuǧūh*).[48] These three respects are: the analogy between the article and the particle *saufa*; the fact that both the imperfect verb and the active participle may receive the particle *la-*; and the fact that imperfect verbs may replace the active participles in many sentences. Essentially, these are the same points as those mentioned by Sībawaihi.[49] Thus, according to the Baṣrians, imperfect verbs are declined because they themselves resemble the nouns; according to the Kūfans, a certain category of the verbs, namely the imperfect verbs, is declined, because verbs bear a general likeness to nouns.

The comparison of the verbal moods to the nominal cases is not as original as it appears to be at first sight. The same comparison is made in Greek grammatical literature, though not because of a resemblance of verbs to nouns, but 'nach dem beliebten Parallelismus zwischen den verschiedenen Gebieten der Grammatik'.[50] Zaǧǧāǧī's remark that verbal forms may be used for more than one meaning, just like the nouns, may be compared to the remarks of Apollonios Dyskolos concerning the *sumpátheia*, i.e., the phenomenon that one form takes the function of another form.[51] As for the equivalence in function of the imperfect verb and the active participle, we may point to the Greek doctrine, which states that a form such as *loúei* (he washes) is equivalent to *estì loúōn* (he is washing), as is customary in logic. According to the Kūfans the active participle constitutes the third tense of the verb, the present tense; the participle is then called the *fi'l dā'im*.[52]

It does not seem very likely that the Arabic term *muḍāri'* was the result of the influence of the Syriac term *zawnā de-damya*, as is asserted by Tarazī;[53] it seems more probable that the influence was the other way round, since the Syriac term is of a much later date.

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[48] For this term: Weil, 1913, 22 sqq.

[49] Also b. Anb. Lum. 56, 4 sqq.; Asr. 12, 21 sqq.

[50] Steinthal, 1891², 2, 296; scholia D.T. 246, 27-8; 399, 22-4; Apoll. Dysk. fragm. pp. 86-7; Theod. 52, 4 sqq.; Choirob. 2, 104, 26 sqq.; Macrobius, diff. 611, 36 Keil; Prisc. instit. 8, 63 (421).

[51] Apoll. Dysk. adv. 202, 2-15. The possibility of one word with two different meanings was denied by some Arabic grammarians, cf. Suy. Muzh. 1, 237-8; b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 2, 308, 9-11.

[52] Cf. Maḫzūmī, 1958, 238-41; also the refutation by Sīrāfī in his commentary on the Kitāb, 1, 493, as quoted by Mubārak in his edition of Zaǧǧāǧī's Īḍāḥ, p. 86, note 1.

[53] Tarazī, 1969, 116.

We have stated above that we do not believe that there is any cogent reason to assume an influence of Aristotelian logic in order to explain the occurrence of three tenses in Sībawaihi's analysis of the Arabic verbal system. Such an influence could, however, be supposed in the case of later grammarians who distinguished between three tenses of the verb, each with its own name: *māḍī*, *ḥāl*, and *mustaqbal*. But because of the fact that this system was used in Arabic grammar before the first translations from Greek into Arabic, we prefer to assume a direct influence of Greek grammar, which should explain the transition from Sībawaihi's terminology (*māḍī-muḍāri'*) to the new terminology with three names for three tenses (*māḍī-ḥāl-mustaqbal*[54]). Probably, the Syrian grammarians had something to do with this: in Syriac grammar the names for the three tenses of the verb are evidently *calques* of the Greek names, *zawnā ḏa-'bar* (= *parelèluthôs*), *zawnā ḏe-qa'em* (= *enhestôs*), *zawnā ḏa-'tid* (= *méllôn*).[55] In Hebrew grammar the term *zemān 'ōmēḏ*—also a *calque* of the Greek *enhestôs*—is used to translate the Arabic *ḥāl*.[56] Ibn Ǧanāḥ tells us that verbs have two tenses, namely *ḥōlēf* (= *parelèluthôs*) and *'āṯiḏ* (= *méllôn*).[57] We may have one instance in Arabic logical literature of the term *kalima qā'ima* being used to indicate the verb in the present tense, namely in Ibn Sīnā's *Šarḥ al-'Ibāra*: 'The situation of the inflected (*muṣarrafa*) and the present (*qā'ima*) verb in the language of the Greeks is that the present verb is that which indicates the present time (*ḥāḍir*), whereas the inflected verb is that which indicates one of the two (other) times'.[58] Note that the Greek term *enhestôs* came in use only a long time after Aristotle, namely in Stoic grammar. This supports the thesis of contact between Arabic grammar and living Greek grammar, where *enhestôs* was used after the example of the Stoa.

Grammarians may object to the reality of the present tense with arguments couched in physical terms,[59] but when it comes to the question of the hierarchy of the three grammatical tenses, these objections disappear: speech is ruled by reason, and therefore, order and regularity should be found in every category, if only you look for

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[54] Cf. Gesenius/Kautzsch, 1909[28], 132 n. *Muntaẓar* (expected) is another name for what is normally called *mustaqbal*. Both terms could translate the Greek term *méllôn* (Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 85, 3; 87, 4; 108, 18: in combination with *munqaḍī*, perfect tense).

[55] Merx, 1889, 17; 26; Tarazi, 1969, 116.

[56] Bacher, 1970[2], (195).

[57] Ibn Ǧanāḥ, Sēfer harriqmā, 41, 23.

[58] Ibn Sīnā, 'Ibāra, 28, 7-8 [A 44], (or *qā'im* = *mustaqīm* = *orthôs*??).

[59] E.g. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. p. 86.

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it; moreover, speech is an image of reality, and there are, therefore, three tenses, just as there are three times. Their hierarchy is determined by the hierarchy of the physical times. Zaǧǧāǧī, for instance deduces from the chronological order of non-existence, existence, and past existence the classification of the verbal tenses: future—present—past.[60] He probably follows the doctrine of his teacher, Zaǧǧāǧī, who held the same theory, and had a famous controversy with Abū Bakr ibn as-Sarrāǧ on this subject.[61] Ibn as-Sarrāǧ thought that the present tense was the first verbal tense; his arguments are mentioned by Sīrāfī, who does not mention Ibn as-Sarrāǧ by name, but evidently thinks of him, when he deals with the controversy on this subject.[62] Zaǧǧāǧī's point of view is also mentioned by Suyūṭī, and apparently it was the point of view of the majority of the grammarians. Ibn Ǧanāḥ, the Hebrew grammarian, tells us in his *Kitāb al-luma'* that 'the Arabic grammarians' consider the future tense the first verbal tense, since every action must first be future, before it can be present, and then past.[63]

The same problem is dealt with in Greek grammar. In the scholia we often find the theory expressed that the present tense is the most important of the verbal tenses, since it is the stem of the verb (*théma rhèmatos*), a morphological argument that is, of course, absent in Arabic grammar. The scholiasts also say that every past tense once was a present tense; this resembles the argument mentioned by Zaǧǧāǧī in the *Iḍāḥ*.[64] Sophronios summarizes the arguments in support of the possible theories concerning this point:[65] a) present—past—future (not identical with ibn as-Sarrāǧ's theory, because he places the future immediately after the past); b) the past is the first of the verbal

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[60] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. p. 85.

[61] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 31, 1-2.

[62] Sīrāfī, Šarḥ, 1, 2, quoted by Mubārak in his edition of Zaǧǧāǧī's *Iḍāḥ*, p. 85, n. 3, unfortunately only in part, without the arguments used by Sīrāfī.

[63] Bacher, 1970[2], 139 and notes 3-5; cf. also b. Anb. Inṣ. 105, 13; Suy. Ašbāh, 1, 54.

[64] Scholia D.T. 249, 9-12; 403, 33 sqq.; 559, 10-3; also Apoll. Dysk. synt. 16, 1-2.

[65] Sophr. 413, 32 - 414, 7: 'First comes the present, second the past, and third the future tense; but others say that the future tense should be put first, since first something is going to happen, then it happens, and then it is past; others prefer the past tense as the first tense, since past things happened before present things ..., but according to another theory, the present tense comes first, because it is visible and evident ...' [G 31]. Sophronios' arguments for the present tense resemble Ibn as-Sarrāǧ's words: 'The imperfect (*muḍāri'*) has the first position in the mind prior to the past' (*al-muḍāri' asbaqu rutbatan fī 'n-nafs min al-māḍī*), ap. b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 105, 10, cf. ib. 3, 331, 13, obviously because the present time is 'before our eyes'; here *muḍāri'* denotes the present time, cf. the quotation from Sīrāfī (above, note 62), who uses *ḥāl*.

tenses (this theory existed in Arabic grammar, according to Naǧǧār[66]); c) future—present—past. The third theory mentioned by Sophronios is the theory which was held by the majority of the Arabic grammarians, who defended it with the same arguments as the Greek grammarians: first something is going to happen, then it happens, and then it is past.

In later Greek grammar the process by which verbs are connected with their objects received the name *metábasis* or *diábasis* (in Latin grammar *transitio*). This term denoted the extension of the action of the verb to an object. This concept of 'transition' fits in with the point of view we find in later Greek grammar about the role of the verbs: verbs are no longer regarded as logical predicates in the sentence, but rather as names of actions: the verb ceases to be the *katēgoroúmenon*,[67] it is now the *ónoma toû prágmatos*. *Metábasis*, *diábasis* are found for instance in the writings of Apollonios Dyskolos,[68] as well as in the scholia on Dionysios Thrax,[69] and in Byzantine grammar.[70] In Syriac grammar there existed a term *mšanyānā* for the transitive verb with approximately the same meaning as the Greek term *metábasis*;[71] in Hebrew grammar we find the term *miṭʿabbēr*, which also corresponds to the Greek term.[72] Both terms, though, may be *calques* of the Arabic term. Arabic grammar used the term *mutaʿaddī* and its negative *ġair mutaʿaddī* (as well as the corresponding substantive *taʿaddī* or *taʿdiya*) for the concept of transitivity and intransitivity.[73] The importance of these terms may be deduced from the fact that Sībawaihi devotes to this subject no less than ten chapters at the beginning of his *Kitāb*.[74] Considering the resemblance between the Greek and the

[66] Naǧǧār in his edition of ibn Ğinnī's *Ḫaṣāʾiṣ*, 2, 31, n. 1, unfortunately without references.

[67] For this term: cf. above, note 21.

[68] Apoll. Dysk. synt. 402 sqq.; pron. 45-7; active and passive verbs: synt. 394 sqq. Cf. also Schneider's index s.v. *diá/metábasis*.

[69] Scholia D.T. 89, 3 *rhêma ametábaton* vs. *rhêma en metábasei*.

[70] E.g. a text ascribed to Gregorios of Corinth, ed. Donnet, 315, 1, 3 etc.

[71] Tarazī, 1969, 116; Merx, 1889, 253.

[72] Bacher, 1970[2], 195, antepen.

[73] Ibn Hišām (Awḍ. 2, 260) uses *qāṣir* (failing) for *ġair mutaʿaddī*, for which we also find *ǧāmid*, e.g. b. Ğin. Ḫaṣ. 2, 215, 20; 2, 349, 2. *Ǧāmid* is an interesting term; it always indicates something simple as against something more complicated: it may designate substantives vs. adjectives (Suy. Iqt. 72, 8; Rāzī, Maf. 1, 44, 6), a simple noun vs. a derivative (de Sacy, 1829, 329; 356), a not-inflected word vs. an inflected one (b. Anb. Inṣ. 57, 22; b. Ğin Ḫaṣ. 1, 37, 10 (*ǧamuda*); Ṭaʿlab ap. Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 350, 8). Because of its concrete meaning ('thick', 'frozen', 'solid') we would assume it to be a *calque* of a foreign word, but we have not been able to find a Greek equivalent.

[74] Sib. Kit. 1, 13-26.

Arabic terms—the Arabic root *ʿ-d-w* means 'to cross, overstep'—we suppose that the Arabic terms are *calques* of the Greek *metábasis*, *metabatikós*, borrowed by the Arabs at an early date through contact with living Greek grammar. The basic conception implied by the use of this term is common to both grammars, namely that the action of the verb passes on, is extended to the object.[75]

One of the hotly debated issues in the discussions between the Basrians and the Kūfans was the relation between the verb and the masdar: the Basrians held that the masdar was the origin of the verb, whereas the Kūfans believed that the verb was the original form, from which the masdar is derived. Ibn al-Anbārī deals with the arguments of both parties in the 28th problem of his *Inṣāf*,[76] and the problem is mentioned by other authors as well.[77] Traces of the discussion are even found in Hebrew grammatical writings.[78] The discussion concerning the arguments pro and contra was garnished, as usual, with extra-linguistic evidence.[79]

The origin of this question lies in Greek grammar: although the Greek infinitive is of a completely different morphological and syntactic nature than the Arabic masdar, the connection between them becomes obvious when we compare the names given to the Greek infinitive and the Arabic masdar. The current name for the masdar, *ism al-fiʿl* (verbal noun) corresponds to the Greek *ónoma toû rhēmatos*.[80] When Zaǧǧāǧī tells us that the masdar is to be regarded as the name for the actions of the things represented by the nouns,[81] he is actually translating the Greek *ónoma toû prágmatos*.[82] There are also traces of Greek doctrines in the arguments which are adduced for or against the priority of the masdar.

The first argument for the priority of the masdar is the one implied by Sībawaihi's description of the verb, in the interpretation of later

[75] Kūfan grammar used another term to denote the transitive verb, namely *wāqiʿ* (falling) (cf. Weil, 1913, 72, note 1).

[76] b. Anb. Inṣ. 102, 6 - 107, 24; cf. Asr. 69, 22 - 71, 19.

[77] b. Yaʿīš, 135, 11 - 136, 13; Suy. Ašbāh, 1, 61 sqq.; Iqt. 180 - 1; according to Mubārak, edition of the *Īḍāḥ*, p. 56, note 1, Sīrāfī deals with this question in the commentary on the *Kitāb*, 1; 9.

[78] Ibn Ğanāḥ, Opuscules, pp. 12-3; Kimḥi, Mikhlol, ed. Chomsky, pp. 363-4, cf. ib. note 633 for a general discussion about the theories on this point in Hebrew grammar.

[79] Cf. below, chapter VII, for logical arguments used in the discussion concerning the priority of the masdar.

[80] E.g. scholia D.T. 400, 25; Apoll. Dysk. frg. 87 sqq.

[81] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 56, 3-8.

[82] E.g. scholia D.T. 72, 24; 399, 34; 558, 22; Choirob. 2, 7, 12.

authors: 'As for the verbs, they are patterns taken from the expression of the events of the nouns'.[83] The actions of the nouns, according to this interpretation, are the masdars, and the verbal forms are taken from the masdars. 'Taken from' (ma'ḫūḏ) receives the meaning of 'etymologically derived from', and this is the usual interpretation given to it by Western scholars as well. As regards the idea of an etymological relation between verbs and infinitives, we may refer to an observation made by Apollonios Dyskolos: 'From the infinitive itself stem all conjugated forms, and within the infinitive they are absorbed again'.[84] This Greek grammatical theory, which makes the infinitive the root of all verbal forms, is borrowed by Fārābī in his description of the Greek kanónes onomatikoì kaì rhēmatikoí:[85] '(The rules distinguish) between those forms which are maṣādir—those are the forms from which the verbs are derived—, and those forms which are not maṣādir; (they also show) how the maṣādir are changed into verbs'.

The Baṣrians deduce from Sībawaihi's words that the masdar occupies a higher position in the hierarchical system of the Arabic language, and they assert that the infinitive is primary with regard to the verb. Another way of saying this is to state that the masdar is the genus (ǧins) of the verbal forms. In Arabic terminology this means that an action, be it a single or a repeated one, can always be described by the masdar. We find the same statement in Greek grammar.[86] Additional arguments mentioned by the Baṣrians are:

1. the masdar is the noun of the verb (ism al-fiʿl); nouns are prior to verbs; therefore, the masdar is prior to the verb.[87]

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[83] Sib. Kit. 1, 2, 2-3; cf. above, chapter III A.

[84] Apoll. Dysk. frg. p. 90 = Choirob. 2, 209, 13-4 [G 32]; Greek grammar does not, however, grant the infinitive the first place in the hierarchy of the verbal forms, cf. the sentence preceding this quotation: 'You must know that the infinitive occupies the second place, and rightly, even though it should have occupied the first place, being the principle and, as it were, the root of the verbs, for from the infinitive ...'. Apollonios' opinion was not very consistent, cf. below.

[85] Far. Ibs. 14, 5-7 [A 45]; on this passage, cf. above, chapter III B. The use of the word masdar in this Greek context suggests a Greek origin for this word (?).

[86] b. Gin. Ḥaṣ. 1, 25, 5-6; 2, 206, 8 sqq.; cf. 1, 27, 2 sqq. with Apoll. Dysk. synt. 325, 1 sqq. (quoted below, cf. note 103).

[87] b. Anb. Ins. 103, 12-6 (masdars are nouns; therefore, they can stand on their own, and do not need a verb; this means that they are more than the verbs: a verb cannot stand on its own, but needs a noun); cf. scholia D.T. 558, 21-8. Contrast with this the reasoning of Choiroboskos, 2, 210, 6-12: an infinitive and a verb can form a sentence together (e.g. hairoúmai philosopheîn, I prefer to meditate); this shows that infinitives cannot be verbs, but must be adverbs. An objection against Ibn al-Anbārī's argument, cf. below, chapter VII, note 30.

2. the name masdar shows that the masdar is the origin (masdar) of the verb.[88]

3. not to every masdar does a verb belong; this proves that the masdar is prior to the verb (this morphological argument was used by Zaǧǧāǧ, Zaǧǧāǧī's teacher).[89]

4. the form of the masdars vary; therefore, they are prior (a morphological argument attributed to Ibn as-Sarrāǧ).[90]

5. the meaning of the masdar is always found in the verb, while the opposite is not true (an argument adduced by the ahl an-naẓar, i.e., the logico-grammarians).[91]

Two other arguments are mentioned by Ibn al-Anbārī:

6. the masdar signifies an absolute time (zamān muṭlaq), the verb a special time (zamān mu'ayyan).[92]

7. the masdar signifies a pure action, the verb an action together with the time of that action.[93]

Just as in Greek grammar another theory is put forward, namely that the infinitive is nothing more than a derivative form of the verb, actually a sort of adverb,[94] Kūfan grammarians held that the verb is the principle (aṣl) from which the rest of the verbal forms are derived, including the masdar. The Kūfans propose the following arguments for their point of view:

1. the masdar is only a reinforcement of the meaning of the verb (taukīd), e.g., in the expression ḍaraba zaid ḍarban (Zaid hit really hard) (this argument was used by Abū Bakr ibn al-Anbārī).[95]

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[88] Suy. Iqt. 80-1; Zaǧǧ. Id. 58, 14-8.

[89] Zaǧǧ. Id. 58, 19 - 59, 5; cf. Suy. Muzh. 2, 112-3. Examples: bunuwwa (sonhood); umūma (motherhood).

[90] Zaǧǧ. Id. 59, 6-12.

[91] Zaǧǧ. Id. 59, 13 - 60, 2; the same argument in the discussion concerning the priority of the noun, cf. below, chapter VII, note 99.

[92] b. Anb. Ins. 103, 5-12.

[93] b. Anb. Ins. 103, 16-19. These last two arguments are only variants of Zaǧǧāǧī's fifth argument (also mentioned by ibn al-Anbārī, Ins. 103, 22 sqq.), namely that the masdar expresses less meaning than the verb, in other words, that the masdar has less accidents than the verbs. Were the masdar derived from the verb it would have an added meaning, such as, for instance, the participles have. This idea is explained by means of a comparison with a metal and the objects made from it, cf. below, chapter VII, note 25.

[94] Apoll. Dysk. frg. p. 87 sqq.

[95] Zaǧǧ. Id. 60 ult. - 61, 6.

2. the name *masdar* shows that the verb is the principle, and that
the masdar is derived from the verb, contrary to what is asserted
by the Baṣrians.[96]

3. the masdars are formed according to the same phonetic rules as
the verbs, i.e., if the verb has a strong radical, the masdar has
likewise a strong radical, and if the verb has a weak radical, so does
the masdar.[97]

Three more arguments are mentioned by Ibn al-Anbārī:

4. syntactically verbs may prevail over the masdars, i.e., they may
have a masdar as their object; therefore, they are prior to them.[98]

5. a masdar presupposes the action of an agent, which is expressed
by the verb; therefore, the verb is prior to the masdar.[99]

6. not to every verb does a masdar belong; this proves that the
verb is prior to the masdar (contrast this with the third argu-
ment of the Baṣrians!).[100]

Some Greek grammarians did not consider the infinitive a real
verb, because of the fact that it is devoid of the characteristics of a
normal verb, such as person, number, verbal mood, while it has some

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[96] Zaǧǧ. Id. 61 ult. - 63, 10. This argument is a common trick in this sort of
discussion, namely that you reverse the meaning of a term in order to obtain from it an
argument in favour of your own theory. We can compare the procedure in the discus-
sion about the masdar with the discussion about the *ḥurūf al-iʿrāb* in the third problem
of Ibn al-Anbārī's *Inṣāf*, where the Kūfans play the same trick with the term *ḥarf al-iʿrāb*
(b. Anb. Inṣ. 13, 15-7). We find it also in theological debates: both parties in the
discussion about free will used the term 'Qadarite' for their adversary, cf. Aš'arī,
Ibāna, 47, 7 sqq.; Watt, 1971, 28-9; van Ess, 1965, 128-30.

[97] Zaǧǧ. Id. 60, 3-9. On the other hand, there is the Baṣrian argument that
masdars sometimes have other consonants than the verbs. When al-Aṣmaʿī says: 'Often
the masdar is derived from another form than the verb' (*rubbamā 'štiqqa 'l-masdar min
ġair lafẓ al-fiʿl*) (Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 140, 1-2) he is in fact undermining his own Kūfan theory,
because it is precisely the uniformity of verb and masdar which is used as an argument
for the priority of the verb. A practical example of this question is found in Rummānī's
commentary on Sībawaihi's *Kitāb* (ap. Mubārak, 1963, 311): 'The pattern *ifʿālaltu*
from the word *ḥuwwa* (dark red or green colour) is *iḥwāwaitu* ... and the masdar from
it is *iḥwiyāʾ*. Some grammarians say that it is better to say *iḥwaiwāʾ*, because the "y"
is the result of the change of the added *alif* in *iḥwāwaitu*, just as it is changed in *suwair*.
But Sībawaihi does not mention this. The difference between the two forms is that in
the masdar we have the original form, without any change, because the verb is derived
from the masdar' [A 46].

[98] b. Anb. Inṣ. 102, 12-5.

[99] b. Anb. Inṣ. 102, 21-3.

[100] b. Anb. Inṣ. 102, 18-21 (namely in the case of such expressions as *niʿma*, *biʾsa*,
mā afʿala, which are verbs according to the Baṣrian theory, cf. problems 14 and 15,
Inṣ. pp. 47-68).

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of the characteristics of the noun.[101] This is the reason why the
infinitive is called *aparémphatos*, i.e., a form which only signifies the
pure meaning, none of the accidents. The argument proposed against
this opinion is that the infinitive is the real verb, which signifies
only and exclusively the action in itself with no accidents attached to
it.[102] In the words of Apollonios Dyskolos: 'As we have said before,
the mood of the infinitive is the most general mood, which of necessity
lacks those things we have discussed before, namely person and the
accident number. These are not connected originally with the verb, but
only serve as an attribute of the persons who partake in the action.
For the action in itself is one, e.g. writing, walking; after it has been
connected with persons, forms like "I walk, we walk" are derived
from it'.[103]

Some people are not convinced by this conception of the infinitive as
the general mood, and they continue to regard the infinitive as
something derived from the verb, as a sort of adverb.[104] These people
wish to exclude the infinitive from the verbal system because of the
fact that it does not have any of the characteristics of the verb, 'just
as the participle ..., which is devoid of all those characteristics, is
excluded from the verbal system'.[105] In that case, the infinitive cannot
remain the 'root' (*rhíza*) of the verbal forms; still, most gram-
marians believe it to be just that. Even more difficulties arise when
we continue to regard the infinitive as a verb, while at the same time
we call it the noun of the action (*ónoma toú prágmatos*), or when we
call the infinitives the 'nominal categories of the actions' (*onomatikaì
katègoriai tôn pragmátōn*)—Apollonios Dyskolos manages to make
these two statements in one and the same passage.[106]

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[101] E.g. Choirob. 2, 6, 8 sqq.; Sophr. 2, 411, 11.

[102] In other words, infinitives denote *prágma* without *ousía*, scholia D.T. 400, 9-11.

[103] Apoll. Dysk. 324, 10 - 325, 3 [G 33]; cf. Choirob. 2, 7, 12-5.

[104] Their arguments are mentioned by Apoll. Dysk. synt. 320-2 and by Choirob. 2,
210, 13 sqq. The arguments against their theory, Apoll. Dysk. synt. 323-4.

[105] Apoll. Dysk. synt. 320, 6 - 321, 2 [G 34]. Translation of the entire passage: 'An
attribute *par excellence* of the verbs is mental condition, but this is incompatible with the
infinitives, together with the categories of number and person, which cannot be expressed
by the infinitive, just as the participle ..., which is devoid of all these characteristics,
is excluded from the verbal system'. In Arabic grammar the participle is excluded from
the verbal system, because it has something more than the verb, namely the added
meaning of a noun.

[106] Apoll. Dysk. adv. 129, 20-1; cf. also scholia D.T. 400, 5-9. *Rhíza* is used by
Sophr. 2, 411, 2-7; in the same sense: *archè* (ib.), and *húlē* (ib. 410, 36).

If we accept the infinitive as part of the verbal system, the problem of its position within that system remains: some Greek grammarians gave the infinitive the first place, because it is the root of the verbal forms: 'Some people wanted to put the infinitive in the first place, reasoning that it is, as it were, the raw material and the origin of the verb. This is the reason why it has not added to its signification "subjectivity" (i.e., the verbal moods), or the persons, or the numbers: for original elements are always simple, just as the four elements as against the bodies (which consist of them), and the twenty-four elements (sc. the letters of the alphabet) as against the words, and shapeless clay as against the household goods made from it'.[107] As a counterargument, the fact is mentioned that the indicative mood is the 'stem' of the verb, from which the other forms are derived.[108] Moreover, the acting person comes before his actions, and the verbal form which expresses the combination of the acting person with his action must needs be prior to the pure action, expressed by the infinitive.[109] Apollonios Dyskolos himself changed his mind about this point: having first placed the infinitive after the indicative, he later put it at the beginning of the verbal system.

In conclusion we can say that in all these discussions the fact is emphasized that the infinitive signifies the pure action without further accidents.[110] This justifies our considering it the 'general verb' (*genikòn rhēma*).[111] Herein lies the resemblance between the Greek and the Arabic data: the contradiction between on the one hand the verbal nature of the infinitive, and on the other hand its nominal characteristics. In both grammars this resulted in the same appellations, and in a *communis opinio* to the effect that the infinitive and the masdar are the *rhiza* and the *aṣl* of the verbal forms; in both grammars, too, the opposition against this point of view was not strong enough to make people abandon it. Close parallels in morphological arguments were not to be expected because of the great difference in nature between the Greek infinitive and the Arabic masdar. But the fact that both

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[107] Sophr. 2, 410, 36 - 411, 2 [G 35]. For the comparison, cf. above, note 93.

[108] Sophr. 2, 410, 34.

[109] Scholia D.T. 400, 5-9, cf. above, note 99. At this point the discussion in the *Īḍāḥ* takes another turn (Īḍ. 56 ult. - 57, 3): Zaǧǧāǧī tries to show from the priority of the acting person in other circumstances the priority of the nouns over the verbs.

[110] In Greek, of course, the infinitive retains the accident 'tense'.

[111] Apoll. Dysk. synt. 325, 12 - 326, 2; scholia D.T. 546 (explanation of the notion *genikòn ónoma*). With regard to the *genikòn rhēma*, cf. Ibn Ḥazm's concept of an 'expression verbale commune aux choses', Arnaldez, 1956, 139-40.

groups of grammarians used the same appellations, and arrived at the same conclusions is sufficient proof that in this point, too, Arabic grammar underwent the influence of Greek grammar. In other words, Greek grammar provided the raw materials, the rest of the building was set up independently by the Arabic linguists, as in so many other cases.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE *USŪL AN-NAHW* AND GREEK EMPIRICIST MEDICINE

'Apart from the doctors, there is nothing more ridiculous
than a grammarian'.[1]

The system of Arabic grammar is held together by a rigid complex
of methodological rules or norms, the so-called 'principles of grammar'
(*usūl an-nahw*). Similar principles are also followed in other branches
of science, such as theology, jurisprudence, tradition, and exegesis
of the Qur'ān, and they are generally believed by Arabic scholars
to belong to one and the same system. Their use in these sciences
illustrates how the development of Islamic culture depended on the
regulating system of working principles, and how different sciences
influenced each other through the principles and the interpretation of
the various elements of the system. In the law the system of principles
was used from the beginning of the 'Abbāsid caliphate: aš-Šāfi'ī
(d. 820/205) was the first to bring the different elements together into
a consistent whole, after various scholars before him had already used
them in their own conception of the law.[2] In Arabic grammar this
system already existed at the time of Sībawaihi and al-Ḫalīl.[3] In
this chapter we shall try to prove the thesis that these principles are
connected with those that were used in Greek empiricist medicine. In
antiquity they already served as a model for a new way of comparing
facts of speech in the so-called *Kanónes hellènismoû*.[4] We shall first
give an outline of the epistemological theory implied by this trend in
medical practice. After that, we will try to show how Greek grammar
borrowed its criteria from this system, and how, under its influence, a
system of judging the facts of language was developed that runs
parallel to the Arabic *usūl an-nahw*.

[1] Athenaios, *Deipnosophistae*, XV, p. 666 a [G 36].

[2] Schacht, 1953; on the development of juridical terminology: Anṣārī, 1972 (*iǧmā'*:
282 sqq.; *qiyās*: 288 sqq.).

[3] Reuschel, 1959, 16, n. 2: '*Qiyās*-Analogie lässt sich schon bei Sībawaihi und
Ḫalīl in einer erweiterten Bedeutung nachweisen.' For the use of *qiyās* in early Arabic
grammar: Mubārak, 1974³, 51-71; Ḍaif, 1968, 46 sqq. (al-Ḫalīl); 80 sqq. (Sībawaihi).

[4] Cf. above, chapter III B.

Fundamental to the study of empiricist medicine is Deichgräber's
Die griechische Empirikerschule,[5] a collection of fragments with an
excellent introduction about the theoretical background of the empiri-
cist theories, in which the author explains how and why empiricist
physicians differed from—and emphatically wished to differ from—
current rational and dogmatic theorizing. This difference manifested
itself most clearly in the specific opinion about the value of an
analogical judgment: we find here the same reluctance to accept a
rational principle as an explanation of physical events as we find
in early Islamic theology—though, of course, for other reasons. The
empiricist school—which cannot be called a 'school' in the strictest
sense of the word, but which was only a way of practising science—
was 'founded' about 250 B.C. by the Greek physician Philinos of Kos,
who dissociated himself from the dogmatic schools of his time. Many
other physicians, most of them working in Alexandria, the centre of
the empiricist school, began to practise according to his principles;
the best known among them were Herakleides of Tarente (1st half of
the 1st century B.C.) and Theodas of Laodikeia (about 100 B.C.).
The most famous of them all was Sextus Empiricus (about 150 A.D.)
who dedicated his life to a complete refutation of everything dog-
matic, whether with respect to medicine, philosophy, or grammar.
After him the 'school' disappeared, only to leave traces in many
quotations by writers such as Celsus and Galenos.

The basic thesis of all these physicians was that knowledge can only
be derived from perception by the senses, to which all other criteria
of knowledge are reduced. Their dialectic methods are mostly based
on common Skeptic arguments, such as the equivalence of all theories,
the incompatibility of scholarly disagreement with the claim of scien-
tific rationality, the *reductio ad absurdum*, the *regressus ad infinitum*,
and the uselessness of all theories.[6] The most important working

[5] Pauly/Wissowa, RE V, 2, 2516-2523 s.v. Empirische Schule (Wellmann); Deich-
gräber, 1930; also: Edelstein, 1933.

[6] For the rich history these arguments had in Islam: van Ess, 1970, 45-6; cf. the
example mentioned in chapter VI, note 47; also the discussion about the question how
it is possible that scholars disagree about scientific questions (a well known Skeptic
argument, Stough, 1969, 102; cf. Taub. Muq. p. 233; Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 46-7. A common
Skeptic argument against the art of grammar is that it is superfluous, because either its
rules are in accordance with current speech—in which case we do not need grammar—,
or its rules are contrary to current speech—in which case it is the wrong sort of
grammar, cf. Sext. Emp. adv. math. I, 184 sqq.; 200 (Varro, De L.L. 8, 27; 33);
Celsus prooem. c. 27 sqq. ap. Deichgräber, 1930, 93, 9-14; Fārābī, Iḥṣā', p. 30; cf.
Mahdi, 1970, 76. On empiricism and skepticism: Stough, 1969, 11-4; 107-25.

principle was observation, which a scholar can do himself (*autopsia, empeiria*). But they define 'science' (*téchnê*) as 'a collection of observations',[7] and as nobody is able to collect in his experience the whole gamma of physical events, a scholar is also dependent on the results of former experiments and observations (*historia*).[8] It is required that the informant through whom these results reach him should receive his own knowledge from physical observation, that he is free from prejudice, and reliable and expert. The safest conclusions can be drawn from historical material, if the tradition is unanimous (*sumphônia*).[9] If all these principles together fail in explaining the phenomena, there is a last resort: the observation that the same circumstances often result in the same healing process; this observation may be used as a working principle. The greater the similarity of the circumstances, the greater the probability of success, and this principle of 'basing one's conclusions on similarity' (*metábasis toû homoíou*) is therefore a principle of a probabilistic nature, which cannot give certain guarantees. We must also emphasize that a conclusion on the basis of this principle does not proceed from a compelling and certain, intrinsic cause by virtue of which events are similar. In this respect empirical analogy differs from dogmatic analogy: an empiricist physician is not interested in the question whether 'something causes something else to happen, because that something else is similar to it'; for him it is enough to know that 'similar events (generally) happen in this or that way'. The *metábasis toû homoíou* is 'a way to find a solution',[10] 'an instrument to find resources';[11] in modern terms, it is a heuristic strategy which serves to fill the gap in our incomplete empirical knowledge. Finally, empiricist medicine used a principle known as the *diastolé*, which consisted in 'separating the particular from the general'.[12]

'Thus, Latin speech consists of nature, analogy, custom, authority. The nature of nouns and verbs is invariable and passes only on to us

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[7] Deichgräber, 1930, 95, 15 (*háthroisma tôn theôrêmátôn*); cf. ib. p. 297: 'Die empirische Wissenschaft ist eine Summe wiederholter Beobachtungen, kein systematisch geordnetes Ganze wie die Stoische'. For 'Stoische' one may also read 'dogmatische'.

[8] Defined as: 'Communication of what has been seen', ib. 65, 32 (*apangelía tôn ophthéntôn*).

[9] Ib. 67, 19; 128, 20.

[10] Ib. 95, 30 (*hodós epi tên heúresin*). On the Skeptic background of this doctrine: Stough, 1969, 133-7.

[11] Deichgräber, 1930, 95, 23 (*órganon boêthêmátôn heuretikón*)

[12] Ib. 154, 8-11 (*apò toû koinoû tò ídion apokrínein*).

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what it received, nothing more and nothing less ... Analogy is an arrangement of speech as it is handed down by nature; it distinguishes uncouth from cultivated speech in the same way as silver is distinguished from lead... Custom is on a par with analogy, not by virtue of its technique, but by its force; it is only accepted because it is supported by the agreement of many people ... Authority ... does not contain reason, nor nature, nor custom: it is only accepted on account of the opinion of orators'.[13] In this way Charisius describes the nature of speech by means of the four criteria *natura, analogia, consuetudo, auctoritas*. These four criteria of correct speech may also be found in a somewhat different arrangement in Quintilianus' writings.[14] Barwick[15] and Fehling[16] have extensively investigated the various accounts of this doctrine and established their mutual dependency, as well as the fact that the doctrine of the criteria has a Greek origin. They are related with the Greek *kanónes orthographías*: *etumología, analogía, diálektos, historia*.[17] Nowadays, it is generally accepted that the model for this system may be found in the methods which empiricist physicians used to derive knowledge about physical facts from observation by sense perception.[18] Grammar was not the only science to be influenced by empiricist theory: the science of law also borrowed many elements from the empiricist system of criteria.[19]

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[13] *Constat ergo Latinus sermo natura analogia consuetudine auctoritate. Natura verborum nominumque immutabilis est nec quicquam aut plus aut minus tradidit nobis quam quod accepit ... Analogia sermonis a natura proditi ordinatio est neque aliter barbaram linguam ab erudita quam argentum a plumbo dissociat ... Consuetudo non arte analogiae sed viribus par est, ideo solum recepta, quod multorum consensione convaluit, ... Auctoritas ... non ... quicquam aut rationis aut naturae aut consuetudinis habet; tantum opinione oratorum recepta est*, Char. art. gram. 62, 14 - 63, 7, probably quoting from Varro.

[14] *Sermo constat ratione vetustate auctoritate consuetudine. Rationem praestat praecipue analogia, nonnumquam et etymologia*: 'Speech consists of rationality, tradition, authority, custom. Rationality is mostly represented by analogy, sometimes by etymology'. (Quint. inst. orat. 1, 6, 1 sqq.). On Quintilianus' criteria of correct speech: von Fritz, 1949.

[15] Barwick, 1922, 213-5 et passim.

[16] Fehling, 1956/7.

[17] Barwick, 1922, 214.

[18] Fehling, 1956, 263-4. On the *observatio* = *paratérēsis*: Mette, 1952; I have not been able to use Siebenborn, 1976.

[19] We will not go into this complicated matter, but only refer to the rhetorical treatise *Ad Herennium* (ed. and transl. H. Caplan, Cambridge, Mass. 1964), chapter XIV, where it is stated that law consists of the following elements: nature (*natura*), statute (*lex*), custom (*consuetudo*), precedents (*iudicatum*), equity (*aequum et bonum*), agreement (*pactum*); in oratorical practice, the categories constituted a useful means for presenting arguments, e.g. (in a somewhat modified form), Cic. *Pro Milone*, cap. 33 (*ratio, necessitas, mos, natura*).

Not surprisingly the empiricist idea of science as a collection of the most frequent physical facts, as an *empeiria*, is found in grammatical literature: Dionysios Thrax defined grammar as 'practical knowledge of the words that occur most frequently in poets and writers of prose'.[20] Our conclusion is that grammarians, influenced by the empiricist doctrine, used to solve linguistic problems and to establish correct speech as against barbarisms and solecisms by means of the four criteria of correct knowledge, i.e. in the case of grammar: the nature of speech; the analogical comparison of linguistic forms; the normal, daily usage; and the authority of writers in the past. The relative importance of each of these criteria may differ when compared with the criteria of medicine, but this is only to be expected, in view of the essential difference between the two disciplines.

The Arabic system of the *uṣūl*, as we shall describe below, shows a striking similarity to the Greek criteria. We could, of course, attribute this similarity, in so far as it concerns the linguistic *uṣūl*, to a direct contact of Arabic grammarians with living Greek grammar, but in that case the existence of the system in other sciences remains unexplained, unless we are to place grammar at the basis of the rest of the Islamic sciences. It seems much more plausible to seek the origin of the system as it existed in the Arabic world, in the translations of Greek medical works, especially those of Galenos (d. 199 A.D.), who was a prolific writer in this field, and who also wrote about the methodology of his profession, i.e. about the various theories concerning the methods a scholar should use to attain knowledge about medical and physical matters. We know that those of Galenos' works that specifically discuss empiricist medicine were translated, or at least known in the Arabic world, from Ḥunain's list in his *Ḏikr mā turǧi-*

[20] Dion. Thr. 5, 2-3 [G 37]; cf. Sext. Emp. adv. math. 1, 57; 76. The *epi tò polù* argument is already used by Aristotle, e.g. top., 112b 1-20, and cf. van den Bergh, 1954, 2, notes 1.6; 2.1. Dionysios Thrax considered grammar an *empeiria*—notwithstanding the modern custom to refer to his book as the *Téchnè* of Dionysios Thrax—, cf. Barwick, 1922, 217, n. 2. For the discussions concerning the nature of grammar: ib. 221 sqq. Arabic grammarians preferred to follow the Stoic custom and called grammar a technique (*ṣinā'a*), e.g. Ḥwār. Maf. 42, 13; b. Ḥald. Muq. 546, 23; b. Maḍā', Radd, 88, 12; 93, 11; cf. Rummānī's definition of grammar: 'The art (*ṣinā'a*) of grammar is based on distinguishing correct from incorrect speech, in accordance with the opinions of the Arabs, by a sound analogy' [A 47]. (Mubārak, 1963, 247; ib. 277, 8 *ahl aṣ-ṣinā'a* = the grammarians). Ibn Ǧinnī distinguishes between *ṣan'a*, i.e. the phonetic aspect of language, and *luġa*, i.e. the morphological-lexical aspect of language (Ḥaṣ. 1, 356, 2 et al.; *ṣinā'ī* vs. *ma'nawī*, ib. 2, 156, 13).

ma min kutub Ǧālīnūs,[21] particularly Galenos' work *Kitāb fī 't-taǧribat aṭ-ṭibbiyya* (Book on medical experience), which has been edited by Walzer.[22] It is a well-known fact that medical writings were among the first to be translated, and that the tradition of the medical philosophers from Alexandria, the centre of the empiricist 'school', continued to exist during the 'Abbāsid caliphate.[23] The early translators were generally practising physicians as well as philosophers who heeded Galenos' injunction that a good physician should also be a philosopher.[24] Many of these medical books were already known long before the times of Ḥunain, not only in Syriac translations, but also in Arabic.[25] The first known translator, Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq, a Byzantine Roman who lived in the reign of the caliph al-Manṣūr (754/137-775/159), translated Ptolemaios' *Tetrabiblos* and other, medical treatises.[26] That in this process empiricist works and methods were very popular is proved among other things by Mas'ūdī's remark that in the reign of al-Wāṯiq (842/227-847/232) there were still empiricists practising at the caliphal court.[27] It was through these translations and maybe through contact with the first translators that Arabic

[21] Ḥunain, Ḏikr, 46, 3-13: 'As for the books in which he follows the methods of the empiricists, I have found three treatises about them ... His book on medical experience. This book consists of one treatise, in which he sets forth one by one the arguments of the followers of experience and of the followers of analogy (sc. the dogmatists). I translated it not long ago into Syriac for Buḫtīšū' ... To these works also belongs his book on the stimulation of the study of medicine. This book consists likewise of one treatise. In this book he gives a paraphrase of the book of Menodotos; it is a good, useful, and spiritual book. I have translated it into Syriac for Ǧibrīl. Ḥubaiš translated it into Arabic for Aḥmad ibn Mūsā ... To these works also belongs his book on the fundamentals of experience. This book also consists of one treatise. I have a manuscript of it among my books; I did not translate it' [A 48]. On these books: Steinschneider, 1960², 351, no. 85; 345, no. 61; 351, no. 85. For Ḥunain's medical background and activities: Meyerhof, 1926; Brockelmann, GAL, I, 224; S I, 366.

[22] The Arabic translation of the first of Galenos' books mentioned by Ḥunain (On medical experience, *Peri tês theatrikês empeirias*) has been edited by Walzer, 1944; cf. Steinschneider, 1960², 351, no. 85. On Galenos: Temkin, 1973; Kieffer, 1964, esp. 1-18 (this is the *Eisagôgè dialektikè* translated by Ḥubaiš, cf. Steinschneider, 1960², 348, no. 70, Ḥunain, Ḏikr. 51, 10-3).

[23] Meyerhof, 1930.

[24] Galenos' book *Hôti ho áristos iatrós kai philósophos* in the Arabic translation of 'Īsā ibn Yaḥyā has been edited by P. Bachmann, Göttingen, 1965 (also translated by Ḥunain, Steinschneider 1960², 345, no. 59; Ḥunain, Ḏikr. 44, 15-9). On Galenos' philosophical writings in Arabic translation: Steinschneider, 1960², 346-8; Badawi, 1968, 112-3; Walzer, 1963², 142, + note 1; Amine, 1959, 86-91.

[25] Hitti, 1968⁹, 311 sqq.

[26] Brockelmann, GAL, I, 221-2; S I, 364; Steinschneider, 1960², 58, 200, 313, 316-7, cf. p. 257 s.v.; Dunlop, 1959; Badawi, 1968, 190.

[27] Mas'ūdī, Murūǧ, 7, 173; cf. van Ess, 1970, 35, n. 73; 24, n. 14.

science in its early stages became acquainted with the highly developed methodology used by the empirical physicians, as presented to them by Galenos' writings. This system served as a scientific foundation not only for those scholars who practised medicine, but also for those who studied law or discussed theological problems, and even for those who tried to describe the Arabic language, like al-Ḫalīl and Sībawaihi. They used the same type of primitive analogy so characteristic of empiricist medicine, and checked it against the very same elements of experience (c.q. the Qur'ān and older poetry) and observation (c.q. the actual state of the language) that were commonly used in Greek medicine. It is clear that Sībawaihi could never have derived such knowledge from the *Corpus Aristotelicum*—which had not yet been translated at the time—, but only from a direct contact with those who understood Greek culture, in this case probably the early translators. The connection is shown not so much by the fact that these elements existed in both Greek and Arabic culture (although it is an important argument in itself), but rather by the fact that these elements were handled in the same way.

We have solid proof of the existence of the empirical criteria in Arabic medicine in the writings of the Christian physician Yūḥannā ibn Māsawaih (d. 857/243), teacher of Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq and first vice-chancellor of the *Bait al-ḥikma* in Baghdad.[28] He says in his *Nawādir aṭ-ṭibbiyya*: 'Everything that is agreed upon by the physicians, which is attested to by analogy, and confirmed by experiments, let that be your basis (sc. of knowledge in medical matters)'.[29] Here we find the medical criteria *iğmā'* (= *sumphônía*), *qiyās* (= *metábasis toû homoíou*), and *tağriba* (the experiment which is indispensable for the *autopsia*). Not only did Yūḥannā ibn Māsawaih write about these matters, but we have also a report about a discussion that took place at the court of the caliph between Ibn Māsawaih and his teacher, Ğibrīl ibn Buḫtīšū' (d. ± 830/215);[30] according to some people, Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq was also present. The caliph asked them: 'I would like to know the essence of obtaining medical knowledge, and the basis of its principles: is it by the senses (*ḥiss*), or by analogy (*qiyās*), or by tradition (*sunna*); are these things (sc. this knowledge) obtained by rational principles, or is knowledge of these things and the method

[28] On Yūḥannā ibn Māsawaih: Brockelmann, GAL I, 266; S I, 416; Meyerhof, 1926, 717; Meyerhof, 1930, 402.

[29] Yūḥ. b. Mas. Nawādir, 33, 9-10 (= fasl. 132) [A 49].

[30] For the Buḫtīšū' family: Peters, 1968, 44; 59.

(of arriving at this knowledge) obtained according to you by hearsay...'.[31] According to some of those present, physicians derive their knowledge from four principles: natural (*ṭabī'ī*), accidental ('*araḍī*), rational (*irādī*), and analogical (*naqlī*[32]) principles. This is the method of those (Greek) physicians who base themselves on the *empeiría* (*tağriba*). This text is a very important one, since it provides us with evidence about the use of terms from the field of the *uṣūl* in discussions about medicine at an early date (1st half of the 9th/3rd century). Especially interesting is the term *sunna*, which is better known as a term used in the sciences of law and tradition.[33]

This originally medical system was, of course, used in different ways in each discipline by which it was taken over. The criteria of grammar, law, and theology, for instance, are not identical, and they do not have the same power. Comparisons between the various sets of principles were already made by Arabic authors, for instance by Ibn Ğinnī in his *Ḫaṣā'iṣ* under the heading 'On the norms of the Arabic language, whether they are theological or juridical ones?'[34] Ibn Ğinnī's conclusion is that grammatical norms are more related to theological norms, in so far as both are based on common sense, on reason, whereas juridical norms derive their power from revelation, which can only be accepted and believed, though not proved. On the other hand, grammatical norms are inferior to theological norms, because theology uses only norms which are based on necessary and stringent arguments, whereas grammar uses also another category of norms, namely those which are based on probable, i.e. facultative arguments.[35] This is also stated by Zağğāğī at the beginning of his chapter about the grammatical norms.[36]

As for grammatical arguments, they are described by Ibn al-Anbārī in his *Luma' al-adilla* in the following way. Ibn al-Anbārī distinguishes between three different kinds of arguments (*uṣūl, adilla*):

[31] Mas'. Murūğ, 7, 173-80 [A 50].

[32] *Naqlī* might be terminologically related to *metábasis toû homoíou*.

[33] For the history of this term: Ansari, 1972, 259-82; *sunna* is also, though infrequently, used in grammar, e.g. Sib. Kit. 1, 74, 7, cf. Carter, 1973, 147; also Suy. Muzh. 1, 194, 4 (*min sunan al-'arab*).

[34] b. Ğin. Ḫaṣ. 1, 48-96: the length of this chapter of the *Ḫaṣā'iṣ* shows the importance of the criteria for correct speech and the wish to be absolutely clear about their nature. Loucel gives a paraphrase and a partial translation of this chapter, 1963, 271-5 (40-5).

[35] b. Ğin. ib. 1, 88, 1-3.

[36] Zağğ. Īd. 64, 2-3.

transmission (*naql*), analogy (*qiyās*), and the argument called *istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl*; the argument of *iǧmāʿ* is related to the tradition.

Naql is the tradition concerning grammatical forms as handed down through earlier literature. Just as we saw above in the case of the *historia* in Greek medical writings, not every tradition is acceptable: the informant must meet certain requirements. Van den Bergh already recognized the similarity between the requirements in use in traditionist circles, and those of the Greek empiricists.[37] It seems that grammatical practice was strongly influenced by the practice of the traditionists: in fact, the terminology that describes a tradition's usefulness and reliability is largely borrowed from that discipline.[38]

Unanimity (*iǧmāʿ*) is one of the most frequently used criteria; it is considered obligatory for the correctness of a linguistic expression, and as such it is related to theological unanimity.[39] It is used in all sorts of discussions not only in a general way,[40] but also in the more restricted sense of 'unanimity of a certain group', just as theologians tended to restrict the notion of *iǧmāʿ* to one single group of theologians, or at least to professional theologians, not to just anybody who cared to advance something about theology.[41] In grammatical discussions we find for instance the unanimity of the grammarians,[42] or the unanimity of the Kūfans and the Baṣrians.[43] Schacht and van den Bergh discovered some connections between the *iǧmāʿ* in Arabic theology and law, and certain procedures in Greek logic.[44]

The second, and far more controversial, norm is analogy (*qiyās*), which is defined by Ibn al-Anbārī as 'The interpretation of the meaning of the secondary in terms of (or: analogously with) the primary',[45] and also as: 'the comparison of the secondary with the

[37] Van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 16.

[38] Sāmarrāʾī, 1971, 60.

[39] Ansari, 1972 (especially pp. 282 sqq.).

[40] E.g. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 52, 1; 72, 4; 77, 11; 78, 1.

[41] Goldziher, 1884, 32 sqq.; Schacht, 1950, 82-97.

[42] E.g. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 41, 2 (*iǧmāʿ an-naḥwiyyīn*); 62, 15 (*iǧtimāʿ an-naḥwiyyīn*).

[43] E.g. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 61, 14-5 (*iǧmāʿ al-kūfiyyīn wa-'l-baṣriyyīn*) 119, 12-3; b. Anb. Lum. 44, 9; 47, 2 (both times with the addition 'unanimity is a deciding argument' (*wa-'l-iǧmāʿ ḥuǧǧa qāṭiʿa*)); cf. also b. Anb. Inṣ. 203, 12 (Baṣra); b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 326, 14-7, and ib. 1, 189 sqq. (chapter on the use of the *iǧmāʿ* as an argument).

[44] Van den Bergh deals with the probabilistic value of this argument, which is already used by Aristotle, 1954, 2, 198, note 349.3. On *iǧmāʿ* in theology and its connections with the Stoic consensus: ib. 205, note 362.3. On consensus as a trace of Greek logic in early Muslim legal science: Schacht, 1950, 83.

[45] b. Anb. Lum. 42, 5-6 [A 51].

primary by virtue of something that causes the secondary to be analogous to the primary'.[46]

The admissibility of the *qiyās* has been an issue throughout the history of Islamic culture. One could even say that there is a remarkable correlation between a scholar's attitude towards analogy and his attitude towards Greek logic and science.

In order to understand why a criterion based on analogy could cause such tremendous differences of opinion, it is important to consider the history of Islamic science, and especially of theology. Early Islamic theology was confronted with a situation in which the conquered peoples were the possessors of a much superior science and culture, and also of a much greater experience in discussion and application of knowledge. On the other hand, the newly converted Arabs, Persians, and other nations, were urging their religious leaders to provide them with practical rules of life, and with arguments to defend themselves against the sarcasm of other religious communities. The theological experts were, therefore, forced to expand the limited number of Qurʾānic regulations, and, as their religious conscience did not permit them to invent such regulations on their own authority, they had to look for other authoritative sources of knowledge. Since not even the practice of the Prophet, as it was handed down by later generations, sufficed, nor the consensus of the (learned) community, they were compelled to use yet another method: reasoning by analogy. But here they were hampered by the fact that in these early times Islam could not at the same time hold the omnipotence of Allāh and the existence of *causae secundae*, which are inherent in and essential to the type of analogy used by Aristotle, and by Greek logic in general. Thus, another type of analogy arose, that of the *qiyās* in its early form: reasoning from one concrete instance to another, where the causes are only pseudo-causes,[47] and where everything but a strict occasionalism is severely condemned. Every statement can only be proved by a preceding, similar, statement, until at last the ultimate proof is derived from Allāh, Who in His wisdom lets everything happen according to a customary pattern—although He could do otherwise, if He wanted to. Syllogistic reasoning was only taken over after the influx of translations of Greek philosophical writings. The introduction of these 'pernicious' foreign doctrines is often ascribed

[46] Ib. 42, 6-7 [A 52].

[47] In orthodox theology the word *sabab* was used for these pseudo-causes, as against the *ʿilal* of the philosophers.

to the philosophers and the Mu'tazila, while it was said to have been introduced into orthodox theology by al-Ǧuwaini the Imām al-Hara-maini (d. 1085/478), the teacher of al-Ġazzālī.[48]

There are two fundamentally different kinds of analogy: the *qiyās aš-šibh* and the *qiyās al-'illa*. The *qiyās aš-šibh*—which does not fall under Ibn al-Anbārī's second definition—is based on a resemblance between the secondary and the primary. We might also say that this sort of analogy is an empirical principle consisting in the comparison between two things because they are alike in one or more respects. This is the original form of analogy as it was accepted by Muslim science at an early time—an analogy which has nothing to do with the classical Aristotelian syllogism. It is, therefore, not contradictory to the omnipotence of Allāh: it is nothing more than the establishment of a resemblance between two things which enables us to draw a conclusion about the secondary, based on the condition of the primary. We may draw this conclusion, since we suppose that Allāh created laws of nature, or rather that it pleases Him to let the same combinations of atoms happen regularly. There is nothing within the things themselves which could make them cause something else without the help of something outside them. Thus, nature and its phenomena bear witness to the omnipotence of Allāh, Who is the *causa efficiens* of everything. This philosophy is altogether different from the determinism we find in Greek philosophy; it is related more closely to the atomism of a Demokritos,[49] in so far as there can be no causal basis for knowledge of natural phenomena; connections between phenomena bear an occasional character. What we have here described is the common view of Aš'arism, and thus of orthodoxy. Some theologians, though, did not even accept an analogy based on mere resemblance: for Ibn Hazm even the establishing of a resemblance between two things is an unwarranted conclusion, not permitted by Allāh.[50]

The second sort of analogy is the later form, which came into use after the beginning of the activities of the Mu'tazila, who did accept

[48] Brockelmann, GAL, I, 486-8; S I, 671-3.

[49] This account is simplified in so far as we leave out the role that is attributed to the human agents in this process of causality, in particular the function of the *kasb* (that is the appropriation by man of his own acts which he is able to perform thanks to the fact that Allāh created in him the accident of being an agent) in Aš'arism; on this problem: Frank, 1966. In nature, causality is denied by Aš'arī; for the resulting atomistic philosophy: Anawati, 1974, 99-102.

[50] Cf. Arnaldez, 1956, 165-93.

the independency of the accidental actions of the substances created by Allāh, and who could, therefore, also accept the notion of causality in nature. According to them causal analogy does exist, and it consists in the observation that two things have an inner 'cause' (*'illa, ma'nā*)[51] in common that causes the secondary to be similar to the primary. This sort of *qiyās* has always been critized by orthodox theologians.[52]

The origin of the *qiyās* is still a point of debate. Schacht and others have pointed to parallels in the Hellenistic world, especially to the resemblance between the *qiyās* and certain procedures in Roman juridical theory.[53] We should not forget that the rhetorical schools all over the Roman—and later the Byzantine—empire taught the same juridical materials. This could explain the parallels between the first theoretical principles used in Arabic manuals of law, and those used by Roman lawyers in the rhetorical schools. There is another terminological parallel which might be mentioned in this context, namely between the *qiyās* and a principle used in Hebrew biblical exegesis. This principle, which is called *hiqqiš* (literally: to hit one thing against another),[54] is used for an extrapolation of the teachings of the Torah: it consists in the juxtaposition of two biblical regulations that share a common feature, and in drawing a conclusion from this.[55] The procedure of *hiqqiš* reminds one indeed of the use of the *qiyās* in Šāfi'ī's time, and a terminological connection between the two procedures is certainly not too far-fetched.

There remains the question of chronology. Supposing that at Siba-waihi's time there existed a more or less consistent system of criteria and analogical rules, we are left with the choice between the rhetorical schools with their juridical theories on the one hand, and the translations of medical works on the other hand, as possible sources for the Arabic system of *usūl*. It is true that the Arabs became acquainted

[51] On *'illa* and *ma'nā*, cf. chapter X, n. 61; Nader, 1956, 86-7.

[52] For the attitude of Muslim theologians towards analogy: Brunschvig, 1970; 1971. We may refer to the empiricists' distinction between a *qiyās analogismós* (conclusion pointing to invisible beings = *qiyās al-'illa*), which is to be rejected; and a *qiyās epilogismós* (conclusion pointing to visible beings = *qiyās aš-šibh*), which is acceptable; both terms are used in the Arabic translation of Galenos' *On medical experience*, Walzer, 1944 58 sqq. They go back to Ainesidemos' theory of causal explanation; Stough, 1969, 97-9.

[53] Schacht, 1950, 99-100, who quotes two articles by D. Daube in *Law Quarterly Review*, 52, 265-6 and in *Tulane Law Review*, 18, 365-6; cf. chapter I, note 8.

[54] Margoliouth compares the Hebrew term with the Greek verb *sumbállein*, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1910, 320, quoted by Schacht, 1955, 99.

[55] For the *hiqqiš*: Zeitlin, 1964.

early on with the educational tradition of the rhetorical schools, but
we also know that medical writings were among the first to be
translated, and that the first contacts with Greek science—especially
in Alexandria—took place precisely in this field. What is more, we
have the testimony of Yūḥannā ibn Māsawaih, quoted above, which
proves that at least the physicians were aware of the existence of a
system of criteria to judge the physical facts. On the other hand, the
study of grammar and grammatical norms was transmitted in the
first place by the rhetorical schools. In any case, both grammar and
the sciences received their methodological principles from the empiri-
cist system, and the same holds true for the study of law, so that
even the transmission of the criteria through the rhetorical schools
found its basis in medicine. The Arabic system may have been even
the result of an interaction between the various disciplines, which all
shared the need to collect, to analyse, and to interpret an enormous
number of facts. These facts could be ordered according to some well
defined principles, and these principles were borrowed from the classi-
cal tradition, possibly with the help of Hebrew biblical exegesis, in
which these principles—or at least one of them—were already used
before the beginning of Muslim science. But at the basis of this system
was the method of the empiricist school, which became known in the
Orient through the translations of medical works, and possibly through
direct contact, for instance in Alexandria.

It goes without saying that, in the course of time, grammatical
science took whatever elements it could use from other disciplines
(such as, for instance, the methods used by the traditionists for
distinguishing between reliable and unreliable information). The scien-
ces of tradition, exegesis, and law were so important in the daily life
of the first centuries of Muslim culture, that they could easily exercise
a considerable influence upon other sciences.[56] We have seen already
that a grammatical informant must meet the same requirements as
someone who transmits a tradition about the life of the Prophet.
Another example is that agreement between different sources is granted
the same value and power in grammar as in law and theology.[57]

Perhaps the influence of other sciences applies also to the last of the
three principles mentioned by Ibn al-Anbārī, the *istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl*,
according to which one may draw a conclusion about the properties

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[56] Kopf, 1956; cf. above, chapter I, note 61 (Carter's theory); Mubārak, 1974³,
79-93.

[57] Cf. above, notes 39, 41; discussion by Weiss, 1966, 62-8.

of something secondary from the properties of something primary. This
is a particular kind of analogical reasoning, which, according to
Schacht,[58] is to be regarded as one of the traces of Greco-Roman
law. On the other hand, one could suppose a connection with the
empirical principle *diastolè*, although the data are not very clear in
this case.

In the law the use of the *istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl* is better known than in
grammar, although Ibn al-Anbārī dedicates a chapter of his book
about the sorts of proof permitted in grammar to it.[59] In the law the
term is used for the legal assumption, in case of doubt or in the
absence of solid proof, that the last known situation still obtains.
According to Goldziher the use of this argument in legal discussions
has its origin in the work of aš-Šāfi'ī (d. 820/205) or in the Šāfi'ite
school.[60] One good example is that given by Goldziher of a man who
is missing, but whose death cannot be established with certainty.
According to the *istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl* this man must be assumed to be alive,
and consequently his relatives may not inherit his possessions; the
missing man himself may inherit from someone else, and in that case,
the inheritance will be kept by the state. In the Ḥanafite school of law,
the former decision is accepted, but not so the latter, since in this
school *istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl* is only applied to the denial of a right, but not
to the recognition of a right (*li-'d-daf' lā li-'l-iṯbāt*).[61] It goes without
saying that for the Ẓāhirite lawyers, such as Ibn Ḥazm, the *istiṣḥāb
al-ḥāl* is a favourite method. For Ibn Ḥazm it ranks as high as, and is
part of, the consensus (*iǧmā'*) of the community: if the community
agrees about something, we dare not accept a change in that situation
until we have solid proof (*dalīl*) for the necessity of such a change.
Such a proof can, of course, be only a text from the Qur'ān or a
tradition from the prophet.[62]

In grammar this sort of argument is connected with the discus-
sions about analogy (*qiyās*) and exceptions (*šāḏḏ*).[63] Each word and

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[58] Schacht, 1950, 100.

[59] b. Anb. Lum. 86, 5 sqq.

[60] Goldziher, 1887; cf. Schacht, 1950, 126.

[61] Goldziher, 1887, pp. 235-6. Is there a connection with Roman legal practice?
According to Zlinszky, 1960, under Roman law a missing person was considered alive until
definite proof was given concerning his death; his capacity to accept an inheritance *in
absentia* was the subject of many legal discussions (ib. 120-4).

[62] b. Ḥazm, Iḥk., 3, 385-90; 5, 590 sqq.

[63] Cf. e.g. ibn as-Sarrāǧ ap. Suy. Muzh. I, 139, 5-13 and Suy. Iqt., 24-5. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ.
72 pen. - 73, 3: the connection between this argument and the juridical theory of

each category has its own rules, and we may only assume a change of these rules (c.q. an exception, in the case of a category of words), when we are able to point at a cause ('*illa*) which is responsible for that change. In all other cases we must adhere to the primary rule (*aṣl*).[64] The same may be stated positively: when we use the argument of an *istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl* we do not need any further proof, since the *istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl* suffices as a proof.[65] A remainder of the discussion between the Ḥanafites and the Šāfiʿites about the use of the *istiṣḥāb* in the case of the recognition of a right may be found in Ibn al-Anbārī's remarks about the argument *e silentio* (*al-istidlāl bi-ʿadam ad-dalīl*) following on the discussion about the *istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl*: such an argument is rather weak, and can never be decisive in the case of an affirmation, at most in the case of a denial.[66]

By way of hypothesis we would like to point to the remarkable similarity of this argument to one of the norms of knowledge which was used in empiricist medicine: the *diastolè* or *diorismós*, defined in the Latin translation of Galenos' *Subfiguratio Empirica* in the following way: 'Something is a *distinctio* (*diastolè*) if it distinguishes the particular from the general only by way of evident knowledge'[67] and '... the determination (*determinatio = distinctio*) of something, which they describe by saying that it is the property which distinguishes within a general category something which is particular in some respect'.[68] In view of the fact that according to our theory all criteria of knowledge used by empiricist physicians are at the origin of the Arabic *uṣūl*, we do not suppose that the similarity in this case is coincidental.

In Zaǧǧāǧī's system of grammatical norms the *qiyās*[69] ('*ilal qiyāsiy-ya*) provides the explanation of the linguistic facts which we have

exception (*istiṯnāʾ*); cf. Arnaldez, 1956, 136 for the Ẓāhirite theory concerning this doctrine (every judgment from the Qurʾān or the tradition should be taken literally and generally, except in the case of textual evidence to the contrary). Apparently, Zaǧǧāǧī was rather fond of this principle of reasoning; cf. Īḍ. 51, 16 - 52, 8; 77, 3-10; 113, 4-7.

[64] E.g. b. Anb. Inṣ. 172, 23-4; 261, 12; 303, 5; cf. Weil, 1913, 9; 16, n. 9.

[65] b. Anb. Inṣ. 199, 1.

[66] b. Anb. Lum. 87, 10 sqq. (the discussion ib. 88, 1 is in fact identical with the problem of Inṣ. 199, 1-2: when there is an original form or rule, we do not need to bother about additional proof). The example ibn al-Anbārī cites is the same as the argument Zaǧǧāǧī uses in proving that there are only three parts of speech, Īḍ. 43, 3-7. Cf. also Īḍ. 129, 12-3.

[67] Gal. ap. Deichgräber, 1930, 59, 8-10: ... *si solummodo distinguat proprium a communi per evidentes cognitiones*, cf. Gal. ib. 154, 8-11.

[68] Ib. 62, 8: ... *determinatio quam discribentes dicunt esse sermonem distinguentem a communibus id quod est secundum unumquodque proprium.*

[69] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 64-5; quoted by Suy. Iqt. 67-9; cf. Mubārak, 1974³, 102-17.

learned through the acquisitional norms ('*ilal taʿlīmiyya*). When we hear the expression *inna zaidan qāʾimun* (indeed, Zaid is standing) we know that after the particle *inna* the subject is in the accusative, and the predicate in the nominative. By analogy we apply this rule to other expressions of the same type. The '*illa qiyāsiyya* explains the rule by referring to the resemblance between the particle *inna* and the transitive verbs. If we then ask in which respect *inna* resembles the verbs, and why we compare it with the transitive verb, we need the '*illa ǧadaliyya wa-naẓariyya* (speculative and theoretical norm).

'Theoretical' (*naẓarī*) is evidently a *calque* of the Greek word *theôrètikós*, just as its counterpart 'practical' ('*amalī*) translates *praktikós*. In the scholia on Dionysios Thrax, we frequently find discussions about the division of sciences; in this context the term *theôrètikè téchnè* denotes a science which explains by means of theory (*lógos*), and which investigates only with the aim of looking into something, examining something (*theôrein*).[70] This is exactly how the term is used by, for instance, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī,[71] and by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā in his translation of the *Placita Philosophorum*.[72] In the present context *naẓarī* indicates the sort of questions which aim at understanding the substance of the matter, and not at the practical use of it; practice is reserved to the '*ilal taʿlīmiyya*, which teach you how to speak exactly according to the grammatical rules, without explaining the essence and the reasons of those rules.

The '*illa naẓariyya* is sometimes called '*illat al-ʿilla*; according to Ibn Ǧinnī this '*illat al-ʿilla* is not a real cause, but only an explanation of the linguistic facts.[73] Ibn as-Sarrāǧ says that there are two sorts of '*ilal*: the linguistic rules that tell us how to speak (= Zaǧǧāǧī's '*ilal taʿlīmiyya*); and the explanations of these linguistic rules, e.g. why it is that the subject always has the nominative case ('*illat al-ʿilla*). However, we do not need to know this reason in order to speak correct Arabic.[74] Obviously, in this system the *taʿlīm* represents the factor

[70] Scholia D.T. 1, 20; 7, 13; 110, 23; 111, 32; 112, 23; 122, 29; 157, 29; 298, 2.

[71] Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī in his *On the four scientific questions regarding the art of logic*, ed. M. Türker, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, 14, 1956, 87-102, quoted by Rescher, 1966, p. 42.

[72] Plac. Phil., 2, 1-8.

[73] b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 1, 173-4; cf. Mubārak, 1974³, 122-3.

[74] b. Sarr. ap. Suy. Iqt. p. 58; cf. Mubārak, 1974³, 154. Cf. the Skeptic objection to the use of grammar, above, note 6; Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 96, 17-9: 'As for those of the common people who speak Arabic without declension, and yet make themselves understood, they can only do so when things of common knowledge and daily use are concerned,

natura, qiyās and *'illat al-'illa* the factor *ars*, which we will discuss below in connection with the theories concerning the origin of speech.[75]

In this connection we should also mention the story about al-Ḫalīl told by Zaǧǧāǧī. Al-Ḫalīl, asked by somebody about his use of grammatical norms, answered: 'The Arabs speak according to their instinct and nature, and they know the structure of their speech. There is in their minds a solid knowledge about its norms (*'ilal*) even if it is not related of them that they possess this knowledge. I considered something a norm whenever I was convinced it was the cause of what I considered its consequence'.[76] In other words, the basis of every grammatical argument is what one hears from the Arabs; our explanations are mere guesses as to what is the reason for their using such-and-such a form. Although we know of other books about the *'ilal an-naḥw*—by al-Māzinī,[77] Quṭrub[78] and Ibn Kaisān[79]— Zaǧǧāǧī claims to have been the first to write a book about this subject.[80]

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but if anyone of them would try to explain an ambiguity to someone else without understanding declension, he would not be able to do so' [A 53].

[75] Cf. below, chapter IX, note 29.

[76] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 66, 1-2 [A 54].

[77] Suy. Buġya, 1, 465 pen.

[78] Suy. Buġya, 1, 243, 3; Fihrist, p. 53.

[79] Suy. Buġya, 1, 19, 8; this book is quoted by Zaǧǧāǧī, Id. 50, ult., under the title *Al-muḫtār*, cf. Flügel, 1862, 209, n. 2; Brockelmann, GAL I, 111; S I, 170.

[80] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 38, 13-6; cf. Mubārak, 1974³, 69-71.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PERIOD OF THE TWO SCHOOLS

> 'Arrange a meeting between Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā and this Baṣrian ...'.[1]

According to the account of the *Fihrist*[2]—which was adopted by Flügel[3]—, the history of Arabic grammar was dominated by the opposition between the Baṣrian and the Kūfan school, which ultimately coalesced into the school of Baghdad, also called the eclectic or the mixed school. This (simplified) account of the history of the schools was criticized by Weil in his introduction to Ibn al-Anbārī's *Inṣāf fī masā'il al-ḫilāf baina 'n-naḥwiyyīn al-baṣriyyīn wa-'l-kūfiyyīn*, and recently by Fleisch.[4] Both regard the distinction as an artificial development invented by later grammarians. Their arguments may be summarized as follows: although there existed in Baṣra and Kūfa two different groups of scholars with, probably, different opinions about grammar and about the various details of grammar, they did not consider themselves representatives of 'schools'. It was not even possible for them to do so because they did not meet each other very often, and had no chance to discuss their points of view, not even when they lived in the same city, as was the case with al-Mubarrad (d. 898/285) and Ṭa'lab (d. 904/291). The generation after Mubarrad collected the 'differences of opinion' (*masā'il iḫtilāfiyya*), i.e. they projected their own differences of opinion into a former situation which never existed. The school of Baghdad, which is said to have been a fusion of the two systems, was nothing more than a conglomerate of grammarians, who, in retrospect, created the schools of Baṣra and Kūfa: 'Ainsi ces "Bagdadiens" sont les fondateurs de l'authentique école de Baṣra et du fantôme d'école que fût Kūfa, car

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[1] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 119, 9-10 [A 55].

[2] Fihrist, ed. Flügel: Baṣrians: 39-64; Kūfans: 64-77; *man ḫalaṭa 'l-maḏhabaini*: 77-84.

[3] Flügel, 1862; the history of Arabic linguistics is discussed according to the tripartition 'grammatische Schule von Baṣra' (p. 3); 'grammatische Schule von Kūfa' (p. 117); 'gemischte grammatische Schule' (p. 183).

[4] Weil, 1913, 48-68; Fleisch, 1961, 11 sqq.; 33 sqq.; cf. also Brockelmann GAL, S I, 157-8.

il n'y eut qu'une véritable tradition grammaticale constructrice, *celle de Başra* qui mit du temps à prendre conscience d'elle même et comme toute tradition grammaticale a demandé de l'effort de plusieurs générations pour porter ses fruits'.[5] The Kūfan school had only been created by the Baghdadians in order to give their own Başrian predecessors a worthy opponent. Those solutions of grammatical problems which in the *iḫtilāf*-literature are given as typically Kūfan, are mostly derived from al-Farrā' (d. 822/207), whose opinions were used by the conservative Ṭa'lab in his struggle to lure pupils away from his personal rival Mubarrad in Baghdad, where grammar was concentrated from then on. 'Eine Synthese der Gegensätze konnte nicht stattfinden, weil neben einem leidlich ausgebildeten System nur die Summe einzelner Entscheidungen *eines* Grammatikers, des Farrā oder höchstens noch des Kisāī stand'.[6]

We shall speak later about the school of Baghdad,[7] here we shall try to modify somewhat this too severe criticism of the Arabic tradition, which tends to be too schematic and could be animated with the help of the various 'sessions of grammarians' (*maǧālis*), which are reported for instance in the writings of Ṭa'lab, Zaǧǧāǧī, and Ibn Ǧinnī (d. 1002/392), and which give us a glimpse of the daily intercourse of the grammarians who belonged to the schools.

In the first place, it seems very unlikely *a priori* that a fairly developed terminology as the one in use at Kūfa should have been the work of one man, al-Farrā'. That such a specifically Kūfan terminology existed may be deduced from the writings of the Kūfans themselves—we possess Farrā's *Ma'ānī 'l-Qur'ān* and the *Maǧālis Ṭa'lab* which show that these grammarians used the Kūfan terminology very consistently—, and from later literature where we very often find the explicit statement that such-and-such a term is Kūfan.[8] Therefore, there can obviously be no doubt that there really was a typically Kūfan terminology, which is confirmed by the following statement of Zaǧǧāǧī: 'We mention the following answer of the Kūfans in so far as we have heard the arguments of those of the later grammarians who wished to support the Kūfan doctrine, and also in so far as we read about it in their writings. However, we replace their technical terms by our own, while preserving their meaning. If we

[3] Fleisch, 1961, 15.

[6] Weil, 1913, 77.

[7] Cf. below, chapter VI.

[8] Weil, 1913, 72, n. 1: a list of some of these terms; cf. also Maḫzūmī, 1958, 303 sqq.

were to try to imitate their technical style in every single case, we would find it hard to hand down (their arguments to our readers), and it would not have any additional advantage. On the contrary, their technical language is probably for the greater part incomprehensible to someone who has not studied their writings'.[9] We quote this passage *in extenso*, since it proves in itself that there did exist something like a Kūfan tradition, unless we are to assume that later grammarians not only invented the Kūfan school, but a special terminology to go with it as well. Besides, we find it hard to believe that a man like al-Fārābī (872/259-950/339), who was 32 years old when Ṭa'lab died (904/291) should speak of a later invention, when he mentions what he calls the 'well-known dispute' about the question whether there exists a present tense in grammar.[10] The problem how to explain this terminological difference between the two schools in terms of different grammatical and historical background is not relevant to our thesis that two more or less distinct 'schools' existed.

But there is more: the whole view Weil and Fleisch adopt with regard to the contacts between these various groups of grammarians is hardly commensurate with the numerous anecdotes which are told about the meetings between these grammarians. When we compare the 'sessions' in Zaǧǧāǧī's *Maǧālis al-'ulamā'* with those in Ibn Ǧinnī's *Ḫaṣā'iṣ*[11] and with the *Maǧālis Ṭa'lab*, and then count how many instances of contact in oral discussion between two grammarians are recorded, we see how lively this contact was. It is true that the one recorded instance of a discussion between Sībawaihi and al-Kisā'ī (d. 799/183)[12] seems to have been a special occasion, which was not to be repeated—afterwards Sībawaihi went to Persia never to return to Başra!—, but on other occasions we find al-Kisā'ī in discussion with several other Başrian grammarians: with Yūnus (d. 798/182),[13] with 'Īsā ibn 'Umar (d. 766/149),[14] with al-Māzinī (d. 863/249),[15] with

[9] Zaǧǧ. Id. 131, 15 - 132, 1 [A 56].

[10] Far. Šarḥ, 40, 1 - 42, 26; on this question: Zaǧǧ. Id. 86-8.

[11] Especially the chapter on the mistakes and the omissions of the scholars (*bāb fī saqaṭāt al-'ulamā'*), b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 3, 282 sqq.

[12] b. Anb. Inṣ. 293, 2 sqq.; Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 8 sqq. (although other discussions between the two of them are mentioned by Ibn Taǧribardī, Flügel, 1862, 122). For this so-called *masʾala zunbūriyya*: Blau, 1963.

[13] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 21-2, cf. b. Anb. Inṣ. 86, 2; Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 254, cf. b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 3, 291, 9 sqq.; b. Anb. Inṣ. 298 sqq., cf. b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 3, 292, 7-8 and Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 244; Suy. Buġya, 2, 163, 9.

[14] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 148; 263.

[15] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 132-3, cf. b. Anb. Inṣ. 81-4.

al-Aṣma'ī (d. 831/216).[16] The grammarian Abū Muḥammad al-Yazīdī
(d. 817/202)[17] even said: 'I put al-Kisā'ī to shame by proving his
mistakes in nine questions in the presence of (the caliph) al-Mahdī'.[18]
The same holds true for al-Farrā', who is mentioned as having discus-
sions with al-Ǧarmī (d. 839/225),[19] al-Aṣma'ī,[20] and al-Māzinī.[21]
Ta'lab had discussions with al-Māzinī,[22] and a rather heated alterca-
tion with one of Mubarrad's pupils, Zaǧǧāǧ.[23] Nor does the statement
seem correct that 'même al-Mubarrad et Ta'lab qui vivaient tous
deux à Bagdad n'ont engagé que de rares discussions orales',[24] in
view of the fact that we counted no less than six accounts of discus-
sions between the two grammarians in Zaǧǧāǧī's *Maǧālis* alone.[25]
Besides, we have Mas'ūdī's statement that Mubarrad loved to have
discussions with Ta'lab, although it is true that Ta'lab tried to avoid
the contact for fear of Mubarrad's eloquence.[26] His son-in-law, Abū
'Abd Allāh ad-Dīnawarī, attended Mubarrad's lectures in spite of his
father-in-law's protests. All this is confirmed by the fact that Ta'lab
speaks about the Baṣrian and Kūfan grammarians as existing groups
and certainly not as divisions made up *ad hoc* by himself.[27]

Finally, al-Kisā'ī and al-Farrā' are quoted as discussing a manual,
which the Kūfans used in their grammatical education, called *al-Faiṣal*
or *al-Faṣl*.[28] This proves that there existed something like a gram-
matical tradition in Kūfa which cannot be explained away, and which

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[16] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 42; 68; 336.

[17] On al-Yazīdī: Suy. Buġya, 2, 340; Brockelmann, GAL I, 110.

[18] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 173, 10-1, cf. also ib. 169; 255; 288.

[19] b. Ǧin Ḫaṣ. 3, 299, 11-8, cf. b. Anb. Inṣ. 25, 9 sqq.

[20] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 178.

[21] b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 3, 303, 4 sqq., cf. b. Anb. Inṣ. 216-7.

[22] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 104; 112; 145.

[23] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 116 sqq.

[24] Weil, 1913, 53; Fleisch, 1961, 13.

[25] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 107; 109; 115; 119; 124; 349. We have made a choice from the
numerous examples, cf. also the parallel texts given in the introduction to the edition
of the *Maǧālis* by A.M. Hārūn.

[26] Mas'ūdī, Murūǧ, 8, 235; ad-Dīnawarī (d. 901/289): Flügel, 1862, 192.

[27] *Ahl al-Baṣra* : Ta'l. Maǧ. 1, 44, 3; 1, 124, 4; 1, 249, 13; 1, 216, 7 etc.; *al-baṣriyyūna*, ib.
1, 58, 6. On the other hand: *naḥnu*, ib. 1, 178, 4; *al-kūfiyyūna*, ib. 1, 106, 9; *aṣḥābunā*,
ib. 1, 127, 10; 1, 196, 3-4, etc. He also uses the expression *Sibawaihi wa-'l-Ḫalīl wa-
aṣḥābulumā*, ib. 1, 42, 8. Cf. the meeting of Ta'lab with the *ahl al-Baṣra*, Suy. Muzh.
2, 204, 15 sqq.

[28] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 266; 269. This work is ascribed to the 'founder' of Kūfan grammar,
Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan ar-Rū'āsī, the teacher of Kisā'ī and Farrā' (d. ± 805/190);
cf. Suy. Buġya, 1, 83-4; Flügel, 1862, 18-9; Maḥzūmī, 1958, 77 sqq.; Brockelmann,
GAL, S I, 177.

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must have meant something to people like al-Mubarrad: he says of an
amateur of grammar that he 'longs for the grammar of these Kūfans;
they collect traditions and in case of disagreement refer to the
books'.[29] The words 'these Kūfans' (*hā'ulā'i 'l-kūfiyyīna*) express the
same sentiment towards the rival group of grammarians as the words
'this Baṣrian' (*hāḍā 'l-baṣrī*) in the quotation at the head of this
chapter.

How then must we regard these two 'schools'? Is it not right to
assume the same rivalry to exist in grammar between the two cities
of Baṣra and Kūfa as existed in questions of law and theology and in
political and religious matters between them?[30] There is no reason to
believe that Muslim universities differed very much from other uni-
versities: they were as proud of their own grammar and their own
methods as contrasted with those of their rivals as any other 'school'
in history. It is true that the resulting differences of opinion were
mainly concerned with points of detail, and it is also true that the
respective methods were not so different as they were made out to be
in reciprocal accusations. As a matter of fact, the only difference
between Baṣrian and Kūfan grammarians was that they admitted
different forms of words or verses; their handling of grammatical
analogy was substantially the same, only their results were different.
This shows that it would be a mistake to compare the two Arabic
schools to the Greek schools of Alexandria and Pergamon—the
advocates of analogy and anomaly in speech, respectively. Not only
is there nothing that even remotely suggests a connection between
the two developments, but there is also nothing that resembles the
discussions about analogy or anomaly in speech in the controversies
between the two Arabic schools: both agreed that the basis of language
is the *qiyās*, grammatical analogy.[31] We could, however, say that
the Kūfan school had the tendency to use a more or less rare
grammatical phenomenon as evidence for an analogy, or to set up
a superficial analogy in order to defend such a phenomenon, which
is the reason why they were severely criticized by the Baṣrians.[32] But

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[29] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 119, 7-8; 'books' (*kutub*) probably refers to the grammatical writings
of the past [A 57].

[30] Cf. e.g. Maḥzūmī, 1958, 65-6.

[31] b. Anb. Lum. 44, 5-8: 'Know that the rejection of analogy is not justified,
because the whole of grammar is analogy ... And whoever rejects analogy, rejects
grammar itself. No scholar is known to have rejected analogy' [A 58]; cf. Weil, 1913, 29.

[32] Cf. the references given by Weil, 1913, 29 sqq. (notes). On the accusation of
irregular analogy: ib. p. 39.

on the other hand, it was completely normal for them to use arguments which consisted of two parts: one based on textual evidence and the other on analogy.[33] Together with these criticisms we must keep in mind that it was more or less a standard procedure among grammarians to accuse the opponent of using an irregular analogy (*qiyās 'alā 'š-šāḏḏ*) based on forms which were not generally acknowledged. As the Kūfan grammarians were more specialized in ancient poetry than their Baṣrian colleagues[34]—like that great connoisseur of pre-islamic poetry, al-Mufaḍḍal aḍ-Ḍabbī, who was a Kūfan (d. ± 786/ 170)—, they attached greater importance to those forms which occurred in poetry even when they were contrary to the rules, and they were apt to use quotations from the poets to corroborate their theses. But on the other hand, they did not fail to use analogy as a (second) basis for their evidence.[35]

Without trying to play down the differences between the two schools, we have emphasized the fundamental agreement between them on the essence of language and grammar. As for the differences of opinion concerning details of grammar, this is not the place to discuss them. We refer to Weil's introduction to the *Inṣāf*, as well as to Maḥzūmī's study on the Kūfan school.[36]

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[33] Cf. e.g. b. Anb. Inṣ. 68, 12-3.

[34] Cf. e.g. Fleisch, 1961, 27.

[35] In one instance analogy even serves as the sole basis for their argument, whereas the Baṣrians in this case rely on the evidence of quotations alone! (b. Anb. Inṣ. 88).

[36] Weil, 1913; Maḥzūmī, 1958; also Ḍaif, 1968, 151-242. The sort of confusion that arises around the character of the two 'schools' may be illustrated by a few remarks made by Carter, 1973b. First he observes—in our view correctly—: '... il peut avoir existé des écoles de grammaire répondant à la définition donnée par Schacht des "anciennes écoles juridiques", à savoir des groupes de savants se distinguant les uns des autres non par un corps de doctrine, mais simplement par leur implantation' (p. 300), but then he repeats once again Weil's opinion about the artificial character of the two schools, which Carter regards as a retrospective creation by Baghdadian grammarians, who attributed everything that contradicted Sībawaihi's *Kitāb* to Kūfan scholars (pp. 301 sqq.). Regardless of these remarks he then tells us that the difference between the two schools may be expressed simply and clearly: Baṣra was prescriptive, whereas Kūfa was descriptive! (pp. 303-4).

THE INFLUENCE OF GREEK LOGIC

'Some people, whose fables one should refuse to accept, think that those who are called the philosophers had a declension and grammatical writings of their own'.[1]

We have already discussed the transfer of cultural life in the 9th/3rd century to Baghdad and the consequences of this for Arabic grammar and linguistics. The 'mixing of the two schools' of Baṣra and Kūfa did not lead to a reconciliation of opinions—in this respect Weil and Fleisch are right—, it only brought together linguists from different groups, with the result that gradually the old distinctions between Baṣrian and Kūfan grammarians disappeared. No longer did grammarians adhere to either the Baṣrian or the Kūfan system, but they were free to choose one of two existing opinions on any particular grammatical problem. This new development is described by Mubārak in the following way: 'Grammar in the (10th) 4th century in Baghdad did not become a grammar with different schools based on biases and emotions; the leaders followed their own various opinions, and some of them—like ar-Rummānī—followed their rationally founded logico-theological convictions, so that the influence of those convictions was discernible in their grammatical methods ... Their scholars used to study the theories of both schools and choose between them, without prejudice in what they chose: some of them usually preferred the school of Baṣra, so that it became possible to call them a continuation of the Baṣrian school in Baghdad; a few others became a continuation of the Kūfan school; still others were Baghdadians, mixing the two sorts of grammar or taking from both of them'.[2] This makes clear how it was possible for the old distinctions to disappear and at the same time to persist, not as a distinction between two groups of grammarians, but as a distinction between two different opinions. It also explains why a Baghdadian school *suo iure* never existed. The non-existence of a 'Baghdadian' school is one of the reasons for Fleisch to conclude that only at Baghdad did grammarians organize

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[1] b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 42, 13-4, cf. below, note 36.

[2] Mubārak, 1963, 329-30.

themselves into two different groups, the 'Baṣrians' and the 'Kūfans'. However, a 'Baghdadian' school could not even exist, because the grammarians in that city had at their disposal two conflicting opinions on almost every grammatical problem, and they could freely choose either one of them without subjecting themselves to any party discipline. It was only on those secondary points left 'unsolved' by the Baṣrians and the Kūfans, that they could advance a theory of their own—which is then mentioned as a theory of the 'Baghdadians',[3] in so far as a *communis opinio* was reached on those points.

One could object that in that case there was no progress at all in Arabic grammar after its transfer to Baghdad. This, of course, is not true. Grammar then occupied itself with problems of a different nature to those of the preceding period. We shall have to distinguish between those elements that were old and constituted a legacy of the past, and those that were new. The latter category will concern us in this chapter.

The new generation of grammarians put to use the achievements of an older period to solve analogous problems. Their methods were more refined, although substantially their theories remained the same. More and more complicated problems were invented in order to have something to solve—this activity being one of the favourite pastimes of almost all grammarians: we need only refer to the eternal hair-splitting about the declension of unusual proper names, or about the construction of almost incomprehensible sentences.[4] What is more, every grammarian was obliged to defend time and again the theory he had adopted about a specific problem, and he had consequently to invent even more ingenuous arguments with which to confound his adversary.

One could make yet another objection to this way of viewing the condition of Arabic grammar in the 9th/3rd and the 10th/4th century: why was it so frequently Kūfan grammar that was considered wrong, and why were the Kūfan grammarians so heavily attacked? We could answer, of course, that the vast reputation of men like al-Ḫalīl and Sībawaihi and of al-Māzinī and al-Mubarrad prevailed over the

[3] Fleisch, 1961, 12. Such a specific theory of the Baghdadians is mentioned for instance, with respect to the nominative of the subject in a sentence like *zaidun akramtuhu* (Zaid, I honoured him) (b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 1, 199, 6 sqq.), to a morphological question (b. Ǧin. *Kitāb al-muǧtasab*, ed. E. Pröbster, Leipzig, 1904 (1968[7]), 3, 2; 4; 15), and to a phonetic question (the vocalization of the gutturals with an 'a', ib. 2, 9, 6-7); cf. Daif, 1968, 245-8.

[4] On proper names: Zam. Muf. pp. 5 sqq. and Fleisch, 1961, 271-5. On 'incomprehensible' sentences: Mub. Muqt. 3, 89 sqq.

undoubted merits of Kūfan grammarians. But another answer might be suggested. We must not forget that the Kūfan grammarians did not consider themselves legislators of language, technical specialists, but rather amateurs of language and literature, collectors of interesting pieces of poetry. Such an attitude is tantamount to reducing one's importance as a scholar: one becomes an erudite, not a scientific investigator. If on the other hand, a grammarian wants to make himself indispensable, he has to emphasize his importance as a technical specialist, and he must pose as the possessor of a knowledge which is unattainable for the average layman. It is interesting to note that in this respect the schools of Baṣra and Kūfa resemble the schools of Alexandria and Pergamon, respectively: in both cases it was the most technical school that won the field and that had the greatest attraction for professional grammarians.

When we compare the grammatical treatises written before and after the transfer of grammar to Baghdad, we find an undeniable difference in mentality and approach. We have already mentioned the fact that later grammarians tried to defend the old theories with new arguments, and it is precisely in these new arguments that we find a lot of elements not present before in grammar.[5] Above all, we find that the grammarians in Baghdad had a new set of grammatical notions at their disposal, or rather the same notions as before, but with a completely new purport, and defined in a new way. There now was an interest in the theoretical background of linguistic phenomena which was almost completely absent from earlier writings about grammar and language. Reflections about the origin of speech, for instance, are absent from grammatical literature until the second half of the 10th/4th century.[6] There also arose a methodological concern to define grammatical categories according to the exigencies of logical law, and an awareness of the difficulties inherent in the organization of a system which is to comprise all known facts. Many of the subjects dealt with for instance in Zaǧǧāǧī's *Īḍāḥ* (e.g. the definition of the parts of speech, their hierarchy, the use of grammar, the reason why certain grammatical procedures are introduced into speech, the nature of declension, and so on) are typical of the discussions in this milieu.[7] The fact that Zaǧǧāǧī (d. 949/337) knew almost

[5] The use of logic: Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 48, 9-10; 59, 13 (*ahl an-naẓar*, i.e. those who use dialectical arguments) and below, chapter VII.

[6] Loucel, 1963, 197 (10), and below, chapter IX.

[7] By this 'milieu' we indicate the grammarians included in the second diagram on

all grammarians of this period personally[8] demonstrates the usefulness of his book for a better understanding of Baghdadian linguistics, especially when we use it to gain an insight into the logical foundation of grammar and its connections with Greek logic and philosophy. From bibliographical works we know that there were similar books by other grammarians, but they have as yet not been rediscovered, or they are still waiting for an editor or a commentator: the *'Ilal an-naḥw* of Ibn Kaisān,[9] Ibn as-Sarrāǧ's *Kitāb al-mūǧaz* and his *Kitāb al-uṣūl*,[10] Rummānī's writings,[11] the *Īḍāḥ* of Abū 'Alī al-Fārisī,[12] and Sīrāfī's commentary on the *Kitāb*[13] are examples of works which could solve a good deal of problems and uncertainties about this period of Arabic linguistics.

Some of the subjects which are found in the chapters of Zaǧǧāǧī's *Īḍāḥ* were also discussed by Greek grammarians, and when we compare their methods and their arguments, we find that there is a definite resemblance, above all in the use of logical terms in grammatical debates and the use of dialectical methods. There are grammatical points, too, which the two grammars share: some definitions of the nouns and the verbs;[14] some of the arguments for the priority of the nouns;[15] the distinctions between two layers or levels of speech (impositions);[16] the question whether grammar is useful.[17] The problem is from what sources the Arabs could have derived such knowledge.

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pp. 192-194. We refer to the exposé of Troupeau, 1962, who summarizes the most important facts about these grammarians and their works, and gives a short survey of the development of grammatical teaching in the 10th/4th century.

[8] As he himself tells us, Iḍ. pp. 78-80.

[9] Suy. Buġya, 1, 19, 8.

[10] A manuscript of the *Kitāb al-mūǧaz* has recently been rediscovered in Morocco by Damerdji and edited in Bairūt, 1965; cf. Brockelmann GAL I, 114.

[11] On the writings of Rummānī: Mubārak, 1963, 87-92; Brockelmann, GAL I, 116; S I, 175. The main source for Mubārak's study was the *Šarḥ al-Kitāb*, which has not yet been edited, cf. Fleisch, 1961, 35, n. 2; more data about the manuscripts of this work in Ḥadīṯī, 1967, pp. 204 sqq. On Rummānī's theological writings: note 63 below.

[12] Three treatises by al-Fārisī, among them the *Īḍāḥ* have been discovered in the library of Leningrad University (ms. nr. 944), cf. Mamulija, 1965[2]. Other manuscripts of the *Īḍāḥ* in the Dār kutub al-miṣriyya (ms. nr. 1006 naḥw; cf. Sāmarrā'ī, 1971, 37-8, who refers to A. I. Šalbī, *Abū 'Alī al-Fārisī*. Qāhira, n.d.) and cf. Brockelmann, GAL, S I, 175-6. The first volume of this work has been edited by H. Š. Farhūd, Qāhira, 1969.

[13] Cf. Brockelmann, GAL I, 115; Hegazi, 1971; Ḥadīṯī, 1967, 159-92.

[14] Cf. chapter VII.

[15] Cf. chapter VII.

[16] Cf. chapter IX.

[17] Cf. chapter VII.

In this connection we think first of all of the translations of Greek philosophical works. In the first chapter we assumed that there was direct contact between the first Arabic grammarians and those among the people in the Hellenistic countries who knew Greek and had learned it through traditional grammar. It proved to be impossible to attribute the influence which at that time existed to the writings of Aristotle and his commentators because these had not yet been translated. But in the 10th/4th century there were Arabic translations of Greek writings: it was precisely in this period that the schools of translators flourished and that the Peripatetic writings were commented upon by Arabic philosophers, among them al-Fārābī, who died in 950/339, two years after Zaǧǧāǧī. All translating activities were concentrated in Baghdad, where the caliph al-Ma'mūn had, in about 830/215 founded, or rather enlarged the *Bait al-Ḥikma* (House of Wisdom). About 25 years later, Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, the greatest of the translators, became director of this university, a function he held till his death in 877/264. Another important scholar, from the Ṣābian community in Ḥarrān, Ṯābit ibn Qurra (d. 901/289) also came to Baghdad and brought with him all the accumulated knowledge of his community. About the same time, Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, a Christian from Ba'labakk, was also working in Baghdad.[18]

But the classical tradition came to Baghdad not only via Syria. Meyerhof proved that the Alexandrian school was another link with classical antiquity.[19] We know this from Arabic authors themselves: al-Mas'ūdī (d. 956/345) still remembered something about the history of the Alexandrian school and its eventual transfer to the capital of the 'Abbāsid caliphate;[20] this transfer took place, according to Mas'ūdī,

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[18] Brockelmann, GAL., I, 219-29. On Ṯābit ibn Qurra: Brockelmann, GAL., I, 241-4; S I, 384-6, Meyerhof, 1930, 403-4; 412; his *Kitāb aḏ-ḏaḫira fī 'ilm aṭ-ṭibb* was edited by G. Sobhy, Cairo, 1928. On Qusṭā ibn Lūqā: Brockelmann, GAL, I, 222-4; S I, 365-6; Meyerhof, ib.; Badawi, 1968, 190; Daiber, 1968, 3-5. The question of the *Bait al-ḥikma* is dealt with by Eche, 1967, 9-57. According to him the first institution of this name was founded under the Umayyads by Mu'āwiya, and continued by Ḫālid ibn Yazīd ibn Mu'āwiya, who was also the first to further the translation of medical and astrological books. Under the 'Abbāsid caliphs al-Manṣūr, al-Mahdī, and Hārūn ar-Rašīd the collection of Greek books increased. But the apogee of the *Bait al-ḥikma* was to be under al-Ma'mūn, who thought of himself as a patron of the sciences, and who was interested in purchasing books in Byzantium.

[19] Meyerhof, 1930.

[20] Mas'ūdī, Tanbīh, 122, 2-5: '(We have discussed) for what reason education was transferred from Alexandria to Antioch in the days of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz; then it was transferred to Ḥarrān in the days of al-Mutawakkil; then it passed on to Quwairī and Yūḥannā ibn Ḥailān in the days of al-Mu'taḍid, and he (sc. Yūḥannā) died in Baghdad in the days of al-Muqtadir ...' [A 59]; cf. Meyerhof, 1930, 407; Georr, 1948, 7.

during the reign of the caliph al-Mu'taḍid (892/279-902/290). Important in this context is above all the chronology: in the second half of the 9th/3rd century, a large number of scholars came to Baghdad with a knowledge of Greek that was sufficient to translate fairly complicated philosophical works from Greek into Syriac and/or Arabic. And in the second place, there was a large collection of translated Greek logical writings at the disposal of those who could not read that language themselves.

It has generally been recognized that the translations played an important role in the history of Arabic culture, but the role of the translators has not been given the attention it deserved. That they knew not only Greek, but also the system of Greek grammar as it was still taught at that time at the Byzantine universities, seems self-evident. It is also confirmed by our sources. Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq spent some years in Constantinople in order to study Greek [21]—thus continuing the tradition of scholars like Jacob of Edessa—,[22] and he himself wrote an Arabic grammar according to the Greek system.[23] It is even said that Ḥunain wrote about Greek grammar. Excerpts from his Arabic grammar are probably given by Ḥwārizmī.[24] In later times, we hear that the Byzantine scholar Psellos even had among his pupils Galatians and Arabs.[25] That this is no mere boast is proved by the fact that we have the name of at least one Arab from Baghdad who, according to an Arabic source, studied in Constantinople at this time (about 1050/440): Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Muḫtār, who was among the pupils of Psellos.[26] If we accept Meyerhof's identification of the 'Theodosios' mentioned by al-Muḫtār with the famous Alexandrian grammarian (first half 5th century A.D.), who in Byzantine times was one of the great authorities,[27] we would have important evidence of the fact that at least one Greek grammarian

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[21] Qifṭī, Ta'rīḫ. pp. 173-4; Madkour, 1969², 33; on Ḥunain: Brockelmann, GAL, I, 224-7; S I, 366-9; Badawi, 1968, 188-9. To be added to the bibliography: Meyerhof, 1926.

[22] Cf. above, chapter I, note 20.

[23] Merx, 1889, 105-6.

[24] Ḥwār. Maf. 46, 3-10; cf. above, chapter II, note 10. Ḥunain and Ḫalīl: above, chapter I, note 49. According to Mas'ūdī, Tanbīh, 112, 15 sqq., Ḥunain translated the *Septuagint* into Arabic.

[25] Sathas, *Mesaiōnikē Bibliothēkē*, Venice, 1872-94 (1972), 5, 508; Krumbacher, 1897², 433.

[26] Fuchs, 1926, but cf. Peters, 1968, 25. On Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Muḫtār: Wüstenfeld, 1841, nr. 133; cf. Meyerhof, 1930, 426.

[27] Meyerhof, 1930, 397; Hilgard, *Grammatici Graeci*, IV, 1, V-IX.

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was known in the Arabic world. Al-Muḫtār could have heard about Theodosios during his studies in Constantinople.

In fact, it seems altogether possible that contact in cultural and scientific matters between the Byzantine and the Muslim world was more regular than is normally assumed. To mention only one example: the mission of the famous apostle of the Slavonic peoples, Kyrillos, to the Saracenes. This mission took place in the second half of the ninth century A.D. Kyrillos was interested in grammar, as is evident from his translations of grammatical works—one work is mentioned about the eight parts of speech—, his study of the Hebrew and the Samaritan language, which he could read fluently, and, of course, by his work on the Slavonic alphabet.[28] It seems rather improbable for such a man not to have engaged in linguistic discussions with his Muslim colleagues.[29] There is also the matter of the theological discussions between Muslims and Byzantine Christians, which continued throughout the Arabo-Byzantine conflict and acquainted the Arabs with many elements of Greek philosophical and logical doctrine.[30]

Besides, we must keep in mind that precisely this period witnessed a revival of science and art in Byzantium under the *oikoumenikòs didáskalos* of the patriarchal academy, Photios (d. ± 891/278).[31] We wonder if there could be a correlation between this 'Byzantine renaissance' and the sudden interest in Greek science in Baghdad. This hypothesis should be studied in the light of the Arabo-Byzantine political relations in the 9th/3rd century.[32] Anyhow, these relations

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[28] On Kyrillos: Dinékov, 1972, Bujnoch, 1972², 63-8; the authenticity of this mission has been questioned, ib. p. 195, n. 45.

[29] We could also refer to Photios' (d. ± 891/278) embassy to the 'Assyrians' in 855/241, during which he collected materials for his (Greek) anthology; cf. Peters, 1968, 23; Hemmerdinger, 1956; RE XX, 1, 677; 689.

[30] Cf. above, chapter I, note 9; Vryonis, 1971, 421-36.

[31] Vasiliev, 1970², 63-8; on Photios: Krumbacher, 1897², 73-9; 515-24; Peters, 1963, 23; Dvornik, 1950. Speck, 1974, argues convincingly against the existence in Byzantium of a state university: the schools of higher education were private institutions with different levels of teaching. They received financial support of a private person—who might even be the emperor himself, as in the case of Konstantinos VII Porphyrogenitos (913/301 - 956/355)—, but they were never part of any official educational system. According to Speck, the *oikoumenikòs didáskalos* was not connected with any 'university' or 'academy' at all (ib. 74-91). For our purpose, however, this correction of the tradition is irrelevant: whether these schools did or did not possess an official status, their cultural importance remained the same.

[32] Vasiliev, 1935-68; Canard, 1973, a collection of articles; particularly interesting are *Quelques à coté de l'histoire des relations entre Byzance et les Arabes* (1956); *La prise d'Héraclée et les relations entre Hārūn al-Rashīd et l'empereur Nicéphore Ier* (1962); *Les relations politiques et sociales entre Byzance et les Arabes* (1964).

were friendly enough to enable Arab caliphs to send for Greek manuscripts to Constantinople—which is reported about al-Ma'mūn and al-Manṣūr.[33] And, in times of war, there always was an opportunity of obtaining Greek manuscripts in the course of a military expedition: aš-Šāfi'ī recommends the translation of such manuscripts—though only if they contain 'medicine or useful sciences'![34]

However, except for the possibility that Theodosios the grammarian was mentioned by al-Muḫtār, no names of Greek grammarians are given in Arabic literature. This point is emphasized by Gätje as a serious setback for any theory which tries to explain the resemblances between Greek and Arabic grammar by supposing a contact between the two cultures.[35] The explanation could be that the general attitude of Arabic scholars towards foreign culture was rather negative; thus, for instance, Ibn Fāris: 'Some people, whose fables one should refuse to accept, think that those who are called the philosophers (i.e. the Greek philosophers) had a declension and grammatical writings of their own. Ahmad ibn Fāris says: we do not go in for that sort of talk'.[36] We do not assert that all grammarians were as chauvinistic and narrow-minded as Ibn Fāris, but certainly the belief in the superiority of the Arabic language and Arabic grammar was very strong among them.[37] This could be the reason why grammarians did not mention any Greek grammarian.

There is one instance of a Greek name mentioned in connection with grammar, namely in the notes of al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār (born in 942/331)[38] on the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Categoriae*. To Aris-

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[33] Hitti, 1968⁹, 309 sqq. We may also mention the case of Leon Philosophos: one of his pupils had been taken prisoner by the Arabs, and the caliph al-Ma'mūn, amazed by his knowledge, tried—unsuccessfully—to obtain the services of Leon at the caliphal court, *Theophanes continuatus*, 189-90, Speck, 1974, 2, 4, note 17.

[34] Meyerhof, 1933, 122, n. 2; Šāfi'ī ap. Ṭabarī, *Iḫtilāf al-fuqahā'*. Ed. Schacht. Leiden, 1933, 178, 28 sqq.

[35] Gätje, 1971, 23.

[36] b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 42, 13-5 [A 60].

[37] b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 42, 6; also: Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 45, 3-5; Siǧistānī ap. Tauḥ. Muq. pp. 293-4; Tauḥ. Imtā', 1, 76, 13 - 78, 5 (cf. Bergé, 1972); cf. the critical remarks of Ibn Ḥazm, Iḥk. 1, 32, 8-10.

[38] On Ibn Suwār: Brockelmann, GAL, S I, 378 (Ibn Siwār); Badawi, 1968, 192; Meyerhof, 1930, 421. He was born in 942/331, and was a pupil of another famous translator, Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī (Brockelmann, GAL I, 228; S I, 370); he died after 1017/408. Ibn Suwār not only gives his own comments on the *Categoriae*, but also translates sometimes or gives paraphrases of Greek commentaries. He quotes Ammonios by name (369, 8 sqq.) and gives paraphrases of parts of his commentaries in a number of passages (361, 14-22 and 363, 2-3, cf. Ammon. pp. 11-2, ed. Busse; 366, 11-4, cf. Ammon. 17,

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totle's words '... like, for instance, grammar, because it has the mind as its substrate', he adds '... as for instance Sībawaihi with the Arabs, and Sūsiānos (?) with the Greeks'.[39] We have sought in vain to fit the name into a form which is more likely to be a Greek name; maybe the person meant is Johannes the Grammarian (Johannes Philoponos),[40] but he was a philosopher, not a grammarian.

Fortunately we at least have evidence that al-Fārābī knew and even studied Greek grammarians. Speaking about a group of words, he says: 'Those words form a part of the group of significant words, which are called by the grammarians *ḥurūf*, and which are used to denote meanings. These *ḥurūf* are also divided into many sub-divisions, although the experts of Arabic grammar have not been accustomed so far to giving a special name to each sub-division. So, in defining these sub-divisions, we will have to use the names which reached us from the grammatical experts of the people of the Greek language, since they gave each sub-division its own name'.[41] We have studied above these various types of *ḥurūf*.[42] Gätje studied al-Fārābī's *Kitāb al-alfāẓ al-musta'mala fī 'l-manṭiq*, where this quotation is found, and

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18 sqq.). According to Walzer, 1963², 74-5, it is not necessary to assume the existence of a commentary previous to Simplikios as Ibn Suwār's ultimate source, since his references to earlier commentaries are also found in Simplikios (so, for instance, b. Suwār, 369, 8 sqq.; cf. Simpl. in Aristot. categ. 18, 9 sqq. ed. Kalbfleisch). But this does not apply to the important passages about the theory of the 'first and second imposition', which exercized a considerable influence on the Arabic theories about the nature of speech, cf. below, chapter IX. We can also mention Ibn Suwār's use of the word *balanṣūr* as an example of a meaningless expression: this word is identical with the Stoic *blituri* (SVF 3, 213, 21; the word was also used by the Aristotelian commentators). It would be very interesting to have at our disposal all notes written by Ibn Suwār in the manuscript of the translation of the *Organon* (Bibliothèque Nationale ar. 2346); cf. Georr, 1948, 190; Kraus, 1942, 2, 251, n. 2.

[39] Text: Georr, 1948, 320, 5-6 = Aristot. categ. 1 a 25-6; notes: b. Suwār, 378, no. 44 [A 61].

[40] *Sūsiānos* must be a mistake; the only possible emendation I can think of is *Johannes* spelled in the Greek form, not in the Arabic *Yūḥannā* (i.e. y - w - ḥ - ' - n - s, instead of the text given by Georr: s - w - s - y - ' - n - s), just as the name *Hippokrates* occurs in two forms: the current form *Buqrāṭ*, and an earlier form *Hifuqrasis*, in the writings of Yūḥannā ibn Māsawaih (Walzer, 1963², 112). Johannes Philoponos, the Alexandrian philosopher, was known in the Arabic tradition as *an-Naḥwī* (the Grammarian); he lived in the first half of the 6th century A.D.; Krumbacher, 1897², 581-2; Steinschneider, 1960², 141-3; Meyerhof, 1930, 397; Qifṭī, Ta'rīḫ, 356, 14; Meyerhof, 1931; Saffrey, 1954. He is probably the Philoponos whose words are quoted in the scholia D.T. (547, 24 sqq., cf. also 524, 11) concerning the question whether the nominative is a case; cf. also below, chapter III B, note 14.

[41] Far. Alf. 42, 7-12 [A 62]; cf. Šarḥ, 54, 9.

[42] Cf. chapter III A.

found many traces of Greek grammatical doctrine: 'Gesichert ist auch durch die eigene Aussage al-Fārābī's und die vorangehende Gegen-überstellung ein Einfluss der griechischen Grammatiker. Die genaue Quelle ist unbekannt. Es scheint aber, dass al-Fārābī mehr wusste als in der *Téchnè grammatikè* des Dionysios Thrax steht'.[43] We may also refer to Fārābī's description of grammatical treatises, which shows many traces of the Greek *téchnai peri hellenismoû*.[44] All this proves that logicians and philosophers in the 9th/3rd and the 10th/4th century not only translated Greek writings, but also occupied themselves with Greek grammar—which, of course, they had to do, if they wished to gain some understanding of the Greek language.

One could, however, object that this does not prove that Arabic grammarians were as interested in the problems of another language as the philosophers. It may not even prove that they knew these problems, but it is a fact that there was a lively, though not always friendly contact between representatives of logic and grammar in the 10th/4th century. One well-known discussion is that between as-Sīrāfī (d. 979/368) and Abū Bišr Mattā ibn Yūnus (d. 970/360), which took place in 932/320.[45] This discussion—the text of which is preserved for us by Yāqūt and at-Tauḥīdī[46]—does not offer a detailed account of the grammatical matters which were discussed, but it does give a marvellous picture of the relations between the old-fashioned grammarians with their empirical[47] logic of sound reasoning and common sense, and the enthusiastic representatives of the new Aristotelian way. These modern logicians were proud of their knowledge of antiquity, and had a deep admiration for the philosophy of the classical thinkers.[48] They were convinced of the superiority of Greek wisdom (and language), a conviction which is also found in the works of another philosopher, Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā Rāzī (d. 925/313).[49]

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[43] Gätje, 1971, 23.

[44] Cf. above, chapter III B.

[45] On this discussion: Mahdi, 1970. Mattā ibn Yūnus; Brockelmann, GAL, I, 228; S I, 370; Meyerhof, 1930, 415-6; Badawi, 1968, 190.

[46] Yāqūt, *Iršād al-arīb*, ed. D.S. Margoliouth, Cairo/Leiden/London, 1907-27, III³, 84 sqq.; Tauḥ. Imtā', 1, 108, 5 - 128, 19.

[47] An example of an attested empirical argument is the argument that if Aristotle had really been so important as claimed by Mattā, then one could dispense with all other logic (Mahdi, 1970, 80); cf. Galenos, *On medical experience*. Walzer, 1944, 101; cf. Mahdi, 1970, 68; Tauḥ. Imtā', 1, 113, 6-9; cf. below, chapter IX, n. 6.

[48] E.g. Mattā ibn Yūnus, Mahdi, 1970, 67.

[49] Rāzi, Opera Philosophica, 1, 42, 14-5: 'We also found as a generally valid matter that none of all other nations has a more subtle flair, nor a more manifest wisdom than the Greek nation' [A 63].

The grammarians, on the other hand, deemed themselves capable of solving any problem with the help of their universal science of grammar, whereas, according to them, logicians were always bound to a single language: 'Grammar is logic, only it is detached from Arabic; logic is grammar, only it is understood through language',[50] says Sīrāfī in the course of the debate. Conversely, we find the following words of a representative of the new logic, as-Siǧistānī (d. ±985/375), the teacher of Tauḥīdī: 'Grammar is an Arabic logic, but logic is a rational grammar. The opinion of the logician is decisive about meanings ... and the opinion of the grammarian is decisive about expressions'.[51] The same distinction is found in Fārābī's *Ihṣā' al-'ulūm*, where he tells us[52] that grammar is concerned with those expressions that are specific to one single language, whereas logic gives rules which apply to the expressions of every language, in other words, universal rules, which are indispensable to any science, even the science of grammar. The idea of logic as a standard for all sciences is developed especially in the philosophy of the Stoics, who considered logic as one of the criteria of truth.[53] It goes without saying that Arabic grammarians resented this claim of the logicians: they tried to claim the same position for grammar. The grammarian whom Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā met in Baghdad was so proud of his knowledge and wisdom, that 'in the end he even said: "This (sc. grammar) is the only science, the rest is wind"! ...; for he was one of those who think that when you are skilled in language, you are able to answer every question'.[54] The problems which were so vehemently discussed by the two factions even found their way into technical grammatical writings.[55] Examples of this kind of discussions are

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[50] Mahdi, 1970, 72; Tauḥ. Muq., 75, 2-3 [A 64].

[51] Tauḥ. Muq. 170 penult.-ult. [A 65]; cf. 177, 16-22.

[52] Far. Ihṣā', 35, 1 sqq. Such discussions about the difference between grammar and logic were also the subject of the *Kitāb tabyīn al-faṣl baina ṣinā'atayi 'l-manṭiq al-falsafī wa-'n-naḥw al-'arabī* by one of Fārābī's pupils, Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī; cf. Qifṭī, Ta'rīḥ, 362, 2; Kraus, 1942, 2, 251, n. 2. As-Saraḥsī, a pupil of al-Kindī, wrote about *Al-farq baina naḥw al-'arab wa-'l-manṭiq*; cf. b.a. Uṣaibi'a, 1, 215; Kraus, ib. On Saraḥsī: Brockelmann, GAL, I, 231-2; Rosenthal, 1943; 1951. For the discussions concerning the relationship between grammar and logic: Mubārak, 1963, 228; 1974³, 72-8.

[53] SVF, 2, 19, 33 sqq.; 2, 20, 15-8. On the problem of the place of logic within philosophy: Jadaane, 1968, 100-6; Fārābī ap. Dunlop, 1951, 92-3.

[54] Rāzi, Opera Philosophica, 1, 43-4 [A 66].

[55] For instance, the question if the expression *zaid aḥsan iḥwānihi* (Zaid is the best of his brothers) is correct or not; cf. Mahdi, 1970, 76, as compared with b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 24, 4 sqq.; 3, 333, 8 sqq.; 3, 336, 8-10 and with Ḥarīrī, *Durrat al-gawāṣṣ*, ap. de Sacy, 1829, 25 penult. - 26, 7, cf. p. 64. This is the problem of the adjunction of something to

abundant in Tauḥīdī's reproduction of the conversations which as-Siǧistānī held with other scholars in the booksellers' quarter in Baghdad.[56] His opponents were not as obsessed by professional pride as as-Sīrāfī, though.

On the whole, there is no reason to suppose such a state of enmity and rivalry to exist between logicians and grammarians as we are led to believe from the foregoing remarks. A striking example of good cooperation is the arrangement al-Fārābī had with the grammarian Ibn as-Sarrāǧ (d. 928/316): the grammarian learned music and logic from the logician, who in his turn studied grammar with the grammarian.[57] At an earlier time we find the logician-philosopher al-Kindī (d. ± 873/260) visiting Baṣra and discussing with al-Mubarrad a linguistic problem.[58] We may also refer to Zaǧǧāǧī's repeated assertion that he tries to deal with his subjects according to grammatical standards, and not according to the theories of logic[59]—which is typical for the need of his time to distinguish carefully between grammatical and logical ideas and opinions.

This is also confirmed by the fact that not everyone succeeded in making the distinction between grammar and logic which Zaǧǧāǧī feels is necessary. More than once we find the grammarian accused of mixing grammar with logic. We have already mentioned Ibn as-Sarrāǧ, who studied with al-Fārābī; from what we know about his grammatical work, we may deduce that logic indeed did have a lasting influence on his ideas about language; he used logical terms, and rearranged the traditional facts of grammar according to logical theory.[60] It seems very probable that Ibn as-Sarrāǧ was one of the primary sources in transmitting the logical materials from his teacher al-Fārābī to the Baghdadian grammarians, since among his pupils were az-Zaǧǧāǧī, al-Fārisī, as-Sīrāfī, and ar-Rummānī. We certainly do not

itself (iḍāfat aš-šay' ilā nafsihī), which is mentioned as a matter of disagreement between the Baṣrians and the Kūfans (b. Anb. Inṣ. 181-2; Asr. 11, 9: the Kūfans allowed this adjunction, whereas the Baṣrians rejected it; cfr. 'Ukb. Mas. p. 111). The same point is touched in the discussions about the identity of ism and musammā, cf. below, chapter VIII, note 37.

[56] For instance in his Muqābasāt; Tauḥīdī was a pupil of ar-Rummānī, the logician-grammarian.

[57] Kraus, 1942, 2, 251, n. 2 on the authority of b.a. Uṣaibi'a, 2, 136.

[58] The discussion between Mubarrad and Kindī concerned the question if the word inna is a superfluous word, Rāzī, Maf. 2, 42 ult. - 43, 4.

[59] Iḍ. 48, 8-16; 58, 6-13; cf. Mubārak, 1974³, 102-17.

[60] b. Anb. Nuzha, 150, 7-8; Qifṭī, Inbāh, 3, 149; Fihrist, ed. Flügel p. 142; Suy. Buġya, 1, 109-10, cf. Amer, 1963, XVIII-XIX.

assert that each of these grammarians was as devoted a logician as Ibn as-Sarrāǧ was, but somehow they contributed all of them to the influence of logic on grammar, if only because they mentioned certain logical terms or theories.

As for ar-Rummānī, he carried on the tradition of his teacher, Ibn as-Sarrāǧ, and even went so far with his logical studies, that it caused him to be accused of making a mixture of logic and grammar, which was incomprehensible to normal grammarians.[61] We know, moreover, that ar-Rummānī was a Mu'tazilite.[62] We shall see below that most Baghdadian grammarians belonged to the Mu'tazila or had connections with that group of philosophers—which could explain their interest in things logical. Rummānī also wrote about the most important problem of Mu'tazilite theology: the creation of the Qur'ān and the incomparability of its style (notably in his Kitāb an-nukat fī i'ǧāz al-Qur'ān).[63] Both subjects had much in common with grammar and linguistic philosophy, as we can see in the writings of that great Mu'tazilite, 'Abd al-Ǧabbār. The discussions about the creation of the Qur'ān were closely linked with the problem of the creation of speech.[64]

We have come to know as-Sīrāfī as a fierce opponent of the new logic, but even he did not escape its influence. He, a pupil of Ibn as-Sarrāǧ and of the famous Mu'tazilite al-Ǧubbā'ī (d. 915/303), spent much of his time studying Greek authors—among them Ptolemaios and Eukleides—, and also devoted his energy to the study of logic, in spite of his opposition to Mattā ibn Yūnus. As a matter of fact, his opposition was not directed at logic in general, but against the new, Aristotelian logic, as it was being preached by Mattā, and against its extravagant claims to supremacy in science.[65]

Yet another scholar of this period, Ibn Kaisān (d. 932/320) probably wrote about both disciplines: his definition of the noun was given in two versions, a grammatical one, and a logical one according to the Aristotelian tradition, as we know from Zaǧǧāǧī.[66] It is typical of the

[61] b. Anb. Nuzha, 189-90; Suy. Buġya, 2, 181, 3 sqq.

[62] Cf. below, chapter VIII, note 18.

[63] For Rummānī's activities in this field: Bouman, 1959, 45-7; Nader, 1956.

[64] Cf. below, chapter IX.

[65] Zub. Ṭab. 132, 12-4. On the distinction between Sīrāfī's logic and the logic of Mattā ibn Yūnus: Mahdi, 1970, 58 sqq. On Sīrāfī: Brockelmann, GAL, I, 115; S I, 174-5; Hegazi, 1971.

[66] Iḍ. 50, 11-6.

scholars of his time that they forgot about the ancient differences between Baṣrian and Kūfan grammar. Sīrāfī tells us so explicitly about Ibn Kaisān[67] and about two other teachers of Zaǧǧāǧī, Ibn Šuqair (d. 929/317) and Ibn al-Ḥayyāṭ (d. 932/320).[68]

The influence of pure, mostly Peripatetic, Greek logic remained preponderant in the logical works of Arabic philosophers. Many of the ideas and terms of the Aristotelian tradition are found for instance in Ġazzālī's works, such as the *Kitāb al-maqṣad al-asnā fī asmā' Allāh al-ḥusnā*, the *Kitāb al-mustaṣfā*, the *Mī'yār al-'ilm*, and the *Kitāb al-ma'ārif al-'aqliyya*.[69] We may also refer to Ibn Ḥazm's *Kitāb at-taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq*[70] and to the section about logic in Ḥwārizmī's *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*. But the most important contribution to our knowledge of Aristotelian logic in the Arabic world comes from Ibn Sīnā's commentaries and from the works of Fārābī: notably his commentary on the *De Interpretatione*, and the section about logic in his *Iḥṣā' al-'ulūm*.[71] From these writings Aristotelian logic found its way to grammar, though it never succeeded in replacing completely the earlier influence of the direct contact with Greek grammar.

It should be noted that with the introduction of Greek logic other elements besides the Peripatetic theory were brought to the Arabic world, among them Stoic elements. This applies for instance to Stoic materialism, which had a strong influence on the Mu'tazilite philosopher Naẓẓām (d. 845/231) and which is also discernible in the

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[67] Sīr. Aḫb. 108, 8-9. Both Ibn Kaisān and al-Aḫfaš aṣ-Ṣaġīr (= Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Sulaimān, d. 917/305) attended the lectures of Mubarrad and Ṯa'lab, the two rivals and representatives of the school of Baṣra and Kūfa, respectively. It is typical that the *Fihrist* begins its analysis of the later grammarians with the words "the names and the biographies of another group of learned grammarians and lexicographers, namely those who mixed the two schools" (*asmā' wa-aḫbār ǧamā'a min 'ulamā' an-naḥwiyyīn wa-'l-luġawiyyīn mimman ḫalaṭa 'l-maḏhabain*) 77, 8-9; cf. Flügel, 1862, 183 sqq.

[68] Sīr. Aḫb. 109, 2-3; cf. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 79, 3-6.

[69] Cf. Brockelmann, GAL I, 535-46, S I, 744-56 (nos. 5, 51, 62, 54); Brunschvig, 1970, 158-69. On the *Asmā'*: Gätje, 1974. We have used the edition M. al-Kutubī, Cairo, 1324 A.H.; the most recent edition is by F.A. Shehadi, Beyrouth, 1971. Two other important logical works by Ġazzālī are the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, GAL ib. no. 56 (we have used the edition M.S. al-Kurdī, Cairo, 1331 A.H.; there is a more recent edition in three volumes, Cairo, 1936) and the *Qisṭās al-mustaqīm* GAL ib. no. 28 (id. V. Chelhot, Beyrouth, 1959), cf. Kleinknecht, 1972.

[70] Brunschvig, 1970, 150 sqq.

[71] Brockelmann, GAL, I, 589-99; S I, 812-28 (Ibn Sīnā); GAL I, 232; S I, 375-7 (Fārābī).

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theories about the nature of sound.[72] The theory of meaning and the Stoic traces found in it will be discussed below, as well as those Stoic elements which are present in Arabic grammatical theories.[73]

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[72] Horovitz, 1903; 1909. For the connection between the materialism of the Stoa and the theories on the nature of sound: cf. chapter II, notes 44, 69, 70.

[73] Cf. below, chapter X.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE USE OF LOGIC IN GRAMMAR

'These are not grammatical terms or issues, but they are
taken from the technical language of the logicians, al-
though a number of grammarians did accept them'.[1]

Just like the Greek commentators on Dionysios' Thrax *Téchnè*
10th century Arabic grammarians tried to give their grammatical
writings a learned image by using logical arguments, philosophical
terms, and dialectic methods; in both cases the results were not always
fortunate. Zaǧǧāǧī is typical of this trend in Arabic grammar. He
evidently believes that reason precedes religious tradition: he was,
after all, a Mu'tazilite;[2] he is also convinced that knowledge is
developed through reason, and that it is not innate, because that
would extremely limit man's free will, and his responsibility for his
own acts.[3] We may, therefore, expect him to be influenced by the
logical theories of his time. On the other hand, it is obvious that he
sincerely tries to keep logic and grammar separate, although he does
not always succeed.[4] In this chapter we will quote a few examples
from Zaǧǧāǧī's *Īḍāḥ* to illustrate the use of logic in grammar.

In the second chapter of the *Īḍāḥ* there is a discussion about the
definition of 'definition' and of 'philosophy'. Such discussions were
typical of the kind of grammar that was in vogue at Zaǧǧāǧī's time.
They are also typical of the scholia on Dionysios Thrax: all scholia
begin with definitions of *téchnè*, 'definition', etc.[5] In his discussion
Zaǧǧāǧī followed Fārābī's introduction to Porphyrios' *Eisagôgè*.[6] He

mentions three definitions, the first of which is the one preferred by
Fārābī.[7]

1. The first definition—'a definition is a concise way of expressing the
   nature of the thing to which it is applied'—is a literal translation of
   the definition which is given in the Greek scholia, without any
   indication of the source.[8] The word 'concise' (*súntomos*) in the
   Greek texts suggests a Stoic origin, when we take into account
   the importance of the notion 'conciseness' (*suntomía*) in the Stoic
   system of the virtues of speech.[9]

2. The definition chosen by Zaǧǧāǧī is that of the Aristotelian school:
   'Definition is what expresses the essence of a thing' (*lógos ho tò tí
   èn eĩnai sèmainôn*).[10] This definition was also quoted in Greek
   grammatical writings.[11] In the Arabic world, it was avoided by
   orthodox theologians because of its connotation of a causal relation
   between the object defined and the decisive terms used for defining
   its nature: theologians used a descriptive type of definition instead
   (cf. Zaǧǧāǧī's third definition). Zaǧǧāǧī, of course, does not have
   such qualms about causality, and therefore uses the Aristotelian
   type of definition, in accordance with his logical and Mu'tazilite
   leanings, although in practice he acknowledges the value of a
   descriptive definition.[12]

3. The type of definition favoured by the theologians is the descrip-
   tion (*rasm*), about which van Ess observes: 'One was not primarily
   concerned with the problem how to find out the essence of a thing,
   but rather how to circumscribe it in the shortest way so that every-
   body could easily grasp what was meant'.[13] In other words, the
   aim of the description is to differentiate the object to be defined
   from other objects resembling it, by mentioning a characteristic
   property it does not share with any other object. In Fārābī's
   words: 'Both (sc. the definition and the description) share the
   use of the genus of the thing, and they differ in that the definition

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[1] Zaǧǧ. Id. 48, 11-2 [A 67].

[2] Cf. below, chapter VIII, note 19. On Mu'tazilite rationalism: Bernand, 1972, 38;
Brunschvig, 1972; Hourani, 1971.

[3] Nader, 1956, 239-58.

[4] Zaǧǧāǧī's attitude towards logic: Mubārak, 1974[3], 102-17.

[5] E.g. scholia D.T. 2, 19 sqq. + 3, 10 sqq.; 107, 1 sqq. + 108, 27 sqq.; 156, 28 sqq. +
157, 15; 297, 17 sqq.

[6] A translation of this (unpublished) introduction: Dunlop, 1951. According to
Dunlop Fārābī's introduction to Porphyrios' *Eisagôgè* may have been based on Philo-
ponos' introduction to philosophy, which borrowed frequently from Ammonios, but is
not preserved (Dunlop, 1951, 78). Zaǧǧāǧī follows Fārābī closely in his discussion
about the definition of philosophy.

[7] Zaǧǧ. Id. 46, 6-11; cf. Far. ap. Dunlop, 1951, 82-4.

[8] Scholia D.T. 107, 20-1 [G 38]; 157, 4-5.

[9] Barwick, 1922, 95; Diog. Laert. 7, 59 = SVF 3, 214, 16-7.

[10] Aristot. top. 1, 5; 101 b 39.

[11] E.g. scholia D.T. 107, 1-2.

[12] Cf. his discussion concerning the definition of philosophy (Id. 46, 12 sqq.); also
his answer to the criticisms against Mubarrad's descriptive definition of the noun, Id.
51, 4-6.

[13] van Ess, 1970, 38.

adds to the genus the substantial *differentiae*, while the description (adds) the accidental *differentiae*'.[14]

It is this type of definition which Zaǧǧāǧī refers to when he talks about the differences between the various definitions of 'philosophy': in his view, definitions may indeed differ, since they are made for different aims.[15] It is evident that this type of definition is related to the Stoic 'description' (*hupographè*), which is defined by Chrysippos as 'showing the characteristic properties' (*hè toû idíou apódosis*).[16]

Every art should have its ultimate justification in that it is useful to man; this aspect of science appears in every definition of *téchnè* from Aristotle to the Stoa.[17] Grammar, too, must have its usefulness and its aim (*télos eúchrèston = fā'ida*).[18] The aim of grammar is to guarantee our speaking correctly according to the rules of our grammar (*hellènismós, latinitas, i'rāb*);[19] its usefulness is to be found in the fact that through grammar we are able to read correctly and to understand old and venerable writings that would be otherwise incomprehensible to us (e.g. the poems of Homer, or the Qur'ān).[20]

Often philosophical terms and doctrines are used in order to 'clarify the discussion'; we will quote a few examples from Zaǧǧāǧī's *Īḍāḥ*, namely from the discussion concerning the priority of the masdar. This controversy between the Basrians and the Kūfans has been dealt with

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[14] Translation Dunlop, 1951, 83; cf. also Zaǧǧāǧī's analysis of the definition of 'man', Iḍ. 46, 7-11.

[15] For instance in Mubarrad's definition of the noun the intention to define the noun in terms of 'subjectivity' (*taqrīb 'alā 'l-mubtada'*), Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 51, 5.

[16] SVF 2, 226; cf. van Ess, 1970, 37 sqq. and note 90; van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 84; 129.

[17] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 95-6; Steinthal, 1891², 163-5; cf. scholia D.T. 108, 31-3: 'An art (*téchnè*) is a systematic collection of observations that are acquired by experience; it serves a useful and vital end' [G 39], (a Stoic definition, cf. Zenon, SVF 1, 21); cf. Far. ap. Dunlop, 1951, 84-5: 'We say that an art is a faculty found in the soul, such that it produces organization in a subject towards a particular aim'. In Arabic literature this is the fourth of the 'four scientific questions', Rescher, 1966, 40; Dunlop, 1951, 79 (Fārābī's introduction to Porphyrios' *Eisagōgē*).

[18] Steinthal, 1891², 2, 179-80; 188-9; *fā'ida*: cf. chapter II.

[19] 'Aim' and 'usefulness' amount, of course, almost to the same thing. For the 'aim of grammar': Dion. Thr. pp. 5-6 (enumeration of the parts of grammar), and cf. scholia D.T. 2, 22; 109, 37-8; 446, 6; Proklos, scholia in Crat. 12, 13-6.

[20] Cf. the claim of the grammarian against Sextus Empiricus that grammar is useful, because only through grammar can we discuss what the poets really meant, Sext. Emp. adv. math. I, 270 sqq.

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above in so far as it contains Greek grammatical elements.[21] The Basrians claimed that the masdar was prior to the verb, and some of them adduced proofs borrowed from logic. For instance, in order to prove that the masdar is prior to the verb because it is the verbal noun, they say that the agent precedes his action, and that he must know the action before he can perform it.[22] We may point to the Mu'tazilite answer to an objection to their doctrine that Allāh has eternal knowledge : to meet the objection that, Allāh's knowledge being eternal, the object of that knowledge must be eternal, too, the Mu'tazilites introduce the distinction between possibility and actualization of an action. Allāh's knowing an action implies the possibility of that action, not the actual happening of it. In the same way, someone who is eating must necessarily have been before in the state of knowing the action of eating; otherwise he could never have started to perform the action of eating.[23]

In the same discussion it is argued by the Basrians that the sounds of the masdar are found in all verbal forms, which implies that the verbal forms are derived from the masdar, and not the other way round. Zaǧǧāǧī then quotes the *ahl an-naẓar*, i.e. those scholars who use dialectic methods.[24] They compare the relation between masdar and verbal forms to the relation between a metal and the objects made from that metal: the 'idea' (*ma'nā*) of silver is found in a silver ring, but the 'idea' of a ring is not found in silver.

The example of the metal (silver) and the ring formed from it is traditional; there are other instances, where it is used for explaining the production of something out of nothing.[25] Zaǧǧāǧī's example shows that for him—in accordance with the Mu'tazilite theory—the potentiality of change is not located in the changing object, but in the *causa efficiens*, i.e., in the last resort, Allāh, whether as the prime and only Creator, or as the Creator of the *causae secundae*. This

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[21] Cf. above, chapter III C.

[22] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 56, 14 - 57, 3; 73, 15-9; cf. the discussion concerning the priority of the masdar, chapter III C.

[23] Cf. Abū'l-Ḥusain al-Ḥayyāṭ (d. after 912/300), *Kitāb al-intiṣār wa-'r-radd 'alā ibn ar-Rāwandī al-mulḥid*, ed. transl. Nader, Beyrouth, 1957, 81, 17 - 82, 1, cf. Nader, 1956, 68-9.

[24] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 59, 13 - 60, 2.

[25] Van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 62, n. 84.1: the production of a ring from the original silver implies the appearance of a new accident and cannot be the result of an inherent principle; cf. Frank, 1966, 21 sqq. A different instance, in Ǧurǧānī, is quoted by Heinrichs, 1969, 75.

view differs fundamentally from the view of the *ashāb al-hayūlā*, who believe that the objects already contain the idea of their future shape. and that in everything there is an inherent principle of potential change—which is more in line with Greek philosophy. Sextus Empiricus, for instance, used the example of bronze and a statue made from it in order to explain the susceptibility of certain materials to become certain products.[26]

As an example of the 'logical' turn a grammatical discussion may take, we will analyse now another passage from Zaǧǧāǧī's discussion of the thesis that the masdar comes before the verb, because it is a verbal noun, and has, therefore, priority. This thesis is refuted by an adversary with arguments borrowed from logic and philosophy.[27] The line this reasoning takes is rather complex and it includes a variety of arguments, so that the connection is vague and sometimes nearly incomprehensible. We will deal with the various elements point by point. The adversary says: 'We do not say that nouns are prior to verbs in an absolute sense, but we say that the noun is prior to the verb of which it is the agent. Now, in this chapter we have already reached an agreement on the fact that "noun" has the technical meaning of "nominatum" because it takes its place when something is predicated about it. We say therefore that Zaid precedes the verb of which he is the agent, but it does not follow from this that he has precedence over a verb of which someone else is the agent. If this is true, then a masdar does not necessarily have precedence only because it is the verbal noun. Nor do we assert in an absolute sense that a noun has precedence over its nominatum, and that it never exists after it: on the contrary, noun and nominatum must needs exist side by side during the time of their existence. With "noun" we indicate the meaning of its rights to "nounness". Do you not see that you can call a given person during his lifetime "Zaid", then you can take this name away from him and call him "Bakr", and after that you can take that name away from him and call him "'Umar"? But his right to "nounness", you cannot take away: the two of them (sc. nominatum and nounness) always coexist. Do you not see that something befalls it (sc. the nominatum), something which does not leave it, something which it possesses in each and every circumstance? That is the reason why people make the mistake of thinking that a noun is identical

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[26] Sext. Emp. adv. math. 1, 108; cf. Sophr. 2, 410, 36 - 411, 2.

[27] For the grammatical arguments, cf. above, chapter III C.

with its nominatum. There are some people who call something that does not exist a thing, others deny this. ... As it is now certain that the noun has no precedence over the nominatum, your argumentation that the masdar has precedence over the verb, because it is its noun, and that it therefore comes necessarily before the verb, has lost its validity'.[28]

1. In the first place, the anonymous adversary states that one cannot make the generalization that nouns come before verbs. One could say that a noun comes before its own verb, just as an agent comes before his own action, though not before the action of someone else. In this context 'noun' is used in the sense of 'the person who performs the real action'.[29] When we know that the person Zaid comes before his own action, and not necessarily before the action of someone else, we also know that the noun *zaid* comes only before its own verb, and not necessarily before another one. Hence it follows that we cannot use the argument of the priority of the nouns in order to defend the priority of the masdar on the ground of its being *ism li-fi'l* (verbal noun).[30]

2. Even if we cannot use the thesis of an absolute priority of nouns above verbs, there is still another possibility: if we could prove that an *ism* (in this context 'a name', 'a word') precedes its *musammā* (the object denoted by the word, in this case the verb: the masdar is the *ism al-fi'l*, therefore, the *fi'l* is named by the masdar, and is its *musammā*), we could show that the masdar is prior to the verb. This turns out, however, to be as fruitless an argument as the first one, because it is impossible to accept anything but the coexistence of the *asmā* and the *musammayāt*: it is inevitable that they exist at the same time.[31]

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[28] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 57, 4 - 58, 5 [A 68]; in line 11 read *at-tasmiya* for *lil-ismiyya*.

[29] Using *ism* with the sense of *musammā* is permitted in the *iḫbār*, i.e. when you are talking about nouns and explaining their relations with verbs; cf. chapter VIII, note 75.

[30] The use of the term *ism li-fi'l* (57, 8) instead of the usual *ism al-fi'l* (e.g. 56, 3)—if it is not a mere printing error—could be an indication of the fact that the speaker, who is defending the Kūfan theory, is aware of Kūfan terminology, which uses *ism al-fi'l* in another sense, namely with the meaning of 'interjection' (cf. Maḫzūmī, 1958, 308), and that in this way he tries to avoid ambiguity. The opposite procedure is followed by Ibn Ǧinnī (Ḫaṣ. 3, 37, 5) who uses *ism li-'l-fi'l* (= *ism sumniya bihī 'l-fi'l*, ib. 3, 36, 13) to indicate those words which are called by the Kūfans *ism al-fi'l*.

[31] Van Ess, 1970, 45. According to Stoic theory a sign can only be a sign of something it coexists with (*sēmeion parōn paróntos*) (SVF 2, 73, 24). Cf. Steinthal, 1890², 1, 308-9: 'Da das Zeichen überhaupt nur ein Gedankenwesen (*noēton*) ist—denn

3. That *ism* and *musammā* indeed always coexist is confirmed by the definition of the notion *ism*, which means nothing more than the right of a certain thing to being named, to nounness (independently of the concrete name it receives, or of a change of name[32]). Every thing (*šay'*) has this right and it cannot lose it, because it is an essential part of its being (*mauǧūd bi-wuǧūdihi*).

4. The notion *šay'* is then elaborated within the framework of the Stoic categories.[33]

5. *Ism* and *musammā* being so closely connected, some people believed them to be identical; this *al-ism huwa 'l-musammā*—theory will be dealt with in the chapter about the Mu'tazila.[34]

6. It would be possible to object against points 2 and 3 (*ism* and *musammā* always coexist) that there are some non-existing things which despite their non-existence are nevertheless called *ašyā'*. In that case, the *ism* would precede its, as yet non-existent, *musammā*, and it would no longer be *mauǧūd bi-wuǧūdihi*. This argument may be refuted when we prove that the so-called non-existing things

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nicht als Tatsache ist es Zeichen, sondern nur als ein im Gedanken bezogenes—so ist auch nicht die Tatsache als solche, sondern nur das auf das Zeichen gegründete Urteil zu beachten, und dieses ist ein Gegenwärtiges'. The same condition is mentioned in the definition of '*illa* by Ibn al-Anbārī (Lum. 54, 9-10). This is consistent with the opinion that words are signs of the things (*simāt*), and that these signs are conventional. Cf. the following note and below, chapter IX. The relation between '*illa* and *ma'lūl* is also explained by al-Ǧubbā'ī, ap. Aš'arī, Maq. 390 and by 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, Muġnī, 4, 313; cf. Frank, 1967, 251.

[33] This reminds us of Plato, Crat. 384 D: 'It seems to me that whatever name one gives to somebody, that will be his right name, and if you then give him another name and call him no longer by the first one, then, the second name will be no less true than the first one'. (Hermogenes is speaking) [G40]; cf. Amm. comment. in Aristot. de interpret. 20, 18 (*hē tōn onomátōn metáthesis*). The opposite opinion is found in those theological writings which defend the divine creation of the names, e.g. in Proklos (cf. Daniélou, 1956, 426): everything has its proper name given to it by God; the same is asserted in the Arabic world, e.g. by Ǧābir ibn Ḥayyān (cf. Kraus, 1942, 2, 257-8). For the influence of the *Cratylus* on Arabic theories concerning the origin of speech, cf. below, chapter IX.

[35] Rescher, 1966, 69-70; (*šay'*); 70 (*mauǧūd*); 80 (*ḥāl*). According to Rescher, one could say about the notion *ḥāl* that 'the circumstantial evidence points almost conclusively to a Stoic origin'. (l.c. 80, n. 37). On *ḥāl* also: van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 4. *Šay'* is defined by the theologians and the philosophers as 'that about which something can be said, and which can be designated' (*mā yaǧūzu an yuḫbara 'anhu wa-yaṣiḥḥu 'd-dalāla 'alaihi*) (cf. Ḥwār. Maf. 22, 14; Aš'arī, Maq. 161, 9-10; van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 4; 122). According to Rescher and van den Bergh the notion *šay'* is based on the Stoic *ti*, cf. below note 35.

[34] Cf. chapter VIII.

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in reality do exist.[35] This proof is provided by a quotation from the Qur'ān,[36] and by a fictitious example.

7. After the excursion about the non-existent things we are brought back to the main argument. The adversary concludes that the

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[35] Van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 62, n. 85.2. According to Stoic theory the highest genus of everything, corporeal or non-corporeal, existing or non-existent, is the *ti* (something) (cf. Rescher, 1966, 66-80; the quotations on page 78, note 31, from SVF are irrelevant, since they do not prove that the Stoics held anything like the aforementioned theory; we could refer to SVF 2, 117, 28-33 = Seneca, ep. 58, 15): 'The first genus seemed to some Stoics to be the 'something'; why this seemed so to them, I shall mention presently. In the universe, they say, there are things that exist, and things that do not exist. These non-existent things are nevertheless part of the universe as well, namely those things which occur to the mind, like Centaurs and Giants and anything else which, formed falsely by the imagination, starts to have a shape, though not a substance'. (*Primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur 'quid'; quare videatur subiiciam. In rerum, inquiunt, naturae quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt. Et haec autem, quae non sunt, rerum natura complectitur, quae animo succurrunt, tamquam Centauri, Gigantes et quicquid aliud falso cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit, quamvis non habeat substantiam*); cf. also Diokles Magnes ap. Diog. Laert. 7, 52 = SVF 2, 87. This theory on non-existent things formed part of the Mu'tazilite doctrine (Nader, 1956, 134-5; van Ess, 1966, 191-200; Bernand, 1972, 39-40) 'la positivité du néant'). According to several Mu'tazilites—among them 'Abbād ibn Sulaimān, al-Ḥayyāṭ (d. after 912/300), al-Ǧubbā'ī, and Abū Hāšim—non-existing things are already things with their own essence and attributes. Allāh can only provide them with the attribute of existence—this is the act of creating. It would appear that Stoic theory is at the root of this doctrine, rather than Aristotelian hylomorphism, where existence is preceded by the mere metaphysical possibility of future existence, not by a real essence (cf. Nader, 1956, 143-4 for a different opinion). Rescher does not provide any quotations for this theory outside the immediate reach of philosophy and logic. As we have seen, it could also be used in grammar, though doubtlessly with less profit than in Mu'tazilite theology.

[36] Qur'ān, 24/39: '... like a mirage in the plain; the thirsty man thinks that it is water, but when he comes to it, he does not find a thing' [A 69]. The example is traditional: Rāzī (Maf. 14, 7-8) mentions the difficulties raised by Muǧāhid ibn Ǧabr, a famous commentator on the Qur'ān (d. 722/104); cf. Sezgin, 1967, 1, 29. Muǧāhid found in this verse a contradiction between 'till he reaches it', which implies that it is something, and 'he finds out that it is nothing'. One proposal for a solution is to take *lā šay'* in the sense of *lā šay' nāfi'* (nothing useful), or to translate 'till he reaches the place of the clouds, and finds out that those clouds are nothing'. Zaǧǧāǧī mentions this solution, and another one according to which mirages are actually sunrays that glitter on the sand (Id. 57, 17-21). Another Qur'ānic example is mentioned by Rāzī, Maf. 2, 94, 6-10. For Zaǧǧāǧī's second example—that of a man we seem to recognize when we look at him from afar, but on approaching he turns out to be someone else—we refer to Suyūṭī (Muzh. 27, 19 - 28, 1) and to Rāzī (Maf. 1, 23, 21-4) where almost the same example is used, but another conclusion drawn from it, namely that meanings correlate with something in the mind, not with something in the outer world: when we imagine that we see someone we know, but on approaching him we have to change our opinion because he turns out to be someone else, the difference of the names which we have given to the object perceived by us does not prove that something non-existent was given a name, but it does prove, according to these authors, that names correlate with pictures in our mind (*suwar ḏihniyya*), not with objects outside us.

argument about the precedence of the *asmā'* over their *musammayāt* has been invalidated, so that there is no way to prove the precedence of the masdar over the verb by means of this argument.

Zaǧǧāǧī's answer is that we are not discussing the possibility of proving the priority of either *asmā'* or *musammayāt* in a semantic theory (or rather: an epistemological theory), but in terms of grammatical facts. The proof of the priority of the masdar is, therefore, reduced to the proof of the priority of the noun, grammatically speaking. *Ism al-fi'l* must be taken, not in the sense of *ism* vs. *musammā*, but of 'grammatical noun vs. grammatical verb'. There is a consensus that nouns are superior to verbs.[37]

There is another interesting remark:[38] according to Zaǧǧāǧī the theory of the adversary does not even prove that *asmā'* and *musammayāt* are coexistent. Zaǧǧāǧī does not explain in which way one could refute this argument of the adversary, because his intentions are only grammatical. But there is a chance that he means the theory that there are *ma'ānī* without an *ism*—which would prove the posteriority of the *asmā'*.[39]

We are left with the question of the identity of the adversary. We have already demonstrated in our introduction that logico-grammatical discussions like the one under discussion here are characteristic of the grammarians in Baghdad during the fourth century. They tried to defend the old theories of the two schools with new logical arguments. In our passage we encounter a very fine example: the adversary defends the Kūfan theory, but we cannot possibly consider him as a real 'Kūfan'.[40] Perhaps he was Ibn Kaisān, one of the teachers of Zaǧǧāǧī, who constantly switched between the two schools and often taught and defended Kūfan theories.[41] That he indeed held the Kūfan theory on this point of grammar is shown by his words in the commentary on Ibn as-Sikkīt's *Tahḏīb al-luġa*: 'The masdar which belongs to *fa''altu* is *taf'īl*; *fi''āl* also occurs, analogous to the expres-

[37] Cf. Zaǧǧ. Īḍ., ch. XI, pp. 83-4.

[38] Ib. 58, 6-8.

[39] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 24, 2-4: 'It is impossible for all substances to be named by expressions, because the substances are infinite. What is infinite cannot be determined by analysis, and what cannot be determined by analysis is prevented from receiving a name' [A 70]. Cf. Suy, Muzh. 1, 26 pen. - 27, 2 'Can every *ma'nā* have its *lafẓ*?'. On the infinity of things, cf. below, chapter VIII, note 73.

[40] But cf. above, note 29.

[41] Or Ibn Kaisān, cf. above, chapter VI, note 66.

sion *daḥraǧtuhu diḥrāǧan* (I rolled it down), because *fa''ala* and *fa'lala* have the same pattern with regard to vowels and vowelless consonants, and their masdars are formed in the same way, because of the resemblance in pattern'.[42] These words presuppose the dependency of the masdar on the verb, in so far as the masdar is said to be formed from the pattern of the verb, i.e., is said to be secondary to the verb.

Philosophical terms are also used in support of the thesis that some parts of speech are prior to other parts. We must, says Zaǧǧāǧī, distinguish between various meanings of the term 'prior'.[43] He then gives the example of a body and its colour: colour is an accident and *ipso facto* posterior to the body in which it inheres, because the elimination of the accidents does not eliminate the body itself.[44] Accidents can only exist in a body; thus, colour only has existence in a body,[45] although it may be thought of as being independent of the body.[46] On the other hand, there does not exist a body without colour. Nevertheless, we can say that bodies are prior to their accidents, and in the same sense we can also say that, for instance, nouns are prior to verbs. They always coexist, yet the agent is always prior to his action.[47] Another example is the coexistence of the male and the female principle,[48] which does not prevent us from saying that the male principle is prior.

After the writings of Aristotle had been translated, his definitions of noun and verb became commonplace in philosophical literature.[49] Apparently there were also grammarians who felt themselves attracted

[42] b. Sikk. Tahḏ. 566 c [A 71].

[43] Compare with this the discussions in Greek logical literature concerning the various meanings of *próteros*: Aristot. categ. 14 a 26 - 14 b 23; Joh. Dam., chapters 7; 13; 60.

[44] Cf. e.g. Joh. Dam., chapter 7, 2-3 = 13, 2-3; and below, note 88.

[45] Cf. e.g. Joh. Dam. 43, 19-21; 52, 77-81; colour is in a body, and not the other way round, ib. 4, 24-6; Aristot. categ. 1 a 28 'every colour is in a body' (*hápan gàr chrôma en sômati*).

[46] Van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 107; Bernand, 1972, 34; 1973, 51-2; Aš'arī, Maq. 392, 15-6; 569. Cf. Naẓẓām's theory on accidents (ap. Aš'arī, Maq., p. 362), according to which we cannot perceive anything except the colours, which are the bodies; no body is without a colour. According to the Mu'tazilites, substances and accidents were inseparably linked, cf. Nader, 1956, 158-60.

[47] Cf. above, note 22.

[48] Except in the case of the Qur'ānic account of the creation of Eve after Adam. This is the sort of reasoning we also find in the argument about the creation of speech: allowance is made for the Qur'anic account, but then, linguistic theory is developed independently, cf. below, chapter IX.

[49] On Aristotle's definitions: Steinthal, 1890², 1, 238-44; 261-2; Larkin, 1971, 28-33.

to these definitions, at least that is what transpires from Zaǧǧāǧī's remark quoted at the heading of this chapter about the Aristotelian definition. Zaǧǧāǧī himself tried to keep logic and grammar apart, but did not always succeed.

Aristotle defines the noun in the *Poetica*: 'A noun is a composite meaningful sound without time, no part of which is meaningful in itself',[50] and in the *De Interpretatione*: 'A noun is a conventional, meaningful sound without time, no part of which is meaningful when it is separated'.[51] The difference between the two definitions is explained by the different nature of the two texts: the *Poetica* deals with the various elements of speech, from the smallest (*stoicheia*) to the largest (*lógos*); one of the relevant properties of the nouns in this context is that nouns are composed of smaller elements, hence the attribute 'composite'.[52] The *De Interpretatione* on the other hand, emphasizes the fact that both nouns and verbs are part of a larger whole, the sentence (*lógos*), so that their being composite is not relevant. The *Poetica* does not deal with the nature of words and speech, but rather with the nature of style and literature; speech is treated here as *léxis*, i.e., as speech from a stylistic point of view. In this context it is not relevant that nouns are the product of a convention. The *De Interpretatione*, however, is concerned with the logical structure of thought, which is influenced by the conventional nature of speech, hence the statement that nouns are conventional (*katà sunthḗkēn*). Both definitions have in common that the noun is defined as a meaningful sound, whose parts do not have an independent meaning. These two characteristics are shared by the verb, the difference between the two being that nouns do not indicate time, whereas verbs do.

The definition from the *Poetica* is found in Mattā ibn Yūnus' translation;[53] the definition from the *De Interpretatione* is found in al-Fārābī's translation and commentary,[54] as well as in Ġazzālī's

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[50] Aristot. poet. 1457 a 11-2 [G 41]; on the linguistic chapter of the *Poetica*: Pagliaro, 1956; Scarpat, 1950; Morpurgo-Tagliabue, 1967.

[51] Aristot. de interpret. 16 a 19-20 [G 42].

[52] We agree with Steinthal (1890¹, 1, 253) that Gräfenhan's correction of *sunhetē* (intelligible) into *sunthetē* (composite) should be accepted, because the original form does not make sense. As an additional argument may be mentioned Ibn Rušd's translation (Ši'r, 31, 10) which presupposes a Greek *sunthetē*; cf. Fischer, 1964, 143-4 note.

[53] Badawi, 1953, 127, 12-3 [A 72].

[54] Fārābī, Šarḥ, 29, 1-2 [A 73].

Mi'yār.[55] Ġazzālī adds that this definition is 'according to the logicians' (*'alā šarṭ al-manṭiqiyyīn*). An abbreviated form of it is given by Ḥwārizmī,[56] and by Ibn Rušd in his translation.[57] A still shorter form is found in Fārābī's *Kitāb al-alfāẓ al-musta'mala fī 'l-manṭiq*, which leaves out the entire second part of the definition, so that only the difference between the nouns and the verbs remains, not those properties they have in common.[58]

There are also a few additions in the Arabic translations of Aristotle's definitions. Fārābī, Ibn Rušd, Ḥwārizmī, and Ġazzālī[59] add that nouns are single (*mufrad*) words. This marks the difference between them and phrases, which consist of more than one word, a difference which is also found in Aristotle's *Categoriae*: 'Some expressions are uttered with a combination of words, other expressions without such a combination. The composite expressions: for instance "man runs", "man conquers"; the single expressions: for instance "man", "cow", "runs", "conquers"'.[60] Besides, Ġazzālī says that nouns are 'definite' (*muḥaṣṣal*),[61] perhaps a reminiscence of Aristotle's distinction between definite and indefinite (*aórista*) words.[62]

Zaǧǧāǧī's version of the definition—'a noun is an invented sound with a conventional meaning, not connected with time'[63]—is clearly based on the definition from the *De Interpretatione*, because he mentions the fact that nouns are conventional (*bi-'ttifāq*).[64] We must keep in mind that the *De Interpretatione* was already translated at an early time by Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain, whereas the *Poetica* was translated only later by Mattā ibn Yūnus.[65] The meaning of Zaǧǧāǧī's additional remark that words are invented (*mauḍū'*) is explained by Ġazzālī's discussion about the invention (*waḍ'*) of names by parents for their

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[55] Ġazz. Mi'yār, 41, 11-2; almost identical with Ibn Sīnā's definition, 'Ibāra, 7, 4-5 [A 74].

[56] Ḥwār. Maf. 145, 9-10 [A 75].

[57] b. Rušd, Ši'r, 236, 5-6 [A 76].

[58] Far. Alf. 41, 13-4 [A 77].

[59] In another version of the definition, Mi'yār, 42, 15-7.

[60] Aristot. categ. 1 a 16-9 [G 43].

[61] Cf. Ġazz., Mi'yār, 42, 15-7.

[62] Aristot. de interpret. 16 a 29-30: 'The expression "not-man" is not a noun, there does not even exist a name to denote it—for it is neither a sentence nor a negative judgment—, but let us call it an indefinite noun' [G 44]. *Ónoma aóriston* is translated by Fārābī (Šarḥ, 32, 3) as *ism ġair muḥaṣṣal*.

[63] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 48, 10-1 [A 78].

[64] The normal translation of *katà sunthḗkēn* is *bi-tawāṭu'*, cf. Loucel, 1963, 254-5 (23-4).

[65] Badawi, 1968, 76; 78.

children.[66] The Arabic term *waḍ'*, just like its Greek parallel *thésis* indicates the human creation of a name.[67] This is in accordance with the conventional nature of the nouns, as held by Aristotle and by the Arabic logicians as his successors.

Zaǧǧāǧī mentions another variant of the Aristotelian definition of the noun—'a noun is an invented sound with a conventional meaning without time, whose parts do not participate in its meaning'[68]—, which includes its second part (the constituent elements of a noun do not possess an independent meaning). We may compare with this the two versions of the same definition given by Fārābī in his commentary and in the *Kitāb al-alfāz*. On the whole, we believe that Fārābī was Zaǧǧāǧī's primary source for the logical definitions, probably through Ibn as-Sarrāǧ, his pupil and Zaǧǧāǧī's teacher.[69]

There is still another version of the logical definition in grammatical literature, namely the one mentioned by Sīrāfī[70] and Ibn al-Anbārī.[71] This version is characterized by the term *iqtirān* (combination, sc. with time).[72] Another group of definitions stress the fact that nouns do not denote time, thus setting the nouns apart from the verbs, for instance Zaǧǧāǧ's definition.[73] These are related to Fārābī's second variant in the *Kitāb al-alfāz*.

Arabic grammarians usually define the verb morphologically, i.e. they list those of its morphological properties that mark it as different from the noun and the particle.[74] Sometimes, they give a syntactic definition, which emphasizes the function of the verb as predicate of a sentence, itself unable to receive a predicate.[75] In the *De Interpretatione* Aristotle defines the verb as follows: 'A verb is (a word) which also indicates time (*prossèmainei*); none of its parts has a signification of its own. It is the sign of things which are predicated about some-

66 Ġazz. Asmā', 6, 11-4.

67 E.g. scholia D.T. 130, 16 *títhetai katá* as compared with the Arabic *waḍi'a 'alā*; cf. below, chapter IX, note 61.

68 Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 49, 6-7 [A79].

69 Cf. above, chapter VI, note 57.

70 Sīr. Šarḥ al-Kitāb, 1, 7 [A80], quoted by Mubārak, in his edition of the *Īḍāḥ*, p. 49, note 1. Almost the same definition is ascribed to Ibn as-Sarrāǧ by al-'Ukbarī, Mas. 44, 1-2, but this is probably an error on his part (cf. the editor's remark in his introduction to the edition, pp. 18-9).

71 b. Anb. Asr. 5, 18-9 [A81].

72 Cf. Zam. Muf. 4, 19-20, also quoted by Rāzī, Maf. 1, 34, 24-5 [A82].

73 Zaǧǧāǧ ap. b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 51, 2-3; cf. Rāzī, Maf. 1, 35, 9-10.

74 Cf. above, chapter III, B.

75 Cf. above, chapter III, B

thing else'.[76] In the *Poetica* the predicative function of the verb is not mentioned: 'A verb is a composite, meaningful sound with time, no part of which is meaningful in itself'.[77] We should not regard 'time' in this context as a morphological property, but as a property of the meaning signified by the verb. In the translations of the *De Interpretatione* definition by Ḥwārizmī and Fārābī, the term *prossèmainei* has been divided into two parts: the verb signifies some meaning (*dalla 'alā ma'nan*) and it also signifies the time of that meaning (*zamān hāḍā 'l-ma'nā*).[78] This is also found in the definition given by Ġazzālī, who adds that the verb does not signify time in general, but the time of the meaning signified by it (this marks the difference between verb and temporal adverb).[79] In Zaǧǧāǧī's definition—'the verb is what signifies an event and a past or future time'[80]—we find the influence of the Aristotelian definition, though with a significant change: the term 'meaning' has been replaced by 'action' (*hadaṭ*). The verb is now described as a word which signifies action and the time of that action. Perhaps this change was a reference to Sībawaihi, who wrote that verbs are the expression of 'the actions of the nouns' (*ahdāṭ al-asmā'*).[81] This is also the case in the definitions given by Zamaḥšarī and by Rāzī.[82]

In Greek grammar the situation is as follows: Dionysios Thrax defines the verb according to its morphological properties: 'The verb is an undeclined word which can receive tenses, persons, and numbers, and which expresses an action (*enérgeia*) or a passion (*páthos*)'.[83] This definition has been imitated by other authors, including Apollonios Dyskolos. Apollonios adds, however, that morphological properties are not essential for the verb: the most characteristic feature of the verb is that it signifies an action (*prâgma*). Only thus can we include

76 Aristot. de interpret. 16 b 6-7 [G45].

77 Aristot. poet. 1457 a 14-5 [G46].

78 Ḥwār. Maf. 145, 12-3 [A83]; Far. Šarḥ, 33, 1-3 [A84]; cf. also Far. Alf. 41, 15 - 42, 1; the *Poetica*-definition is translated by Mattā ibn Yūnus, Badawī, 1953, 128, 3-6 [A85]; cf. Ibn Rušd, Ši'r, 236, 9-11 [A86].

79 Ġazz. Mi'yār, 42, 17 - 43, 1: 'The verb (*kalima*) is a single expression which signifies a meaning, and the time in which that meaning exists ...' [A87].

80 Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 52 ult [A88].

81 Cf. above, chapter III A.

82 Zam. Muf. 108, 6: 'The verb is what signifies the combination of an action with time ...' [A89], quoted by Rāzī, Maf. 1, 36, 11; cf. also Rāzī, Maf. 1, 36, line 9 from below: 'The verb is a word which signifies the inhering of a masdar in an indefinite thing during a definite time' [A90].

83 Dion. Thr. 46, 4-5 [G47].

the infinitive in our definition of the verb. The rest of the properties is accidental (*sumparhepómena*).[84] Probably, this emphasis on the *prâgma* as essential meaning of the verb in later Greek grammar is responsible for the replacement of *ma'nā* by *ḥadaṯ* in the Arabic definitions of the verb in grammatical writing. It is significant that *ma'nā* retained its place in philosophical definitions.

Both in Greek and in Arabic grammar the need was felt to make a hierarchical classification of the parts of speech. As speech was considered the reflection of rational thought, which in its turn reflects the rational order in the cosmos—this was commonly thought by all grammarians, whether they held *phúsei* or *thései*, *tawqīf* or *iṣṭilāḥ*—, one could not accept that each part of speech was to occupy the same place in hierarchy, and that it was to have the same rights as the other parts.[85] Apollonios Dyskolos justifies his search for hierarchy with the argument that once one accepts the hierarchical principle for the letters of the alphabet, one cannot agree with those who assume that the order of grammatical elements is determined entirely by accident.[86] This demonstrates the necessity for a grammarian to make rules for every part of grammar, and to explain every linguistic phenomenon. In this respect Greek and Arabic grammar resembled each other very much.

When we analyse Apollonios' arguments for the priority of the noun, before the verb and the other parts of speech, together with the arguments found in the scholia on Dionysios Thrax and in other grammatical works,[87] we find that nouns are prior to verbs because:

1. nouns denote substances (*ousia*), verbs accidents (*sumbebēkós*); substance is prior to accident.[88]

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[84] Steinthal, 1891², 2, 267 sqq.

[85] Apoll. Dysk. synt. pp. 15-6.

[86] The word *martaba* indicates the place a word occupies within the hierarchical system of Arabic grammar; originally it means 'step', 'rank', 'degree'; it may also indicate the elevation that serves as a seat. In 'Abbāsid society *martaba* (or *rutba*) means the place one occupies at a feast. A strict order was observed as to who had the right to occupy which place, so that *martaba* became the place (*manzila*) one occupies in the social hierarchy of high society. Cf. Sadan, 1973.

[87] In the following texts arguments are given for the priority of the nouns: 1. Apoll. Dysk. synt. 18, 5-8; 2. id. ib. 19, 24 sqq.; 3. scholia D.T., 71, 5-6; 4. ib. 216, 8-10; 5. ib. 244, 5-7; 6. ib. 358, 11 sqq.; 7. ib. 359, 21-3; 8. ib. 360, 13-4; 9. ib. 521, 13-20; 10. ib. 515, 15-8; 11. ib. 522, 21-33; 12. Choirob. 1, 105, 2 sqq.; 13. id. 2, 2, 22 sqq.; 14. id. 2, 3, 6 sqq.; 15. Sophr. 376, 4 - 377, 8; 16. (Ps.)-Theodosios, ed. Göttling, p. 136; 17. Gregorios of Corinth, 4 + 7; 18. Amm. in Aristot. de interpret. 102, 34 ed. Busse.

[88] In texts: 9, 10, 12, 13, 15.

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2. nouns indicate the existence of things, verbs the actions and the vicissitudes of those things; the person who acts is always prior to his action.[89]

3. nouns and verbs have the same logical proportion as *génos* and *eîdos*: if the agent is abolished, the action is abolished as well, while the reverse is not true (*sunanhaireîn*);[90] the action presupposes the agent, while the reverse is not true (*suneisphéreîn = sunnoeîn*);[91] the action is performed by the agent, while the reverse is not true (*apoteleîn*).[92]

4. the word for 'noun', *ónoma*, is also used for 'word' in general.[93]

5. noun and verb are the only essential parts of speech, since it is impossible to make a complete sentence without them. In certain cases, however, two nouns suffice to constitute a complete sentence, when the verb 'to be' is understood. A verb without a noun is always incomplete.[94]

From Arabic grammatical literature the following parallel passages may be quoted:

ad 1. For this purely logical argument we have to turn to the logical writings about grammar, e.g. Rāzī: 'The noun is a word that signifies the essence, and the verb is a word that signifies the inhering in this essence of something at a certain time'.[95] Here the verb is defined as an accident of the essences signified by the nouns. Hebrew grammarians used the same argument.[96]

ad 2. This is the main non-syntactic argument for the priority of the noun in grammatical literature. We find it for instance with Zaǧǧāǧī, who also uses it in his chapter on the priority of the

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[89] In texts: 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 18.

[90] For the meaning of this term : Aristot. top. 141 b 28; categ. 7 b 38, and cf. above, note 42.

[91] For these terms: Choirob. 2, 3, 15.

[92] In texts: 6, 9, 13, 15.

[93] In texts: 1, 6, 11.

[94] In text 17; cf. Donnet, 1967, 151-3 for further examples. We may compare with this argument a Stoic text, SVF 2, 181: 'The Stoics say that some meanings (*lektá*) are independent, and some are incomplete; incomplete are those meanings that have a disconnected form, e.g. *gráphei* (writes), because we ask "who?"' [G 48]. Some verbs do not have an expressed subject, namely verbs in the first and the second person, scholia D.T. 57, 12 sqq.

[95] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 111, 2 sqq [A 91].

[96] Cf. Ḳimḥi, Mikhlol, p. 10 (transl.) and note 4.

masdar;[97] it is, moreover, the argument that underlies his defini-
tion of the noun.[98]

ad 3. The comparison of the relation between noun and verb with the
relation between *génos* and *eidos* is found, though not explicitly,
in the argument of al-Kisā'ī, al-Farrā', and Hišām: 'The noun
is lighter than the verb, because the noun is included in the
verb, whereas the verb is not included in the noun'.[99] We may
also point to Rāzī's remark: 'It is impossible to use the verb
without connecting it with the agent, ..., although we can use
the expression for the agent without connecting it with the
verb'.[100]

ad 4. Although the term *ism* is used also for 'word' in general, the
argument drawn from this use in Greek grammatical literature
is not proposed, as far as we know, by any Arabic grammarian.

ad 5. This argument is very important. Only nouns can form a com-
plete sentence without the help of any other part of speech, but
verbs cannot do this.[101] (The term used to translate the Greek
term *autotelès* in this context is *mufīd*[102]). Verbs, even in the
first or the second person, always need a subject, which is in
Arabic expressed by the suffix; this suffix is equivalent to a
noun.[103] As for the verb in the third person, we never know
who is its agent until the noun is mentioned.[104]

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[97] Cf. above, chapter III C.

[98] Cf. above, chapter III A.

[99] Ap. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 101, 3-4; the verb *istatara* in this quotation is equivalent to the
Greek verb *suneisphérein* [A 92].

[100] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 111, 7-8 [A 93]; cf. the argument connected with *sunanhairein*,
above.

[101] Sīb. Kit. 1, 6, 11-2; b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 1, 41, 13 sqq.; b. Anb. Inṣ. 103, 13 sqq.; id.
Asr. p. 9; Rāzī, Maf. 1, 111, 2 sqq.; cf. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 100, 3-5, where this argument is used in
the discussion about the lightness of the nouns as compared with the heaviness of the
verbs; cf. Gabučan, 1972, 31.

[102] Cf. above, chapter II.

[103] Cf. e.g. b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 20, 10 sqq. for the verbal forms *qumtu* and *qāma*: the first
form, 'I stood up', contains a pronoun with a phonetic expression, in the second form,
'he stood up', the pronoun is understood and does not have a phonetic expression.
Pronouns are included in the category of the nouns, cf. above, chapter III A, note 93.
The verbal forms in the first person were analysed differently in Greek grammar, cf.
above, note 94.

[104] Cf. Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 100, 3-5 with text 17 (Gregorios).

There are two additional arguments:

1. Nouns only signify a nominatum, whereas verbs have to signify
an agent, one or more objects, the masdar, the time and the place
of the action, and the condition of the agent (*ḥāl*).[105] Nouns are,
therefore, lighter than verbs, and thus, prior to them. The same
fact is mentioned by (Ps.-) Theodosios, but in order to defend the
priority of the verb: 'The verb has even something more than the
noun. The noun signifies only the thing (sc. the nominatum), but
the verb signifies something more, e.g., *légō* (I say) indicates the
action in itself, in this case (the action of) saying, but, moreover,
it signifies the time ...'.[106]

2. The Baṣrians used still another argument, which was stated in
terms of the syntactic ability to serve as the subject and/or the
predicate of a sentence.[107]

Subject and nominal predicate, says Zaǧǧāǧī, are substances or
accidents represented in speech by their names.[108] But we also define
them as those words to which we may apply specifically nominal
ideas (*ma'ānī*), such as attributes, prohibitions, or vocatives. In other
words, subject and predicate (*al-muḥbar 'anhu wa-'l-muḥbar bihī*) are
terms which may stand for something in the outer world, or, in
metalanguage, for those words which represent them (*al-ism an-nā'ib
'an al-musammā*), and which are characterized by the nominal ideas
they may receive (*al-ma'ānī allatī ta'tawīruhā*). What is meant by
'nominal ideas'? In order to understand this we must consult the
Greek data.

Protagoras the Sophist (5th century B.C.) was the first to speak
about classes of sentences: he distinguished between four 'pillars of
speech' (*puthménes lógōn*), viz., wish, question, answer, and com-
mand.[109] According to Koller this division was the result of his
rhetorical studies,[110] and actually we find in Aristotle's writings that
there is only one sort of sentence that can constitute the subject of
logical studies: the simple true-or-false judgment (*apóphasis*, Aussage).
All other sorts of sentences such as command, wish, question, etc.,

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[105] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 50, 15-6; Ta'lab, Maǧ. pp. 266-7; Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 101, 1-2.

[106] On the notion *consignificare*: Pinborg, 1967, 30 sqq. The quotation is from
(Ps.-) Theodosios, ed. Göttling, p. 136; cf. Steinthal, 1891², 2, 236 [G 49].

[107] Cf above, chapter III A, note 82; III B, note 33.

[108] Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 42, 14 sqq.

[109] Cf. Radermacher, 1951, p. 38, frg. 10.

[110] Koller, 1958.

belong to the art of rhetoric,[111] since they cannot be subjected to the test of truth or falseness.[112] This logical doctrine was then constantly repeated by the commentators, who mostly distinguished between five sorts of speech (judgment, command, wish, question, invocation)[113] On the other hand, we find that in grammar the Aristotelian classification turned into a genuinely grammatical one, and almost coincided with the division into grammatical moods: the 'wish' became an optative, the 'command' an imperative, and so on.[114] Apollonios Dyskolos tells us of these moods (*enkliseis*) that they are 'mental conditions' (*psuchikaì diathéseis*) with regard to the action or with regard to another person. Here we find expressed for the first time that the verbal mood is not only a verbal form, but that it is a verbal form which is connected with the state of mind of the acting subject.[115] This explains to a large degree why Zaǧǧāǧī connects the nouns (i.e., the representatives of acting bodies) with the 'nominal meanings/ideas'. The Stoa put the same Aristotelian division to another use, namely a division into ten sorts of speech, or rather, ten sorts of 'independent meanings' (*lektà autotelē*).[116]

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[111] Aristot. de interpret. 17 a 1 sqq.: 'Not every (utterance) is categorical, but only when it contains truth or falseness, which is not contained in every utterance: for instance, a prayer is an utterance, but it is neither true nor false. All other (utterances than the categorical) must be left aside, because they belong rather to the study of rhetoric or literary theory, whereas the categorical utterances belong to the present study' [G 50]. Cf. Coseriu, 1970, 74-5; 77-8.

[112] For the definition of the categorical utterance or sentence: cf. above, chapter III C.

[113] *Apophantikón, prostaktikón, euktikón, erôtêmatikón, klêtikón*, respectively, cf. Koller, 1958, 23. The number of five classes of sentences is also given by Ammonios, cf. below, note 118.

[114] Steinthal, 1891², 2, 272-91. The subjunctive constituted the main problem in the attempts to transform the Aristotelian division into a grammatical system. The same confusion of *enkliseis* and classes of sentences was taken over by the Syriac grammarian Jacob of Edessa, cf. Merx, 1889, 249-50.

[115] Apoll. Dysk. synt. 44, 9 - 45, 3 (the question is why the infinitive does not possess person, number, or mood): 'It seems to me, therefore, that those who inquire why the infinitive lacks person, number, mood, act absurdly, since it (sc. the infinitive) is not plural, every action being singular. Moreover, it does not possess a mental condition (*psuchikê diáthesis*), since it has no inflection to indicate the various persons, and only persons, being rational, can proclaim their own condition of mind. Thus, even the verb itself does not possess originally person and number. But when it is used about a person, then it must also distinguish between those persons, which are singular, dual, or plural, besides. Consequently, it (sc. the infinitive) cannot possess a mental condition, just as we have said before' [G 51].

[116] These ten classes are enumerated by Sextus Empiricus, adv. math. 8, 70 = SVF 2, 187, and by Diogenes Laertios 7, 66 = SVF 2, 186; they are the classes of those *lektá* which produce an independent meaning (for the *lektón*: below, chapter X).

Returning to the Arabic world we notice in the first place the influence exercised by the commentaries on Aristotle's writings, for instance in Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.[117] Fārābī reproduces almost exactly the five categories of the Peripatos: judgment about truth or falseness (*qaul ǧāzim*), command (*amr*), question (*ṭalb*), request (*taḍarru'*), invocation (*nidā'*). That Arabic scholars were still aware of the Greek doctrine, is also proved by a statement of the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā' that according to some people there are six, according to others ten, sorts of sentence: this corresponds to a remark of Ammonios that the Peripatos recognized five, but the Stoa ten, sorts of sentence. We must take into account that Arabic authors usually distinguished between a negative command (*nahy*), and a positive one (*amr*).[118] The Brethren themselves recognized only: judgment, question, command, and prohibition, so that 'wish' and 'invocation' are missing.[119] These last two categories do figure in Ibn Ḥazm's list: judgment (*ḫabar*), wish or prayer (*du'ā'*), question (*istifhām*), command (*amr*); Ibn Ḥazm, however, does not distinguish between a positive and a negative command.[120] His term for the categories of sentences is 'elements of speech' (*'anāṣir al-kalām*).[121]

As for Zaǧǧāǧī, his list—command (*amr*), prohibition (*nahy*), invocation (*nidā'*), attribute (*na't*)—is not intended to be exhaustive. We notice especially the absence of the category 'judgment', but perhaps the 'attribute' (*na't* = *ṣifa*?)[122] should be considered the equivalent of *ḫabar*—the term *ḫabar* is indeed used a few lines later in the sense of 'verb', 'verbal predicate'.

That the categories of sentences are called 'meanings/ideas' (*ma'ānī*) which characterize the nouns, could be explained by the Stoic use of

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[117] Far. Šarḥ, pp. 51-2; b. Sīnā, 'Ibāra, 31, 8-15. In Syriac logic/grammar we find this division into five classes of sentences with Johannes bar Zu'bi (13th/7th century); Merx, 1889, 163.

[118] Rasā'il Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā', 3, 119-20; cf. Ammonios' remark, SVF, 2, 189: '... so that he (sc. Aristotle) does not deal here with every utterance: not with the wish, nor with the command, nor with any other utterance, either from the five according to the Peripatos, or from the ten according to the Stoa, but only with the categorical' [G 52].

[119] Rasā'il, 3, 119, pen: categorical speech (*ḫabar*), question (*istiḫbār*), command (*amr*), prohibition (*nahy*).

[120] b. Ḥazm, Iḫk. 1, 265, 9-10.

[121] Arnaldez, 1956, 50, n. 1; 'Abd al-Ǧabbār (Muǧnī, 7, 3, 8) uses the expression *aqsām al-kalām* (sorts of speech; in this context it cannot mean 'parts of speech', cf. ib. 7, 50, 12 *aqsām wa-ḍurūb*, e.g. *ḫabar, amr, nahy*). The term brings to mind the Greek *eidè toù lógou*.

[122] Cf. above, chapter III A. On *na't*: Diem, 1970, 315.

the word *lektá* in this context, and also by comparison with Apollonios Dyskolos' doctrine, inasmuch as the categories of the sentences represent a mental state of the acting subject; a command, a wish, etc., always presuppose an acting and thinking subject.

THE MU'TAZILA

'Speech is made by a speaker, for he produces it, while before it did not exist; therefore, it is an action on his part'. [1]

According to Ibn al-Anbārī, Rummānī wrote about grammar and logic 'in a Mu'tazilite way' ('alā maḏhab al-mu'tazila), [2] which seems to imply that there existed some sort of Mu'tazilite tradition in grammar. There must have been a specifically Mu'tazilite method and style of writing. We would, of course, be wrong in calling every Mu'tazilite grammarian a professional logician. In this respect Fleisch is quite right when he says: 'Dans quelle mesure des grammairiens ont-ils reçu une formation philosophique, ceci n'a pas encore été précisé. D'al-Aḫfaš al-Awsaṭ (m. 830/215), disciple de Sībawaihi, as-Suyūṭī (Buġya, p. 158, l. 7) rapporte qu'il était mu'tazilite ... Mais l'indication n'est pas suffisante pour en faire un philosophe'. [3] On the other hand, it is more than likely that a grammarian who was at the same time Mu'tazilite, tended to write about language from a logical point of view, considering the data about the aforementioned grammarians. We can also refer to the Kūfan grammarian al-Farrā' (d. 822/207), who was a Mu'tazilite and at the same time was known for his fondness of using logical and philosophical terms in his writings. [4] Perhaps we can identify this Mu'tazilite method with that of the 'linguistic philosophers' (falāsifat an-naḥwiyyīn), a name which indicates those scholars who occupied themselves with the difference between logic and grammar. This group of grammarians must have been closely connected with al-Fārābī, who stands out as one of the principal sources for the knowledge of Greek logic among the Arabs. [5]

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[1] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 43, 10-1 [A94].

[2] b. Anb. Nuzha, 189, 10-1; according to Nyberg (EI², 790-1, s.v. Mu'tazila) the Mu'tazilites introduced the strictly grammatical method; he also notes the very close connection between them and the philological school of Baṣra.

[3] Fleisch, 1961, 25, n. 1.

[4] Suy. Buġya, 2, 333 sqq.

[5] Cf. above, chapter VII, note 6. That these Mu'tazilite grammarians may be treated as a group is also confirmed by the fact that there existed a special biography of the

As for the number of grammarians who belonged to the Mu'tazila, it must have been considerable. The following grammarians are said to have held Mu'tazilite views: Abū 'Amr ibn al-'Alā' (d. 770/154);[6] 'Īsā ibn 'Umar (d. 766/149);[7] al-Ḫalīl (d. 791/175);[8] Sībawaihi (d. 793/177);[9] al-Aḫfaš al-Awsaṭ (d. 830/215);[10] al-Farrā' (d. 822/207);[11] Quṭrub (d. 821/206);[12] al-Māzinī (d. 863/249);[13] al-Mubarrad (d. 898/285);[14] al-Fārisī (d. 987/377);[15] Ibn Ǧinnī (d. 1002/392);[16] as-Sīrāfī (d. 979/368);[17] ar-Rummānī (d. 994/384).[18] Doubtlessly, Zaǧǧā-ǧī also belonged to the Mu'tazilite grammarians, as may be inferred from the Īḍāḥ.[19] Even if we allow for a certain unreliability of our sources, especially about the earlier grammarians, there still remains a respectable number of names mentioned in connection with the Mu'ta-zila.

We shall see in chapter IX that the Mu'tazila played an important part in the development of the theories about origin and nature of speech. Their preoccupation with this and similar subjects is partly due to their main dogma, the creation of the Qur'ān, partly the result of their interest in logic. We may say that this interest in logic led them to study the differences and the similarities between the two disciplines of logic and grammar—a very popular topic in the discussions of the 9th/3rd and the 10th/4th century, as we have seen above. Thanks to the Mu'tazila or to the Mu'tazilite grammarians, grammar became more preoccupied with the rationalization of gram-

nuḥāt al-mu'tazila—this is mentioned by Suyūṭī, Buġya, 1, 527, 18, in the biography of a certain Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Būrānī an-Naḥwī, cf. Mubārak, 1963, 241, n. As to the connections between the Mu'tazila and Ma'mūn's Bait al-ḥikma: Eche, 1967, 48-54; on Ma'mūn's religious policy: Sourdel, 1962.

[6] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 80, 9.
[7] b. Murt. Ṭab. 131.
[8] Id. ib.
[9] Id. ib.
[10] Id. ib.; 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, Muġnī, 7, 218, 7; Suy. Buġya, 1, 590-1.
[11] Suy. Buġya, 2, 333, 7.
[12] b. Murt. Ṭab. 131; b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 3, 255, 7 sqq.; 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, Muġnī, 7, 218, 7.
[13] Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 294, 5-6 ??; cf. 'Ubaidī, 1967, 60-7, especially p. 66.
[14] b. Murt. Ṭab. 131; 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, Muġnī, 7, 218, 7.
[15] Suy. Buġya, 1, 496; id. Muzh. 1, 7, 10-1; b. Murt. Ṭab. 131.
[16] b. Murt. Ṭab, 131; Suy. Muzh. 1, 7, 10-1; id. Ašbāh, 1, 338; cf. Naǧǧār in his introduction to the Ḫaṣā'iṣ, pp. 42-3, for further reference.
[17] b. Anb. Nuzha, 184, 15; b. Murt. Ṭab. 131.
[18] b. Anb. Nuzha, 189, 11; cf. above, chapter VI, note 11.
[19] This may be inferred from his words that speech is an act of the speaker and not created by Allāh (cf. Id. 43, 16-7) and from his opinion about the ism and its musammā (cf. Id. 43, 11-2).

matical methods.[20] The attitude of many scholars towards logic and the logical element in grammar may be deduced from their views about the use of analogy (qiyās).[21] At first there was a strong opposition against the use of the 'causal analogy' (qiyās al-'illa), in which the conclusion arrived at by analogy follows necessarily and inevitably from the premisses.[22] For the orthodox this amounted to blasphemy, since it implied a restriction of the omnipotence of Allāh. The most outspoken on the subject were the Mu'tazilites who held the existence of causality in nature, that is: natural phenomena happen as the result of natural laws which have been instituted by Allāh. According to the orthodox theologians, things happen in nature because Allāh wishes them to happen. Applied to analogy this means that the conclusion of a reasoning is true not because of the validity of the logical principles concerned, but because of the will of Allāh, Who in this case permits the conclusion to be true always, although He could change that truth if He wanted to.

In speech we find causality—at least according to the Mu'tazilite grammarians—in the theory about the 'determinants' ('awāmil): the different endings of nouns and verbs in the declension are caused not by Allāh, but by the speaking subject.[23] Grammarians distinguish between 'āmil lafẓī and 'āmil ma'nawī, but according to Ibn Ǧinnī this does not imply that the words themselves, present or absent in the sentence, cause the endings: it only means that sometimes our action, which causes the endings, is accompanied by a visible sign, and sometimes it is not. Man himself is the real 'āmil, not only in the declension, but also with regard to speech in general: hence the typically Mu'tazilite statement that speech is an act of the speaker. So we find in al-Ǧubbā'ī (d. 915/303), teacher of the theologian al-Aš'arī and the grammarian as-Sīrāfī: '(Allāh) utters the speech which He creates in a substrate. But real speech ... is articulated sounds and letters (i.e. consonants) in a certain order. The real speaker is he who

[20] We also point to Zaǧǧāǧī's insistence that every statement about speech be proved rationally, cf. Id. 41, 16- 42, 10.
[21] Brunschvig, 1970.
[22] Cf. above, chapter IV; Frank, 1966.
[23] Maḥzūmī, 1958, 264-6; cf. b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 1, 109-10. Zaǧǧāǧī does not say explicitly that man is the 'āmil of the declension, as Ibn Ǧinnī says, but it seems to be evident from his remarks on the use of the declension and its introduction into speech that in his opinion man provides words with the endings of the cases (Id. 69, 8- 70, 2). This conforms to the Mu'tazilite doctrine on the human origin of speech, cf. below, chapter IX.

creates speech, and not he who is its substrate'.[24] Everything turns on the question what we intend by giving a person the attribute *mutakallim* (speaking). The connection between this question and the problem of the creation of the Qur'ān may be studied in the seventh book of 'Abd al-Ğabbār's *Muġnī fī abwāb at-tauḥīd wa-'l-'adl*, which deals with the *Ḥalq al-Qur'ān*, especially in the chapter which is entitled 'On the fact that the real condition of the speaker is that he brings speech into being by himself, in accordance with his intention and his will'.[25] 'Abd al-Ğabbār begins by reasoning with one of his characteristic grammatical arguments: according to grammatical rules the meaning of the expression *huwa mutakallim* (he is speaking) is *fa'ala 'l-kalām* (he made speech), just as we say *huwa ḍārib* (he is hitting), i.e. *fa'ala 'd-ḍarb* (he made blows). The grammarians, however, are not competent to judge whether a person really creates his act, whether he is its *muḥdiṯ* (creator, innovator): grammarians are not able to say anything about the theological implications of the verb *fa'ala*. But, leaving the grammatical facts for what they are worth, we may indeed conclude by way of logical reasoning that that person does create his act. Most certainly the grammarians would also reach this conclusion, if only they would use the method of logical reasoning. It follows that we must accept the literal text of the Qur'ān where it says that Allāh is speaking. We must conclude from this text that He is really speaking,[26] that He really makes His speech—which means that the Qur'ān is created. On the other hand, when Allāh creates speech in a person, we cannot say that that person is speaking, by virtue of the creation of speech into him, because he does not really produce his speech himself. But when we are reciting the Qur'ān, it is our own action, and we ourselves are creating speech—this speech being an imitation of Allāh's words.[27] We may compare with this a quotation by Zaġġāġī : 'speech is made by a speaker, for he produces

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[24] Ap. Sahrastānī, Milal, 1, 54, 15-7 [A95]; cf. Bouman, 1959, 25; Frank, 1966, 24-5.
[25] 'Abd al-Ğabbār, Muġnī, 7, 48 sqq [A96]. *Mutakallim* is not used in the Qur'ān, but cf. e.g. 4/164; for the creation of the Qur'ān: Nader, 1956, 99-113.

[26] The same sort of reasoning with the Ḥanbalite Ibn al-'Aqīl (about 1095/490), who uses it in order to prove that Allāh really speaks with audible sounds (against the Aš'arite doctrine), Rasā'il, pp. 22-3.

[27] On the recitation of the Qur'ān being an imitation of Allāh's words: Bouman, 1959, 15; 24; on the Aš'arite point of view: b. 'Aqīl, Rasā'il, 22, 18-20: 'According to them (sc. the Aš'arites), the recitation and the reading and the writing (sc. of the Qur'ān) are created. But the Qur'ān itself is an attribute which resides in the mind of the speaker, not perceptible to the senses of the believer, and the sounds and the letters are only an imitation of it' [A97].

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it, while before it did not exist; therefore, it is an action on his part',[28] in other words, the speaker creates his speech.

We find the same linguistic reasoning in Ibn Ğinnī in a polemic with Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Aḥfaš : 'Do you not see that each of us when he is speaking, only deserves that attribute (sc. the attribute "speaking") by virtue of his own speaking, not by virtue of something else, or by virtue of His creating speech in his instrument of articulation. He would not be speaking (sc. he would not deserve the attribute "speaking"), unless he moved his own articulatory organs'.[29] Returning to Zaġġāġī, we notice that he talks about this originally theological thesis, because it has been used by an adversary to attack the usual classification of the parts of speech. For, the adversary says, if every word is an action (*fi'l*) on the part of the speaker, why then do the grammarians distinguish between *asmā'*, *af'āl* and *ḥurūf*? Zaġġāġī agrees with the theological thesis, but according to him, it cannot be used as an argument against the usual classification of the parts of speech because of the unequality of the two levels of the discussion: there is no real contradiction, since the terminology and classification of the parts of speech are based on grammatical facts and on the grammatical differences between the parts of speech. Exactly the same answer is given by 'Abd al-Ğabbār to the objection that the grammatical classification invalidates his definition of speech as consisting of 'letters in a certain order' (*ḥurūf manẓūma*). He answers: 'What is said by the experts of the Arabic language does not contradict what we said. When they say "speech is noun, verb, and particle with a meaning", they are talking about the speech as we have defined it; they divide it into different parts, without denying that speech in its totality consists of letters with a special arrangement'.[30]

The opposite opinion about the action of the speaker says that, on the contrary, every action belongs to Allāh alone, Who is the Creator of everything. This position was defended by Ibn Maḍā' of Córdoba (d. 1195/592): 'The doctrine of the people of the truth (i.e. the orthodox Ẓāhirites, like Ibn Ḥazm and himself) is that these sounds are only an action of Allāh the Lofty; their connection with man is the same as the connection of the rest of his voluntary actions with

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[28] Zaġġ. Id. 43, 10-1. Cf. Kindī's definition of creation (*ibdā'*): 'making something appear out of nothing' (*iẓhār aš-šay' 'an laisa*), Rasā'il, 1, 165, 11. For the Mu'tazilite *creatio e nihilo*: Walzer, 1962, 187 sqq.
[29] b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 454, 6-8 [A98].
[30] 'Abd al-Ğabbār, Muġnī, 7, 9, 4-6 [A99]; cf. b. 'Aqīl, Rasā'il, 9, 13 sqq.

him'.[31] A compromise between the two extremes was formulated by al-Aš'arī; this compromise was finally accepted by the majority of the orthodox theologians.[32]

The influence of the Mu'tazila is also discernible in the partly theological, partly grammatical debate about the question whether words are identical with their nominata (the things denoted by them), or with the act of inventing the words for the nominata, that is with the act of using the words. The first thesis was opposed by almost all grammarians according to Mu'tazilite doctrine, which held that words were identical with the act of using them. In the discussions about this subject, many difficulties arose from conflicting interpretations of the term *musammā*. Zaǧǧāǧī makes clear[33] that nomen and nominatum cannot simply be put on a par: in the sentence *zaid qā'im* (Zaid is standing), the word *zaid* is not identical with the person, Zaid, whom it denotes, and the verb *qā'im* cannot be held to be identical with the action of that person,[34] because both words, *zaid* as well as *qā'im*, are actions of the speaker (*af'āl al-mutakallim*).[35]

Ibn Ǧinnī proposes a grammatical proof of the distinction between *ism* and *musammā*, which may be summarized as follows.[36] An adjunction (*iḍāfa*) of a nomen to a nominatum is possible; they can, therefore, not be identical, since it is not allowed to connect something with itself.[37] When we look at the examples of such an adjunction of a nomen to a nominatum, it becomes clear what the meaning of *musammā* in this context is: in the expression *hāḍā ḍū zaidin* the meaning is *hāḍā ṣāhib hāḍā 'l-ism allaḍī huwa zaid* (he is the possessor of the name Zaid), or in other words *hāḍā huwa 'l-musammā bi-hāḍā 'l-ism* (he is the person who is named by this name).[38] Another example is the common expression *kāna 'indanā ḍāta ṣabāḥin* (he was with us on a certain morning); the meaning of this expression is *kāna 'indanā 'l-waqt al-musammā ṣabāḥan* (he was with us at the time

[31] b. Maḍā', Radd. 87 [A 100], cf. Maḥzūmī, 1958, 265 sqq.; Arnaldez, 1956, 89; Mubārak, 1974², 148-58; 'Īd, 1973, 251-62.

[32] Aš'arī, Ibāna, 52-5; cf. Watt, 1971, 27; Frank, 1966.

[33] Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 43, 11 sqq.; 57, 4 sqq.

[34] Besides, *zaid* is not the real agent, but only a grammatical one; cf. Rāzī, Maf. 1, 55, 11 sqq.

[35] Cf. above, notes 24-8.

[36] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 188, 10-2; 3, 24, 3-4.

[37] Cf. above, chapter VI, note 55, and Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 109, 15 - 110, 16.

[38] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 27, 9-10; the example comes via Abū 'Alī al-Fārisī from Ta'lab's teacher, an-Nadīm.

which is called morning).[39] In these and similar examples the nominatum (*musammā*) is that which is named by the nomen (*ism*), in other words, *ḍū, ḍāt* in the sentences quoted are the nominata of the nomina *zaid, ṣabāḥ*.[40] This means that a word may be nomen or nominatum, depending on the use we make of it: if I ask someone 'what is the spelling of *sayf* (sword)', and he answers *s-y-f*, then we are talking about a nomen. But when I say 'I hit him with a *sayf*, with a sword', then I am talking about a *musammā*.[41] In the first example, the nominatum of the word *sayf* is a nomen, in the second example it is a nominatum. As a matter of fact, we are dealing here with the distinction between the first and the second name-giving,[42] or, to put it in modern terms, between language and meta-language.

Ibn Ǧinnī also asks how it is possible that some people believe that nomina and their nominata are identical. His answer is that it is customary to use the nomina in talking about the nominata. In fact, the nomina are the only way to 'reach' the nominata. For this reason, some people thought that they could be used indiscriminately, and that, consequently, they were identical.[43]

A new element is brought into the discussion by Ǧazzālī, viz. denomination (*tasmiya*).[44] According to Ǧazzālī we must distinguish between three elements: the nomen, its nominatum, and the act of giving a nominatum a nomen. As for the identity of the nomen and the nominatum, he mentions three theories. The first of these theories holds that all nomina are identical with their nominata. The second theory holds that this is nowhere the case. The third theory asserts that there are three sorts of nomina: those which are identical with their nominata (e.g. *Allāh, mauǧūd* (Allāh, existent)); those which are not identical with their nominata (e.g. *ḥāliq*, (creating), because this word is not only connected with Allāh, but also with the thing

[39] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 32, 1-3.

[40] Cf. Īḍ. 57, 8-9; the verb is the *musammā* of the noun, because the masdar is called the *ism al-fi'l*.

[41] b. Ǧin. Ḥaṣ. 3, 31, 5-10.

[42] Cf. below, chapter IX, note 47.

[43] For the expression *al-ism dalīl al-ma'nā*, cf. Ǧazz. Asmā', 6, 12: *al-madlūl 'alaihi* (= *al-musammā*), and Zaǧǧ. Īḍ. 50, 4 (*al-ism mā dalla 'alā 'l-musammā*). That we can reach the nominata only through the nomina is said by Zaǧǧāǧī, Īḍ. 56, 5-6, cf. below, note 75.

[44] Ǧazz. Asmā', pp. 4 sqq. On Ǧazzālī's theories: Gätje, 1974.

created); and those about which neither the first nor the second property can be predicated (Allāh's inherent attributes).[45]

The word *Allāh*, which is used as an example of the words of the first category—those words which are identical with their nominata—is used also by 'Abd al-Ġabbār.[46] He uses it to refute precisely the theory about the identity of nomen and nominatum. If the word *Allāh* were indeed identical with its nominatum, then it would be eternal—which is, of course, impossible in 'Abd al-Ġabbār's theology.[47] Nor can the names of Allāh be identical with Allāh, because He is One, whereas His names are various and diverse.[48] On the other hand, the advocates of the identity of nomen and nominatum assert that precisely the eternity of the word *Allāh* is proof of the eternity of the Qur'ān—which can, therefore, not be a creation by Allāh. In Šahrastānī's *Milal* we find the statement that Allāh's attributes are identical with His essence, because there cannot exist any plurality in His essence.[49]

The element of the *tasmiya* is also mentioned by al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013/404), who deals with the theory of the identity of the nomen and the nominatum in his *Tamhid*.[50] The orthodox opinion, he says, is that nomen and nominatum are identical—which shows that the majority of the grammarians in Baghdad were not orthodox at the time, because they all agreed that the nomen is something else than the nominatum.[51] The Mu'tazila held, according to Bāqillānī, that the nomen is identical with the *tasmiya*, i.e. the namegiving. The same theory is also explicitly attributed to the Mu'tazila by Ibn Ḥāġib

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[45] The same classification is used by Baiḍāwi. Similar classifications in three categories (a, not-a, neither a nor not-a) in Stoic writings, e.g. in ethics the division of objects into good, bad, and indifferent (SVF 3, pp. 28-30; cf. Jadaane, 1968, 191; van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 117); also Poseidonios' definition of dialectics as the science of truth, falsehood, and what is neither (SVF 2, 122); other connections, with Christian theology: van Ess, 1965, 119-20. On the doctrine of the attributes of Allāh: Pretzl, 1940; Allard, 1965; Frank, 1969.

[46] 'Abd al-Ġabbār, Muġnī, 7, 164, 10; 7, 165, 7.

[47] As is asserted by Ġazzālī, Asmā 4, 7: 'as when we say that Allāh—He is Lofty—is essence and existent' (*ka-qaulina lillāh ta'ālā annahu ḏāt wa-mauğūd*).

[48] Van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 128, note 219.2: according to Ibn Ḥazm, Bāqillānī held that Allāh has only one name, but many appellations (*tasmiyāt*). For this distinction, cf. below, note 57 and 70.

[49] Šahr. Milal, 34; Pretzl, 1940, 11.

[50] Bāq. Tamh., 227-36; also id. Inṣāf, 47.

[51] Which was to be expected in view of the fact that many grammarians belonged to the Mu'tazila, cf. above, notes 2 and 5.

(d. 1248/646) in his *Īḍāḥ šarḥ al-mufaṣṣal*:[52] 'Some of them say that the *ism* is the *tasmiya*, and this is the doctrine of the Mu'tazila and of the grammarians and of many jurists. Others say that the *ism* is the *musammā*, and this is the Aš'arite opinion'. It is hard to explain why this theory is mentioned nowhere else in grammatical writings.[53] It is not clear what exactly is meant by *tasmiya*: one is tempted to interpret the Mu'tazilite theory of meaning in terms of 'use', i.e. meaning is the sum total of all concrete uses of a word, but probably this is too modern an interpretation.

It is not easy to understand what is meant by the word *musammā* in these discussions, since two different meanings of the word are being used at the same time. Ġazzālī's theory of signification distinguishes between three modes of being:[54] a physical level, a psychological level, and a linguistic level; words correlate within this frame with concepts in the mind (*ṣuwar ḏihniyya*), not with objects in the outer world.[55] In that case, *musammā* is clearly the 'imaginary' correlate of the word, not the concrete thing denoted by the word. This is the meaning of *musammā* for Ġazzālī as well as Ibn Ġinnī.

On the other hand, 'Abd al-Ġabbār uses in his refutation of the theory that *ism* and *musammā* are identical, arguments which are only comprehensible if by *musammā* we understand the concrete thing denoted by the word. The same meaning of *musammā* is used by the adversaries of Bāqillānī: they argue that if the nomen is identical with the nominatum, then by saying the word 'fire', we would burn our mouths, and by saying the word 'zaid', that individual would be present on our tongues. Here *musammā* means the concrete thing denoted by the word.[56] Bāqillānī's answer is: 'This is talk of the man

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[52] Ibn al-Ḥāġib, Īḍāḥ, p. 107, quoted by Sāmarrā'ī, 1971, 215-6 [A 101].

[53] Cf. van Ess, 1965, 117-8.

[54] Cf. below, chapter IX, note 50; Gätje, 1974, 161, sqq. (Ġazzālī's theory of identity and diversity as it is applied to the problem of the *ism* and the *musammā*: 168-75).

[55] Ġazz. Asmā', 6, 10 sqq.: remark on the difference between the notions *waḍ'*, *mauḍū'*, and *mauḍū' lahu*.

[56] We are reminded of the Stoic paradox of the wagon (whatever you say passes through your mouth; you say 'wagon'; therefore, a wagon passes through your mouth), de Rijk, 1968, 98-9. That the argument may also be used the other way round, may be seen in a completely different context, namely in the controversy in Indian grammar concerning the natural relationship between a word and its meaning. It is there argued by the adherents of the Vaiśeṣika school that words do not co-exist with the objects they denote: the word 'fire' does not burn the mouth, and the word 'razor' does not cut it; nor does the word 'honey' sweeten it (cf. Kunjunni Raja, 1969², 22).

in the street, and typical of ignorant people, because the words "fire", "zaid", which are present in our mouths, are not the name of Zaid, nor the name of the fire, but only a denomination (*tasmiya*), and an indication of those names. Their argument does, therefore, not apply.'.[57] In other words, *ism* is a sort of idea which is inherent in the objects and which is identical with them, whereas the sounds of the physical word are an indication (*dalāla*) of those *asmā*'. We do not doubt that this argument of Bāqillānī's adversaries is one of the arguments used by the Mu'tazila. We may compare with it 'Abd al-Ğabbār's argument that, if *ism* and *musammā* were identical, the word *Allāh* would then be eternal.

The difficulties concerning the meaning of *musammā* are also mentioned by Baiḍāwī (d. 1286/685) in his commentary on the *Fātiḥa*.[58] He says that the thesis of the identity of nomen and nominatum may be accepted with a certain reserve. If by *ism* we understand the physical words (*alfāẓ*), there can be no question of an identity with the *musammayāt*, i.e. with the concrete things denoted by the words, because in that case the two notions are incomparable, they are not on the same level. If, however, by *ism* we understand 'the essence of the thing' (*ḏāt aš-šay*')—a meaning the word does not possess normally—then it is identical with the *musammā*. A third possibility is that we understand by *ism* an attribute of Allāh (e.g. in the Qur'ānic text *sabbiḥ ism rabbika* (worship the name of thy Lord)[59]). In that case, we must distinguish between essential attributes, which indicate the essence of the thing (*nafs aš-šay*'), non-essential attributes, and in the third place, indifferent attributes, i.e. those about which neither of the two things can be predicated.[60] Apparently, there can be only identity of *ism* and *musammā* in the case of attributes of the first category (al-Aš'arī, according to Baiḍāwī[61]).

[57] Bāq. Tamh. 232, 12-6 [A 102].

[58] Baiḍ. Tafsīr, 4, 7-14; cf. also al-Azharī, *Šarḥ at-taṣrīf 'alā 't-tauḍīḥ*, 1, 7, quoted by Sāmarrā'ī, 1971, 215-6.

[59] Qur'ān, 87/1.

[60] This classification of the attributes reminds us of Ğazzālī, cf. above note 45; cf. Gätje, 1974, 155-8; 175-7.

[61] According to Baǧdādī, Uṣūl, 114 (d. 1037/429), quoted by Pretzl, 1940, 20, Aš'arī defended the orthodox thesis of the identity of name and thing named in his book on the explanation of the Qur'ān, but in his book on the attributes of Allāh, he divided the names of Allāh according to His properties. Cf. Aš'arī's discussion concerning the names of Allāh, Ibāna, p. 24, namely the problem whether they are created or not. He there concludes—from the Qur'ānic text *tabārak ism rabbika*—that these names cannot be created, and are, therefore, identical with His essence. But Šahrastānī, Milal, 34,

Rāzī's account[62] completes the picture. His method resembles the method used by Ğazzālī, in so far as he also includes the notion of *tasmiya* in his discussion. He even mentions the fact that the identity of *ism* and *tasmiya* was proclaimed by the Mu'tazila (and he refutes this thesis[63]). We believe that, on the whole, Rāzī's discussion served as a model for Baiḍāwī. Rāzī says that the theory of the identity of *ism* and *musammā* was chosen by the Aš'arites.[64] Apparently it is rejected by the Mu'tazilites, because that school had a theory of their own, which held that the *ism* is identical with the *tasmiya*. We have seen above that both Ibn Ğinnī and 'Abd al-Ğabbār rejected the identity of nomen and nominatum; both were of Mu'tazilite confession. Rāzī admits, furthermore, that, if we use *ism* in the sense of 'essence of the thing' (*ḏāt aš-šay*'), it is indeed identical with the *musammā*, although in that case the whole theory is a mere tautology (*iḍāḥ al-wāḍiḥāt*). The arguments used by the advocates of the theory are various, he says, the most important ones being the text of the Qur'ān (*tabārak ism rabbika*, cf. the above cited *sabbiḥ ism rabbika*), and another argument connected with the formula of divorce.[65]

The names of only a few authors are mentioned in connection with this theory. Of the grammarians we have found only the name of Abū 'Ubaida (d. 825/210), the teacher of al-Māzinī.[66] We are told that one of the arguments he used was the text of the Qur'ān (*sabbiḥ ism rabbika*). From the same source we hear that Sībawaihi opposed the theory.[67] It is small wonder that the majority of the grammarians did not favour the theory of the identity of nomen and nominatum, because the number of Mu'tazilites among them was considerable. As we have seen, the Mu'tazila rejected this theory.

cf. Pretzl, 1940, 11, tells us that Aš'arī affirmed that in Allāh all opposites are destroyed, which implies that it cannot be predicated about His attributes that they are identical with Him, nor that they are not identical with Him (*coincidentia oppositorum*), cf. van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 128, note 219.1.

[62] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 108-10. Cf. also Anawati, 1974, 363-6, concerning Rāzī's discussion of the various arguments for or against this theory in his *Lawāmi' al-bayyināt fī 'l-asmā' wa-'ṣ-ṣifāt* (ed. Cairo, 1914, pp. 3-10).

[63] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 110, 2-4 sqq.

[64] Cf. above, note 52.

[65] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 110.

[66] Lisān, s.v. *s - m - w*, 14, 402, 7-11 r.; on the authority of Abū 'l-'Abbās, i.e. al-Mubarrad, a pupil of Māzinī's. Cf. Abū 'Ubaida, Maǧāz al-Qur'ān, ed. M. F. Sezgin, Qāhira, 1954, 1, 16, 8.

[67] Lisān, ib. 402, 1. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that the question, Id. 11, 8 is put to the followers of Sībawaihi, but probably, Sībawaihi himself was too early for this discussion.

Originally, the problem was a theological one with rather grave consequences for the idea of one God: if we accept the identity of nomen and nominatum, then we must also accept the eternity of the words, which in the case of Allāh contradicts the Mu'tazilite doctrine.[68] The Mu'tazila therefore opposed the theory in the first place. Their argument was the incompatibility of the unity of Allāh with eternal and different names.[69] The grammarians among the Mu'tazilites adduced grammatical arguments to prove the impossibility of the theory, as in the case of Ibn Ğinnī. The theory favoured by the Mu'tazila was the identity of *ism* and *tasmiya*, but we find Ibn Kullāb (d. 845/240) making an effort to distinguish between the two notions. He distinguished between 'the natural-conventional name which is given to something in a particular language, which is its denomination (*tasmiya*)' and 'the thing's necessary and universal meaning or intelligible idea, which is its true name (*ism*)'.[70]

No arguments of a grammatical nature are found in favour of the theory of the identity of *ism* and *musammā*: the only grammarian whose name is connected with it, Abū 'Ubaida, apparently restricted himself to theological arguments. Zaǧǧāǧī lived at a time when the problem had ceased to be a controversial issue for grammarians, and he mentions it rather as a sort of commonplace objection, which does not need to be refuted, since everyone knows it is based on an incorrect theory. It is important to keep in mind that the original issue was the identity of words and the objects denoted by them. Only later did the problem, which was originally a theological one, change into a semantic one, namely the identity of words with their meanings. This change was partly caused by the need to find new, grammatical arguments against the old theory.

There is perhaps a parallel between the original problem and the Aristotelian theory that thought and the object of thought are identical

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[68] Cf. the orthodox statement in Baġdādī, Uṣūl, 114; if names were really different from the things named, then Allāh would not possess names and attributes from eternity; Pretzl, 1940, 20.

[69] Concerning the nature of the discussion, which was rather primitive, cf. Pretzl, 1940, 20: 'Diesem Problem stehen alle *Mutakallimūn* aus Mangel an dialektischer Schulung doch sehr hilflos gegenüber. "Gleichsein" oder "Verschiedensein" sind die einzigen viel zu groben Denkmittel, mit denen sie um die Sache herumraten'.

[70] Cf. Mahdi, 1970, 59; this theory was advanced by the grammarian Sīrāfī in his discussion with Mattā ibn Yūnus (cf. above, chapter VI). For the doctrine of Ibn Kullāb; Bouman, 1959, 37-8; van Ess, 1965. Ibn Kullāb was not a Mu'tazilite, but an independent thinker. In some respects his doctrine is reported to approximate that of the Christians, cf. Nader, 1956, 99, note; Sezgin, 1967, 1. 599.

—except when we conceive of thought as an act—: if this identity would not exist, we could only have an impression of the truth, never truth itself, because our thought would in that case be different from the truth.[71] This theory is also dealt with by Plotinos and by Alexandros in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*.[72]

Aristotle even mentions that nomen and nominatum may be confused, in approximately the same terms as Zaǧǧāǧī: 'As we cannot reproduce the objects themselves in speaking, we use words instead of the objects as symbols. Consequently, we tend to believe that what applies to the words also applies to the objects, just like the numbers in arithmetic. But there is a difference: words are finite, as is the number of sentences. But the objects are infinite. Thus, the same sentence and the same word must needs signify more than one thing'.[73] Augustinus discusses the same problem as follows: 'As we are not able to speak about words unless with words, and as we speak, when we speak, only about things, it may occur to us that words are signs of things without ceasing to be things themselves'.[74] There is a striking resemblance with Zaǧǧāǧī's words: 'The term "nouns" can take the place of the term "what is named by the nouns" when something is told about them (*fī 'l-iḫbār 'anhā*), for you can only get hold of (the nominata) through (the nouns), as we have mentioned'.[75]

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[71] Van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 120, note 201.2; Islamic philosophy, 1972, 29.

[72] Plot. Enn. 5, 3, 5; Alexandros of Aphrodisias, comment. in Aristot. de anima, (Arabic translation), Badawi, 1971, 34-5. Cf. also Proklos, scholia in Plat. Crat. 6, 8-9.

[73] Aristot. soph. el. 165 a 7-13 [G 53]; cf. Steinthal, 1890², 1, 190-1; Coseriu, 1970, 70; 79-80. On the Arabic translations of the *Sophistici Elenchi*: Badawi, 1968, 77. The infinity of things as compared with the finiteness of words: Suy. Muzh. 1, 26 pen. - 27, 2; Rāzī, Maf. 1, 24, 2-4; above, chapter VII, note 39. In literary theory the argument of the infinity of things is used in the discussion concerning *ištirāk*, the use of one expression for more than one concept. Words are formed from finite letters, and are, therefore, finite; they are used to express an infinite number of things; therefore, *ištirāk* exists by necessity. This argument is used by Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Ḫalīl ibn Aybak aṣ-Ṣafadī (d. 1362/764; cf. Brockelmann, GAL II, 31; S II, 27) in his *Faḍḍ al-ḫitām 'an at-tawriya wa-'l-istiḫdām* according to Bonebakker, 1966, 89. In another context the infinity of the *ma'ānī* as compared with the finiteness of the *alfāz* is used as an argument for the superiority of the artist, who has to select the right word for a meaning; cf. Heinrichs, 1969, 70-1.

[74] August. dialect. c. 5; 8, 1-3 ... *nam cum de verbis loqui nisi verbis nequeamus et cum loquimur nonnisi de aliquibus rebus loquamur, occurrit animo ita esse verba signa rerum, ut res esse non desinant*. Cf. Barwick, 1957, 11.

[75] Zaǧǧ. Īd. 56, 5-6 [A 103].

CHAPTER NINE

THE ORIGIN OF SPEECH

'... and particularly the theory of names happens to be a rather complicated problem'.[1]

It is a wellknown fact that Islamic theology had an enormous influence on the linguistic studies of the Arabs,[2] and considering the number of grammarians with Mu'tazilite views, we cannot but expect that the Mu'tazila, too, exercised some influence in this field. We can detect the Mu'tazilite influence particularly in the ideas about the nature and origin of speech. Although we do not believe in a Mu'tazilite 'liberal humanism', we do believe that their preference for logical, i.e. Greek methods, and for rational thinking, led them to a more anthropocentric conception of speech. On the other hand, it is certainly wrong simply to deduce from the Mu'tazilite doctrine of the creation of the Qur'ān by Allāh that the Mu'tazila considered speech a human invention:[3] it is very well possible to conceive of a doctrine which contains both the creation of the Qur'ān and of speech by Allāh, without diminishing man's free will. Nevertheless, our sources indicate that the combination of Mu'tazilite ideas and a conventionalist theory about the origin of speech was fairly common, though there are exceptions, as is proved by the case of Abū 'Alī al-Fārisī.[4] Moreover, we find that it is possible to deny the creation of the Qur'ān by Allāh and at the same time to believe in the human origin of speech.[5] In short, the conventionalist theory is neither a necessary nor an exclusive condition for Mu'tazilites.

As a matter of fact, it is impossible to understand properly the ideas of the Arabic grammarians and theologians with regard to the origin and nature of speech without comparing them with the data from Greek grammar and philosophy. It is important to keep in mind that the history of this problem is a complicated one because of the constant change in meaning of the terms used in the discussions about this problem. We shall see that several terms have been borrowed from Greek discussions by Arabic grammarians, even when the framework of these discussions was completely different from the Arabic point of view. In connection with this, we refer to Steinthal's methodologically important observation: 'Solche Schlagwörter ändern, ..., mit der Zeit und mit den Vertretern und mit der gegenseitigen Stellung der Parteien ihre Bedeutung; die Geschichte der Parteien, die Entwicklung ihrer Kämpfe, liegt gerade in der veränderten Bedeutung der oft unverändert gebliebenen Namen'.[6] The two words most frequently used in these discussions, *phúsis* and *thésis* were not meant originally to indicate the origin of speech, but the epistemological value of speech, i.e. the possibility to understand the nature of the things through the words which signify them. Speech is *phúsei* when it gives us an insight into the nature of things, when the form of the words tells us something about the nature of things; speech is *thései* when it contains only words which have been chosen or agreed upon arbitrarily and independently of the things they signify. In both cases, the origin of speech remains an open question: in both theories, it may be due to a divine or a human name-giver, to nature, or to the community. In later times, the terms *phísei* and *thései* were also used in the discussions about the origin of speech, whence the ambiguity and the pointlessness of some of these discussions. This fact was already known in antiquity, for instance by Proklos in his commentary on Plato's *Cratylus*,[7] and by Ammonios in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*.[8] According to these sources, the word *phísis* has several meanings.[9] Kratylos uses it in Plato's dialogue of

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[1] Platon, Crat. 384 B [G 54].

[2] Cf. e.g. Kopf, 1956; Weiss, 1966; 1974.

[3] *Contra* Loucel, 1963, 275 (44): 'Mais que reste-t-il du Mu'tazilisme si la langue est considérée comme révélée par Dieu? En quoi le libre arbitre humain pourra-t-il désormais s'exercer? ...'; for the Mu'tazilite theory: Nader, 1956, 255-7.

[4] The astonishment of Loucel (1963, 275 (44)) and Kopf (1956, 57) at this fact does not seem to be justified.

[5] *Contra* Loucel, 1963, 199 (12): 'Qui affirme que le Coran est incréé peut difficilement soutenir l'origine humaine du langage'.

[6] Steinthal, 1890², 1, 75.

[7] We do not agree with Steinthal, when he says that Proklos 'sich völlig unfähig (zeigt) einen getreuen Bericht über alte Philosopheme zu geben'. (1890², 1, 170). On the whole, the remarks of Proklos (and Ammonios) bear witness to a keen insight into the different meanings of the key-words. What is true, though, is that he tends to over-systematisize and to project new opinions back into older writings. On Proklos: Daniélou 1956.

[8] Amm. in Aristot. de interpret. 34-5, ed. Busse.

[9] For the four meanings of *phísei*: Prokl. comm. in Plat. Crat. par. 17 '... because the term "by nature" (*phísei*) has four meanings: it may be used to indicate living beings, animals, or plants, as a whole or in part; it may be used to indicate their

the same name to indicate that things receive their names according
to their nature, and that therefore these names indicate those things
naturally, i.e., in a natural way, so that the sounds of the word
imitate the nature of the thing.[10] But speech may also be said to be
phúsei because it is made up of something natural, something physical,
viz. sounds.[11] Epikouros and Lucretius use the term in still another
sense: words originate in a natural way; just as animals make natural
sounds, man began to use natural sounds in order to indicate things,
though arbitrarily.[12] The opposite of *phúsis* is the term *thésis*: some
people mean by this that words signify things as the result of an
arbitrary agreement between the first men,[13] whereas others under-
stand by *thésis* the action of a wise name-giver, who understood the
nature of things and expressed it in appropriate words.

The doctrine of the Stoics constitutes as it were a compromise
between the various theories; it came to be accepted by the majority
of the grammarians, and so found its way into the schools.[14] We
believe that the Stoic theory was one of the major sources of the

potential or actual properties, for instance the lightness and the warmth of fire; it
may be used to indicate the shadows and the images in a mirror; or it may be used to
indicate a picture made by an artist, which resembles its model ...' [G 55]. According
to him, Kratylos used *phúsei* in the second meaning, Epikouros in the first; cf.
Steinthal, 1890², 1, 168-82 and note 10 and 12 below.

[10] 'Kratylos speaks the truth when he says that a thing has a name according to
its nature (*phúsei*), and that not everybody is able to be a maker of names, but only he
who takes into regard the natural name of everything, and who is able to express its
essence in letters and syllables', Plat. Crat. 390 D-E [G 56]. For the interpretation of
the *Cratylus* I refer to the fundamental work of Derbolav, 1972, which gives an almost
exhaustive survey of older interpretations and literature.

[11] Cf. Alexandros of Aphrodisias ap. Amm. in Aristot. de interpret. 39, 14-7, ed.
Busse: '... the syllogism presented by the commentator from Aphrodisias (sc. Alexan-
dros), which seems to prove that nouns and verbs are only natural (*phúsei*): for nouns,
he says, and verbs are sounds, and sounds are natural; therefore, nouns and verbs are
natural' [G 57]. Cf. the Arabic translation of Alexandros' treatise on sound, Badawī
1971, 31.

[12] For the Epicurean analysis of language: Diog. Laert. 10, 75 sqq.; Lucr. De Rer.
Nat. 5, 1019 sqq. and Ernout/Robin's commentary *in locum* (Paris, 1962, 3, 138 sqq.);
de Lacy, 1939; Schrijvers, 1974. Epikouros' doctrine is a good example of the confusion
in the terminology: words are natural (*phúsei*), but they are conventional at the same
time—which is mostly a statement characteristic of the *thései*-theories!

[13] In that case, it is synonymous with *sunthḗkēi*, or if the emphasis lies on the
traditionality of speech with *nómōi*, *éthei*.

[14] Pinborg, 1961, 125-6: 'Die am meisteten verbreitete Auffassung der Antike war
die der Stoa, die auch von den Rhetorschulen mit wenigen Korrekturen angenommen
worden ist, und so Zugang zur Algemeinbildung fand'.

Arabic theories, not least because of the great influence of the schools
of rhetoric on cultural life in the Hellenistic countries.[15]

Traditionally we are told about the Stoic doctrine that, with regard
to the nature of language, it held that speech is *phúsei*,[16] that there is
a connection between the sounds of speech and the nature of the
things signified by those sounds. It is true that the Stoics believed
that in the first phase of the creation of speech, or rather, in the first
creative activity of man in this field, the 'first sounds' (*prôtai phônai*)[17]
showed a correlation between the essence of things and the form of
the words. This correlation is proved by Chrysippos with the form of
some of the personal pronouns.[18] But after this first period of cre-
ativity, speech follows its own course and its own laws, thereby losing
contact with the *realia* which are designated by the words. This is the
period of the development of grammatical rules, but also the period
of the denominative formations, which are irregular, i.e., which can-
not be classified by rules. This distinction between two periods is
important for the establishment of the value of words with regard to
the essence of the things designated by them: in the first period,
which is ruled by nature (*natura*), words express the essence of the
things, but in the second period everything is ruled by grammar (*ars*)
and speech becomes a traditional, conventional way of speaking (*usus*).
Consequently, words lose their ability to express the essence of the
things designated by them, and they change constantly. In order to
rediscover the original words (the *étuma* which express the true essence
of the things), the Stoa used certain etymological principles of a
phonetic and semantic nature;[19] they even thought that with these

[15] Daiber, 1968, 93 sqq. The schools of rhetoric in general: Marrou, 1965⁵.

[16] Origenes, *Contra Celsum*, 1, c. 24 = SVF 2, 146: 'The theory about the nature
of the words, whether they are *thései*, as Aristotle thinks, or, as is held by the people
of the Stoa, *phúsei*, in so far as the first sounds imitate the things designated by the
words. They also use certain etymological principles in this matter' [G 58].

[17] They are identical with Augustinus' *cunabula verborum*, dialect. VI, 10, 9; 11, 13
(= *stirps*), cf. Barwick, 1957, 29-33.

[18] Cf. SVF 2, 895: a quotation by Galenos from Chrysippos' *Perì psuchḗs*: 'For we
pronounce the word *egó* (I) by pulling down our lower lip at the first syllable, thus
indicating ourselves (pointing at ourselves); following this pointing gesture—the move-
ment of the chin and the nod towards the breast—comes the next syllable. (The word
egó) does not point at anything outside us, such as is the case with the word *ekeínos*
(he)' [G 59]; cf. Schmidt, 1839, 23-5. In Latin grammatical literature, this example has
been taken over by Publius Nigidius, who contrasts *nos* and *vos* the same way Chrysip-
pos does with *egó* and *ekeínos*, cf. de Rijk, 1968, 92-3.

[19] For the four categories of phonetic change (*adiectio*, *immutatio*, *transmutatio*,
detractio): cf. above chapter II. The semantic principles operate with the categories of

principles every word could be explained.[20] The Stoic etymological
principles soon became common property of Greek grammatical litera-
ture, and they are used in Arabic grammar as well. Suyūṭī defines ety-
mology as follows : 'Etymology means deriving one form from another,
where both forms agree in meaning and original content and the combi-
nation of consonants, so that the second form signifies the original
meaning with a significant addition (in meaning), which is why they differ
phonetically or morphologically ...'[21] Here we may see an echo of the
Stoic doctrine: the change from original word to secondary word is
irregular, but may be explained through a correlation between the
change in meaning and the change in form. There are in fact two
layers of speech, one of which is fixed by nature, whereas the other is
the result of human activity and can be changed, or rather, is being
changed all the time. This distinction between primary and secondary
or derived words is most important in Arabic literature, which divides
words into two classes, 'roots' (uṣūl) and 'branches', i.e., 'derived
words' (furū').[22] The two layers of speech are also called—if one looks
at speech from a glottogenetic point of view—'impositions'. The doc-
trine of the two impositions of speech was known to the Arabs from
the translation of the relevant passages in Ammonios' commentary on
Aristotle's De Interpretatione,[23] which constituted one of the major
sources in relaying Stoic doctrines to the Arabic world.

   True language (orthòs lógos), says Chrysippos, is just as natural
(phúsei) as are law and equity.[24] In this respect, his views about the
development of human society concur with those of the Sophists,
who created the famous distinction between natural and conventional

similitudo, contrarium, and vicinitas, cf. Barwick, 1957, 58-69. We find the same cate-
gories in Suy. Muzh., 1, cap. 23-4, pp. 187-207 (on figurative speech (maǧáz) and
etymology (ištiqáq)).

   [20] August. dialect. VI, 9, 18-9: Stoici autumant ... nullum esse verbum, cuius non
certa explicari origo possit. (The Stoics assert ... that there exists no word whose origin
cannot be determined exactly).

   [21] Suy. Muzh. 1, 201, 5-7, a quotation from the Šarḥ at-tashīl, probably the one
written by Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī (d. 1344/745) [A 104].

   [22] The blurring of this distinction between the uṣūl and the furū' appears in the
Zāhirite system, which regards it as an encroachment upon the power of Allāh: 'Dieu
n'a pas créé des radicaux sur lesquels l'homme aurait eu la permission de broder pour
les adapter aux besoins de ses libres entreprises intellectuelles. Il a créé les mots réels,
simples ou dérivés, contenant en eux leur signification, c'est-à-dire la règle totale de
leur usage'. (Arnaldez, 1956, 86; cf. also pp. 154 sqq.).

   [23] Cf. above, chapter VI, note 38.

   [24] SVF 3, 76, 4-6.

institutions (nómôi vs. phúsei).[25] But the Stoa by no means regarded
human inventions as being necessarily bad, as the Sophists had done;
for the Sophists, the two poles 'natural' and 'conventional' stand in
opposition; for the Stoics, civilization (ars) is something human beings
achieve by means of their divine reason (ratio), which is a gift of
nature.[26] Civil law, for instance, is the adaptation of common,
natural law to the needs of civilization, but always in accordance
with that natural law: law is the highest reason, implanted in nature
(lex est ratio summa insita in natura),[27] and that natural law is the
starting-point for instituted law (a lege ducendum est iuris exordium).[28]

   In this way, Stoic theory provided a compromise between the two
poles of ars and natura by claiming their essential identity: civilization
is nature expressed by human custom (usus). These three categories
exercised an enormous influence upon every theory of civilization,
and, through these theories, upon general education throughout anti-
quity. In the words of Pinborg: 'Aus dem berühmten sophistischen
Konflikt phúsei contra nómôi ... entsteht die vermittelnde Theorie vom
Ternar der natura, ars, usus, das die Entwicklung aller menschlichen
Fähigkeiten und Institutionen bedingt, sowohl im allgemeinen als
Stufen der Kulturgeschichte, als im Individuellen als Prinzipien der
persönlichen Ausbildung'.[29]

   One of the most important facets of civilization is language, without
which no convention between human beings is possible. We have seen
that according to the Stoa, language is in origin a natural, physical
thing, consisting in 'first words' (prôtai phônaí), which are placed on
the right things in the right way.[30] This first stage represents the
element natura. Later, speech is codified and regulated by the element
ars, the result being the usus, normal everyday speech.

   Hence it follows that we have to distinguish between basic words
and derivatives. The basic words are words from the first stage of
language: they are 'natural' (phúsei), i.e. they are in accordance with
nature and they tell us something about the essence of the things
denoted by them. The derivatives are words of the later stages: they
are more arbitrary and their original form may have become confused

   [25] Steinthal, 1890³, 1, 55-79.

   [26] SVF 3, 89, 30 sqq.

   [27] Cic. de leg. 1, 18.

   [28] Ib. 19; also: SVF 3, pp. 76-80.

   [29] Pinborg, 1961, 136.

   [30] Cf. above, note 17.

by frequent use. This means that in order to trace them back to their
original form we need a scientific discipline, the science of etymology.
Later grammarians used this historical distinction in a more gram-
matical and less principal sense, when they spoke about the 'first
imposition' and the 'second imposition' (*prôtè thésis kaì deutéra thésis*),
as an indication of the difference between 'root words' (*prôtótupa*) and
'derivatives' (*parágôga*). We find this for the first time with Diony-
sios Thrax: 'A root word is a word that is said according to the first
imposition, e.g. "earth"; a derivative is a word that derives its origin
from another word, e.g. "earthly"'.[31] The connection with the Stoic
theories about the origin of speech is evident in a remark made by
Choiroboskos: 'The root word resembles the first-created man; the
derivatives those who have sprung from him'.[32] In the same way,
prima et secunda positio are used in Latin grammar, e.g. by Quintilianus:
prima positio is the basic form of the word as against the *composita*,
which stem from a later development.[33] Later *prima positio* receives
the meaning 'basic form of the word, from which the declined forms
are derived'.[34] Priscianus uses *prima positio* in this sense,[35] and shows
that he is aware of the original meaning when he says: 'The first
imposition of the verb, which seems to have been proffered by nature
itself', and: 'Therefore it is original, because it received the first
imposition from nature itself'.[36]

In all these examples the two stages of development, as we found
them with the Stoics, have been put together, and have been trans-
ferred to actual, spoken speech. Instead of two chronological levels of
speech we now have two coexisting categories of words: the basic
words; and those words that have been more or less arbitrarily
derived from them, thereby forming new roots. The relation between
the two categories, the root words and the derivatives, is likened by
Varro to a tree with its offshoots: 'As every offshoot is secondary by
nature, because the vertical trunk from which it has sprung is primary,
such is the case with the declension in words: *homo* (man) is the
vertical, *hominis* (of the man) is the oblique, because it is declined

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[31] Dion. Thr. 25, 3-5 [G 60].

[32] Choirob. 1, 108, 3-5 [G 61].

[33] Quint. instit. orat. 1, 6, 10; 1, 5, 65; cf. 1, 6, 22.

[34] Char. 228, 4; 330, 8; cf. also 233, 4; Diom 344, 2; 349, 11; 356, 39; 384, 17.

[35] Prisc. instit. 8, 63/421, 26-7; 8, 72/427, 12.

[36] Prisc. 11. cc.: *prima positio verbi quae videtur ab ipsa natura esse prolata*; *est igitur primitiva, quae primam positionem ab ipsa natura accepit.*

from the vertical'.[37] This resembles the Arabic division of words into
uṣūl and *furū'*; there is even a terminological resemblance.[38] In Latin
grammar, the ultimate criterion for the correctness of speech remains
everyday use.[39] We find the same division of words into two categories
in Ibn Ğinnī: 'People in their wisdom weighed the language of the
Arabs, and found that it consists of two groups of words: the first
category of words should be accepted as it is, involuntarily and
intuitively, e.g. "stone", "house" ... The other category is the one
that is found to be formed by analogical rules; it was not very
difficult for people to get to know this category, so they were able
to classify and to analyse it, since they could understand it ...'.[40]
Note that in Arabic grammar the analogical element is emphasized
with regards to the derivatives; in Latin grammar a distinction is made
between the analogical element (i.e. the declension) and the anomalous
element (i.e. the derivatives proper).[41]

As we have seen in the preceding paragraphs, the original Stoic
distinction between two stages of speech, between first and second
imposition, between *natura* and *ars*, was modified into a distinction
between two levels of speech, on a strictly grammatical basis, between
simple and composite words. The original distinction remained in use,
however, as a description of two chronologically distinct stages in the
development of speech and grammar. The 'artificial' element was now
represented by the grammatical categories and terms, whereas the
'natural' situation was that of speech without such classification. This
is what has become known as the distinction between object speech
and metalanguage. According to the classical theory, objects received
their names in the first imposition; subsequently, these names received
names themselves, so to speak, in the second imposition. First the
names of the first imposition received the name 'name' as a common
appellation, and then they were divided into 'nouns', 'verbs' and so on.

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[37] Varro, De L.L. 8, 1: *Ut propago omnis natura secunda, quod prius illud rectum, unde ea, sic declinata: itaque declinatur in verbis: rectum homo, obliquam hominis, quod declinatum a recto.*

[38] For *far'*: Varro's *propago*; for *aṣl*: *origo* and a word *radix* to be supposed from the use of *propago* and the simile of the tree. The concept of a root in words is also found in Indian grammar, so that the likeness is hardly conclusive (cf. e.g. Brough, 1951, on the *sphoṭa*-theory). Cf. Barwick, 1957, 29-33.

[39] For the *criteria latinitatis* and the *uṣūl an-naḥw*: above, chapter IV.

[40] b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 42, 9-12 [A 105].

[41] The analogical element is called *declinatio naturalis*, and the anomalous element *declinatio voluntaria*, Varro, De L.L. 8, 21-3.

This theory is explained in only a few texts.[42] Ammonios tells us:
'Let it, therefore, be known that nature, realizing that this animal
(sc. man) was to be a social animal, gave it a voice, so that it would be
able to communicate its own thoughts to others by that means. And
men came together and agreed with each other to call this for instance
"wood", and that "stone" ... According to this way of indicating
things all words were invented. Their second activity was to observe
that some words could be construed with an article, though not with
a tense—these were called "nouns"—, and that other words could be
construed with tenses, though not with an article—these are the
verbs'.[43] In Latin grammar the same theory is found with Charisius:
'The Latin tongue, born at the same time as the people of its civiliza-
tion, satisfied their needs of signifying and of understanding what was
said. Afterwards, however, it (sc. the Latin tongue) was examined by
experts in the course of time, and it was tamed by the observations
of our brilliant minds. While a few of its parts still did not fit in with
the norms of speech, it let itself be ruled by grammatical rules and it
made that old licence of speech subordinate to reason'.[44]

This chronological account of the origin of two logical levels of
speech was later to become a logical distinction between the same two
levels, but in a synchronic frame, for the first time explicitly in
Augustinus' dialogue *De Magistro*. Augustinus distinguishes between
words that signify words (e.g. *nomen*, *verbum*, and so on), and words
that signify things (e.g. *homo*, *flumen*): 'I observe that the word *nomen*
and these four words (sc. *Romulus*, *Roma*, *fluvius*, *virtus*), to which we
applied the signification of (*nomen*), differ in that the former is the
audible sign of audible signs, whereas the latter words, audible signs
though they are, are the signs of objects, not of signs'.[45]

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[42] Pinborg, 1961, 136-8; 1967, 45-6.

[43] Amm. comment. in Aristot. cat. ed. Busse, pp. 11-2 [G62]; cf. id. comment. in
Aristot. de interpret. ed. Busse, 10, 4 sqq.; almost the same theory in Porphyrios, com-
ment. in Aristot. cat. ed. Busse, pp. 57-8. An amusing practical example: scholia D.T.
31, 24 sqq.

[44] Char. 62, 2-8: *Latinus vero sermo cum ipso homine civitatis suae natus significan-
dis intellegundisque quae diceret praestitit. Sed postquam plane supervenientibus saeculis
accepit artifices et sollertiae nostrae observationibus captus est, paucis admodum partibus
orationis normae suae dissentientibus, regendum se regulae tradidit et illam loquendi
licentiam servituti rationis addixit.* On this passage: Fehling, 1956, 222 sqq., especially
pp. 233-5 with the reconstruction of the prototype of this text; cf. also Varro, De L.L.
8, 3, on the reason for the introduction of declension into speech: it helped people to
cover the overwhelming amount of ideas with relatively few words.

[45] Pinborg, 1967, 46; Coseriu, 1970, 110-4. It seems exaggerated to call Augustinus

Returning to Arabic sources, we find that Arabic scholars operate
with the same distinction between object speech and metalanguage.
They were aware of the difference between two logical levels of
language, between names and the names of names. For instance, Rāzī:
'Know that words are most of all expressions for things. These things
may be words or something else. Words, as e.g. "noun", "verb",
"particle", because each of these three words denotes something that
is a word in itself; something else, like "stone", "heaven", "earth"'.[46]
We may also refer to the passage from Ibn Ǧinnī's '*Ḫaṣā'iṣ*' quoted
above[47] with its distinction between the object sword and the word
's-w-o-r-d-'. The most explicit reference to this doctrine is found in
Ǧazzālī who says: 'We say that words are an expression by means of
articulated sounds, invented by man's will, for the signification of
individual objects. They are divided into those words that were
invented primarily, and those words that were invented secondarily.
Those words that were invented primarily are e.g. "heaven", "tree",
and so on; those words that were invented secondarily are e.g. "noun",
"verb", "particle", "imperative", "negation", "imperfect"'.[48] Ac-
cording to Ǧazzālī, there is even a third imposition, namely when we
are dividing nouns into various sub-categories and so forth.

We should also point to the logical distinction between the first and
the second intention, used in treatises on logic' 'wo man von einer
ersten und zweiten *intentio* spricht, je nachdem ob sich das Denken
unmittelbar auf die besonderen Dinge oder auf die allgemeinen Begrif-
fe von den Dingen bezieht'.[49] This theory was developed by Ibn Sīnā
and we know it had an enormous influence on Medieval scholastic
grammar, where it formed the basis for all theories of language.[50]

Apart from these testimonies we also have an explicit reference to
the doctrine of the two impositions in the context of an Aristotelian
commentary, namely in al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's notes on the text of the

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the 'Wegbereiter der *suppositiones*-Lehre' (Coseriu, o.c., 105): surely, Ammonios c.s.
represent a tradition that is independent from the *De Magistro*. For Augustinus also:
de Rijk, 1968.

[46] Rāzī, Maf. 2, 96, 12-4 [A106].

[47] b. Ǧin. Ḫaṣ. 3, 31, 5-10, cf. above, chapter VIII, note 41.

[48] Ǧazz. Asmā', 5, 19-23 [A107].

[49] Gätje, 1965, 281; cf. van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 111. Kw. Gyeke draws the attention
to an ambiguity in the use of *prima intentio et secunda intentio*, (Gyeke, 1971).

[50] Pinborg, 1967, 37 sqq. Note the importance of Ǧazzālī's doctrine of the three
modes of being, as compared with the Medieval *modi essendi, intelligendi et significandi*.

Categoriae, which are based on a Greek commentary, possibly by Ammonios.[51] Ibn Suwār says: 'We say "in the first imposition" to distinguish between expressions from the first and from the second imposition, because the expressions from the first imposition are the names ... that have been imposed on the objects primarily, and that have become marks and signs serving as a general denomination for them, for instance when we call this "silver" and that "copper", and that "gold": in short, all expressions that point at one single meaning. The expressions from the second imposition are those that we have separated from the expressions of the first imposition. Their meaning is that we call, for instance, every word that signifies a definite meaning without time ... ("noun"), and every word that signifies a meaning as well as time "verb" ... These are the expressions of the second imposition; they owe their names to the fact that we invented them after the expressions of the first category'.[52] We assume that Ammonios' commentary on the *Categoriae* was the source of the Arabic theories about the two impositions.

As for the Arabic grammarians, they were only interested in this doctrine in so far as they wanted to use it for the solution of the problem of which part of speech came first chronologically, and whether there ever existed a stage of language in which there was speech without declension. The majority of the grammarians decided that the original Arabic language did probably possess declension, because of the wisdom of the ancient Arabs, who introduced declension into speech in order to prevent ambiguities and doubts about the meaning of a sentence.[53] The old distinction *natura* vs. *ars* becomes here once again pejorative with regard to the 'artificial' element, since according to general opinion, the original language was pure and undefiled, but later generations corrupted it by their frequent use of words (*katr al-isti'māl*).[54] Some grammarians, however, asserted that the original language did not possess declension, which was added only later by an effort of reason.[55] Anyway, we may conclude that in

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[51] Cf. chapter VI, note 38.

[52] b. Suwār, 361, 8-16 [A 108].

[53] b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 31, 7 - 32, 5: the doctrine of Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Aḫfaš.

[54] Ib. 2, 29, 4 sqq.; the same doctrine with Ibn Ḥazm, Arnaldez, 1956, 45-6.

[55] Cf. the discussion in Zağğ. Iḍ. 67-9. According to Zağğāğī speech and declension always coexisted; nevertheless it is possible to say that nouns are prior to verbs, when we make a hierarchical classification, not a chronological one. Zağğāğī admits that some people have a different opinion (Iḍ. 68 ult. - 69, 2).

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technical grammar the original distinction lost its logical flavour, and turned itself into a practical question.[56]

Another important source for the Arabs was the *Cratylus*. We know that Plato's dialogue about the 'rightness' (*orthótès*) of the words (i.e. about their value for our knowledge of the essence of the things designated by them) was discussed in the Arabic world. That they understood correctly what the *Cratylus* was all about may be deduced from Fārābī's explanation of the character of that dialogue in his *Falsafat Aflāṭūn*: 'Thereafter, he (sc. Plato) investigates whether this art (sc. the art of happiness) is the art of the science of language, and whether man, if he has a complete knowledge of the words which signify meanings, in so far as they signify something for the majority of the nation to which that language belongs, and if he investigates those words and knows them according to the methods of the scholars of that language, whether in that case man would have acquired a complete knowledge of the essence of things ...'.[57] It will be noted that for Fārābī the question is not who created speech, but what is the value of speech for the understanding of objects in the outer world.

More data are provided by the writings of Aristotle. According to him, speech is the result of an agreement (*sunthèkè*) among men, and it has therefore an arbitrary nature:[58] we cannot judge from the form of the words what is the essence of the things designated.[59] Aristotle,

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[56] This practical question also shows that Arabic grammarians were aware of a certain development in speech. As a matter of fact, this dynamic aspect of speech was a controversial issue in another respect, namely that of the creation of new words (e.g. in the language of the artisans, Loucel, 1963, 267-8); cf. Kopf, 1956, 40-5. Fleisch's remark (1961, 17, n. 1) that Arabic theories about language lack a dynamic view does not seem altogether justified. Those grammarians who occupied themselves with the origin of speech, certainly made room for a development in speech according to the Stoic doctrine of *ars - natura - una*. Change of language as a result of corruption of the old habits was a commonplace in almost every work about correct language; e.g. b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 29, 1-6: here, Ibn Ğinnī asserts that the Bedouins did not change their speech, but with the introduction of civilization people deviated from the *i'rāb* (= 'declension' or *arabitas*??) of pure speech; cf. also Flück, 1955², pp. 44 sqq. et passim; Zubaidī ap. Loucel, 1963, 206 (19); also b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ, 2, 5 sqq.; Ibn Ḥazm's views on the changes of language: Iḥk. 1, 30, 8-23.

[57] Far. Fals. Afl. 7, 1-8 [A 109]. The *Cratylus* in Arabic: b.a. Uṣaibi'a, 1, 201, 5; Kraus, 1942, 2, 238, n. 2; Bergsträsser, 1913, 50. It may be added that the *Cratylus* was also known in Syriac literature, namely in Jacob of Edessa's introduction to his letter on orthography, and in a scholion about the names of God, which also exists in an Arabic translation, cf. Nestle, 1878, especially p. 502.

[58] E.g. Aristot. de interpret. 16 a 19; 16 a 26-9; soph. el. 165 a 7; sens. 437 a 13-5.

[59] That words have no epistemological value is evident from Aristotle's remark, de

though, was not interested in the genetic problem of the origin of speech: for him it was important to determine the functional value of the words and the way they function in actual communication; the important thing is that words are conventional, not that they are the result of a convention.[60] Later generations were more interested in another aspect of the matter: the creation of speech by the first communities of men (*sunthèkè, thésis*). The term *thésis* must have been taken over rather early by the Arabs, because we find the Arabic equivalent *waḍ'* right at the beginning of Arabic grammar.[61] The Aristotelian point of view was transmitted at a later time, first through the commentaries on the *De Interpretatione*, which were translated into Arabic (particularly the commentary of Ammonios in the notes of Ibn Suwār), and later through the indigenous commentaries, of which Fārābī's *Šarḥ al-'ibāra* shows the best understanding of the original problem.[62] In grammatical discussions, however, we are almost always confronted with the question of the origin of speech: is it a creation of Allāh, or a product of human creativity? This is the problem as it is discussed by Ibn Ğinnī, Suyūṭī, and others.[63]

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interpret. 17 a 1-2: 'Every sentence (*lógos*) is meaningful, not as an instrument (*órganon*), but, as we have said, by agreement' [G63]. The word *órganon* clearly refers to the *Cratylus*, where Sokrates calls a word an *órganon didaskalikòn kaì diakritikòn* (Plat. Crat. 388 B; cf. Steinthal, 1890², 1, 186-7)—although, according to Ammonios, Aristotle refers here to another thesis, namely that a sentence is a natural instrument of speech, just as the human faculty of speech, Amm. comment. in Aristot. de interpret. 62, 21 sqq., ed. Busse.

[60] Aristotle does not use the dative *sunthèkèi*, but the expression *katà sunthèkèn*, which Coseriu, 1970, 65-9, interprets as 'traditionell', 'historisch-motiviert'. According to him, Aristotle's purpose is not to define the genetic connection between words and things, but to establish the functioning of words in actual speech. Cf. also ib., p. 82 and pp. 90-5.

[61] Cf. the expression *wuḍi'a 'alā* (to have been invented for a certain meaning), e.g. Sīb. Kit. 1, 186, 8. According to Weiss, 1966, 38-40, the original meaning of *waḍ'* is 'givenness of language'; this meaning gradually gave way to the meaning 'establishment of language', 'origin of speech' (*waḍ' al-luġa*); in his view, the Mu'tazilites were the first to use the word in the sense of 'conventional establishment'. It seems, however, that *waḍ'* did not denote the givenness of the relation between expressions and meanings before the introduction of the treatises on the *waḍ' al-luġa* by al-Īğī (14th/8th century); cf. also Weiss, ib., 52-3; 78, where it is stated that in the sense of 'conventionality' the term used is *muwāḍa'a*, not *waḍ'*.

[62] Cf. especially Far Šarḥ, 50, 1 - 51, 7 for the different uses of terms such as 'nature' (*ṭab'*). Fārābī also uses the Arabic translation of the Aristotelian *nómos*, namely *šarī'a* (ib. 27, 13; 20).

[63] Loucel, 1963-4.

Returning to the opinion of the Mu'tazila, we must note that they need not oppose the creation of speech by Allāh on principle, since it could fit perfectly well in their philosophy. On the other hand, a Mu'tazilite could hardly accept the existence of a necessary relation between words and things, created by Allāh or invented by men, because this would impair human judgment and thereby human liberty to choose by his own will. 'They (sc. the Mu'tazila) reason thus: if the knowledge about an attribute is necessary (*ḍarūrī*), then the knowledge about the thing to which it is assigned must be necessary, too. If Allāh the Lofty had created this knowledge in the heart of the wise, by determining such-and-such a word for such-and-such a meaning, it would thence follow that knowledge of Allāh would be necessary. This is contradicted by the reality of the task He imposes upon us (sc. the task to believe in Him)'.[64] The result of this reasoning is a general belief among the Mu'tazilites that language is a product of a conventional agreement (*isṭilāḥ, muwāḍa'a*) among men.[65] The theoretical possibility remains, though, that men made the first language, and that, after that, Allāh taught them through this language the rest of the languages—which is actually the opinion of 'Abd al-Ğabbār's teacher, Abū Hāšim (d. 933/321):[66] note once again that the Mu'tazila is not opposed on principle to the revelation of a language by Allāh.[67]

However this may be, words were generally regarded by the Mu'tazilites as arbitrary signs (*simāt*), which are used accidentally for certain objects. The word 'sign' (*sima*) is connected with the problem of the etymology of the word *ism*. This problem is dealt with by Ibn al-Anbārī in the first question of the *Inṣāf*.[68] Ibn al-Anbārī tells us that the Baṣrians—probably represented by al-Mubarrad[69]—derived the word *ism* from the radicals *s-m-w*, c.q. from the word *sumuww* (height), for words are an expression of nominata below them, and

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[64] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 23, 1-6 [A110]; cf. Suy. Muzh. 1, 12-3.

[65] 'Abd al-Ğabbār, Muġnī, 7, 183, 9-12. The fact remains that at least one Mu'tazilite held that the relation between words and things is completely necessary. This is the opinion of 'Abbād ibn Sulaimān (d. 844/230), cf. Mahdi, 1970, 52, n. 2 and above, chapter II, n. 61. In this case, however, the relation is considered as being natural (imposed by nature) and not imposed by Allāh. As for the implications of this identity of 'meaning' and 'necessary cause', cf. below, chapter X, note 63.

[66] Rāzī, Maf. 2, 201, 15-6; 'Abd al-Ğabbār, Mutašābih, 1, pp. 82-3.

[67] Mahdi, 1970, 53, n. 5.

[68] b. Anb. Inṣ. 1, 17 - 6, 10; cf. id. Asr. 3, 3 - 5, 18; Lisān, 19, 126, s.v. *s-m-w*; b. Ya'īš, 26, 21 - 27, 15.

[69] Mub. ap. b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 57, 17-8.

they are therefore elevated above them.[70] The Kūfans, on the other hand, derive the word *ism* from the radicals *w-s-m*, c.q. from the words *sima* (sign) and *wasm* (stigma): 'The word is a sign which is placed upon the thing and by which the thing is distinguished'.[71] Ibn al-Anbārī himself agrees with the explanation of the Kūfans, although he rejects the etymology proposed by them.[72]

Sima is an arbitrary sign, which serves to distinguish between different nominata in a conventional way.[73] The opposite interpretation of *ism* as derived from the radicals *s-m-w*, considers words as something connected with the things designated, and given to them for a special reason, whether by Allāh, or by nature. There is indeed a text where *sima* is used by the advocates of a conventional theory about the origin of speech; Ibn Ğinnī tells us: 'For (according to them) everything happened as if two, three, or more scholars should come together and should want to designate known objects. In order to do so they would choose for every object a sign and an expression (*sima wa-lafẓ*). By recalling this sign you would know the object it designates, and distinguish between it and other objects, and you would not need to have the object present, if this word was used'.[74] A connection between the Mu'tazila and the etymology *ism - sima* is reported by Bāqillānī.[75]

Considering these facts, and the fact that Weil thinks that this problem arose rather late,[76] we suppose that the original discussion about the true etymology of the word *ism* was later translated in terms of the discussion about the origin and the nature of speech. The

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[70] Cf. the expression *al-musammayāt taḥtahā* which is used in this context. The idea that words are elevated above the nominata is ridiculed by Ibn Ḥazm (*Kitāb al-fiṣal*, Cairo, 1321 A.H., 5, 29: the fact that we use words like 'dog, pig, idolatry, etc.' shows that not every word is as elevated as the Baṣrians suppose!). Cf. Arnaldez, 1956, 85.

[71] Ta'lab ap. b. Anb. Inṣ. 2, 4 [A111]; as a synonym for *sima* the term *'alāma* is used, ib. 2, 1; 2. Cf. Abū 'l-'Abbās (probably Ta'lab), Lisān, 14, 401, 1.6 from below: 'The noun is a description and a sign which is placed upon the object in order to make it known (by that sign)' [A112].

[72] Just as Ibn Fāris and 'Ukbarī do: b. Fār. Ṣāḥ., p. 57; also 'Ukb. Mas., 65-6: *ism* means the same as *'alāma*, but this does not imply that *ism* is derived from *wasm, sima*.

[73] Or between their various grammatical functions: *sima* as a grammatical sign, e.g. Zağğ. Iḍ. 99, 6; cf. b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 355, 16: *mausūm bi-'l-i'rāb*. Ibn Ğinnī uses the term with this meaning of 'grammatical sign' also ib. 2, 300, 4; as a synonym for *'alam*—cf. *'alāma* above, note 71—: ib. 2, 316, 12 sqq.

[74] b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ. 1, 44, 3-6 [A113]; cf. Loucel, 1963, 267 (36).

[75] Bāq. Tamh. 225-7; on the theological implications of the etymology of *ism*: van Ess, 1965, 117.

[76] Weil, 1913, 121.

Baṣrian etymology in Ibn al-Anbārī's account represents the opinion that words are the expression of the true nature of things, whereas Kūfan etymology grants words only a conventional, purely arbitrary meaning. It is not clear, however, if these consequences of the two etymologies were already drawn at the time of al-Mubarrad (the representative of the Baṣrian theory in Ibn al-Anbārī's account) and Ta'lab, or if they are the result of later theorizing influenced by the Mu'tazilite school.

The orthodox point of view in its most extreme form attributes the creation of each and every word to Allāh Himself. This is mostly based on the Qur'ānic affirmation that Allāh taught Adam all names.[77] There are precedents for this belief in Greek patristic and theological literature, where we can find the tendency not to acknowledge any activity of man in the creation of words.[78] On the other hand, for a follower of orthodoxy it was also possible to combine the two doctrines—creation of speech by Allāh and human activity—and suppose an agreement among men resulting in the invention of speech (which is then arbitrary, of course), but at the same time to state that this agreement first needed an inspiration from Allāh. There is, to be sure, a difference between this theory and the one we reported above from Abū Hāšim, but the result is virtually the same. In fact, we even find a Mu'tazilite who held this opinion, namely Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarā'inī (d. 1027/418).[79] It was also shared by al-Ğuwainī, the Imām al-Haramaini, Ğazzālī's teacher (d. 1085/478).[80] If instead of 'Allāh' we read the word 'nature' in these combinations of the two doctrines, we have here a faint echo of the Stoic doctrine, even more so if we keep in mind that the original controversy was not about the origin of speech, but about the value of the words for the understanding of the essence of the things designated by them. Interpreted in this way, the same combination is found in Ibn Ğinnī, who states that there are two kinds of words, the first sort not being liable to grammatical analogy (*qiyās*) (i.e. the original, natural words), whereas the second one is (i.e. the derived words which are classified by rules and grammar).[81] Here we are close again to the doctrine of the two impositions.

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[77] Qur'ān, 2/31; e.g. b. Fār. Ṣāḥ. 5-8; cf. Loucel, 1963, 255 sqq. (24 sqq.); b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ. 1, 40.

[78] Cf. Daniélou, 1956, 422-3.

[79] Suy. Muzh. 13, 8 sqq.

[80] Ib. 14, 5 sqq. Ğazzālī mentions the opinion of his teacher as one of the three possible solutions to the problem, in almost the same words as Suyūṭī, Ğazz. Mustaṣfā, 145, 16-7. Cf. Asín Palacios, 1939, 266; Cabanelas, 1956, 44-5.

[81] b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 42, 9-12, cf. above, note 40.

CHAPTER TEN

THE STOIC COMPONENT IN THE THEORY OF MEANING

> 'How could we say that someone is speaking without
> thinking, if speech were really the same as thought?'[1]

We have spoken above[2] about the so-called *voie diffuse*, by which
Greek doctrines filtered through to the Arabic world, and we have
also seen that there was another way, the *voie érudite*, constituted by
the translations of Greek learned works, which, in a more organized
way, acquainted the Arabs with Greek doctrines during the period
leading up to and coinciding with the bloom of the Baghdad univer-
sity.[3] It has been recognized lately that there are a considerable
number of traces of Stoic doctrine in Islamic culture.[4] Many of these
can be traced back to general philosophical literature (such as the
translations of the commentaries on Aristotle, pseudo-Ploutarchos'
Placita Philosophorum, etc.). But there are also such as cannot be
accounted for in this way. In such cases we must resort to the hypo-
thesis of a *voie diffuse*, which found its origin in the still Hellenistic
environment of the conquered territories. We have tried to show in
the preceding chapters that a number of elements in Arabic grammar
came to the Arabs by this *voie diffuse*, i.e. through contact with living
Greek grammar. Some of these elements can be traced back to the
Stoic roots within this Greek grammar (e.g. Zaǧǧāǧī's definition of
the noun;[5] the paradigms for the nouns *faras* and *insān* (or *raǧul*);[6]
the distinction between proper nouns and common nouns;[7] the Stoic
division of sounds;[8] the Stoic doctrine of phonetic changes;[9] the
concept of verbal tense[10]). Other elements must be the result of the

influence which translations of Greek philosophical writings exercised
upon Islamic philosophy (e.g. the definition of 'definition';[11] the
notion of 'predicate';[12] the Stoic conception of sound;[13] the notion
of 'something';[14] the concept of time[15]). In this chapter we want to
discuss the part the Stoics played in the movement of ideas with
regard to one important problem of Stoic logic, namely the connec-
tion between thinking and speaking, i.e. the problem of meaning.

To the logical part of Stoic philosophy belong dialectic (the knowl-
edge of truth and falsity), and rhetoric (the knowledge of eloquence).
The science of dialectic is divided by Chrysippos into two parts: the
signifying part (*sēmaínonta*) and the signified part (*sēmainómena*).[16]
This distinction between things which are signified and things which
signify, between meaning and sound, and in connection with it, the
distinction between thinking and speaking, i.e. between concept and
meaning, is essential for Stoic logic. It is true that Aristotle already
speaks about the difference between sound and meaning,[17] but in his
view meaning is identical with the concept formed in the thinking
mind. His distinction between an outer speech (*éxō lógos*) and a speech
in the mind (*lógos en tēi psuchēi*)[18] must be understood in the sense

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[1] 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, Muǧnī, 7, 18, 13-4 [A 114].

[2] Cf. above, chapter I, note 45.

[3] For this period: Hitti, 1968[9], 306-16.

[4] E.g. Jadaane, 1968.

[5] Cf. above, chapter III B, note 36.

[6] Cf. above, chapter III A, note 12.

[7] Cf. above, chapter III B, note 7.

[8] Cf. above, chapter II.

[9] Cf. above, chapter II, note 44.

[10] Cf. above, chapter III C.

[11] Cf. above, chapter VII, note 8.

[12] Cf. above, chapter III C.

[13] Cf. above, chapter II, note 37.

[14] Cf. above, chapter VII, note 33.

[15] Cf. above, chapter III C.

[16] Diog. Laert. 7, 41-2 = SVF, 2, 48: 'Some people say that the logical part
(sc. of philosophy) is divided into two sciences, namely into rhetoric and dialectic ...,
and (they say) that rhetoric is the science of speaking well about the things at issue;
and that dialectic is the science of discussing correctly about the things in question
and answer. That is the reason why they define it (sc. dialectic) thus: it is the science
of truth and falsehood and that which is neither' [G 64]. Diog. Laert 7, 62 = SVF 2,
122: 'Dialectic, according to Poseidonios, is the science of truth and falsehood and that
which is neither, it happens to deal with that which signifies and that which is signified,
as Chrysippos says' [G 65].

[17] E.g. Aristot. rhet. 1405 b 6-8: 'The beauty of a word, as Likumnios put it, lies
in the sounds or in the meaning, just as the ugliness of a word' [G 66].

[18] This difference is introduced anal. post., 76 b 24-7: 'The argumentation is not
connected with the outer speech, but with the speech in the mind, because neither is a
syllogism (sc. connected with outer speech). For it is always possible to object against
outer speech, but not always against inner speech' [G 67]. The same distinction between
two sorts of speech occurs as early as Plato, Soph. 263, who plays with the words *lógos*
and *diálogos*, just as Latin authors later used the words *ratio* and *oratio* (cf. also Theaet.
189 E - 190 A). This is the source of the distinction between speech-in-sounds and
speech-in-thought, later designated with the words *prophorikòs lógos* and *endiáthetos
lógos*, respectively. Pohlenz has shown (1939, 191-8) that this distinction, though resem-
bling to a certain degree the Stoic theory, cannot be attributed to the older Stoa. What
fell normally under the *endiáthetos lógos* (cf. SVF 2, 135) was dealt with by the Stoa

of his theory of meaning, which was later to become the basis for almost every theory of meaning in the Western world during the Middle Ages: 'What is in speech is a symbol of what is in the mind, and what is written is a symbol of what is in speech. Just as the letters are not the same for everyone, neither are the sounds. The emotions of the mind, however, of which these (sc. the sounds) are the immediate signs, are the same for everyone, and the things (sc. in the outer world) of which these (sc. the emotions in the mind) are the images, likewise'.[19] It will be clear that this tripartition 'things in the outer world'—'concepts = meanings'—'sounds' is different from the Stoic doctrine, which distinguishes most carefully between concept and meaning. But when even Steinthal tells us that the Stoics themselves did not understand their own innovation, and that in practice they confused their newly discovered 'meaning' with the concept or the thing in the outer world designated by it,[20] it seems necessary to consult the sources again. We must keep in mind, of course, that so revolutionary an innovation could very easily be misunderstood by later authors, but the fact that they confused it with the traditional point of view in their accounts[21] does not prove that even the Stoics themselves were inconsistent in their own doctrine.

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under the heading *sēmainómena*. In other words, the Stoics know about the distinction, but only in so far as they distinguish strictly between thinking and speaking, and not as a distinction between the physical and the psychical side of speech. One could say that the *sēmainómena* are identical with, or have the same content as the *endiáthetos lógos* in a system which does not distinguish between thoughts and meaning. Porphyrios attributes the distinction between the *prophorikós lógos* and the *endiáthetos lógos* explicitly to the Stoa (de abstin. 3, 2-17), which could be interpreted as follows: that the Stoa did use the distinction but in the sense of an opposition between the thoughts (*énnoiai*, SVF 2, 83) = *endiáthetos lógos* and the sounds together with their meaning (*phōnè* + *prágmata*) = *prophorikós lógos*. This opposition was later understood as a distinction between inner and outer speech.

[19] Aristot. de interpret. 16 a 3-8 [G 68]. For a discussion about this difficult text: Steinthal, 1890[2], 1, 185 sqq.; he translates: 'Die Sprache ist Zeichen für die Erregungen der Seele, und das Geschriebene für jene; und wie die Buchstaben nicht überall dieselben sind, so auch nicht die Laute. Die Erregungen der Seele dagegen, von denen letztere zunächst Zeichen sind, sind dieselben überall, und die Dinge, von denen jene (die Seeleneindrücke) Abbilder sind, sind ebenfalls dieselben'. Cf. also Pinborg, 1967, 36, who quotes Boethius' translation into Latin of this text, through which it became known to Medieval scholiasts in the Western world; also Pinborg, 1972, p. 30-1. Cf. also Ackrill, 1963, pp. 113-5; Kretzmann, 1974; Coseriu, 1970, 65-70; Larkin, 1971, 21 sqq.

[20] Steinthal, 1890[2], 1, 288: 'Es scheint auch kaum, als wären die Stoiker im Stande gewesen, das Wesen desselben (sc. of the *lektón*) genau anzugeben und festzuhalten; es schmilzt ihnen doch bald mit dem *nóēma*, bald mit dem *tunchánon* zusammen'.

[21] Cf. below, note 52.

The text which, unwittingly, gives us the clearest insight into the real meaning of the Stoic doctrine, and which at the same time betrays the reason for the innovation—perhaps even more so than the intellectual arguments mentioned by Sextus Empiricus and Augustinus—is the remark of an ignorant scholiast on Homer, who observes on Iliad B 349: 'Lie (*pseûdos*): instead of "false" (*pseudés*). Such things are called by the Stoics *lektá*, which are used instead of other words with regard to the signification'.[22] The sense of this is clear: in the verse from the Iliad there is a discrepancy between the meaning of what is said and what we think when we say it, and this is, according to the scholiast, the famous Stoic *lektón*—he does not, of course, understand the frame-work within which the *lektón* operates in the Stoic doctrine. But it must have been this discrepancy which led Chrysippos to write about anomaly, i.e. about the fact that similar things are indicated by different words and different things by similar words,[23] and it must have been this discrepancy which led the Stoics to distinguish between meaning and thought—possibly as a result of their non-Greek background, which made them more sensitive to such discrepancies than the Greeks themselves.[24] The same intention is evident in a fragment from Ploutarchos: 'They themselves (sc. the Stoics) say that one who forbids something says something, forbids something else, and commands something else again. For when you say "Do not steal!", you say those words "Do not Steal!", you forbid the stealing, and you command not to steal'.[25] Here we find the distinction between the signifying sounds (the words 'Do not steal!'), the concept in the mind (the prohibition to steal), and the linguistic meaning (a negative imperative of the verb 'to steal').

This implicit distinction is explained in the more 'official' texts, like for instance in a fragment from Ammonios, who speaks about

[22] SVF 2, 169 [G 69].

[23] Varro De L.L. 9, 1: ... *quod et Chrysippus de inaequabilitate cum scribit sermonis propositum habet ostendere similes res dissimilibus verbis et dissimiles similibus esse vocabulis notatas* ... Mette has explained this text correctly with the help of a fragment from Simplikios (1952, 12): 'Es handelt sich um ein formallogisches, kein im eigentlichen Sinne sprachliches Problem'; cf. Barwick, 1957, 53-4; Gentinetta, 1961, 107-8; 114 sqq.; the fragment from Simplikios: SVF 2, 177.

[24] For the non-Greek background of many Stoics: Pohlenz, 1939, 157. We may also point to Chrysippos' interest in figurative speech, which was probably for him more figurative than for native Greek speakers; cf. SVF 2, 259, 28; 260, 39; 261, 16; 263, 3; 263, 9; SVF 3, 125, 12.

[25] SVF 2, 171 [G 70]; cf. maybe also the quotation from Ps.-Apuleius, SVF 2, 204 a, and van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 4.

the difference between Aristotle and the Stoa on this point, although he does not seem to be too well informed: 'By these words (sc. the text we quoted above from the *De Interpretatione*), Aristotle teaches us what is principally and immediately signified by them (sc. the sounds), namely the concepts, and through them the things, and also, that we cannot suppose something between the concept and the things, as the Stoics did, calling it *lektón*'.[26] This question—whether meaning is something apart from thought or not—formed in the Middle Ages one of the most important issues in the discussions between the Modists, who held the first opinion, and the Nominalists, who held the second: 'Die Frage ob die Bedeutungen der Wörter und der Sätze irgendeine Existenzform haben, oder ob es nur die Wörter und ihren willkürlichen Gebrauch gibt, gehört von jeher zu den am heissesten umstrittenen Grundfragen dieser Disziplin'.[27].

A systematic discussion of the elements of the Stoic theory is provided by Sextus Empiricus in connection with the problem whether we can find truth and falsity in the sounds, in the meaning, or in the activity of the mind: 'The people of the Stoa say that three elements are connected with each other: that which is signified (*sèmainómenon*), that which signifies (*sèmaínon*), and the incidental thing (*tunchánon*). Of these elements the second one is the sound, for instance d-i-$ô$-n, the first one the meaning (*prágma*) itself, which is indicated by it, and which we grasp in its correlation with our understanding, whereas the barbarians do not understand it, even though they hear the sounds. The incidental thing is that which is in the outer world, in

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[26] Amm. comm. in Aristot. de interpret. 17, 24, ed. Busse = SVF 2, 168 [G 71]. It is, of course, true that Ammonios' statement that Stoic *lektá* are something intermediate between thoughts (concepts) and objects, is not entirely correct—he ought to have said that they are something intermediate between sounds and concepts (Long, 1971, 81). On the other hand, we may perhaps understand this statement in a less technical way ('something apart from thoughts and objects'). Long's equation of the triad *logikè phantasía—lektón—phantasthén* with the triad *sémeion—lektón—tunchánon* (ib. 83) cannot be accepted. Objects cause an impression, a representation in the mind (*phantasía*); on a linguistic level objects are represented by the linguistic entity sound—meaning; some representations correspond to, correlate with such meanings, and are therefore called rational (expressive, communicable) representations. It is incorrect to assert that 'the words which an auditor receives must be the utterance of the speaker's rational presentation' (Long, ib.). The hearer receives sounds emitted by a speaker's *phônètikón*, one of the faculties or the parts of the mind!

[27] Pinborg, 1967, 9, who follows this question up to modern times.

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this case Dion himself'.[28] We do not agree with Steinthal that in this case meaning is confused with thought.[29]

It seems that *lektón* was not originally a technical term, but an expression which indicated the principal characteristic of the 'things' (*prágmata*, in the Stoic sense of 'meaning'), namely that they are used in speech, and that they are the meaning of the actual sounds. This non-technical use appears in the following passages: 'Sounds are uttered, but the meanings (*prágmata*) are said; that is precisely the reason why they are also (called) *lektá*';[30] and: 'Every meaning (*lektón*) must be said, whence it obtained this name'.[31]

Augustinus, in the fifth chapter of his *De dialectica*[32] sums up in a similar way the elements which constitute meaning. He says: 'A word (*verbum*)[33] is a sign of any given thing which can be understood by a hearer, if it is uttered by a speaker. A thing *(res)* is everything which can be felt or understood or what is hidden ... Everything in the word which is not perceived by the ears, but by the mind, and which is deposited in the mind, is called *dicibile*'.[34]

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[28] Sext. Emp. adv. math. 8, 11 = SVF 2, 166 [G 72].

[29] Steinthal (1890², 1, 289), who says that in this case the *lektón* is confused with the *nóema*. The word *parhuphistámenon* is not to be translated as 'das im Verstande vorhandene', but it is to be understood as 'coexisting with and correlating with what is in the mind'; for the meaning of the word, cf. Liddell/Scott, s.v. (to the loci quoted there add: Apoll. Dysk. synt. passim, cf. Schneider's index, s.v.); Long, 1971, 77, 80, 84; 108, note 25; 110, note 71.

[30] SVF 3, 213, 22-3, a quotation from the *Téchnè* of Diogenes the Babylonian [G 73].

[31] Sext. Emp. adv. math. 8, 80 = SVF 2, 167 [G 74]. One wonders whether the term *legómena*, which occurs in the title of several Stoic works, might not mean the same thing, viz. meaning in so far as it is expressed in what is said; cf. a book of Chrysippos *Perì tôn stoicheíon toû lógou kaì tôn legoménôn*, SVF 2, 6, 17, and another one *Perì tès suntáxeôs tôn legoménôn*, SVF 2, 6, 18; especially the title of a book of Antipatros *Perì léxeôs kaì tôn legoménôn*, SVF 3, 247, 25-6 (*léxis = phônè; legómena = lektá, prágmata*?). Cf. the term *legómenon* used by the Aristotelian commentators, Long, 1971, 107, n. 13; 108, n. 23.

[32] This source had been already used by Schmidt for his reconstruction of the Stoic doctrine, 1839, 54-5; cf. also Barwick, 1957, 8-28; de Rijk, 1968; Coseriu, 1970, 105-23.

[33] *Verbum* is used by Augustinus in two senses: it can mean 'the phonetic shape of a word', but also 'unity of sound and meaning, linguistic entity', approximately in the same way as Apollonios Dyskolos uses *lektón* in the sense of 'word in so far as it means something', cf. Schneider's index, s.v. In this sense it is equivalent to the Stoic *léxis sèmantikè, phônè sèmantikè*, cf. SVF 2, 48, 29-30; 3, 213, 8.

[34] August. dialect. V, 7, 6-7; 8, 4-5: *Verbum est uniuscuiusque rei signum, quod ab audiente possit intellegi, a loquente prolatum. Res est quidquid vel sentitur vel intellegitur vel latet ... Quidquid autem ex verbo non aures sed animus sentit et ipso animo tenetur inclusum, dicibile vocatur.*

Several attempts have been made to give the Stoic concept of meaning its place within the logical context,[35] but its value has been expressed very well by Steinthal, notwithstanding his negative attitude to the Stoic innovation: 'Das *lektón* ist nur das, was Aristoteles *tà en tèi phônèi, hai en tèi phônèi katáphaseis kaì apóphaseis* nannte, und was auch er von der *dóxa* noch unterschied. Der Unterschied liegt nicht im Inhalt (denn die Vorstellung und das *lektón* haben denselben Inhalt), sondern in der Existenzweise, wie namentlich nach der Ansicht der Stoa der Fall sein musste'.[36] We must add, though, that in the Stoic doctrine there was a difference between the *lektón* and the 'Vorstellung' (*nóèma*), not only ontologically (non-existing *lektá* vs. corporeal existing *noèmata*[37]), but in practice as well, as we have seen for instance in the remark of the scholiast. It was precisely this difference which led the Stoics to stipulate something else, apart from the idea (*nóèma*).[38]

Several authors suppose a connection between the Stoic term *lektón* and the Arabic word *ma'nā* (meaning),[39] but this supposition is based exclusively on philosophical texts. One tends to forget that the first occurrence of the Arabic term was in grammatical texts, namely in Sībawaihi's *Kitāb*. This means that if there is any connection with the Greek term, this connection should be proved primarily through the grammatical contact between Greeks and Arabs, and not through the translations of Greek philosophical works.

In Arabic grammar, we find two pairs of words which indicate the opposite entities, sound and meaning. In the first place there are the

words *ism* and *musammā*, which indicate the opposition between the word and the real object in the outer world denoted by that word. Sībawaihi does not use the term *musammā* in his *Kitāb*, but his name is mentioned in the discussions about the identity of *ism* and *musammā*.[40] For these two terms we find a clear parallel in Greek texts: Ammonios uses the terms *ónoma* and *onomazómenon* in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*: 'For if the name of something is the name of a nominatum, it is clear that in the absence of a nominatum the meaningless sounds are not names'.[41] *Onomazómenon* is also found in the technical vocabulary of Apollonios Dyskolos.[42] In all probability this pair of words found its way into Arabic grammar and logic through the translations of Greek philosophical writings. This explains why precisely these two terms were used in the discussions about the identity of *ism* and *musammā*, which is a logical issue of a later date. We do not believe, therefore, that Sībawaihi used the term *musammā*, and the occurence of his name in this context must be explained in some other way. We refer to the discussion about the meaning of the term *musammā* as opposed to *ism*.[43]

In the second place, we have the pair *lafz* and *ma'nā*, as the expression of the opposition between a phonetic expression and its meaning. These terms are equivalent to the current distinction in later Greek grammar between *phônè* (sound) and *sèmainómenon* (meaning).[44] The basis for this opposition is found in the Stoic theories on meaning. The Stoics made a strict distinction between the phonetic and the semantic aspect of the linguistic sign, as we have seen in the quotation from Sextus Empiricus. *Sèmaînon* is the signifying, i.e. phonetic aspect (= *phônè*), and the *lektón* is its semantic correlate (= *sèmainómenon*). In Arabic grammar *lafz* and *ma'nā* are used in exactly the same way, viz. as terms for the two aspects of the linguistic sign. For 'sound' as a linguistically irrelevant entity, the Arabs used *ṣaut*; in Greek grammar we find in this case also *phônè*. *Lafz* and *ma'nā* remained the

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[35] E.g. Christensen, 1962, 44-8; Bocheński, 1956, 126 sqq.; Mates, 1961², 11-26; Mignucci, 1965, 88-103; Virieux-Reymond, 1941; Long, 1971; Kneale/Kneale, 1962, 139-43; Pinborg, 1972, 31-2.

[36] Steinthal, 1890², 1, 296.

[37] The incorporeity of the *lektá*: Sext. Emp. adv. math. 8, 409 = SVF 2, 85; cf. SVF 2, 170; 2, 331; 2, 48, 23 and cf. the discussion Long, 1971, 84-90. The *lektón* possesses only a *huphestánai*, and it can only be conceived of by inference, by abstraction (*katà metábasín tina*), Diog. Laert. 7, 53; Sext. Emp. adv. math. 9, 393; Long, 1971, 109, n. 54.

[38] Cf. also Schmidt's excellent summary of the Stoic views about meaning, 1839, 55, n. 78: 'Hoc *prâgma* vero cave putes Stoicis fuisse arborem illam ipsam s. illud *tò tunchánon*, in quod tu primum incideris, neve etiam ipsam illam visionem s. *phantasían*, quam arbor effecerit in animo tuo. Utravis enim non solum ipsa arbor, verum etiam visio, quippe quae nihil sit nisi *pâs échon hègemonikón*, secundum Stoicos ad res corporales pertinet: sed *prâgma* est incorporale illud, quod cum tua vox s. *phônè* alterius cuiuspiam animum attigerit, unusquisque voci isti subesse vel intelligat vel sentiat'. Cf. Christensen, 1962, 45-6.

[39] Rescher, 1966, 80, n. 39; van Ess, 1970, 33; Gätje, 1965, 280 sqq.; van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 188.

[40] Cf. above, chapter VIII, note 67.

[41] Amm. comment. in Aristot. de interpret. 30, 18-21, ed. Busse [G 75]; cf. ib. 35, 1-2; 10-1; 38, 3-4; 39, 4-5.

[42] Apoll. Dysk. synt. 113, 11.

[43] Cf. above, chapter VIII.

[44] Or *dèloúmenon*, cf. Schneider's index, s.v.; only once, the term *lektón* is used in combination with *phônè*, adv. 136, 32. Heinrichs, 1969, 69-82, discusses the significance of the *ma'nā/lafz* controversy in literary theory.

current expressions, both in Baṣrian and Kūfan grammar,[45] and the distinction was maintained by later grammarians.

There is no direct proof, apart from the resemblance in meaning (the verb *'anā* could translate the Greek verb *légein*, to intend), that *ma'nā* was a *calque* of the Stoic *lektón*, but whatever may have been the terminological connection between the Greek and the Arabic pair of words, it seems that in any case there is a link between the word *ma'nā* and the Stoic term *prâgma*, which is used as a synonym of *lektón*. At first, *prâgma* had the non-technical meaning of '(some)-thing'.[46] Then, in Stoic terminology, it received the meaning 'thing signified by the sounds, meaning' (= *lektón*). Still later, we find *prâg-ma* mostly in the sense of 'something abstract', as against *sôma*, which denotes a concrete object. This new meaning may have been prompted by the fact that the Stoa believed the *prágmata* (in the Stoic sense of 'meanings') to be bodiless.[47] In its new meaning, the word is used for instance by Dionysios Thrax, who divides words of the nominal class into concrete and abstract ones: 'Noun is a part of speech with cases, which can signify a body or an (abstract) thing'.[48] We find the same division into abstract and concrete nouns with Zamaḫšarī, who uses the terms *ism 'ain* (concrete noun) and *ism ma'nan* (abstract noun) for the two categories of nouns.[49] Here the word *ma'nā*, which is supposed to be the translation of the Stoic term *lektón*, appears as a translation of the word *prâgma*, which—as we have seen—was used in Stoic terminology as a synonym for that same term *lektón* with the sense of 'meaning'. Ibn Ğinnī uses the same terms *'ain* and *ma'nā*, and he even gives as the first two examples for the category of the concrete nouns the very two nouns used by Dionysios Thrax in this con-text: '... the masdars are the generic expressions for the abstract nouns (*ağnās al-ma'ānī*), just as other words are the generic expressions for the concrete nouns (*ağnās al-a'yān*), for instance "man", "horse", "boy", "house", "garden"...'.[50]

As a consequence of the abstract meaning of the word *ma'nā* and of the confusion in the Greek world about the precise meaning of the word *lektón*, which was often thought to be equivalent with the

notions 'idea, thought', we find *ma'nā* in the translations of Greek philosophical writings as a synonym for the Aristotelian *nóēma*. We do not agree with van Ess that this translation was caused by the nearly identical meaning of the two terms:[51] the difference between thought and meaning was fundamental in Stoic logic, as we have explained above. But this difference was misunderstood or not understood at all in classical antiquity.[52] This misunderstanding of the meaning of *lek-tón* and *prâgma* also explains the translation of the Greek term *lógos* (sentence) by *ma'nā* in the text of Ḥunain.[53] Possibly there was also some ambiguity, caused by the use of *prâgma* in some contexts where it almost seems to mean 'sentence'.[54] The confusion reaches its height in the commentary of al-Fārābī, who translates the Aristotelian word *prágmata* by *ma'ānī*, apparently because he misunderstood the word and took it in its Stoic sense. Aristotle, of course, did not know this Stoic sense: he used the word for the objects in the outer world (which are indicated in Stoic terminology by the word *tunchánonta*).[55] The same incorrect translation is found in Ğābir ibn Ḥayyān.[56]

In view of the aforegoing we must distinguish between two uses of the word *ma'nā*: on the one hand, we have *ma'nā* as the counterpart of *lafẓ*, in the sense of 'meaning correlating with a sound'; on the other hand, we have *ma'nā* in the sense of 'something abstract'. Possibly under the influence of the second use, *ma'nā* is often used in almost the same way as the *eîdos* of Platonism: it is then an abstract correlate of something physical in the physical world. This abstract correlate can be situated within or outside the mind, i.e. in the speaking subject or in the objects. The 'meaning which resides within the mind' (*ma'nā qā'im fī 'n-nafs*) has been the hotly debated subject of many discussions. Relevant information can be found in the chapter dealing with the refutation of those who claim that speech is a meaning within the mind, in the seventh book of 'Abd al-Ğabbār's *Muġnī*.[57] When his adversary tries to convince him that this supposed meaning within the mind is identical with thought, 'Abd al-Ğabbār retorts: 'and if he says "what I mean is thought and reason, because

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[45] For Kūfan grammar, cf. e.g. Ta'lab, Mağ. 2, 387, 3 sqq.

[46] Cf. e.g. Aristot. de interpret. 17 a 38.

[47] Cf. above, note 38.

[48] Dion. Thr. 24, 3 [G 76].

[49] Zam. Muf. 5, 3.

[50] b. Ğin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 206, 8-10 [A 115].

[51] van Ess, 1970, 33, n. 62.

[52] E.g. Simpl. comment. in Aristot. categ. 10, 3 sqq., who says that *lektá* are thoughts.

[53] Gätje, 1965, 280.

[54] Diog. Laert. 7, 64; id. 7, 66 = SVF 2, 186.

[55] Far. Šarb. 27, 23 = Aristot. de interpret. 16 a 7; also Aristot. top. 108 a 18 sqq.; soph. el. 165 a 6-14; on *prágmata* = *tunchánonta*: Long, 1971, 80.

[56] Ğābir, ap. Kraus, 1942, 2, 258, nn. 4-5.

they are speech (*kalām*), and what we hear is an indication of it", we answer: "if that is what you mean, you use the wrong terms, although you hit on the right meaning—just as someone who claims that movement is a meaning within the mind, thereby indicating the will (i.e. it was never our purpose to deny the existence of thought: the only thing you have done is to give it another name). We know for sure that there is no connection between thought and the expression (*'ibāra*) of that thought. So, how could the expression be called an indication (*dalāla*) of that thought?"'.[58] Here we find expressed in a somewhat crude way the essence of the Stoic theory that there is no identity of thought and speech. Otherwise, as 'Abd al-Ǧabbār puts it, it would be impossible to say that someone 'speaks without thinking". We will find Ibn Ḥazm using the same theory.

On the other hand, we cannot identify the *ma'ānī* with the physical objects themselves, in the way al-Fārābī and Ǧābir did in the passages quoted above—probably because they misunderstood the meaning of the Aristotelian term *prágmata*. When Fārābī talks about the 'traces (*āṯār*) in the mind, which are imitations of meanings existing outside the mind',[59] he is in all probability referring to physical objects. On the other hand, when the Mu'tazilites are talking about the *ma'ānī* outside the mind, they are referring to something non-physical within the objects.

The meaning of the term *ma'nā* in the works of the Mu'tazilite philosopher Mu'ammar (d. 835/220) has been studied by Frank.[60] The gist of his conclusion is that *ma'nā* often receives the meaning 'cause' (*'illa*).[61] This means that *ma'nā* is 'the intrinsic causal determinant of the thing being so', in other words: the inhering of a certain accident in a certain substance is caused by an infinite series of causal determinants (*ma'ānī*)—these determinants are infinite because each of them has to be caused by another one. This is the 'coercive cause' (*ma'nā*

[57] 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, Muġnī, 7, 14-20.

[58] Ib. 18, 6-11 [A 116]. Probably, 'Abd al-Ǧabbār's adversary in this discussion was an Aš'arite. We find the Aš'arites as the defenders of the theory that language is a *ma'nā qā'im fī 'n-nafs* in a treatise of the Ḥanbalite Ibn 'Aqīl (d. ± 1095/490), Rasā'il, pp. 22 sqq.

[59] Far. Šarḥ, 24, 24 - 25, 1 [A 117].

[60] Frank, 1967; cf. Nader, 1956, 208-10.

[61] To Frank's quotations we may add b. Ḥazm, Iḥk. 8, 1129, 9-10: 'Some of them call the causes (*'ilal*) meanings (*ma'ānī*), and this is one of their grossest heresies, and a false doctrine of their followers, because meanings are the explanation of sounds (sc. and not the cause of something)' [A 118].

mūǧib), of which 'Abd al-Ǧabbār speaks.[62] When there is in everything something which causes it to be the way it is, and when this something is called *ma'nā* (meaning), we may naturally suppose that this 'meaning' is necessarily connected with the word which indicates the object—which is what one Mu'tazilite actually holds.[63] We will not enter here into the question which of the two theories originated first, and whether we can explain Mu'ammar's theories from this opinion about meaning, or the other way round.

It is not necessary, though, to go as far as the Mu'tazila, and conceive of the *ma'nā* as a sort of autonomous cause within the object, always coexisting with the object itself. We may also regard them as *intentiones universales* in the objects, put there by Allāh, and forming the material for the thinking mind. This conception is found in the psychological theories of Ibn Rušd and Ibn Sīnā.[64] In their theories, *ma'ānī* are those elements in the objects which are not perceived by the physical senses, but only by some sort of perceiving faculty of the mind (called by Ibn Rušd *quwwa mutafakkira* and by Ibn Sīnā *quwwa bāṭina*):[65] 'As for the meaning, it is that which is perceived by the mind within the object that is perceived, without the senses being able to perceive it (sc. that meaning) in the first place'.[66] With this we may compare the Stoic definition of 'meaning' we quoted above—'(*sèmainómenon*) is the meaning (*prágma*) itself, which is indicated by it (sc. the sound), and which we grasp in its correlation with our understanding'—:[67] in the Stoic definition thought and meaning are parallel developments in the mind, whereas in the theories of Ibn Rušd and Ibn Sīnā meaning is situated within the physical objects. In that case, the meaning of *ma'ānī* is very close to the Aristotelian concept of 'form'. There is a faint reminiscence of Ammonios' incorrect observation that the *lektón* is something between the concept and the object—and not something between the sound and the concept, as he ought to have said.[68]

All this is absolutely unacceptable to Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064/456). For him as a Zāhirite and a profound believer in the creation of speech by

[62] E.g. 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, Muġnī, 7, 15; 7, 19, 8.

[63] Cf. chapter IX, note 65.

[64] Cf. Gätje, 1971b.

[65] Cf. Gätje, 1965.

[66] b. Sīn. Šifā', 43 [A 119]; cf. Gätje, 1965, 279.

[67] SVF 2, 166; cf. also the remarks in the scholia D.T. on abstractions, 217, 7-8; 360, 8-11; 572, 17.

[68] Cf. above, note 26.

Allāh, the meaning of a word is not identical with something in the objects, nor with something in the mind: meaning is something objective connected with the phonetic expression. A word has a meaning, because Allāh provided it with that meaning. We dare not interpret that meaning otherwise than literally, not to mention changing it. We must accept the apparent and evident meaning of speech, such as it is evidently understood by everyone in common discourse (*zāhir*).[69] This means that the relation between a word and its meaning is necessary, not because of an infinite series of *ma'āni* as in the theories of Mu'ammar, but because Allāh created words and meanings together. Our own intention (*maqṣūd*) can only be expressed in accordance with the objective intention of the word (i.e. the meaning): 'It is correct to say that what is intended (*murād*) by the imperative is a meaning (*ma'nā*) reserved to its phonetic expression and to its morphological structure'.[70] (i.e. the imperative has a meaning, and our role is restricted to putting that meaning to a use). The meaning correlates with an object in the physical world (*musammā*), not with our concept of that object. As the result of completely different reasons and motives, Ibn Ḥazm and the Stoa arrive at the same point of view: meaning and concept are different entities, although they are both correlated with the physical objects.

Finally, we must point to another meaning of the term *ma'nā*, namely 'intention', almost synonymous with terms such as *mu'annā* and *maqṣūd*. Probably this sense was in part brought about by the meaning of the verb from which *ma'nā* is derived: '*anā* 'to intend'.[71]

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[69] Whence the name of the school, the 'Zāhiriyya', Goldziher, 1884.

[70] b. Ḥazm, Iḥk. 3, 261, 9 [A 120]; on this passage, Arnaldez, 1956, 52, n. 2; 58. Arnaldez translates: 'Il est constant que pour l'impératif, son propos (*murād*) est une signification (*ma'nā*) particularisée par son expression verbale (*lafẓ*) et son intention (*niyya*)', apparently reading *bi-niyya* instead of *binya*. We cannot agree with this translation, because ibn Ḥazm speaks nowhere before in this chapter about the *niyya*, and because the combination *lafẓ wa-binya* (or *lafẓ wa-binā'*) is a standard expression. What is more, we do not believe that Arnaldez' interpretation of *niyya* as 'intention significative' is correct. The term *niyya* is generally used with the sense of 'intention of the speaker' (Sib. Kit. 1, 123, 11; 1, 125, 13; 1, 126, 4; b. Ġin. Ḥaṣ. 1, 309, 9; 1, 313, 14; b. Kais. ap. Zaǧǧ. Maǧ. 320, 6; b. Anb. Inṣ. 36, 11; 198, 5; 259, 17; 287, 21), and never with the sense of 'objective grammatical meaning without correlation with the intention of the speaker'. (Only once have we found *niyyat al-iḍāfa*, b. Ġin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 303, 10.) Another signification Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 103, 3: with the force of a vowel (*fī niyya ḥaraka*).

[71] Rāzī, Maf. 1, 24, 16: '... because the meaning is an interpretation of the thing, hinted at by someone and intended by him' [A 121]. Cf. *mu'annā* (Zaǧǧ. Lām. 23, 10) and *ma'niyya* (b. Ġin. Ḥaṣ. 2, 300, 1); *maqṣūd* is used in this sense b. Anb. Inṣ. 48, 5; 54, 20; 63, 20; 139, 1; Zaǧǧ. Iḍ. 134, 2. The first two of these synonyms are probably derivatives of *ma'nā*.

Addendum

After the completion of my manuscript I received a copy of the dissertation of dr. J. R. T. M. Peters, entitled *God's created speech. A study in the speculative thought of the Mu'tazilī Qāḍi l-Quḍāt Abū l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Ǧabbār bn Aḥmad al-Hamaḍānī* (diss. Nijmegen; Leiden, 1976). Peters analyses here for the first time in great detail the structure and terminology of 'Abd al-Ǧabbār's thought, especially in the seventh book of the *Muġnī*. I will restrict myself to the enumeration of those passages that are of immediate interest for the subject of my study, without making any comments. The classification of sounds (Muġnī, 7, 6, 16-7, 2; cf. below, pp. 32-3): Peters, 1976, 38-42; 295-9; (Peters proposes the same emendation *muqayyad* that I suggested, but he translates "fluent", "bound together"; cf. ib. 139, note 160; 296, note 17); *ma'nā qā'im fi 'n-nafs* (Muġnī, 7, 14-20; cf. below, pp. 187-8): Peters, 1976, 308-12; *al-kalām fi'l al-mutakallim* (Muġnī, 7, 48 sqq.; cf. below, p. 152): Peters, 1976, 209-10. Peters' analysis of 'Abd al-Ǧabbār's *Muġnī* is certainly of great importance for the study of the Arabic ideas concerning the nature of speech.

Finally I wish to refer to another book, which I regret not having been able to use, namely Troupeau's index on Sibawaihi (G. Troupeau, *Lexique-index du Kitāb de Sibawayhi*. Paris, 1976. Études Arabes et Islamiques, Série 3, Études et Documents, VII), which will prove to be a most useful instrument for the study of Arabic grammar.

Diagram of the most Important Arabic Grammarians

Abū 'Amr (d. 154/770)

F 32 / D 27 / G I, 97 / N 16 / B 2, 231 / A 28 / Z 11 / W 3, 466

Abū 'Ubaid (d. 223/837)

F 85 / G I, 105; S I, 166 / N 86 / B 2, 253 / Z 39

Abū 'Ubaida (d. 210/825)

F 68 / G I, 102; S I, 162 / N 64 / B 2, 294 / A 67 / Z 35 / W 5, 235

al-Ahfaš al-Awsaṭ (d. 215/830 or 221/835)

F 61 / D 94 / G I, 104 / N 84 / B 1, 590 / A 50 / Z 16 / W 2, 380

al-Ahfaš al-Kabīr (d. ?)

F 61 / G S I, 165 / N 27 / B 2, 74 / A 40; 48 / Z 12

al-Aṣma'ī (d. 216/831)

F 72 / G S I, 163 / N 69 / B 2, 112 / A 58 / Z 35 / W 3, 170

al-Farrā' (d. 207/822)

F 129 / D 192 / G I, 118; S I, 178 / N 59 / B 2, 333 / A 34; 51 / Z 29

al-Ġarmī (d. 225/839)

F 81 / D 111 / G I, 108 / N 90 / B 2, 7 / A 72 / Z 16 / W 2, 485

al-Ḥalīl (d. 175/791)

F 37 / D 30 / G I, 98; S I, 159 / N 27 / B 1, 557 / A 38 / Z 13 / W 2, 244

Ibn as-Sikkīt (d. 244/858)

F 158 / G I, 120; S I, 180 / N 109 / B 2, 349 / Z 40

'Īsā ibn 'Umar (d. 149/766)

F 29 / D 25 / G I, 96 / N 14 / B 2, 237 / A 31 / Z 36

al-Kisā'ī (d. 183/799)

F 121 / D 172 / G I, 117; S I, 177 / N 39 / B 2, 162 / A 34; 40; 51 / Z 28 / W 3, 295

al-Māzinī (d. 249/863)

F 83 / D 115 / G S I, 168 / N 111 / B 1, 463 / A 74 / Z 18 / W 1, 283

Quṭrub (d. 206/821)

F 65 / D 108 / G S I, 161 / N 56 / B 1, 242 / A 49 / Z 23 / W 4, 312

Sībawaihi (d. 177/793)

F 42 / D 57 / G I, 99; S I, 160 / N 35 / B 2, 229 / A 48 / Z 15 / W 3, 463

as-Siġistānī, Abū Ḥātim (d. 182/798)

F 87 / G I, 107 / N 116 / B 1, 606 / A 93 / Z 21

Yūnus (d. 182/798)

F 34 / D 28 / G I, 97; S I, 158 / N 14 / B 2, 237 / A 31 / Z 36

N = b. Anb. Nuzha; B = Suy. Buġya; A = Sir. Aḥb.; Z = Zub. Tab.; W = b. Ḥall. Waf.; G = Brockelmann, GAL; F = Flügel, 1862; D = Daif, 1968.

al-Aḫfaš aṣ-Ṣaġīr (d. 315/927)

F 63 / G I, 130 / N 149 / B 2, 167 / Z 25 / W 3, 301

al-Fārābī (d. 339/950)

G I, 232; S I, 375 / W 5, 153

al-Fārisī (d. 377/987)

F 110 / D 255 / G I, 116; S I, 175 / N 187 / B 1, 496 / W 2, 80

Ibn al-Anbārī, Abū Bakr (d. 328/939)

F 168 / D 238 / G I, 122; S I, 182 / N 158 / B 1, 312 / Z 32 / W 4, 341

Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004)

F 246 / D 241 / G I, 135; S I, 197 / N 190 / B 1, 352

Ibn Ginnī (d. 392/1002)

F 248 / D 265 / G I, 131; S I, 191 / N 197 / B 2, 132 / W 3, 246

Ibn al-Ḥayyāṭ (d. 320/932)

F 203 / D 246 / N 149 / B 1, 48 / A 109 / Z 26

Ibn Kaisān (d. 320/932 or 299/911)

F 97; 209, n. 2 / D 248 / G I, 111; S I, 170 / N 143 / B 1, 18 / A 108 / Z 27

Ibn as-Sarrāg (d. 316/928)

F 103 / D 140 / G I, 114 / N 150 / B 1, 109 / A 108 / Z 52 / W 4, 339

Mabramān (d. 345/956)

F 96 / N 133; 151 / B 1, 175 / A 108 / Z 25

al-Mubarrad (d. 285/898)

F 92 / D 123 / G I, 109; S I, 168 / N 132 / B 1, 269 / Z 23 / W 4, 313

ar-Rummānī (d. 384/994)

F 108 / G I, 115; S I, 174 / N 189 / B 2, 180 / Z 27? / W 3, 299

as-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979)

F 107 / D 145 / G I, 115; S I, 174 / N 183 / B 1, 507 / A 109 / Z 26 / W 2, 78

Ṭa'lab (d. 291/904)

F 164 / D 224 / G I, 121; S I, 181 / N 139 / B 1, 396 / Z 31 / W 1, 102

Zaggāg (d. 311/923)

F 98 / D 135 / G I, 111; S I, 170 / N 147 / B 1, 411 / A 108 / Z 24 / W 1, 49

az-Zaggāgī (d. 337/949 or 340/951)

F 99 / D 252 / G I, 112 / N 183 / B 2, 37 / Z 26 / W 3, 136

N = b. Anb. Nuzha; B = Suy. Buġya; A = Sir. Aḫb.; Z = Zub. Tab.; W = h. Ḥall. Waf.; G = Brockelmann, GAL.; F = Flügel, 1862; D = Daif, 1968.

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ORIGINALS OF THE ARABIC AND GREEK TEXTS QUOTED IN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

١ — هذه الصناعة تسمى باليونانية غرماطيقي وبالعربية النحو.

٢ — الكلام إسم وفعل وحرف، فالإسم ما انبأ عن المسمى، والفعل ما أنبئ به، والحرف ما جاء لمعنى.

٣ — واما الفعل فأمثلة أخذت من لفظ أحداث الأسماء وبنيت لما مضى ولما يكون ولما يقع وما هو كائن لم ينقطع.

٤ — الرفع عند أصحاب المنطق من اليونانيين واو وناقصة وكذلك الضم وأخواته . . . . . والكسر وأخواته عندهم ياء ناقصة والفتح وأخواته عندهم ألف ناقصة، وان شئت قلت الواو المدودة اللينة ضمة مشبعة والياء المدودة اللينة كسرة مشبعة والألف الممدودة فتحة مشبعة.

٥ — ألا ترى أن من متقدمي القوم من كان يسمى الضمة الواو الناقصة والكسرة الياء الصغيرة والفتحة الألف الصغيرة ؟

٦ — وسئل الخليل عن الرفع لم جعل للفاعل ؟ فقال : الرفع أول حركة، والفاعل أول متحرك، فجعلوا أول حركة لأول متحرك.

٧ — فأما مقابلة الألفاظ يا يشاكل أصواتها من الأحداث فباب عظيم واسع، . . . . . وذلك أنهم كثيراما يجعلون أصوات الحروف على سمت الأحداث المعبر بها عنها فيعدلونها بها ويحتذونها عليها.

٨ — من ذلك قولهم : خضم، وقضم، فالخضم لاكل الرطب، . . . . . والقضم للصلب اليابس . . . فاختاروا الخاء لرخاوتها للرطب، والثقاف لصلابتها لليابس، حذوا لسموع الأصوات على محسوس الأحداث.

٩ — والأصل في هذا الباب أن جنس الصوت قد يختلف الوجه الذي يحدث عليه، فقد يكون صوتا مفيدا غير مقطع، وقد يكون مقطعا في جنس واحد، وقد يكون مقطع في جنس على وجه يتصل تارة

في الحدوث وينفصل أخرى، وقد يحدث على وجه يكون حرفا
وحروفا. وقد يحدث على وجه لا يوصف بذلك، كصرير الباب،
وإن كان قد يكون من جنس بعض الحروف، وإنا تكشف الحروف
بأن يحدث الصوت في بنية ومخارج مخصوصة، كبنية الفم وغيره.

١٠ — فلذلك لا يوصف منطق الطير كلاما، وإن كان قد يكون حرفين
أو حروفا منظومة.

١١ — . . . . لأنه لا يكون حروفا منظومة إلا وهي أصوات مقطعة.

١٢ — أما الكلام فكل لفظ مستقل بنفسه، مفيد لمعناه. وهو الذي
يسميه النحويون الجمل نحو زيد أخوك، وقام محمد . . . وأما
القول فأصله أنه كل لفظ مذل به اللسان، تاما كان أو ناقصا.
فالتام هو المفيد، اعني الجملة . . . . . والناقص ما كان بضد
ذلك، نحو زيد، ومحمد، وإن، . . . . . فكل كلام قول، وليس كل
قول كلام.

١٣ — فالكلم إسم وفعل وحرف جاء لمعنى ليس بآسم ولا فعل.

١٤ — وأما الفعل فأمثلة أخذت من لفظ أحداث الأسماء وبنيت لما مضى
ولا يكون ولم يقع وما هو كائن لم ينقطع.

١٥ — وليس بآسم ولا فعل صفة لحرف لا لمعنى كما ظن بعضهم بدليل
قوله في آخر الباب وليس بآسم ولا فعل.

١٦ — ومن الألفاظ الدالة الألفاظ التي يسميها النحويون الحروف التي
وضعت دالة على معان.

١٧ — وقد أكثر أهل العربية في هذا، وأقرب ما فيه ما قاله سيبويه،
إنه الذي يفيد معنى ليس في آسم ولا فعل، نحو قولنا « زيد
منطلق » ثم نقول « هل زيد منطلق » فأفدنا « بهل » ما لم
يكن في « زيد » ولا « منطلق ».

١٨ — وإن سأل سائل فقال : لم قال وحرف جاء لمعنى وقد علمنا أن
الأسماء والأفعال جئن لمعنى ؟ ألخ.

١٩ — اللقب هو آسم طارئ على آسور لها آسم آخر.

٢٠ — الإسم ما كان واقعا على معنى، نحو رجل وفرس وزيد وعمرو وما
أشبه ذلك.

٢١ — الإسم ما سمى بمسماه وأوضحه وكشف بمعناه.

٢٢ — كل ما دخل عليه حرف من حروف الجر فهو آسم فإن أمتنع من
ذلك فليس بآسم.

٢٣ — فالمفردة منها ما هي ألقاب أعيان مثل زيد وعمرو ومنها ما يدل
على أجناس الأشياء وأنواعها مثل الإنسان والفرس والحيوان
والبياض والسواد.

٢٤ — الإسم ما دل على معنى وذلك المعنى يكون شخصا وغير شخص.

٢٥ — الأسماء ما أبانت عن الأشخاص، وتضمنت معانيها نحو رجل
وفرس.

٢٦ — الإسم ما جاز فيه نفعني وضرني — يعني ما جاز أن يخبر عنه.

٢٧ — إذا وجدت شيئا يحسن له الفعل والصفة نحو زيد قام وزيد قائم
ثم وجدته يثنى ويجمع نحو قولك الزيدان والزيدون ثم وجدته
يمتنع من التصريف فآعلم أنه آسم.

٢٨ — طعن قوم في قولهم « الإسم ما يصح الإخبار عنه » بأن قالوا :
لفظه « أين وكيف وإذا » أسماء مع أنه لا يصح الإخبار عنه،
وأجاب عبد القاهر النحوي عنه بأنا إذا قلنا « الإسم ما جاز
الإخبار عنه » أردنا به ما جاز الإخبار عن معناه، ويصح الإخبار
عن معنى « إذا » لأنك إذا قلت « آتيتك إذا طلعت الشمس »،
كان المعنى « آتيتك وقت طلوع الشمس »، والوقت يصح الاخبار
عنه، بدليل أنك تقول « طاب الوقت ».

٢٩ — الإسم في كلام العرب ما كان فاعلا او مفعولا أو واقعا في حيز
الفاعل والمفعول به.

٣٠ — فالإسم ما جاز ان يكون فاعلا او مفعولا.

٣١ — إن كل فاعل وكل منفعل فهو جسم.

٣٢ — ثم يعرف في أي حال يلحق كل واحد من الأسماء والكلم أي

طرف فيأتي أولا على إحصاء حال حال من أحوال الأسماء الموحدة المتصرفة التي يلحقها بحال ما طرف من الأطراف ثم يعطي مثل ذلك في الأسماء المؤنثة والمثناة والمجموعة ثم يعطي مثل ذلك في الكلم الموحدة وفي المثناة والمجموعة إلى أن يستوعب الأحوال التي تتبدل بها على الكلم أطرافها التي جعلت لها ثم يعرف الأسماء تتصرف في بعض الأطراف وفي أيها تتصرف وفي أيها لا تتصرف ثم يعرف الأسماء التي كل واحد منها مبني على طرف واحد فقط وأيها مبني على أي طرف.

٣٣ — فاستنبطوا من مجاري كلامهم قوانين لتلك الملكة مطردة شبيه الكليات والقواعد يقيسون عليها سائر أنواع الكلام ويلحقون الأشباه بالأشباه.

٣٤ — التصريف هو لفظ يزاد على الإسم بحركة على إستقامته . . . . . وأصناف التصاريف خمسة كما ذكرته في كتاب العبارة.

٣٥ — (الصرف) هو علم بأصول تعرف بها أحوال أبنية الكلم التي ليست بإعراب.

٣٦ — (الصرف) هو معرفة أصل الكلمة وزيادتها وحذفها وأبدالها.

٣٧ — الفعل ما أمتنع من التثنية والجمع.

٣٨ — الفعل لا يؤنث وإنما يؤنث الإسم.

٣٩ — الفعل ما حسنت فيه التاء نحو قمت وذهبت.

٤٠ — الفعل ما حسن فيه أمس وغدا.

٤١ — والمبتدأ الإسم الذي هو الأول في المرتبة قبل كل عامل لفظي، وإنما قيل أول في المرتبة ليفرق بين ما هو أول في اللفظ وموضعه التأخير، وبين ما هو أول يستحق التقديم، وإن كان مؤخرا في اللفظ على الإتساع.

٤٢ — فإذا أخذ زمان له بعد محدود في الماضي من الآن الذي هو نهاية ومبدأ، وجمع إلى مثله من المستقبل وكان بعدهما جميعا من

الآن الذي هو النهاية والمبدأ بعدا واحدا في الماضي والمستقبل وجمعا جميعا كان ذلك الزمان هو الزمان الحاضر.

٤٣ — وأما الفعل فأمثلة أخذت من لفظ أحداث الأسماء لما مضى ولما يكون ولم يقع وما هو كائن لم يتقطع، فأما بناء ما مضى فذهب وسمع ومكث وحُمِدَ، وأما بناء ما لم يقع فإنه قولك . . . مخبرا يقتل ويذهب ويضرب ويُقتّل ويُضرّب، وكذلك بناء ما لم ينقطع وهو كائن إذا أخبرت.

٤٤ — وأما حال الكلمة المصرفة والقائمة، فهي أن القائمة في لغة اليونانيين هي ما يدل على الحاضر، والمصرفة ما يدل على أحد الزمانين .

٤٥ — . . . . . بين ما هي منها مصادر وهي التي منها تعمل الكلم عما ليس بمصادر وكيف تغير المصادر حتى تصير كلأ.

٤٦ — وبناء إفعاللت من الحُوَّة، . . . . والمصدر منه إحوياء — وقال بعض النحويين الأجود إحويواء، لأن الياء منقلبة عن ألف زائدة في إحواويت كما تنقلب في سُوَيْر — ولم يذكر هذا سيبويه. والفرق بينها أنها في المصدر بمنزلة الأصل غير منقلبة، لأن الفعل هو المأخوذ من المصدر.

٤٧ — فإن صناعة النحو مبنية على تمييز صواب الكلام من خطئه على مذاهب العرب بطريق القياس الصحيح .

٤٨ — وأما الكتب التي ينحو بها نحو أصحاب التجارب فوجدت ثلاث مقالات منها . . . — كتابه في التجربة الطبية. هذا الكتاب مقالة واحدة يقتص فيها حجج أصحاب التجارب وأصحاب القياس بعضهم على بعض. وترجمته أنا منذ قريب إلى السريانية لبختيشوع . . . . — ومنها كتابه في الحث على تعلم الطب. هذا الكتاب أيضا مقالة واحدة ونسخ فيه كتاب مينوذوطس وهو كتاب حسن نافع ظريف. ترجمته أنا إلى السريانية لجبريل وترجمه إلى

العربية حبيش لأحمد بن موسى . . . — ومنها كتابه في جمل التجربة. هذا الكتاب أيضا مقالة واحدة. ونسخته في كتبي ولم أترجمه.

٤٩ — ما إجتمع الأطباء عليه وشهد له القياس و عضدته التجربة فليكن إمامك.

٥٠ — أحببت أن أعلم كيفية إدراك معرفة الطب ومأخذ أصله، أذلك بالحس أم بالقياس والسنة، أم يدرك بأوائل العقل، أم عــلم ذلك وطريقة يدرك عندكم من جهة السمع ؟ ألخ .

٥١ — (القياس) عبارة عن تقدير الفرع بحكم الأصل.

٥٢ — (القياس) هو حمل فرع على أصل بعلة يقتضي إجراء حكم الأصل على الفرع .

٥٣ — فأما من تكلم من العامة بالعربية بغير إعراب فيفهم عنه، فإنما ذلك في التعارف المشهور والمستعمل المألوف بالدراية. ولو إلتجأ أحدهم إلى الايضاح عن معنى ملتبس بغيره، من غير فهمه بالإعراب، لم يمكنه ذلك.

٥٤ — إن العرب نطقت على سجيتها وطباعها. وعرفت مواقع كلامهم، وقام في عقولها علله، وان لم ينقل ذلك عنها، وإعتلت أنا بما عندي أنه علة لما علته منه.

٥٥ — إجمعْ بين أحمد بن يحيى وبين هذا البصري.

٥٦ — وإنما نذكر هذه الأجوبة عن الكوفيين، على حسب ما سمعنا ما يحتج به عنهم من ينصر مذهبهم من المتأخرين، وعلى حسب ما في كتبهم إلا أن العبارة عن ذلك بغير ألفاظهم، والمعنى واحد. لأنا لو تكلفنا حكاية ألفاظهم بأعيانها لكان في نقل ذلك مشقة علينا من غير زيادة في الفائدة، بل لعل أكثر ألفاظهم لا يفهمها من لم ينظر في كتبهم.

٥٧ — وانه رام نحو هؤلاء الكوفيين، وانهم يحصلون على الرواية فإذا إختلفوا رجعوا إلى الكتب.

٥٨ — إعلمْ أن إنكار القياس في النحو لا يتحقق، لأن النحوكله قياس، . . . . فمن أنكر القياس، فقد أنكر النحو . . . ولا يعلم أحد من العلماء أنكره.

٥٩ — . . . . . ولأي سبب نقل التعليم في أيام عمر بن عبد العزيز من الإسكندرية إلى أنطاكية ثم إنتقاله إلى حران في أيام المتوكل وانتهى ذلك في أيام المعتضد إلى قويري ويوحنا بن حيلان وكانت وفاته بمدينة السلام في أيام المقتدر ألخ .

٦٠ — وزعم ناس يتوقت عن قبول أخبارهم أن الذين يسمون الفلاسفة قد كان لهم إعراب ومؤلفات نحو . . قال أحمد بن فارس : وهذا كلام لا يخرّج على مثله.

٦١ — « ومثال ذلك نحو ما فإنه في موضوع ما أي في النفس » نحو سيبويه مثلا عند العرب وسوسياتس عند اليونانيين .

٦٢ — ومن الألفاظ الد الة الألفاظ التي يسميها النحويون الحروف التي وضعت دالة على معان، وهذه الحروف هي أيضا أصناف كثيرة، غير أن العادة لم تجر من أصحاب علم النحو العربي إلى زماننا هذا بأن يفرد لكل صنف منها إسم يخصه، فينبغي أن نستعمل في تعديد أصنافها الأساسي التي تأدت إلينا عن أهل العلم بالنحو من أهل اللسان اليوناني فإنهم أفردوا كل صنف منها بآسم خاص.

٦٣ — ونجد أيضا من الأمر العام الكلي أنه ليس أمة من الأمم أرق فطنة وأظهر حكمة من اليونانيين .

٦٤ — والنحو منطق ولكنه مسلوخ عن العربية والنطق نحو ولكنه مفهوم باللغة.

٦٥ — النحو منطق عربي، والنطق نحو عقلي، وجل نظر المنطقي في المعاني . . . . وجل نظر النحوي في الألفاظ.

٦٦ — إلى أن قال فيما قال : « هذا والله العلم وما سواه ريح » . . . . . فإنه بمن يرى أن من سهر في اللغة يمكنه الجواب عن جميع ما يسأل عنه.

٦٧ — وليس هذا من ألفاظ النحويين ولا أوضاعهم، وإنما هو من كلام المنطقيين وإن كان قد تعلق به جماعة من النحويين .

٦٨ — ليس الأمر كما ذهبت إليه، ولسنا نقول : إن الأسماء قبل الأفعال مطلقا، بل نقول إن الإسم قبل فعله الذي يفعله، وقد إصطلحنا على أنا نريد بالإسم المسمى في هذا الفصل لأنه ينوب عنه في الإخبار فنقول زيد سابق لفعله الذي يفعله، وليس يجب من هذا أن يكون سابقا لفعل غيره، وإذا كان هذا كما ذكرنا فليس يجب أن يكون المصدر، إذا كان إسم لفعل، أن يكون سابقا له، لأنه لا نطلق أيضا أن يكون الإسم سابقا للمسمى، ولا موجودا بعده، بل إسمه لازم له موجود معه حين وجوده، وإنما نريد بالإسم معنى إستحقاقه للإسمية، ألا ترى أن شخصا ما حين وجوده يجوز أن نسميه زيدا، ثم تنقله عنه فتسميه بكرا، ثم تنقله عنه فتسميه عمرا، واستحقاقه للإسمية لم ينتقل عنه وهو موجود بوجوده، ألا ترى أنه يقع عليه شيء ولا يفارقه، فهو شيء على كل الأحوال. ولذلك غلط قوم فتوهموا أن الإسم هو المسمى. وقد يسمى بعضهم المعدوم شيئا. وأباه آخرون . . . . فإذا قد ثبت أن الإسم لا يسبق المسمى، فقد بطل إحتجاجكم يسبق المصدر الفعل لأنه اسمه، وأنه واجب من ذلك أن يكون قبله سابقا له.

٦٩ — كسراب بقيعة يحسبه الظمآن ماء حتى اذا جاء لم يجده شيئا.

٧٠ — لا يمكن أن تكون جميع الماهيات مسميات بالألفاظ، لأن الماهيات غير متناهية، وما لا نهاية له لا يكون مشعورا به على التفصيل، وما لا يكون مشعورا به امتنع وضع الاسم بازائه.

٧١ — والمصدر الجاري على فعّلت التفعيل. وجاز فيه الفعّال تشبيها بقولك دحرجته دحراجا لأن فعّل في وزن فعلل في الحركات والسكون فجعل مصدره على بناء مصدره اذا وافقه في الوزن.

٧٢ — وأما الاسم فهو لفظة او صوت مركب دالة او دال، خلو من الزمان، جزء من أجزاءه لا يدل على انفراده.

٧٣ — (الاسم) هو لفظة دالة بمواطؤ مجردة من الزمان وليس واحد من أجزائها دال على انفراده.

٧٤ — الاسم صوت دال بتواطؤ مجرد عن الزمان والجزء من أجزاءه لا يدل على انفراده ويدل على معنى محصل.

٧٥ — فالاسم كل لفظ مفرد يدل على معنى ولا يدل على زمانه المحدود كزيد وخالد.

٧٦ — وأما الاسم فهو صوت او لفظة تدل بانفرادها على معنى خلو من الزمان ولا يدل جزؤه على جزء من المعنى اذا أفرد.

٧٧ — (الاسم بالجملة) كل لفظ مفرد دال على المعنى من غير أن يدل بذاته على زمان المعنى.

٧٨ — الاسم صوت موضوع دال باتفاق على معنى غير مقرون بزمان.

٧٩ — الاسم صوت موضوع دال باتفاق على معنى بلا زمان، ولا يدل جزؤه على شيء من معناه.

٨٠ — كل شيء دل لفظه على معنى غير مقترن بزمان محصل من مضى او غيره فهو اسم.

٨١ — (الاسم) كل لفظة دلت على معنى تحتها غير مقترن بزمان محصل.

٨٢ — (الاسم) كل لفظ مفرد يدل على معنى ويدل على زمانه المحدود.

٨٣ — الاسم ما دل على معنى في نفسه دلالة مجردة عن الاقتران.

٨٤ — وأما الكلمة فهي ما تدل مع ما تدل عليه على زمان وليس واحد من أجزائه يدل على إنفراده وهو أبدا دليل ما يقال على غيره.

٨٥ — (فإن) الكلمة لفظة مفردة تدل على المعنى وعلى زمانه . . .

٨٦ — وأما الكلمة فهي صوت دال أو لفظة دالة تدل — مع ما تدل عليه — على الزمان جزء من أجزائه لا يدل على إنفراده . . . .

٨٧ — (الكلمة) هي لفظة مفردة تدل على معنى وعلى الزمان الذي ذلك المعنى موجود فيه.

٨٨ — (الفعل) ما دل على حدث، وزمان ماض أو مستقبل

٨٩ — الفعل ما دل على اقتران حدث بزمان.

٩٠ — الفعل كلمة دالة على ثبوت المصدر لشيء غير معين في زمان معين .

٩١ — الإسم لفظ دال على ماهية، والفعل لفظ دال على حصول الماهية بشيء من الأشياء في زمان معين .

٩٢ — (وقال الكسائي والفراء وهشام) الإسم أخف من الفعل، لأن الإسم يستتر في الفعل، والفعل لا يستتر في الإسم.

٩٣ — الفعل يمتنع التلفظ به إلا عند الإسناد إلى الفاعل، . . . أما اللفظ الدال على ذلك الفاعل فقد يجوز التلفظ به من غير أن يسند إليه الفعل.

٩٤ — والكلام يفعله المتكلم ويوجده بعد أن لم يكن، فهو فعل من أفعاله.

٩٥ — (كان الله) متكلما بكلام يخلقه في محل وحقيقة الكلام . . . . . أصوات مقطعة وحروف منظومة والمتكلم من فعل الكلام لا من قام به الكلام.

٩٦ — فصل في أن حقيقة المتكلم أنه وجد الكلام من جهته ويحسب قصده وإرادته.

٩٧ — والقراءة عندهم والتلاوة والكتابة مخلوقة، والقرآن صفة قائمة في نفس المتكلم، لا يظهر لإحساس المكلفين، وإنما الأصوات والحروف حكايتها.

٩٨ — ألا ترى أن المتكلم منا إنما يستحق هذه الصفة بكونه متكلما لا غير، لا لأنه أحدثه في آلة نطقه، وان كان لا يكون متكلما حتى يحرك به آلات نطقه ؟

٩٩ — فليس ما يقوله أهل العربية، من أن الكلام إسم وفعل وحرف جاء لمعنى، بقادح فيما قلناه، لأنهم قصدوا إلى الكلام الذي حددناه فصنفوه أصنافا، ولم يدفعوا كون جميعه حروفا منظومة نظاما مخصوصا.

١٠٠ — أما مذهب أهل الحق، فإن هذه الأصوات إنما هي من فعل الله تعالى، وإنما تنسب إلى الانسان كما ينسب إليه سائر إفعاله الإختيارية.

١٠١ — فمنهم من يقول : الإسم هو التسمية وهو مذهب المعتزلة والنحويين وكثير من الفقهاء، ومنهم من يقول : الإسم هو المسمى، وهو مذهب الأشعري.

١٠٢ — فإنه من كلام العامة وتعلق الأغبياء، لأن القول « نار » والقول « زيد » الموجودين في الفم ليس بآسم زيد وآسم النار، وإنما هو تسمية ودلالة على الإسم — فسقط ما قالوه.

١٠٣ — ويجوز أن يكون أقام الأسماء مقام المسميات بها في الإخبار عنها، إذ كان لا يتوصل إليها إلا بها كما ذكرنا.

١٠٤ — الإشتقاق أخذ صيغة من أخرى مع اتفاقهما معنى ومادة أصلية وهيئة تركيب لها ليدل بالثانية على معنى الأصل بزيادة مفيدة لأجلها اختلفوا حروفا أو هيئة.

١٠٥ — لكن القوم بحكمتهم وزنوا كلام العرب فوجدوه ضربين، أحدهما ما لا بد من تقبله كهيئته، لا يوصية فيه، ولا تنبيه عليه، نحو حجر ودار . . . . ومنه ما وجدوه يتدرك بالقياس.

١٠٦ — إعْلَمْ أن الألفاظ في الأغلب عبارات دالة على أمور هي : أما الألفاظ أو غيرها، أما الألفاظ فهي كالإسم والفعل والحرف، فإن هذه الألفاظ الثلاثة يدل كل واحد منها على شيء هو في نفسه لفظ مخصوص، وغير الألفاظ فكالحجر والسماء والأرض.

١٠٧ — فنقول : الألفاظ عبارة عن الحروف المقطعة الموضوعة بالإختيار الإنساني للدلالة على أعيان الأشياء، وهي منقسمة إلى ما موضوع أولا، وإلى ما هو موضوع ثانيا، وأما الموضوع أولا فكقولك سماء وشجر وإنسان وغير ذلك، وأما الموضوع ثانيا، فكقولك كل إسم وفعل وحرف وأمر ونهي ومضارع .

١٠٨ — وقولنا التي في الوضع الأول للفصل بينها وبين الألفاظ التي في الوضع الثاني لأن الألفاظ التي في الوضع الأول هي الأسماء . .

التي أوقعت أولا على الأمور وصيرت سمات وعلامات تدل عليها
دلالة بجملة مثل تسميتنا لهذا فضة ولهذا نحاسا ولهذا ذهبا وبالجملة
كل الألفاظ التي يشار بها الى معنى مفرد. والألفاظ التي في
الوضع الثاني هي الألفاظ التي تدل على ما ميزناه من الألفاظ
التي في الوضع الأول مثل أنا سمينا كل لفظ دال على معنى
محصل مجرد من الزمان . . . وكلما يدل معا يدل عليه على زمان
كلمة . . . فهذه الألفاظ التي في الوضع الثاني وذلك أن بعد
وجود تلك وضعنا هذه.

١٠٩ — ثم لخص بعد ذلك هل تلك الصناعة هي صناعة علم اللسان
وهل إذا أحاط الإنسان بالأسماء الدالة على المعاني على حسب
دلالتها عند جمهور تلك الأمة التي لها ذلك اللسان وفحص عنها
وعرفها على طريق أهل العلم باللسان يكون قد أحاط علما
بجوهر الأشياء.

١١٠ — واختلفوا بأن العلم بالصفة إذا كان ضروريا كان العلم بالموصوف
أيضا ضروريا، فلو خلق آلله تعالى العلم في قلب العاقل بأنه
وضع هذا اللفظة لهذا المعنى لزم أن يكون العلم بآلله ضروريا
وذلك يقدح في صحة التكليف.

١١١ — الإسم سمة توضع على الشيء يعرف بها.

١١٢ — الإسم وسم وسمة توضع على الشيء تعرف به.

١١٣ — وذلك كأن يجتمع حكيمان أو ثلاثة فصاعدا، فيحتاجوا إلى الابانة
عن الأشياء المعلومة، فيضعوا لكل واحد منها سمة ولفظا، إذا
ذكر عرف به ما مسماه، ليمتاز من غيره، وليغنى بذكره عن إحضاره
إلى مرآة العين .

١١٤ — وكيف يصح أن يقال : إنّ فلانا يتكلم من غير فكر، إنّ كان
الكلام هو الفكر؟

١١٥ — إنّ المصادر أجناس للمعاني كما غيرها أجناس للأعيان، نحو رجل
وفرس وغلام ودار وبستان . . .

١١٦ — فإن قال : إنّ الذي أشير إليه هو الفكر والنظر، لأن ذلك هو
الكلام وما سمع يدل عليه، قيل له : إن كنت إلى هذا أشرت
فقد أخطأت في العبارة، وأنت مصيب في المعنى، وسبيلك سبيل
من إدعى أن الحركة معنى في النفس وأشار إلى الإرادة. وقد
علمنا أن الفكر لا نسبة بينه وبين العبارات، فكيف يقال أنها
دلالة عليه ؟

١١٧ — والآثار التي في النفس مثالات للمعاني الموجودة خارج النفس.

١١٨ — وقد سمى بعضهم أيضا العلل معان، وهذا من عظيم شغبهم
وفاسد متعلقهم وإنّما المعنى تفسير اللفظ.

١١٩ — وأما المعنى فهو الشيء الذي تدركه النفس من المحسوس من غير
أن تدركه الحس الظاهر أولا.

١٢٠ — وصح أن الأمر مراد به معنى مختص بلفظه وبنيته.

١٢١ — لأن المعنى عبارة عن الشيء الذي عناه المعاني وقصده القاصد

1. Τῆς δὲ διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας συμφώνως δοκεῖ τοῖς πλείστοις ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἐνάρχεσθαι τόπου.

2. Οὕτω δὲ ἴσως καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὀνομάτων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν σκοπεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται εἴ τι πρόσκειται γράμμα ἢ μετάκειται ἢ ἀφῄρηται, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις παντάπασιν γράμμασίν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις.

3. Λιμός, ἡ λεῖψις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. Γίνεται παρὰ τὸ λείπω, λείψω λιμός· καὶ ὤφειλε διὰ διφθόγγου γράφεσθαι, ἀλλὰ συνέπαθεν ἡ φωνὴ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔνδειαν δηλοῖ, τούτου χάριν καὶ ἔνδειαν φωνήεντος ἀνεδέξατο, ὡς Τρύφων.

4. ... ὥσπερ ὁ ἐποίουν πλέον ἔχει τοῦ παρῳχημένου πρὸς τὸν ποιῶ ...

5. Ἔστι δὲ φωνὴ ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος ἢ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς, ὥς φησι Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς τέχνῃ.

6. ... καὶ ζῴου μέν ἐστι φωνὴ ἀὴρ ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος, ἀνθρώπου δέ ἐστιν ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, ὡς ὁ Διογένης φησίν.

7. Λέξις δέ ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς Στωικούς, ὥς φησιν ὁ Διογένης, φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος, οἷον «ἡμέρα». Λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, οἷον «ἡμέρα ἐστί» ... διαφέρει δὲ φωνὴ καὶ λέξις, ὅτι φωνὴ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἦχος ἐστι, λέξις δὲ τὸ ἔναρθρον μόνον. Λέξις δὲ λόγου διαφέρει, ὅτι λόγος ἀεὶ σημαντικός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ καὶ ἀσήμαντος, ὡς ἡ «βλίτυρι», λόγος δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

8. Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι τῶν φωνῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν ἔναρθροι καὶ ἐγγράμματοι, ὡς αἱ ἡμέτεραι, αἱ δὲ ἄναρθροι καὶ ἀγράμματοι, ὡς ὁ ἦχος τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ ὁ κτύπος τοῦ λίθου ἢ τοῦ ξύλου, αἱ δὲ ἄναρθροι μέν, ἐγγράμματοι δέ, οἷον αἱ μιμήσεις τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων, ὡς τὸ βρεκεκέξ καὶ τὸ κοΐ (ἡ φωνὴ τοῦ χοίρου)· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ φωνὴ ἄναρθρος μέν, καθὸ οὐκ ἴσμεν τί σημαίνει, ἐγγράμματος δέ, καθὸ δύναται γραφῆναι, αἱ δὲ ἔναρθροι μέν, ἀγράμματοι δέ, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ συρισμοῦ· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ φωνὴ ἔναρθρος μέν, καθὸ ἴσμεν τί σημαίνει, οἷον «ῥοίζησεν δ᾽ ἄρα πιφαύσκων Διομήδεϊ δίῳ», ἀγράμματος δέ ἐστι, καθὸ οὐ δύναται γραφῆναι.

9. Συμβήσεται γὰρ τὴν μὲν εἶναι φωνὴν σημαντικὴν καὶ ἐγγράμματον, ὡς τὴν ἀνθρώπου, τὴν δὲ σημαντικὴν καὶ ἀγράμματον, ὡς τὴν κυνὸς ὑλακήν, τὴν δὲ ἄσημον καὶ ἐγγράμματον, ὡς τὸ βλίτυρι, τὴν δὲ ἄσημον καὶ ἀγράμματον, ὡς τὸν μάτην καὶ οὐ τοῦ σημῆναί τι χάριν γινόμενον συριγμόν ἢ τὴν φωνῆς τινὸς τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων μίμησιν.

10. Λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι προσσημαίνει χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δ᾽ ὑγιαίνει ῥῆμα· προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν. Καὶ ἀεὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σημεῖόν ἐστιν, οἷον τῶν καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου.

11. Λεκτέον οὖν ὡς παντὸς μέρους τὰ ἴδια δεῖ σκοπεῖν καὶ οὐ τὰ παρεπόμενα, καὶ οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι τὸν μερισμόν.

12. Ἐπίθετον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐπὶ κυρίων ἢ προσηγορικῶν ὁμωνύμως τιθέμενον καὶ δηλοῦν ἔπαινον ἢ ψόγον.

13. Ἄρθρον δέ ἐστι στοιχεῖον λόγου πτωτικόν, διορίζον τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, οἷον «ὁ, ἡ, τό, οἵ, αἵ, τά».

14. Ἔστι δὲ προσηγορία μέν, κατὰ τὸν Διογένην, μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον κοινὴν ποιότητα, οἷον «ἄνθρωπος», «ἵππος». Ὄνομα δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου δηλοῦν ἰδίαν ποιότητα, οἷον «Διογένης», «Σωκράτης».

15. Ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει τὸ εἶδος ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ τὸ γένος οἷον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον γνωριμώτερον ἂν ἀποδοίη ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ ζῷον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ κοινότερον.

16. Ἐπεὶ δέ ἐστι τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον — λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δὲ ὃ μή, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον — ἀνάγκη δ᾽ ἀποφαίνεσθαι ὡς ὑπάρχει τι ἢ μή.

17. Ὄνομά ἐστι μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν, ἑκάστου τῶν ὑποκειμένων σωμάτων ἢ πραγμάτων κοινὴν ἢ ἰδίαν οὐσίαν ἀπονέμον.

18. Ὄνομά ἐστι μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν... κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίας λεγόμενον· κοινῶς μὲν οἷον «ἄνθρωπος», «ἵππος», ἰδίως δὲ οἷον «Σωκράτης».

19. Τοῦ δὲ ὀνόματος διαθέσεις εἰσὶ δύο, ἐνέργεια καὶ πάθος, ἐνέργεια μὲν ὡς κριτής ὁ κρίνων, πάθος δὲ ὡς κριτός ὁ κρινόμενος.

20. Πάντως γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνεργοῦσά τι ἢ πάσχουσα, τὸ δὲ ῥῆμα σημαίνει τὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ τὸ πάθος.

21. Καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος δὲ ἀναγκαίως πρόκειται τὸ ὄνομα, ἐπεὶ τὸ διατιθέναι καὶ τὸ διατίθεσθαι σώματος ἴδιον, τοῖς δὲ σώμασιν ἐπίκειται ἡ θέσις τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἰδιότης τοῦ ῥήματος, λέγω τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὸ πάθος.

22. Τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὂν δήλωμα ῥῆμά που λέγομεν... τὸ δὲ γ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐκείνας πράττουσι σημεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα.

23. Θέλουσι μὲν γὰρ καθολικά τινα θεωρήματα συστησάμενοι ἀπὸ τούτων πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος κρίνειν ὀνόματα, εἴτε ἑλληνικά ἐστιν εἴτε καὶ μὴ κτλ.

24. Ἑλληνισμός μὲν οὖν ἐστι φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συνηθείᾳ.

25. Τί διαφέρει τὸ μονόπτωτον τοῦ ἀκλίτου; Διαφέρει ὅτι τὸ μονόπτωτον ἄρθρα μόνα ἐπιδέχεται, ὡς τὸ «Ἀβραάμ», ἄκλιτον δέ ἐστι τὸ μήτε ἐπιδεχόμενον, μήτε ὅλως κλινόμενον, οἷον τὸ «οὗς», τὸ «δέμας».

26. Ῥῆμά ἐστι λέξις ἄπτωτος ἐπιδεκτικὴ χρόνων τε καὶ προσώπων καὶ ἀριθμῶν, ἐνέργειαν ἢ πάθος παριστᾶσα.

27. Ἢ ὅτι πρῶτον λόγον οἱ παλαιοί, τὴν τότε καλουμένην πρότασιν, νῦν ἀξίωμα, προσηγόρευον, ὃ πρῶτον λέγοντες ἢ ἀληθεύουσιν ἢ ψεύδονται; Τοῦτο δὲ ἐξ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος συνέστηκεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν πτῶσιν οἱ Διαλεκτικοί, τὸ δὲ κατηγόρημα καλοῦσιν.

28. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ κατηγόρημα τὸ κατά τινος ἀγορευόμενον, ἢ πρᾶγμα συντακτὸν περί τινος ἢ τινῶν, ..., ἢ λεκτὸν ἐλλιπὲς συντακτὸν ὀρθῇ πτώσει πρὸς ἀξιώματος γένεσιν.

29. Μὴ νόμιζε δὲ ὅτι ἐν τῇ συνθέσει τοῦ λόγου πρῶτον ἐξ ἀνάγκης κεῖται τὸ ὄνομα, δεύτερον τὸ ῥῆμα, εἶτα τόδε ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ὡς τύχῃ συντίθεται... καίτοι ἐχρῆν φυσικῶς προτάττεσθαι μὲν τὸ ὄνομα ὡς οὐσίαν, μεθέπεσθαι δὲ τὸ ῥῆμα ὡς συμβεβηκός, ὑποτάττεσθαι δὲ τὰ λοιπά.

30. Φασὶ δὲ ὡς εἰς χρονικὰ διαστήματα διεῖλε τοὺς χρόνους ὁ Διονύσιος ὡς εἴ τις εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ μῆνα καὶ ἡμέραν καὶ ὥραν τέμνει τοὺς χρόνους. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνεστῶτα φησιν, ἤτοι ὡς πρὸς μῆκος ἐνιαυτοῦ ἢ μηνὸς ἢ ἡμέρας ἢ ὥρας, καὶ γὰρ φαμὲν ἐνεστῶτα ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ μῆνα καὶ ἡμέραν καὶ ὥραν.

31. Πρῶτος ὁ ἐνεστώς, δεύτερος ὁ παρεληλυθώς, τρίτος ὁ μέλλων. Ἀλλ' ὤφειλε, φασί τινες, ὁ μέλλων πάντων προτάττεσθαι, πρῶτον γὰρ μέλλει τι γίνεσθαι, εἶτα γίνεται, καὶ οὕτως οἴχεται. Ἄλλοι δὲ τὸν παρεληλυθότα μᾶλλον, ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρέλθοντα τῶν ἐνεστώτων πρότερα.... Καθ' ἑτέρους μέντοι γε λόγους προτέτακται ὁ ἐνεστὼς ὡς ὁρατὸς καὶ φανερός.

32. Ἰστέον ὅτι τὰ ἀπαρέμφατα δευτέραν ἔχουσι τάξιν, καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως, εἴ γε καὶ πρώτην ὤφειλον ἐπέχειν τάξιν, ὡς ὄντα

ἀρχαὶ καὶ οἱονεὶ ῥίζαι τῶν ῥημάτων· ἐξ αὐτῆς γὰρ τῆς ἀπαρεμφάτου γίνονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἐγκλίσεις καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν ἀναλύονται.

33. Καθὼς ἔφαμεν, ἔστιν γενικωτάτη ἡ τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων ἔγκλισις, ἀναγκαίως λείπουσα τοῖς προδιαπορηθεῖσι, τοῖς προσώποις καὶ τῷ παρεπομένῳ ἀριθμῷ, ὃς οὐ φύσει παρέπεται τῷ ῥήματι, παρακολούθημα δέ γίνεται προσώπων τῶν μετειληφότων τοῦ πράγματος. Αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἕν ἐστιν, τὸ γράφειν, τὸ περιπατεῖν, ὅπερ ἐγγινόμενον ἐν προσώποις ποιεῖ τὸ περιπατῶ, τὸ περιπατοῦμεν, τὸ περιπατοῦσιν.

34. Τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐξαίρετος παρέπεται ἡ ψυχικὴ διάθεσις, ὅπερ οὐ σύνεστι τοῖς ἀπαρεμφάτοις, καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ προσώποις καταγίνεσθαι, ὧν τῆς διαφορᾶς οὐκ ἔτυχεν τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον, καθὸ καὶ ἡ... μετοχὴ στερουμένη τῶν προκειμένων καὶ τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων ἰδέας ἀπεβλήθη.

35. Τινὲς δὲ ἠξίουν προτάσσειν τὴν ἀπαρέμφατον λέγοντες, ὅτι ὕλη τίς ἐστι καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν ῥημάτων· ἐντεῦθεν οὐδὲ βούλησιν ψυχῆς οὐδὲ πρόσωπα οὐδὲ ἀριθμοὺς ἐμφαίνει· αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ἁπλαῖ τυγχάνουσιν, ὡς τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα πρὸς τὰ σώματα, καὶ τὰ εἰκοσιτέσσαρα πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ πηλὸς ἀνείδεος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος πρὸς τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἰδοποιούμενα σκεύη.

36. Εἰ μὴ ἰατροὶ ἦσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν τῶν γραμματικῶν μωρότερον....

37. (Γραμματική ἐστιν) ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων.

38. Ὅρος ἐστὶ λόγος σύντομος, δηλωτικὸς τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ὑποκειμένου πράγματος.

39. Τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων ἐμπειρίᾳ ἐγγεγυμνασμένων πρός τι τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

40. Ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὅτι ἂν τίς τῳ θῆται ὄνομα, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀρθόν, καὶ ἂν αὖθίς γε ἕτερον μεταθῆται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μηκέτι καλῇ, οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ὕστερον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν τοῦ προτέρου.

41. Ὄνομα δέ ἐστι φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ἄνευ χρόνου ἧς μέρος οὐδέν ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ σημαντικόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώμεθα ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ σημαῖνον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Θεοδώρῳ τὸ δῶρον οὐ σημαίνει.

42. Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ιππος οὐδὲν καθ' αὑτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἵππος.

43. Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκήν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει,

ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

44. Τὸ δ' οὐκ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ὄνομα, οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ κεῖται ὄνομα ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτό — οὔτε γὰρ λόγος οὔτε ἀπόφασίς ἐστιν —, ἀλλ' ἔστω ὄνομα ἀόριστον.

45. Ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς· ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον.

46. Ῥῆμα δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ μετὰ χρόνου ἧς οὐδὲν μέρος σημαίνει καθ' αὐτό....

47. Ῥῆμά ἐστι λέξις ἄπτωτος ἐπιδεκτικὴ χρόνων τε καὶ προσώπων καὶ ἀριθμῶν, ἐνέργειαν ἢ πάθος παριστᾶσα.

48. Τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελῆ οἱ Στωϊκοί, τὰ δὲ ἐλλιπῆ. Ἐλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφοράν, οἷον «γράφει», ἐπιζητοῦμεν γὰρ «τίς».

49. Ἔχει δὲ τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ πλέον τι τοῦ ὀνόματος. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὄνομα σημαίνει πρᾶγμά τι μόνον, τὸ δὲ ῥῆμα καί τι πλέον, οἷον τὸ «λέγω» σημαίνει καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὅτι λέγω, σημαίνει δὲ πλέον καὶ τὸν χρόνον.

50. Ἀποφαντικὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς (sc. λόγος), ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει· οὐκ ἐν ἅπασι δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μέν, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής....

51. Ἔνθεν μοι δοκοῦσιν εὐήθως ἀναστρέφειν οἱ ἐπιζητοῦντες διὰ τί ἐλλείπει προσώποις καὶ ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ἔτι ψυχικῇ διαθέσει, εἴγε οὐ πληθύνεται ὅτι πᾶν πρᾶγμα ἕν ἐστιν, — εἴγε οὐκ ἔχει ψυχικὴν διάθεσιν, ὅτι μηδὲ εἰς πρόσωπα ἀνεκυκλήθη, ἅπερ ἔμψυχα ὄντα τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς διάθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπαγγέλλεται· ὥστε δυνάμει αὐτὸ τὸ ῥῆμα οὔτε πρόσωπα ἐπιδέχεται οὔτε ἀριθμούς, ἀλλ' ἐγγενόμενον ἐν προσώποις τότε καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα διέστειλεν, ὄντα λοιπὸν ἢ ἑνικὰ ἢ δυϊκὰ ἢ πληθυντικά. Πρόϋπτον δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ ψυχικὴν διάθεσιν καθὼς προείπομεν.

52. Ὥστε οὐ περὶ παντὸς λόγου ἐκεῖ διαλαμβάνει, οὔτε περὶ τοῦ εὐκτικοῦ, οὔτε περὶ τοῦ προστακτικοῦ, οὔτε ἄλλου τινὸς ἤτοι τῶν πέντε κατὰ τοὺς Περιπατητικοὺς ἢ τῶν δέκα κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς πλὴν τοῦ ἀποφαντικοῦ.

53. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα διαλέγεσθαι φέροντας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀντὶ τῶν πραγμάτων χρώμεθα συμβόλοις, τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡγούμεθα συμβαίνειν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ψήφων τοῖς λογιζομένοις. Τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα πεπέρανται καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων

πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ πράγματα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἄπειρά ἐστιν. Ἀναγκαῖον οὖν πλείω τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοὔνομα τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν.

54. ... καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ σμικρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν μάθημα.

55. ... ὅτι τὸ φύσει τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ὡς αἱ τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν οὐσίαι ὅλαι τε καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν, ἢ αἱ τούτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ δυνάμεις, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς κουφότης καὶ θερμότης, ἢ ὡς αἱ σκίαι καὶ αἱ ἐμφάσεις ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις, ἢ ὡς αἱ τεχνηταὶ εἰκόνες ἐοικυῖαι τοῖς ἀρχετύποις ἑαυτῶν κτλ.

56. ... καὶ Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐ πάντα δημιουργὸν ὀνομάτων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα ὂν ἑκάστῳ καὶ δυνάμενον αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶδος τιθέναι εἴς τε τὰ γράμματα καὶ τὰς συλλαβάς.

57. ... τὸν συλλογισμόν, ὃν ὁ Ἀφροδισίευς ἐξηγητὴς ἐκτίθεται, κατασκευάζειν δοκοῦντα μόνως εἶναι φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα· τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα, φησί, καὶ τὰ ῥήματα φωναί, αἱ δὲ φωναὶ φύσει, τὰ ἄρα ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα φύσει.

58. ... ὁ περὶ φύσεως ὀνομάτων (sc. λόγος), πότερον, ὡς οἴεται Ἀριστοτέλης, θέσει ἐστὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἤ, ὡς νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει, μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα, καθ' ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα, καθὸ καὶ στοιχεῖά τινα τῆς ἐτυμολογίας εἰσάγουσιν.

59. Τὸ γὰρ ἐγὼ προφερόμεθα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν κατασπῶντες τὸ κάτω χεῖλος εἰς αὐτοὺς δεικτικῶς, ἀκολούθως δὲ τῇ τοῦ γενείου κινήσει καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ στῆθος νεύσει καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ δείξει ἡ ἑξῆς συλλαβὴ παράκειται, οὐδὲν ἀποστηματικὸν παρεμφαίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐκεῖνος συντέτυχε.

60. Πρωτότυπον μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην θέσιν λεχθέν, οἷον «Γῆ». Παράγωγον δὲ τὸ ἀφ' ἑτέρου τὴν γένεσιν ἐσχηκός, οἷον «Γαιήϊος».

61. ... καὶ ἔοικε τὸ μὲν πρωτότυπον τῷ πρωτοπλάστῳ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ δὲ παράγωγον τοῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρωτοπλάστου γενομένοις.

62. Εἰδέναι γὰρ δεῖ ὅτι ἡ φύσις γινώσκουσα ὅτι κοινωνικὸν ἔμελλε γενέσθαι τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο, ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ φωνήν, ἵνα διὰ ταύτης ἀλλήλοις σημαίνωσι τὰ ἑαυτῶν νοήματα. Καὶ συνελθόντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους τόδε μέν, εἰ τύχοι, «ξύλον» ὀνομάζεσθαι, τόδε δὲ «λίθον»...· κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ σημαινόμενον ἅπασαι φωναὶ ὀνομάζονται. Κατὰ δευτέραν δὲ ἐπιβολὴν ἐπεσκέψαντο ὅτι ταῖς μὲν τῶν φωνῶν δύναται συντάττεσθαι

ἄρθρα, χρόνοι δὲ οὐχί, ἅπερ ἐκάλεσαν ὀνόματα, ταῖς δὲ χρόνοι μὲν συντάττονται, ἄρθρα δὲ οὔ, ἅπερ εἰσὶ ῥήματα.

63. Ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, οὐχ ὡς ὄργανον δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται κατὰ συνθήκην.

64. Τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ εἰς διαλεκτικήν... τήν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τοῦ ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων, ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὁρίζονται· ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων.

65. Διαλεκτικὴ δέ ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος, ἐπιστήμη ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων· τυγχάνει δὲ αὕτη, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα.

66. Κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος τὸ μέν, ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, καὶ αἴσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως.

67. Οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ συλλογισμός. Ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐνστῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἔσω λόγον οὐκ ἀεί.

68. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. Καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτων, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά.

69. Ψεῦδος· ἀντὶ τοῦ ψευδής. Ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς λεκτὰ καλεῖται τὰ πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν δι' ἄλλων φερόμενα.

70. Αὐτοί γε μὴν λέγουσι, τοὺς ἀπαγορεύοντας ἄλλο μὲν λέγειν, ἄλλο δ' ἀπαγορεύειν, ἄλλο δὲ προστάσσειν· ὁ γὰρ λέγων «μὴ κλέψῃς», λέγει μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, «μὴ κλέψῃς», ἀπαγορεύει δὲ κλέπτειν, προστάσσει δὲ μὴ κλέπτειν.

71. Ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης διδάσκει διὰ τούτων, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ προηγουμένως καὶ προσεχῶς ὑπ' αὐτῶν σημαινόμενα (sc. ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν), καὶ ὅτι τὰ νοήματα, διὰ δὲ τούτων μέσων τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον δεῖ παρὰ ταῦτα ἐπινοεῖν μέσον τοῦ τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ὅπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὑποτιθέμενοι λεκτὸν ἠξίουν ὀνομάζειν.

72. (Οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς) τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνήν, οἶον τὴν «δίων», σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς δηλούμενον καὶ οὖ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ παρυφισταμένου διανοίᾳ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι

οὐκ ἐπαΐουσιν καίπερ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκούοντες, τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ Δίων.

73. Προφέρονται μὲν γὰρ αἱ φωναί, λέγεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα, ἃ δὴ καὶ λεκτὰ τυγχάνει.

74. Πᾶν τε λεκτὸν λέγεσθαι δεῖ, ὅθεν καὶ ταύτης ἔτυχε τῆς προσηγορίας.

75. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὄνομά τινός ἐστι τοῦ ὀνομαζομένου, δῆλον ὅτι αἱ ἄσημοι φωναὶ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ὀνομαζομένου οὐκ ἂν εἶεν ὀνόματα.

76. Ὄνομά ἐστι μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν, σῶμα ἢ πρᾶγμα σημαῖνον.

INDEXES

PERSONAL NAMES

ARABIC TERMS

'ṯr : āṯār 188
'bd : ma'būd 41, 84
'dw : adā 38[3]
'sṭqs : usṭuquss 46
'ṣl : aṣl 85, 88, 166, 169
uṣūl (an-naḥw) 12, 16, 18, 90, 94, 97, 101
'lf : alif x[13], 19, 20, 21, 22
alif-lām 73
'mr : amr 67, 147
'n : inna 53, 124[58]
'ns : insān 41, 57, 178
'hl : ahl an-naẓar 72[11], 85, 115[5], 131
'wl : awwal 53[111]
— al-waḍ' 29
'yn : aina 58, 61, 75
bd' : ibtidā' 73[17]
mubtada' 53[111], 71, 72, 73, 74, 74[22]
taqrīb 'alā 'l-mubtada' 59
bd' : ibdā' 153[28]
bdl : badal 16
abdāl al-ḥarakāt 19
abdāl al-asmā' 51
bsṭ : zamān basīṭ 76[30]
bṭn : quwwa bāṭina 189
bnǧr : balanǧar 34, 121[38]
bny : binā' 15[69], 23[28]
binya 190[70]
byḍ : bayāḍ 57
byn : bayān 63
tmm : tāmm 69
qaul tāmm 34
tny : istiṯnā' 104[63]
ǧdl : 'illa ǧadaliyya 105
ǧrr : ǧarr 6
maǧrūr 68
ǧrb : taǧriba 96, 97
ǧry : maǧrā (maǧārī) 19

ǧz' : ǧuz'i 49, 56[13]
ǧzm : ǧazm x[13]
qaul ǧāzim 147
ǧzy : ǧazā 16
ǧls : maǧlis 108
ǧmd : ǧāmid 49[84], 82[73]
ǧm' : iǧmā' 96, 98, 99, 103
ǧml : ǧumla 34
— fi'liyya 72
— ismiyya 72
ǧns : ǧins 48[70], 84
aǧnās al-ma'āni 186
aǧnās al-a'yān 186
ǧwz : ǧāza (fīhi) 57[26]
maǧāz 166[18]
ḥǧǧ : ḥuǧǧa 16
ḥdd : ḥadd 16
ḥdṯ : ḥadaṯ 141, 142
aḥdāṯ al-asmā' 41, 141
aḥdāṯ al-ašḫāṣ 42
muḥdiṯ 152
ḥḏf : ḥaḏf 25
ḥrf : ḥarf x[13], 8, 38, 44, 44[51], 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 121, 153
— ǧā'a li-ma'nan 43, 44, 44[53], 45, 45[58], 45[61]
— ṣaġīr 21
— at-ta'rīf 52[107]
— al-ma'nā 38[3], 45, 47
— mutaḥarrik 23
— sākin 23
— zā'id 25[40]
— al-mu'ǧam 46, 47
— al-i'rāb 86[97]
ḥurūf al-līn wa-'l-madd 19
ḥurūf manẓūma 153
ḥrk : ḥaraka x[13], 12, 15[69], 19, 22, 22[23], 23, 24
abdāl al-ḥarakāt 19

mutaḥarrik 23, 24, 24[31]
ḥarf mutaḥarrik 23
ḥss : ḥiss 96
ḥsn : ḥasuna 57[26], 71
ḥasan 14
ḥšw : ḥašw 53, 53[111]
ḥāšiya (ḥawāšī) 51, 53
ḥṣl : muḥaṣṣal 139
ism ġair muḥaṣṣal 139[62]
ḥḍr : ḥāḍir 80
ḥkm : ḥukm 74[22]
maḥkūm 74[22]
ḥml : maḥmūl 74, 74[22]
ḥwṭ : ḥā'iṭ 11[53], 39, 39[10], 40
ḥwl : ḥāl 8, 9, 64[59], 74, 80, 134[33], 145
istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl 98, 102, 103, 104
ḥyy : ḥayawān 57
ḫbr : ḫabar 71, 72, 73, 74[22], 147
iḫbār 133, 161
'an al-fi'l 74
muḫbar 71, 73, 145
'anhu 72, 74[22]
istiḫbār 147[118]
ḫḍm : ḫaḍm 28
ḫlf : ḫilāf 66[76]
ḫawālif 51
d'w : du'ā' 147
dll : dalīl 97, 103
al-ism dalīl al-ma'nā 155[43]
dalāla 158, 188
al-istidlāl bi-'adam ad-dalīl 104
madlūl 155[43]
dwm : fi'l dā'im 79
ḏhn : ṣuwar ḏihniyya 135[56], 157
ḏw : ḏāt 13
— aš-šay' 158, 159
ḏwq : ḏauq al-'arab 11
rb' : rābi' 46, 51, 52, 53
ribāṭ 38[3], 39, 45, 46, 52
rtb : rutba 142[86]
martaba 142[86]
rǧl : raǧul 11[53], 39, 40, 42, 54, 57, 178
rsm : rasm 129
rf' : raf' x[13], 6, 15[69], 67, 68
marfū' 68
rwd : murād 190
irādī 97
zmn : zamān 75[25], 141
— muṭlaq 76[30], 85
— basīṭ 76[30]
— mu'ayyan 76[30], 85
znbr : mas'ala zunbūriyya 109[13]

zyd : ḥurūf zā'ida 25[40]
ziyāda 25
zaid 41[21], 54, 56, 58, 73[17], 85, 105, 114[5], 123[33], 133, 154, 158
s'l : mas'ala iḫtilāfiyya 107
— zunbūriyya 109[13]
sbb : sabab 99[47]
str : istatara 144[99]
skn : ḥarf sākin 23
smw : sumuww 175
smy : ism x[13], 8, 11, 15[69], 38, 39, 44[53], 46, 48, 48[70], 49, 49[84], 50, 54, 133, 134, 136, 144, 150[19], 153, 154, 155, 158, 175, 176, 185
— al-fi'l 83, 84, 133, 136, 155[40]
— li-fi'l 133, 133[30]
— muḥaṣṣal 139
— ġair muḥaṣṣal 139[62]
— 'ain 186
— ma'nā 186
al-ism huwa 'l-musammā 134, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161
ism muḍmar 51
— mubham 51
— al-išāra 51
— mauṣūl 52
al-ism an-nā'ib 'an al-musammā 145
al-ism dalīl al-ma'nā 155[43]
ṣāḥib al-ism 41, 42[29], 154
abdāl al-asmā' 51
aḥdāṯ al-asmā' 41, 141
ismiyya 133
tasmiya 155, 156, 156[48], 157, 158, 159, 160
musammā x[13], 15[69], 42[29], 44[53], 133, 134, 136, 150[19], 154, 155, 155[40], 155[43], 157, 158, 185
al-musammayāt taḥta 'l-asmā' 176[70]
snn : sunna 96, 97
snd : isnād 72[8]
musnad 71, 72[8], 73
swd : sawād 57
swf : saufa 78, 79
šb' : išbā' 20
šbh : qiyās aš-šibh 100
šḫṣ : šaḫṣ 57
abdāl al-ašḫāṣ 42
šdd : šadd 103
qiyās 'alā 'š-šāḏḏ 112
šrṭ : šarṭ 14, 16

GREEK TERMS

LATIN TERMS

HEBREW AND SYRIAC TERMS